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Yogendra Singh vs Rajkumar Satnami
2025 Latest Caselaw 2302 Chatt

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 2302 Chatt
Judgement Date : 6 March, 2025

Chattisgarh High Court

Yogendra Singh vs Rajkumar Satnami on 6 March, 2025

Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
                                         1




                                                            2025:CGHC:11111


                                                                      NAFR

                HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
                    Judgment reserved on : 10-01-2025
                    Judgment delivered on : 06-03-2025
                     Acquittal Appeal No.219 of 2017
        Yogendra Singh S/o Shri Mahatam Singh, aged about 31 years,
        R/o House No.203, Ramnagar Supela Bhilai, in front of Post
        Office Bhilai, Tahsil and Distt. Durg (CG)
                                                ---- Appellant/complainant
                                   Versus
       Rajkumar Satnami, S/o Bahaliram, aged about 45 years (as per
        deposition of the respondent) R/o Near Gaytri Kirana Stores,

Ghasidas Nagar, ACC Chhawni, Bhilai, Tehsil and Distt. Durg (CG)

---- Respondent

For Appellant : Shri Avinash Chand Sahu, Advocate.

Respondent                    :     None though served.

                   Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J

                                  CAV Judgment

Challenge in this appeal is to the legality and validity of the

judgment dated 24.5.2017 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class,

Durg in Complaint Case No.5353/2015 whereby the

respondent/accused has been acquitted of the charge under Section

138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.

02. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the respondent/accused

being known to the appellant/complainant and there relations being

cordial, in April, 2015 he requested the appellant for giving him Rs.1.10

lacs for meeting his personal needs, on which in April, 2015 the

appellant/complainant gave him Rs.1.10 lacs on credit. In lieu of

discharge of that liability, the respondent/accused gave him a cheque

bearing No.520876 dated 4.6.2015 amounting to Rs.1.10 lacs of State

Bank of India, Branch-Bhilai with the assurance that on being

presented, it would be encashed. However, when the

appellant/complainant presented the said cheque for encashment at

State Bank of India, Branch-Bhilai where he has an account, it got

dishonoured due to insufficient amount in the account of the drawer

and returned to the appellant with a memo to this effect. The

appellant/complainant then orally informed the respondent/accused

about dishonour of the cheque and demanded his money back but the

respondent/accused did not take any interest in it. Hence the

appellant/complainant sent a legal notice on 16.6.2015 through his

advocate to the respondent/accused which was received by him on

17.6.2015 but neither the respondent/accused made payment of the

said amount nor did he reply to that notice. Therefore, the

appellant/complainant filed a complaint case under Section 138 read

with Section 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short "the NI

Act") against the respondent/accused.

03. Learned trial Court framed charge under Section 138 of the NI

Act against the respondent/accused, to which he abjured his guilt and

prayed for trial. Learned trial Court framed as many as seven issues

and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, by

the impugned judgment acquitted the respondent/accused of the said

charge extending him benefit of doubt. Hence this appeal.

04. Learned counsel for the appellant/complainant would submit that

the impugned judgment of acquittal is per se illegal and contrary to the

material available on record. The respondent/accused has failed to

show that the cheque in question was not issued by him. As the

respondent/accused failed in rebutting the presumption under Section

139 of the NI Act, an adverse inference ought to have been drawn

against him and he should have been held guilty under Section 138 of

the NI Act. However, the learned trial Court without properly

appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record acquitted

him of the said charge. As such, the impugned judgment is liable to be

set aside and the respondent/accused be held guilty under Section 138

of the NI Act and sentenced accordingly.

Reliance has been placed on the order dated 24.10.2019 of this

Court in CRR No.327/2019 in the matter of Ambika Traders and

another Vs. Roopchand and another.

05. None appears for the respondent despite service of notice.

06. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the

material available on record.

07. It is clear from the record of learned trial Court that the

appellant/complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act

against the respondent/accused on the ground that the cheque given

by the accused to him towards discharge of his debt when presented

for encashment before the bank, got dishonoured. To prove his case,

the complainant examined himself and filed the cheque (Ex.P/1),

cheque bounce memo of the bank (Ex.P/2), legal notice (Ex.P/3),

postal receipt (Ex.P/4) and the computerized acknowledgment

(Ex.P/5).

08. Defence of the respondent/accused is that his name is Rajkumar

Satnami whereas notice was sent by the complainant in the name of

Rajkumar Satyani and he did not receive any notice. In para 9 of

cross-examination of the complainant it was suggested by the accused

that the cheque in question was given as a guarantee for payment of

the amount in future and this fact was admitted by the complainant.

09. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bir Singh Vs.

Mukesh Kumar reported in (2019) 4 SCC 197 held in paras 20 & 24 of

its judgment as under:

"20. Section 139 introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof and shifts the onus on the accused. The presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a presumption of law, as distinguished from presumption of facts. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, which requires the prosecution to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law and presumptions of fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact as held in Hiten P.Dalal.

24. In K. N. Beena v. Muniyappan, this Court held that in view of the provisions of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 118 thereof, the Court

had to presume that the cheque had been issued for discharging a debt or liability. The said presumption was rebuttable and could be rebutted by the accused by proving the contrary. But mere denial or rebuttal by the accused was not enough. The accused had to prove by cogent evidence that there was no debt or liability. This Court clearly held that the High Court had erroneously set aside the conviction, by proceeding on the basis that denials/averments in the reply of the accused were sufficient to shift the burden of proof on the complainant to prove that the cheque had been issued for discharge of a debt or a liability. This was an entirely erroneous approach. The accused had to prove in the trial by leading cogent evidence that there was no debt or liability."

10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Baslingappa Vs.

Mudibasappa reported in (2019) 5 SCC 418, held in para 23 of its

judgment as under:

23. We may now notice the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the complainant i.e. judgment of this Court in Kishan Rao v. Shankargauda. This Court in the above case has examined Section 139 of the Act. In the above case, the only defence which was taken by the accused was that cheque was stolen by the appellant. The said defence was rejected by the trial Court. In paras 21 to 23, the following was laid down.

"21. In the present case, the trial Court as well as the appellate Court having found that cheque contained the signatures of the accused and it was given to the appellant to present in the Bank, the presumption under Section 139 was rightly raised which was not rebutted by the accused. The accused had not led any evidence to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The

accused even did not come in the witness box to support his case. In the reply to the notice which was given by the appellant, the accused took the defence that the cheque was stolen by the appellant. The said defence was rejected by the trial Court after considering the evidence on record with regard to which no contrary view has also been expressed by the High Court.

22. Another judgment which needs to be looked into is Rangappa v. Shri Mohan. A three-Judge Bench of this Court had occasion to examine the presumption under Section 139 of the 1881 Act. This Court in the aforesaid case has held that in the event the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubt with regard to the existence of a debt or liability, the presumption may fail. The following was laid down in paras 26 and 27:

26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant.

27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant-accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof.

23. No evidence was led by the accused. The defence taken in the reply to the notice that cheque was stolen having been rejected by the two courts below, we do not see any basis for the High Court coming to the conclusion that the accused has been successful in creating doubt in the mind of the Court with regard to the existence of the debt or liability. How the presumption under Section 139 can be rebutted on the evidence of PW 1 himself has not been explained by the High Court."

11. Relying upon the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court, this Court dismissed the revision petition (CRR No.327/2019)

filed by the accused Ambika Traders and another (supra) where the

accused also failed to rebut the presumption available under Section

139 of the NI Act.

12. In light of above decisions, if the facts of the present case and

evidence on record are seen, it is clear that here also the defence

suggested that the cheque in question was given only as a

security/guarantee for payment of the amount in future but in his

statement, the accused denied any transaction with the complainant.

Learned trial Court also considered that the cheque was given as a

security and dismissed the complaint. The findings recorded by learned

trial Court are not in consonance with the provisions of Sections 118

and 139 of the NI Act and also are contrary to the guidelines of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court as referred to above. Hence the impugned

judgment of acquittal of learned trial court is not sustainable in law.

13. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment

dated 24.5.2017 of learned trial Court is hereby set aside. The

respondent/accused is held guilty under Section 138 of the NI Act and

sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.1.50 lacs within a period of six months

from today or else he shall suffer RI for two years. The fine so

deposited by the respondent/accused shall be paid to the

appellant/complainant as compensation under Section 395(1)(b) of

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Sd/ (Rajani Dubey) Judge Digitally MOHD signed by AKHTAR MOHD KHAN AKHTAR KHAN

Khan

 
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