Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 247 Chatt
Judgement Date : 13 January, 2023
1
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
WP(CR) No. 538 of 2021
Ashok Kujur, S/o. Late Shri J. Kujur, Aged About 59 Years, Currently Posted
as Deputy Superintendent Of Police, High Court Security Having His
Residence At 27 Kholi, Vikas Nagar, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
---- Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Director General Of Police, Police
Headquarters, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
2. Inspector General Of Police, Raipur Range, Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh
3. Superintendent Of Police, District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.
---- Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Sabyasachi Bhaduri, Advocate
For State/Respondents : Mr. Soumya Rai, Panel Lawyer
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order On Board
(13.01.2023)
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
1. The petitioner Mr. Ashok Kujur was involved in the investigation
for the offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of Narcotic Drugs &
Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985 registered at Police Station-
Komakhan, District Mahasamund and accused Mohan Sao &
Kiran Pond @ Mathura Bai were charge-sheeted before the
Special Judge (N.D.P.S. Act) Mahasamund in Crime
No.155/2017. Accordingly, the trial was conducted in the said
Court and ultimately by judgment dated 27.07.2021, the
accused Mohan Sao & Kiran Pond @ Mathura Bai were
acquitted from the aforesaid offences extending him benefit of
doubt. However, in para 34 of the judgment, the learned
Special Judge has made certain adverse remarks against the
petitioner, pursuant to which, a departmental enquiry vide
notice dated 21.08.2021 (Annexure A-1) was initiated against
him for defective investigation.
2. Reply has been filed opposing the writ petition stating that the
observation made is strictly in accordance with law.
3. Mr. Sabyasachi Bhaduri, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner would submit that the learned Special Judge was not
justified in making adverse remarks against the petitioner
holding that he was negligent while performing his duties and
that too no opportunity of hearing was afforded before making
adverse remarks against him. He relied upon the decision of
the Supreme Court in State (NCT Of Delhi) V. Pankaj
Chaudhary And Others1 and submit that adverse remarks
against the petitioner in para 34 of the impugned judgment
deserve to be expunged since departmental enquiry has been
initiated against the petitioner.
4. Mr. Soumya Rai, learned State counsel would submit that the
finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the petitioner
was negligent in performing his duties is a correct finding of
fact, therefore, no relief can be granted to the petitioner.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their
1 (2019) 11 SCC 575
rival submissions made herein-above and went through the
records with utmost circumspection.
6. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was involved in the
investigation of Crime No.155/2017 from time to time and the
accused Mohan Sao & Kiran Pond @ Mathura Bai were
charge-sheeted and the learned Special Judge while acquitting
them made comments in para 34 that the petitioner was
negligent and he has not been vigilant in conducting the
investigation. Para 34 is quoted as under :
**34- izdj.k esa ;g fo'ks"k #i ls mYys[kuh; gS fd vfHk;qDrx.k ds fo#) fopkfjr fd;k x;k mDr vijk/k varxZr /kkjk 20 ¼ch½¼nks½¼ch½s Lokid vkS"kf/k vkSj eu% izHkkoh inkFkZ vf/kfu;e 1985 esa vf/kdre 10 o"kZ rd ds dBksj dkjkokl o vf/kdre 1]00]000 #i;s rd ds tqekZus ls naMuh; vijk/k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa pwafd mDr vijk/k gsrq ,uMhih,l ,DV esa dBksj n.M ds izko/kku fd;s x;s gSa rks ,sls izdj.kksa esa foospuk Hkh mlh Lrj dh gksuk pkfg,] fdarq izdj.k esa miyC/k lk{; ds vk/kkj ij vfHk;kstu dFkk dks lansgkLin gksuk ikrs gq;s vfHk;qDrx.k dks lansg dk ykHk nsrs gq;s nks"keqDr fd;k x;k gS rFkk mDr lk{; foospuk vuqlkj izdj.k ds foospd v'kksd dq t wj ¼v0lk0 09+½ }kjk izdj.k dh foospuk dk;Zokgh ds nkSjku xaHkhj foospukxr =qfV;ka fd;k tkuk nf'kZr gSA ekuuh; U;k;n`"Vkar xqtjkr jkT; fo#) fd'ku HkkbZ ¼2014½ 5 ,llhlh 108 esa ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; }kjk fnukad 07-01-2017 dks fu.kZ; ikfjr djrs gq, ;g er laizsf"kr fd;k x;k gS fd detksj foospuk ds dkj.k vfHk;qDrx.k ds nks"keqDr gksus ij mls tfLVl fMfyojh flLVe dk Qsy gksuk ekuk tk;sxk rFkk ,sls ekeys esa lacaf/kr foospuk vf/kdkjh ds fo#) foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh dh tkuh pkfg,A vr% ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr mDr fu.kZ; ds ifjizs{; esa izdj.k ds foospd vk'kksd dqtwj ¼v0lk0 09½ ds fo#) leqfpr foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh gsrq bl fu.kZ; dh izfr iqfyl v/kh{kd egkleqan dh vksj bl funsZ'k ds lkFk izsf"kr dh tkrh gS fd os mDr iqfyl vf/kdkjh ds fo#) leqfpr foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh djrs gq;s dh x;h dk;Zokgh ls bl U;k;ky; dks fu.kZ; dh izfr ds izkfIr ds ,d ekg ds Hkhrj voxr djkosaA
7. Way back in the year 1964, in the matter of The State U.P. v.
Mohammad Naim2, the Supreme Court (Constitution Bench)
has held that the High Court can in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction expunge remarks made by it or by a Lower Court if
it be necessary to do so to prevent abuse of the process of the
court or otherwise, to secure the ends of justice and observed
as under:-
"9. We think that the High Court of Bombay is correct and the High Court can in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction expunge remarks made by it or by a lower court if it be necessary to do so to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; the jurisdiction is however of an exceptional nature and has to be exercised in exceptional cases only."
8. Their Lordships have also laid- down the test in considering the
expunction of disparaging remarks made against persons or
authorities whose conduct comes for consideration before the
Court of law to be decided by them by summing up as under:-
"(a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself.
(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and
(c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognized that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature,
2 AIR 1964 SC 703
and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve."
9. Similarly, in the matter of Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of
Bihar3, the Supreme Court has held that the High Court has
inherent power to expunge objectionable remarks in judgment
and order of the subordinate court against stranger, after it has
become final and culled out the principles as under:-
"7-8. From the aforesaid discussion the following principles emerge:
(1) A judgment of a criminal Court is final; it can be set aside or modified only in the manner prescribed by law.
(2) Every Judge, whatever may be his rank in the hierarchy, must have an unrestricted right to express his views in any matter before him without fear or favour.
(3) There is a correlative and self-imposed duty in a Judge not to make irrelevant remarks or observations without any foundation, especially in the case of witnesses or parties not before him, affecting their character or reputation.
(4) An appellate Court has jurisdiction to judicially correct such remarks, but it will do so only in exceptional cases where such remarks would cause irrevocable harm to a witness or a party not before it.
29. When the question arises before the High Court in any specific case whether to resort to such undefined power it is essential for it to exercise great caution and circumspection. Thus when it is moved by an aggrieved party to expunge any 3 AIR 1964 SC 1
passage from the order or judgment of a subordinate Court it must be fully satisfied that the passage complained of is wholly irrelevant and unjustifiable, that its retention on the records will cause serious harm to the person to whom it refers and that its expunction will not affect the reasons for the judgment or order."
10. Likewise, in the matter of Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan
Kar4, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that
harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against
persons and authorities whose conduct comes into
consideration before courts of law unless it is really necessary
for the decision of the case and followed the decision of the
Supreme Court in the matter of Mohammad Naim (supra) and
observed as under:-
"24. It is, therefore, settled law that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against persons and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. We hold that the adverse remarks made against the appellant were neither justified nor called for."
11. Similar is the proposition laid down in the matter of R. K.
Lakshmanan v. A. K. Srinivasan5, in which the Supreme
Court has followed the tests laid down for expunction of
adverse remarks in Mohammad Naim (supra).
4 (1986) 2 SCC 569 5 (1974) 2 SCC 566
12. In the matter of A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta 6, their
Lordships of the Supreme Court have emphasized the need for
judicial restraint and held that judicial restraint and discipline
are necessary to the orderly administration of justice and
observed as under:-
"13. Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint, this humility of function should be constant theme of our judges. This quality in decision making is as much necessary for judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary. Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect, that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come before the court as well to other coordinate branches of the State, the executive and the legislature. There must be mutual respect. When these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the judge nor for the judicial process."
13. Their Lordships have further concluded that intemperate
comments should not be made by the Judges and observed as
under:-
"14. The Judge's Bench is a seat of power. Not only do judges have power to make binding decision, their decisions legitimate the use of power by other officials. The judges have the absolute and unchallengeable control of the court domain. But they cannot misuse their authority by intemperate comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism 6 (1990) 2 SCC 533
of counsel, parties or witnesses. We concede that the court has the inherent power to act freely upon its own conviction on any matter coming before it for adjudication, but it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that derogatory remarks ought not to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct."
14. In the matter of Monish Dixit v. State of Rajasthan7, it has
been held by the Supreme Court that castigating remarks
against any person should not be made and the Court is
required to give opportunity of being heard in the matter in
respect of the proposed remarks or strictures and the same is
basic requirement, otherwise offending remarks would be in
violation of the principles of natural justice and held as under:-
"43. Even those apart, this Court has repeatedly cautioned that before any castigating remarks are made by the Court against any person, particularly when such remarks could ensue serious consequences on the future career of the person concerned he should have been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter in respect of the proposed remarks or strictures. Such an opportunity is the basic requirement, for, otherwise the offending remarks would be in violation of the principles of natural justice. In this case such an opportunity was not given to PW 30 (Devendra Kumar Sharma)."
7 AIR 2001 SC 93
15. In the matter of Prakash Singh Teji v. Northern India Goods
Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd.8 it has been held by the Supreme
Court that adverse remarks should not be made unless it is
necessary for decision of case and opportunity to give his
explanation should be afforded to the concerned officer and
observed as under:-
"13. In the light of the above principles and in view of the explanation as stated by the appellant for commenting the conduct of the plaintiff, we are satisfied that those observations and directions are not warranted. It is settled law that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against persons and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before Courts of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof. The direction of the High Court placing copy of their order on the personal/service record of the appellant and a further direction for placing copy of the order before the Inspecting Judge of the officer for perusal that too without giving him an opportunity would, undoubtedly, affect his career. Based on the above direction, there is every possibility of taking adverse decision about the performance of the appellant. We hold that the adverse remarks made against the appellant was neither justified nor called for."
16. The principle of law laid down in above-stated judgments have
been followed with approval by Supreme Court recently in the
matters of Amar Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh9, State
of Gujarat v. Justice R.A.Mehta (Retired)10, Om Prakash 8 2009 AIR SCW 3078 9 (2012) 6 SCC 491 10 (2013) 3 SCC 1
Chautala v. Kanwar Bhan11 and State of Uttar Pradesh v.
Anil Kumar Sharma12.
17. The Supreme Court in the matter of Pankaj Chaudhary (supra)
their Lordships has clearly held that in case of defective / illegal
investigation disparaging remarks/ direction to initiate
prosecution should not be passed against the police officials
without affording them opportunity of hearing. It was held as
under : -
"42. While passing disparaging remarks against the police officials and directing prosecution against them, in our considered view, the High Court has failed to bear in mind the well settled principles of law that should govern the courts before making disparaging remarks. Any disparaging remarks and direction to initiate departmental action/ prosecution against the persons whose conduct comes into consideration before the court would have serious impact in their official career.
45. Since the High Court has passed strictures against the police officials who were involved in the investigation in FIR No.559 of 1997 without affording an opportunity of hearing to them, the disparaging remarks are liable to be set aside."
18. A conspectus of the judgment mentioned hereinabove would
show that though judge has unrestricted right to express his
views in any matter before him but there is corresponding duty
in a judge not to make unmerited and undeserving remarks
specially in case of witnesses or the parties who are not before 11 (2014) 5 SCC 417 12 (2015) 6 SCC 716
him affecting their character and reputation unless it is
absolutely necessary for just and proper decision of the case
and that too after affording an opportunity of explaining or
defending that witness or the party as the case may be, judicial
decisions must be judicial in nature and it must show judicial
respect to the litigant/party, witnesses who come before the
court for their cause. It is also well settled that this Court in
exercise of inherent or extraordinary jurisdiction can expunge
those remarks made by subordinate court following the three
tests laid down in Mohammad Naim (supra), if it is really
necessary to do so or prevent abuse of the process of the court
or to secure the ends of the justice in exceptional cases, where
those remarks would cause irreparable injury to the witness or
party not before the court holding that retention of those
undeserving remarks will cause harm to the person referred
and the expunction will not affect the judgment rendered by the
court.
19. Reverting to the facts of this case in the light of the aforesaid
principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the adverse
remarks passed by learned Special Judge is absolutely
contrary to the well settled principles of law. The learned
Special Judge ought to have given a reasonable opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner herein before passing any adverse
comments for discrepancies in the investigation.
20. Particularly, it is not the case of respondents/State that
petitioner was afforded an opportunity to explain those
circumstances and similarly such adverse remarks were neither
necessary nor justifiable for the just decision of the case. Thus
the offending remarks made by the trial Court in its judgment
are in breach of the judgments rendered by their Lordships of
the Supreme Court in Mohammad Naim and Pankaj
Chaudhary (supra), and as such, retention of those remarks
would cause legal harm and demonstrating consequence in
service career of the petitioner herein and accordingly the
adverse remarks being unreasonable deserve to be expunged
in the ends of justice.
21. Following the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme
Court, we are inclined to allow this writ petition. Consequently,
the adverse remarks made by the Special Judge in para 34 in
the matter of State of Chhattisgarh v. Mohan Sao & Anr.
decided on 27.07.2021 are hereby expunged.
22. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated
hereinabove.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge Judge
Aks
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