Chattisgarh High Court
Jayadevi vs Maniram on 7 May, 2025
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2025:CGHC:20988
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MAC No. 1167 of 2020
Jayadevi W/o Late Amar Singh Thakur, Aged About 55 Years R/o Vikas
Nagar, Kusmunda, Tahsil Katghora, District Korba Chhattisgarh
...............Claimant, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh
...Appellant (s)
versus
1 - Maniram S/o Santram, R/o Village Batari, Police Station Dipka, Tahsil
Pali, District Korba Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh
2 - Nandkishor Agrawal, S/o Late Shri Matadin Agrawal, Aged About 65
Years R/o Kamal Traders, Pali Road, Dipka, District Korba Chhattisgarh,
District : Korba, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
__________________________________________________________
For Appellant (s) : Mr. Dashrath Kushwaha, Advocate
For Respondents : Mr. Hanuman Prasad Agrawal,
Advocate
For proposed respondent/ : Mr. Dashrath Gupta, Advocate
United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
_______________________________________________________
S.B.: Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge
Judgment On Board
07/05/2025
1. Heard on IA No.4 which is an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of
CPC and IA No.2, which is an application under Order 41 Rule 27
SHUBHAM
DEY
of CPC filed on behalf of respondents No. 1 & 2.
Digitally
signed by
SHUBHAM
DEY
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2. Mr. H.P. Agrawal, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 & 2 would
submit that after passing of award and receipt of notice issued in
appeal filed by claimant for enhancement of award of
compensation awarded by learned Claims Tribunal, respondents
No. 1 & 2 approached him and it was informed that counsel
appearing before learned Claims Tribunal has not properly advised
them and have not pleaded with regard to insurance of ill-fated
vehicle on 16.06.2018. He contended that the owner of the vehicle
has handed over the premium amount to Agent namely P.R.
Damahe prior to date of accident, however, when owner of the
vehicle after accident approached him for handing over the policy,
he prepared proposal 'Form' on 16.06.2018 and have deposited in
the office on the same day and policy was generated on
16.06.2018 at about 17:00 hrs. It is contention of learned counsel
for respondents No.1 & 2 that 16.06.2018 was the Saturday and on
all Saturdays of the month, the office of insurance company
remains closed and, therefore, preparation of proposal form and
generating the policy on the same day i.e. closed Saturday itself
shows that the proposal form and the insurance policy was
prepared after getting knowledge of the accident of vehicle.
3. He also contended that the amendment in the written
statement/reply can be made at any time and at any stage of
proceedings. In support of his contention, he places reliance upon
the decision in the case of North Eastern Railway
Administration, Gorakhpur Vs. Bhagwan Das (Dead) by Lrs.
(2008) 8 SCC 511. He next contended that respondents No. 1 & 2
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have also submitted an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC
for bringing additional evidence on record i.e. copy of insurance
policy issued by the proposed respondent/United India Insurance
Company Ltd. It is contention of learned counsel for respondents
No. 1 & 2 that copy of insurance policy could not be brought on
record before learned Tribunal due to wrong advice of counsel
representing respondent No.2, whereas, premium was paid prior to
date of accident.
4. Mr. Dashrath Kushwaha, learned counsel for the appellant/claimant
opposes the submission of learned counsel appearing for
respondents No. 1 & 2.
5. Mr. Dashrath Gupta, learned counsel appearing for proposed
respondent/United India Insurance Company, would submit that he
has placed on record the copy of proposal 'Form' as Annexure R-1
along with reply to application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC and
from perusal of the proposal form, it is apparent that proposal form
was filled-up on 16.06.2018 at about 6:40 pm, whereas, date and
time of accident is 16.06.2018 at about 5:30 pm. Proposal form
was filled-up after the accident which also bears signature of
respondent No.2. He next contended that copy of policy is filed
along with cross-appeal and the effective date and time of policy is
17.06.2018 at 0:00 hrs i.e. midnight. Policy came into effect after
the accident. The cash payment at the time of purchase of the
policy, was also received after the accident and, therefore, there
was no insurance policy of offending vehicle owned by respondent
No.2 on the date and time of accident and it is for this reason, in
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reply, there is no specific pleading with respect to purchase of
policy against the ill-fated vehicle by respondent No.2. He also
contended that amendment at the belated stage and that too after
passing of award at appellate stage is not permissible in the facts
of case. He also contended that in the application under Order 41
Rule 27 CPC also it is not specifically pleaded that as to even after
due diligence, respondent No.2 could not able to produce the
evidence which is sought to be produced as additional evidence
under the provision of Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. Hence, both the
applications may be dismissed.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties.
7. So far as the submission of learned counsel for the respective
parties on application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC is concerned,
provision under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC came to be amended
w.e.f. 01.07.2002. Under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC, a proviso is
added which creates bar in allowing the amendment application,
after the trial has commenced unless Court comes to conclusion
that in spite of due diligence, party could not have raised matter
before commencement of trial. Filling of application after
commencement of trial has been discussed by Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Vidyabai & Ors. Vs. Padmalatha and Anr.
(2009) 2 SCC 409 and it was held as under:
"10. By reason of the Civil Procedure Code
(Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 22 of 2002), Parliament
inter alia inserted a proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the
Code, which reads as under:
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"Provided that no application for amendment
shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless
the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due
diligence, the party could not have raised the matter
before the commencement of trial."
It is couched in a mandatory form. The court's
jurisdiction to allow such an application is taken away
unless the conditions precedent therefor are satisfied
viz. it must come to a conclusion that in spite of due
diligence the parties could not have raised the matter
before the commencement of the trial.
11. From the order passed by the learned trial Judge,
it is evident that the respondents had not been able to
fulfil the said precondition. The question, therefore,
which arises for consideration is as to whether the trial
had commenced or not. In our opinion, it did. The date
on which the issues are framed is the date of first
hearing. Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
envisage taking of various steps at different stages of
the proceeding. Filing of an affidavit in lieu of
examination-in-chief of the witness, in our opinion,
would amount to "commencement of proceeding".
x x x
x x x
19. It is the primal duty of the court to decide as to
whether such an amendment is necessary to decide
the real dispute between the parties. Only if such a
condition is fulfilled, the amendment is to be allowed.
However, proviso appended to Order 6 Rule 17 of the
Code restricts the power of the court. It puts an
embargo on exercise of its jurisdiction. The court's
jurisdiction, in a case of this nature is limited. Thus,
unless the jurisdictional fact, as envisaged therein, is
found to be existing, the court will have no jurisdiction
at all to allow the amendment of the plaint."
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8. In the case at hand, application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC has
been filed at appellate stage before this Court. Perusal of
application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC would show that
respondent No.2 in the application has not specifically pleaded
that the fact which is sought to be brought on record in reply to
claim application by way of amendment, was not within his
knowledge and it came to his knowledge only after the claim case
was decided. No satisfactory explanation is offered as required
under the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC.
9. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gayathri Women's
Welfare Assn. v. Gowramma, (2011) 2 SCC 330 has observed
thus:
"34. In Ishwardas [(1979) 4 SCC 163] , it has been
observed as follows: (SCC p. 166, para 5)
"5. There is no impediment or bar against an
appellate court permitting amendment of pleadings so
as to enable a party to raise a new plea. All that is
necessary is that the appellate court should observe
the well-known principles subject to which
amendments of pleadings are usually granted.
Naturally one of the circumstances which will be taken
into consideration before an amendment is granted is
the delay in making the application seeking such
amendment and, if made at the appellate stage, the
reason why it was not sought in the trial court. If the
necessary material on which the plea arising from the
amendment may be decided is already there, the
amendment may be more readily granted than
otherwise. But, there is no prohibition against an
appellate court permitting an amendment at the
appellate stage merely because the necessary material
is not already before the court."
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These observations clearly indicate that one of the
circumstances which will be taken into consideration
before an amendment is granted is the delay in
making the application seeking such amendment and,
if made at the appellate sage, the reason why it was
not sought in the trial court. In the present case, not
only there is wholly untenable delay in the application
but the appellants had a decree for permanent
injunction in their favour.
36. In Revajeetu Builders [(2009) 10 SCC 84] this Court
reiterated the very wide discretion the courts have in
the matter of amendment of pleadings. These
observations were in the context of an application filed
by the appellant, seeking amendment of the original
plaint including the prayer clause being rejected by the
High Court upon coming to a definite conclusion that
the appellant while seeking permission to amend the
plaint is trying to introduce a new case, which was not
his case in the original plaint and the proposed
amendment, if allowed, would certainly affect the
rights of the respondents adversely. It was also held
that any such amendment, which changes the entire
character of the plaint, cannot be permitted and that
too, after a lapse of four years and after the institution
of the suit.
38. In our opinion, the decision of the trial court is in
conformity with the aforesaid principles. The trial court
has clearly held that the cause of action for the relief of
possession arose to the respondents many years ago.
They may, therefore, have a cause of action, if any, for
an independent suit. In the aforesaid case, the Court
-8-
further reiterated the principle in Ganga Bai v. Vijay
Kumar [(1974) 2 SCC 393] wherein it was rightly
observed: (SCC p. 399, para 22)
"22. ... The power to allow an amendment is
undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be
appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the
law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of
such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by
judicial considerations and wider the discretion,
greater ought to be the care and circumspection on
the part of the court."
10. In case of Shivshankara and Anr. Vs. H.P. Vedavyasa Char
(2023) 13 SCC 1, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:
"24. We are not oblivious of the settled position
that in dealing with prayers for amendment of the
pleadings the courts should avoid hypertechnical
approach. But at the same time, we should keep
reminded of the position that the same cannot be
granted on the mere request through an
application for amendment of the written
statement, especially at the appellate stage,
where, what is called in question is the judgment
and decree passed by the trial court and, in other
words, after the adverse decree and without a
genuine, sustainable reason. In short, the
circumstances attending to the particular case
are to be taken into account to consider whether
such a prayer is allowable or not and no doubt, it
is allowable only in the rarest of rare
circumstances.
x x x
x x x
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43. In the totality of the circumstances, especially
taking into account the relevant reasons
assigned by the High Court for disallowing the
prayer for amendment of the written statement
and taking note of the delay and the failure to
offer any reason therefor and the reasons
mentioned hereinbefore we see no reason at all
to hold any perversity or illegality with the
rejection of the prayer for amendment of the
written statement."
11. In the case at hand, respondent No.2 being owner of vehicle was
well aware of the fact that he has purchased the policy of the ill-
fated vehicle, however, he has not made any pleading in the
written statement, of his vehicle being insured by the insurance
company. Respondent No.2 did not appear before learned Tribunal
as witness. The impugned award passed by learned Tribunal would
show that based on material available before it, liability to satisfy
the impugned award was fastened upon respondent No. 1 & 2
therein. The award is dated 17.03.2020, however, respondent No.2
has not challenged the award before this Court on any of the
ground but for filing of cross-appeal after receipt of notice in appeal
filed by claimant seeking enhancement of amount of
compensation.
12. Perusal of Annexure R-1 which is a copy of proposal 'Form' filed by
agent of proposed respondent (insurance company) would show
that proposal form was filled-up on 16.06.2018 at about 6:40 pm,
whereas, copy of FIR produced before the Tribunal as Ex. P-2
would show that date and time of accident was 16.06.2018 at
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about 5:30 pm and FIR was registered on 16.06.2018 at 8:25 pm
(20:25 hrs.). Copy of final report is also placed on record as Ex.P-1
in which after investigation, charge sheet has been filed for alleged
offence under Section 304 (A) of IPC and under Sections 3/181,
139/192, 246/196, 56/192 of Motor Vehicless Act. Charge sheet
was filed for offence under Section 246/196 which is an offence
under the Motor Vehicles Act for driving un-insured vehicle. Before
the investigating agency also appellant has not brought to notice
that vehicle was insured on the date of accident. Copy of insurance
policy was also not produced and hence in seizure memo there is
no mention of seizure of copy of insurance policy.
13. Under the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC, it is specifically
mentioned that the application for amendment is to be allowed
after commencement of trial, only when the applicant satisfies the
Court that in spite of due diligence the party could not have placed
the matter before the Trial Court. In the application, no such
pleading is made but for the vague pleading that due to ill-advice of
counsel said fact has not been pleaded in reply to claim
application. In absence of the compliance of proviso to Order 6
Rule 17 of CPC and the aforementioned decisions of Hon'ble
Supreme Court, in the opinion of this Court, respondent No.2 failed
to make out a case that even after due diligence he could not raise
the matter before the Trial Court.
14. For the foregoing discussions, I do not find any good ground to
allow the application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. The
application being sans merit is liable to be and is accordingly
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dismissed.
15. So far as the application filed under Order 41
Rule 27 of CPC is concerned, perusal of application would show
that no specific pleading is made as to why the additional evidence
which is sought to be produced at the appellate stage could not be
produced before learned Claims Tribunal. Provision under Order
41 Rule 27 of CPC mandates that the party seeking to produce
additional evidence establishes that notwithstanding the exercise
of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or
could not after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at
the time when decree appealed against was passed. There is no
specific pleading as to the evidence which is sought to be
produced was not within his knowledge or after due diligence such
evidence could not produce before the trial Court. In absence of
specific pleading and ground raised under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC,
it cannot be allowed in a routine manner.
16. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad Patel
(Dead) through LR and Ors. v. Shivnath & Ors. (2019) 6 SCC
82 has observed thus:
"29. Under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, production of
additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, is
permitted only under three circumstances which are:
(I) where the trial court had refused to admit the
evidence though it ought to have been admitted;
(II) the evidence was not available to the party
despite exercise of due diligence; and
(III) the appellate court required the additional
evidence so as to enable it to pronounce judgment or
for any other substantial cause of like nature.
An application for production of additional evidence
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cannot be allowed if the appellant was not diligent in
producing the relevant documents in the lower court.
However, in the interest of justice and when
satisfactory reasons are given, the court can receive
additional documents.
30. In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin [Union of India
v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 362] , this Court held as under : (SCC pp. 167-
68 & 170, paras 36-37, 40 & 47)
"36. The general principle is that the appellate
court should not travel outside the record of the lower
court and cannot take any evidence in appeal.
However, as an exception, Order 41 Rule 27 CPC
enables the appellate court to take additional
evidence in exceptional circumstances. The appellate
court may permit additional evidence only and only if
the conditions laid down in this Rule are found to
exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the
admission of such evidence. Thus, the provision
does not apply, when on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate court can pronounce a
satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within
the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly.
Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion
circumscribed by the limitation specified in the Rule
itself. (Vide K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama
Reddy [K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy,
AIR 1963 SC 1526] , Municipal Corpn., Greater
Bombay v. Lala Pancham [Municipal Corpn., Greater
Bombay v. Lala Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008] ,
Soonda Ram v. Rameshwarlal [Soonda Ram v.
Rameshwarlal, (1975) 3 SCC 698] and Syed Abdul
Khader v. Rami Reddy [Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami
Reddy, (1979) 2 SCC 601] .)
37. The appellate court should not ordinarily
allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable
a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly,
where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain
point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled
to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the
court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment
against him and does not require any additional
evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide
Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohd. Iqbal and Mohd. Ali
& Co. [Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohd. Iqbal and
Mohd. Ali & Co., (1978) 2 SCC 493] .)
***
40. The inadvertence of the party or his
inability to understand the legal issues involved or the
wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a
pleader or that the party did not realise the
importance of a document does not constitute a
"substantial cause" within the meaning of this Rule.
The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is
not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that
evidence in appeal.
***
47. Where the additional evidence sought to be
adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case
and the evidence has a direct and important bearing
on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice
clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to
be permitted on record, such application may be
allowed."
17. For the foregoing discussions made, I do not find any good ground
to allow the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC for
taking additional evidence on record. Even otherwise copy of policy
which is filed along with cross-appeal was in the possession of
respondent No.2, however, he has not placed any material to show
that the effective date of policy as mentioned therein was
challenged by him in any manner before any of the authority
mentioning any of the reason therein but for filing of application
seeking amendment and the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of
CPC. In absence of challenge to the date of issuance of insurance
policy, more particularly, the effective date of issuance of policy, in
opinion of this Court, submission of learned counsel for the
respondent that respondent No.2 has deposited the amount prior
to date of accident is not acceptable. The policy is to be read as it
is and when the policy has been made effective from 17.06.2018 it
will not give any benefit to respondent No.2 when the accident is of
prior to handling over money, filling of proposal Form is
of16.06.2018 at about 6:40 pm and policy is made effective for
17.06.2018, 00.00 hrs.
18. In the case New India Assurance Co. v. Bhagwati Devi (1998) 6
SCC 534, a three-Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed that, in absence of any specific time and date, the
insurance policy becomes operative from the previous midnight.
But when the specific time and date is mentioned, then the
insurance policy becomes effective from that point of time.
19. For the foregoing discussions, both the applications filed by
respondents, one under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC and another
under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC are hereby dismissed.
20. So far as the application (IA No.6) filed under Order 1 Rule 10 of
CPC is concerned, as the vehicle was not insured on the date and
time of accident, and dismissal of application under Order 6 Rule
17 and application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, consequently,
application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC is also dismissed.
21. With the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties,
appeal filed by the claimant/applicant for enhancement of amount
of compensation as also cross-appeal filed by respondent No.2
under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC r/w Rule 242 (3) of Rules of 1994
are heard finally on merit.
22. This is the claimant's appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "Act of 1988") seeking enhancement
of amount of compensation awarded by learned First Additional
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Katghora (CG) vide award dated
17th March 2020 passed in Motor Accident Claim Case No.103 of
2018 whereby learned Claims Tribunal allowed the application in
part, awarded Rs.10,77,816/- as compensation and liability to
satisfy amount of compensation is fastened upon the respondents.
23. Facts relevant for disposal of this case are that claimant/appellant
filed an application under Sections 166 of the Act of 1988 pleading
therein that in the evening of 16.6.2018 at about 5.30 p.m., non-
applicant No. 1- Maniram, driving a goods vehicle bearing
registration number CG/12/AN 1986 rashly and negligently, dashed
against the motorcycle of the applicant's son Kamal Narayan, due
to which Kamal Narayan Singh died on the spot as a result of the
injuries sustained by him. It was pleaded in the application that
age of Kamal Narayan was 31 years at the time of the accident
and Kamal Narayan was working as a Driver in G.V.K. Emergency
Management and Research Institute and was earning Rs. 13,000/-
per month. The claimant (mother of deceased Kamal Narayan)
prayed for a total compensation of Rs. 30,00,000/- under different
heads from respondents.
24. No written statement was filed by non-applicant No.1.
25. Non-applicant No.2 by filing his written statement denied the
pleadings made in the claim application and stated that no accident
was caused by vehicle of non-applicant No.2, hence, he is not
liable to pay any compensation and claim application against him
be dismissed.
26. Learned Claims Tribunal, on appreciation of pleadings and
evidence brought on record by respective parties, held that on the
date of accident, offending vehicle was being driven by non-
applicant No.1 rashly and negligently, due to which, said accident
occurred in which Kamal Narayan suffered grievous injuries and
died. Assessing income of the deceased as Rs.11,340/- per month
on the date of accident and calculating the loss suffered by the
claimant under different heads, awarded total compensation of
Rs.10,77,816/ -.
27. Learned counsel for the appellant/claimant would submit that this
appeal is filed by the claimant seeking enhancement of amount of
compensation on two grounds. First ground is with respect to
application of wrong multiplier of 11 instead of 16, as on the date of
accident deceased was aged about 31 years and secondly, that
learned Tribunal has not awarded the amount of compensation
under the head of 'loss of consortium'.
28. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 & 2
opposes the submission of learned counsel for the
claimant/appellant. In cross-appeal filed by respondent No.2, the
ground of 'wrong advice given by counsel appearing before
Tribunal, effective date of policy, payment of premium, insurance
company not being a party before the Tribunal' have been taken.
29. From perusal of the grounds taken by respondent No.2 in the
cross-appeal, it is evident that these grounds are pari materia to
those raised by the respondent in the application filed under Order
6 Rule 17 CPC and the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC.
Both the said applications have already been dismissed by this
Court as discussed herein-above. Furthermore, no other
substantial or persuasive ground has been advanced by the
learned counsel for the respondents that justify the entertainment
of the present cross-appeal.
30. In view of the above, the cross-appeal filed by Respondent No.2
under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC stands dismissed.
31. Perusal of the impugned award would show that learned Tribunal
considering the age of the deceased as mentioned in the
postmortem report has assessed the age of deceased as 31 years,
however, learned Tribunal has erroneously applied the multiplier of
11 overlooking the age of deceased on the date of accident.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma (Smt.) and
Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. (2009) 6 SCC,
has clearly specified as to the application of multiplier to be based
on age of deceased. Undisputedly, in the case at hand, age of the
deceased was 31 years and according to decision of Supreme
Court in the case of Sarla Verma (supra), appropriate multiplier for
age group of 31 to 35 years would be 16. It is ordered accordingly.
32. Award of compensation under the head 'loss of consortium' was
considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National
Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi and Ors. (2017) 16
SCC 680. Further in the case of Magma General Insurance Co.
Ltd. Vs. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram & Ors. (2018) 18 SCC
130, Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained types of loss of
consortium and it is held that the widow/husband is entitled for
'loss of spousal consortium', children are entitled for 'loss of
parental consortium' and parents are entitled for loss of 'filial
consortium' .
33. In the case at hand, claimant is mother of deceased and, hence,
she is entitled for compensation of Rs.40,000/-. under the head
'loss of filial consortium' . It is ordered accordingly.
34. In the aforementioned facts of the case and the discussions, I find
it appropriate to re-compute the amount of compensation as
under:-
S. N. Heads Compensation
1. (A) Loss of Income/dependency
11340 x 12 = 136080
(B) Addition towards future prospects
@ 40% (136080 x 40% =54432)
136080 + 54432 = 1,90,512
Rs. 15,24,096
(C) Deduction of 50% towards
personal and living expenses
(1,90,512 x 50% =95256)
1,90,512- 95256 = 95256
(D) Multiplier of 16
95256 x 16 = 15,24,096
4. Funeral Expenses : (+) Rs. 15,000
5. Loss of Estate : (+) Rs. 15,000
8. Loss of Filial Consortium of : (+) Rs. 40,000
Rs.40,000/- to appellant/claimant
Total compensation : Rs. 15,94,096
35. Now the appellant/claimant is awarded total compensation of
Rs. 15,94,096/- instead of Rs.10,77,816/- as awarded by the
Claims Tribunal.
36. Aforementioned total amount of compensation shall carry interest
@ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of claim application till its
realization. Any amount of compensation already paid to the
claimant shall be adjustable from the total amount of compensation
which has now been calculated and awarded by this Court. Other
conditions of impugned award shall remain intact.
37. In the result, appeal filed by by appellant/claimant is allowed in
part. Impugned award is modified to the extent as indicated herein
above.
/--/- Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu)
Judge
Praveen
