Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 4340 Chatt
Judgement Date : 10 September, 2025
1
2025:CGHC:46249
Digitally
signed by
SHOAIB
SHOAIB ANWAR
ANWAR Date:
2025.09.12
18:40:15
+0530
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 916 of 2019
1 - Udham Yadav S/o Suresh Yadav Aged About 22 Years R/o
Gangagarh, Police Station And District Kasganj Uttar Pradesh., Uttar
Pradesh
...Appellant
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Of
Police Station Magarlod District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh., District :
Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent
(Cause title taken from CIS)
For Appellant :Shri Aditya Chopra, Advocate. For Respondent(s) :Shri U.K.S. Chandel, Dy. Advocate General
Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Judgment on Board
10.09.2025
1. Heard.
2. The appellant has filed the instant appeal under Section
374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hence forth
'the Cr.P.C.') questioning the judgment of conviction and order
of sentence dated 20.05.2019 passed by the learned Special
Judge Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, Dhamtari, District Dhamtari (C.G.) (hereinafter
referred as a trial Court for sake of brevity) in Special Session
Trial (S.T./S.C. Act) No. 99/2018, whereby the appellant has
been convicted and sentenced as under:
Conviction Sentence
Under Section Rigorous Imprisonment for 07
370(2) of the years and fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in
Indian Penal Code default of payment of fine
additional R.I. for 03 months
3. It is pertinent to note that in the present case there were two
accused persons. Out of them, appellant Smt. Yashoda
Vishwakarma has already undergone the entire sentence and
was released from jail on 08.09.2023. Consequently, her
appeal bearing CRA No.1582 of 2019 came to be dismissed by
this Court as not pressed vide order dated 26.03.2025.
4. Brief facts of the case is that, on 11.11.2017 a report was
lodged by father of the victim namely; Mahesh Kumar Kanwar
(PW-3), at Police Station Magarlod, District Dhamtari (C.G.),
alleging that on 07.11.2017, when he had gone along with his
wife to the agricultural field, their minor daughter was left
alone at the house. In the evening, upon their return, they did
not find their daughter at home. It was further alleged that on
the same date, co-accused Yashoda Vishwakarma (already
completed jail sentence) had also left the house without
informing anyone. That, on the basis of the said report, Police
Station Magarlod registered a missing report for offence
under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code against an
unknown person, and commenced investigation.
5. After completing the investigation, a charge sheet was filed
before the concerned Court, wherein the charge under
Sections 363, 366-A, 376, 372, 370, 370-A and 34 of the Indian
Penal Code, Section 6 of the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, and Sections 3(2) and 3(1)(ट) of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 was framed. The prosecution examined
as many as 16 witnesses to prove its case and no defence
witness has been examined. Accused was also examined
under Section 313 CrPC in which he pleaded innocence and
false implication.
6. The learned trial Court after completing the trial, did not find
the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 370-A, 376,
Section 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act and Section 06 of POCSO Act and
acquitted him. However, convicted and sentenced him for
offence under Section as mentioned in the opening paragraph
of this Judgment.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment
of conviction passed by the learned trial Court is bad both in
law and on the facts available on record. It is contended that
the trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence and
documents produced during trial. There are material
contradictions and omissions in the statements of the
prosecution witnesses, which render the prosecution version
unreliable. The trial Court itself recorded a finding that on the
date of the alleged incident the victim was not less than 18
years of age and that she had voluntarily left the house of her
parents. Moreover, the victim turned hostile, and although she
partly supported the case of the prosecution, her testimony is
insufficient to base a conviction. He further submits that no
cogent evidence has been collected by the prosecution to
establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt,
and therefore the conviction and sentence recorded against
him are unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside.
8. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the
argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant
and has submitted that there are sufficient evidence available
on record to hold that the appellant was guilty of the alleged
offence and the learned trial Court has absolutely justified in
passing the judgment of conviction and sentence against the
appellant hence, the appeal filed by the appellant is liable to
be dismissed.
9. I have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
parties and perused entire evidence adduced by the
prosecution and gone through the evidence available on
record with utmost circumspection.
10. Since, it is undisputed that the prosecutrix (PW-2) was a major
on the date of incident, as before the trial Court the
prosecution failed to establish the fact that on the date of
incident she was below 18 years of age and hence the
appellant has been acquitted from the said charge, the Court
must now decide the central issue: whether the appellant is
guilty of the alleged offence under Section 370(2) of the IPC.
11. The prosecutrix (PW-2), deposed that she know the accused
Udham Yadav. She disclosed that she is educated up to Class
VIII, having received her primary education at the Primary
School, Mohandi, and that her date of birth is 09.01.2001.
According to the prosecutrix, on one occasion, while she was
alone at home, co-accused Smt. Yashoda Vishwakarma
persuaded her on the pretext of taking her out and took her
by bus from their village to Raipur. From Raipur, she was taken
by train to Sonbarasa, Uttar Pradesh, and thereafter by
Marshal jeep to Gangagadh. There, she was kept at the house
of accused Udham Yadav, and co-accused Yashoda thereafter
left for Sonbarasa. Before leaving, Yashoda told her to stay
with Udham Yadav as his wife by wearing a saree. The
prosecutrix asserted that she did not stay with Udham Yadav
of her own free will. She further stated that she remained at
the house of Udham Yadav for about six months. Later, when
she was travelling with the parents of the accused to another
village, the police apprehended her and brought her back to
Police Station Magarlod.
In her cross examination, the prosecutrix admitted that
after leaving her at the house of accused Udham Yadav, co-
accused Yashoda Vishwakarma told him that she had brought
the girl and that he should fulfill the arrangement which had
been agreed upon. She further admitted that at that time
accused Udham Yadav gave a large sum of money to co-
accused Yashoda Vishwakarma, although she could not
specify the exact amount. She also admitted that when co-
accused Yashoda was leaving her at the house of Udham
Yadav, she cried a lot. She stated that accused Udham used to
tell her that he would marry her. She further deposed that
thereafter accused Udham Yadav took her around the fire
three or four times in the manner of a marriage ceremony,
and on the same night he told her that she had now become
his wife. She stated that during that night accused Udham had
sexual intercourse with her against her will. She further
deposed that throughout the period she stayed in the house
of accused Udham Yadav, he repeatedly made corporeal
relation with her.
12. PW-1, the mother of the victim, deposed that about one year
prior to the incident, she had gone with her husband to their
field at about 9:00 a.m. for harvesting paddy, leaving the
victim alone at home. She deposed that when they returned at
about 5:00 p.m., the victim was not present in the house. On
making enquiries in the neighbourhood, they could not trace
her. She further deposed that at about 6:00-7:00 p.m., when
they went to the village bus stand, some persons sitting there
informed them that the victim had been seen boarding a bus
along with co- accused Yashoda. She further deposed that
thereafter they lodged a missing report at Police Station
Magarlod. About one month later, the police recovered her
daughter, the victim, from the State of Uttar Pradesh, She
further deposed that on asking the victim as to where she had
gone, the victim informed her that co- accused Yashoda had
taken her to Uttar Pradesh and had sold her to the present
accused. She stated that beyond this, the victim did not
disclose anything further to her.
13. In this case, the appellant has been convicted under Section
370(2) of IPC. For the sake of convenience, Section 370 IPC is
quoted below :
"370. Trafficking of person.--(1) Whoever, for the
purpose of exploitation, (a) recruits, (b)
transports, (c) harbours, (d) transfers, or (e)
receives, a person or persons, by-
First. using threats, or
Secondly.- using force, or any other form of
coercion, or
Thirdly.- by abduction, or
Fourthly. by practising fraud, or deception, or
Fifthly. by abuse of power, or
Sixthly. by inducement, including the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits, in order to
achieve the consent of any person having control
over the person recruited, transported,
harboured, transferred or received, commits the
offence of trafficking.
Explanation 1.- The expression "exploitation"
shall include any act of physical exploitation or
any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or
practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the
forced removal of organs.
Explanation 2.- The consent of the victim is
immaterial in determination of the offence of
trafficking.
(2) Whoever commits the offence of trafficking
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than seven
years, but which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine.
(3) Where the offence involves the trafficking of
more than one person, it shall be punishable
with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than ten years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be
liable to fine.
(4) Where the offence involves the trafficking of a
minor, it shall be punishable with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than ten years, but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
fine.
(5) Where the offence involves the trafficking of
more than one minor, it shall be punishable with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than fourteen years, but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be
liable to fine.
(6) If a person is convicted of the offence of
trafficking of minor on more than one occasion,
then such person shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, which shall mean
imprisonment for the remainder of that person's
natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(7) When a public servant or a police officer is
involved in the trafficking of any person then,
such public servant or police officer shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, which shall
mean imprisonment for the remainder of that
person's natural life, and shall also be liable to
fine.]
14. From perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that there
should be an element of exploitation. The word 'Exploitation'
has been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary, sixth edition,
as under:-
"Exploitation. Act or process of exploiting,
making use of, or working up. Utilization by
application of industry, argument, or other
means of turning to account, as the exploitation
of a mine or a forest. State Finance Co. v.
Hamacher. 171 Wash. 15, 17 P.2d 610, 613.
Taking unjust advantage of another for one's
own advantage or benefit (e.g. paying low wages
to illegal aliens)."
15. Similarly, the word "exploitation" has been defined in
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Edition as
under:-
"exploitation (1) a situation in which you treat
someone unfairly by asking them to do things
for you, but give them very little in return - used
to show disapproval: [+of] The film industry
thrives on the sexual exploitation of women. (2)
the development and use of minerals, forests, oil
etc for business or industry : [+of] the controlled
exploitation of resources/ commercial/ economic
exploitation 3 the full and effective use of
something: [+of] greater exploitation of these
data (4) an attempt to get as much as you can
out of a situation, sometimes unfairly : [+of] the
exploitation of religion for political ends."
16. Further, the explanation (1) of Section 370 IPC explains
exploitation, which shall include any act of physical
exploitation or any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or
practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the forced removal of
organs.
17. From the evidence, this Court do not find any material which
would suggest that the victim exploited. None of the witness
stated about exploitation. Admittedly, this is not a case of
sexual assault nor of indecent behavior with the victim by the
appellant. From the evidence of the victim, it appears that she
has remained with the appellant for a long period of 6
months, the victim never tried to object the act committed by
the appellant and she stayed freely with accused and his
family members.
18. On careful appreciation of the evidence of the prosecutrix
(PW-2) and her mother (PW-1), it is evident that the victim was
taken by co-accused Yashoda from her village and was left at
the house of appellant Udham Yadav. The prosecutrix
remained in the company of the appellant for about six
months and during this period the accused was not saying
anything. As far as the prosecutrix is concerned, she stayed
with accused for a period of 6 months, whereas her mother
stated that she stayed for one month. There are material
contradiction and omission in the statement of victim and
mother.
19. However, for attracting Section 370 IPC, it must be proved that
the transportation or receipt of a person was for the purpose
of exploitation as defined under the provision. "Exploitation,"
as explained in Section 370 IPC. In the present case, the
evidence only indicates that the prosecutrix was kept by the
appellant in the guise of a wife and was subjected to sexual
intercourse. There is no material on record to show that she
was trafficked for the purpose of exploitation.
20. The facts & alleged charges do not satisfy the essential
ingredients of Section 370 IPC. In absence of proof of
organized trafficking or exploitation. The provision of Section
370 will not attract to the facts of the present case. Hence, the
prosecution failed to establish the case beyond reasonable
doubt.
21. Considering the aforesaid evidence, I do not find any
ingredients to attract Section 370 of the Indian Penal Code
against the appellant.
22. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid legal analysis,
the impugned judgment dated 20.05.2019 is hereby set aside.
The accused / appellant is acquitted of the said charges
levelled against him. The appellant is reported to be on bail.
His bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and the bonds
shall remain operative for a period of six months in view of
Section 481 of the BNSS. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is
allowed.
23. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be
sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for
compliance and necessary action.
Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge
Shoaib
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