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Udham Yadav vs State Of Chhattisgarh
2025 Latest Caselaw 4340 Chatt

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 4340 Chatt
Judgement Date : 10 September, 2025

Chattisgarh High Court

Udham Yadav vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 10 September, 2025

                                                        1




                                                                     2025:CGHC:46249
         Digitally
         signed by
         SHOAIB
SHOAIB   ANWAR
ANWAR    Date:
         2025.09.12
         18:40:15
         +0530




                                                                                 NAFR

                                 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR


                                               CRA No. 916 of 2019



                      1 - Udham Yadav S/o Suresh Yadav Aged About 22 Years R/o

                      Gangagarh, Police Station And District Kasganj Uttar Pradesh., Uttar

                      Pradesh

                                                                             ...Appellant

                                                     versus

                      1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Of

                      Police Station Magarlod District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh., District :

                      Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh

                                                                          ... Respondent

(Cause title taken from CIS)

For Appellant :Shri Aditya Chopra, Advocate. For Respondent(s) :Shri U.K.S. Chandel, Dy. Advocate General

Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

Judgment on Board

10.09.2025

1. Heard.

2. The appellant has filed the instant appeal under Section

374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hence forth

'the Cr.P.C.') questioning the judgment of conviction and order

of sentence dated 20.05.2019 passed by the learned Special

Judge Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, Dhamtari, District Dhamtari (C.G.) (hereinafter

referred as a trial Court for sake of brevity) in Special Session

Trial (S.T./S.C. Act) No. 99/2018, whereby the appellant has

been convicted and sentenced as under:

              Conviction                       Sentence

       Under       Section     Rigorous Imprisonment for 07
       370(2)     of the       years and fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in
       Indian Penal Code       default of payment of fine
                               additional R.I. for 03 months



3. It is pertinent to note that in the present case there were two

accused persons. Out of them, appellant Smt. Yashoda

Vishwakarma has already undergone the entire sentence and

was released from jail on 08.09.2023. Consequently, her

appeal bearing CRA No.1582 of 2019 came to be dismissed by

this Court as not pressed vide order dated 26.03.2025.

4. Brief facts of the case is that, on 11.11.2017 a report was

lodged by father of the victim namely; Mahesh Kumar Kanwar

(PW-3), at Police Station Magarlod, District Dhamtari (C.G.),

alleging that on 07.11.2017, when he had gone along with his

wife to the agricultural field, their minor daughter was left

alone at the house. In the evening, upon their return, they did

not find their daughter at home. It was further alleged that on

the same date, co-accused Yashoda Vishwakarma (already

completed jail sentence) had also left the house without

informing anyone. That, on the basis of the said report, Police

Station Magarlod registered a missing report for offence

under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code against an

unknown person, and commenced investigation.

5. After completing the investigation, a charge sheet was filed

before the concerned Court, wherein the charge under

Sections 363, 366-A, 376, 372, 370, 370-A and 34 of the Indian

Penal Code, Section 6 of the Protection of Children from

Sexual Offences Act, and Sections 3(2) and 3(1)(ट) of the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989 was framed. The prosecution examined

as many as 16 witnesses to prove its case and no defence

witness has been examined. Accused was also examined

under Section 313 CrPC in which he pleaded innocence and

false implication.

6. The learned trial Court after completing the trial, did not find

the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 370-A, 376,

Section 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act and Section 06 of POCSO Act and

acquitted him. However, convicted and sentenced him for

offence under Section as mentioned in the opening paragraph

of this Judgment.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment

of conviction passed by the learned trial Court is bad both in

law and on the facts available on record. It is contended that

the trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence and

documents produced during trial. There are material

contradictions and omissions in the statements of the

prosecution witnesses, which render the prosecution version

unreliable. The trial Court itself recorded a finding that on the

date of the alleged incident the victim was not less than 18

years of age and that she had voluntarily left the house of her

parents. Moreover, the victim turned hostile, and although she

partly supported the case of the prosecution, her testimony is

insufficient to base a conviction. He further submits that no

cogent evidence has been collected by the prosecution to

establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt,

and therefore the conviction and sentence recorded against

him are unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside.

8. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the

argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant

and has submitted that there are sufficient evidence available

on record to hold that the appellant was guilty of the alleged

offence and the learned trial Court has absolutely justified in

passing the judgment of conviction and sentence against the

appellant hence, the appeal filed by the appellant is liable to

be dismissed.

9. I have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

parties and perused entire evidence adduced by the

prosecution and gone through the evidence available on

record with utmost circumspection.

10. Since, it is undisputed that the prosecutrix (PW-2) was a major

on the date of incident, as before the trial Court the

prosecution failed to establish the fact that on the date of

incident she was below 18 years of age and hence the

appellant has been acquitted from the said charge, the Court

must now decide the central issue: whether the appellant is

guilty of the alleged offence under Section 370(2) of the IPC.

11. The prosecutrix (PW-2), deposed that she know the accused

Udham Yadav. She disclosed that she is educated up to Class

VIII, having received her primary education at the Primary

School, Mohandi, and that her date of birth is 09.01.2001.

According to the prosecutrix, on one occasion, while she was

alone at home, co-accused Smt. Yashoda Vishwakarma

persuaded her on the pretext of taking her out and took her

by bus from their village to Raipur. From Raipur, she was taken

by train to Sonbarasa, Uttar Pradesh, and thereafter by

Marshal jeep to Gangagadh. There, she was kept at the house

of accused Udham Yadav, and co-accused Yashoda thereafter

left for Sonbarasa. Before leaving, Yashoda told her to stay

with Udham Yadav as his wife by wearing a saree. The

prosecutrix asserted that she did not stay with Udham Yadav

of her own free will. She further stated that she remained at

the house of Udham Yadav for about six months. Later, when

she was travelling with the parents of the accused to another

village, the police apprehended her and brought her back to

Police Station Magarlod.

In her cross examination, the prosecutrix admitted that

after leaving her at the house of accused Udham Yadav, co-

accused Yashoda Vishwakarma told him that she had brought

the girl and that he should fulfill the arrangement which had

been agreed upon. She further admitted that at that time

accused Udham Yadav gave a large sum of money to co-

accused Yashoda Vishwakarma, although she could not

specify the exact amount. She also admitted that when co-

accused Yashoda was leaving her at the house of Udham

Yadav, she cried a lot. She stated that accused Udham used to

tell her that he would marry her. She further deposed that

thereafter accused Udham Yadav took her around the fire

three or four times in the manner of a marriage ceremony,

and on the same night he told her that she had now become

his wife. She stated that during that night accused Udham had

sexual intercourse with her against her will. She further

deposed that throughout the period she stayed in the house

of accused Udham Yadav, he repeatedly made corporeal

relation with her.

12. PW-1, the mother of the victim, deposed that about one year

prior to the incident, she had gone with her husband to their

field at about 9:00 a.m. for harvesting paddy, leaving the

victim alone at home. She deposed that when they returned at

about 5:00 p.m., the victim was not present in the house. On

making enquiries in the neighbourhood, they could not trace

her. She further deposed that at about 6:00-7:00 p.m., when

they went to the village bus stand, some persons sitting there

informed them that the victim had been seen boarding a bus

along with co- accused Yashoda. She further deposed that

thereafter they lodged a missing report at Police Station

Magarlod. About one month later, the police recovered her

daughter, the victim, from the State of Uttar Pradesh, She

further deposed that on asking the victim as to where she had

gone, the victim informed her that co- accused Yashoda had

taken her to Uttar Pradesh and had sold her to the present

accused. She stated that beyond this, the victim did not

disclose anything further to her.

13. In this case, the appellant has been convicted under Section

370(2) of IPC. For the sake of convenience, Section 370 IPC is

quoted below :

"370. Trafficking of person.--(1) Whoever, for the

purpose of exploitation, (a) recruits, (b)

transports, (c) harbours, (d) transfers, or (e)

receives, a person or persons, by-

First. using threats, or

Secondly.- using force, or any other form of

coercion, or

Thirdly.- by abduction, or

Fourthly. by practising fraud, or deception, or

Fifthly. by abuse of power, or

Sixthly. by inducement, including the giving or

receiving of payments or benefits, in order to

achieve the consent of any person having control

over the person recruited, transported,

harboured, transferred or received, commits the

offence of trafficking.

Explanation 1.- The expression "exploitation"

shall include any act of physical exploitation or

any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or

practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the

forced removal of organs.

Explanation 2.- The consent of the victim is

immaterial in determination of the offence of

trafficking.

(2) Whoever commits the offence of trafficking

shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment

for a term which shall not be less than seven

years, but which may extend to ten years, and

shall also be liable to fine.

(3) Where the offence involves the trafficking of

more than one person, it shall be punishable

with rigorous imprisonment for a term which

shall not be less than ten years but which may

extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be

liable to fine.

(4) Where the offence involves the trafficking of a

minor, it shall be punishable with rigorous

imprisonment for a term which shall not be less

than ten years, but which may extend to

imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to

fine.

(5) Where the offence involves the trafficking of

more than one minor, it shall be punishable with

rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall

not be less than fourteen years, but which may

extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be

liable to fine.

(6) If a person is convicted of the offence of

trafficking of minor on more than one occasion,

then such person shall be punished with

imprisonment for life, which shall mean

imprisonment for the remainder of that person's

natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.

(7) When a public servant or a police officer is

involved in the trafficking of any person then,

such public servant or police officer shall be

punished with imprisonment for life, which shall

mean imprisonment for the remainder of that

person's natural life, and shall also be liable to

fine.]

14. From perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that there

should be an element of exploitation. The word 'Exploitation'

has been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary, sixth edition,

as under:-

"Exploitation. Act or process of exploiting,

making use of, or working up. Utilization by

application of industry, argument, or other

means of turning to account, as the exploitation

of a mine or a forest. State Finance Co. v.

Hamacher. 171 Wash. 15, 17 P.2d 610, 613.

Taking unjust advantage of another for one's

own advantage or benefit (e.g. paying low wages

to illegal aliens)."

15. Similarly, the word "exploitation" has been defined in

Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Edition as

under:-

"exploitation (1) a situation in which you treat

someone unfairly by asking them to do things

for you, but give them very little in return - used

to show disapproval: [+of] The film industry

thrives on the sexual exploitation of women. (2)

the development and use of minerals, forests, oil

etc for business or industry : [+of] the controlled

exploitation of resources/ commercial/ economic

exploitation 3 the full and effective use of

something: [+of] greater exploitation of these

data (4) an attempt to get as much as you can

out of a situation, sometimes unfairly : [+of] the

exploitation of religion for political ends."

16. Further, the explanation (1) of Section 370 IPC explains

exploitation, which shall include any act of physical

exploitation or any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or

practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the forced removal of

organs.

17. From the evidence, this Court do not find any material which

would suggest that the victim exploited. None of the witness

stated about exploitation. Admittedly, this is not a case of

sexual assault nor of indecent behavior with the victim by the

appellant. From the evidence of the victim, it appears that she

has remained with the appellant for a long period of 6

months, the victim never tried to object the act committed by

the appellant and she stayed freely with accused and his

family members.

18. On careful appreciation of the evidence of the prosecutrix

(PW-2) and her mother (PW-1), it is evident that the victim was

taken by co-accused Yashoda from her village and was left at

the house of appellant Udham Yadav. The prosecutrix

remained in the company of the appellant for about six

months and during this period the accused was not saying

anything. As far as the prosecutrix is concerned, she stayed

with accused for a period of 6 months, whereas her mother

stated that she stayed for one month. There are material

contradiction and omission in the statement of victim and

mother.

19. However, for attracting Section 370 IPC, it must be proved that

the transportation or receipt of a person was for the purpose

of exploitation as defined under the provision. "Exploitation,"

as explained in Section 370 IPC. In the present case, the

evidence only indicates that the prosecutrix was kept by the

appellant in the guise of a wife and was subjected to sexual

intercourse. There is no material on record to show that she

was trafficked for the purpose of exploitation.

20. The facts & alleged charges do not satisfy the essential

ingredients of Section 370 IPC. In absence of proof of

organized trafficking or exploitation. The provision of Section

370 will not attract to the facts of the present case. Hence, the

prosecution failed to establish the case beyond reasonable

doubt.

21. Considering the aforesaid evidence, I do not find any

ingredients to attract Section 370 of the Indian Penal Code

against the appellant.

22. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid legal analysis,

the impugned judgment dated 20.05.2019 is hereby set aside.

The accused / appellant is acquitted of the said charges

levelled against him. The appellant is reported to be on bail.

His bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and the bonds

shall remain operative for a period of six months in view of

Section 481 of the BNSS. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is

allowed.

23. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be

sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for

compliance and necessary action.

Sd/-

(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge

Shoaib

 
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