Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 2 Chatt
Judgement Date : 2 January, 2023
1
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Criminal Appeal No. 116 of 2015
1. Nanku Uraon S/o Udal Uraon, Aged about 40 years, R/o
Village Cherhapara, P.S. Charcha, District Koriya, Civil
and Revenue District Koriya, Chhattisgarh.
2. Gajanand S/o Kanhaiya Lal Panika, Aged about 35 years,
R/o Village Shivpur, P.S. Charcha, District Koriya, Civil
and Revenue District Koriya, Chhattisgarh.
---Appellants
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh through Station House Officer,
Police Station Charcha, District Koriya, Chhattisgarh.
---Respondent
For Appellants :- Mr. Anil Gulati, Advocate
For State :- Mr. Avinash Singh, P.L.
Criminal Appeal No. 655 of 2013
Brijbhan Singh S/o Late Gulab Singh Rajpoot, Aged about
40 years, R/o Chehara Para P.S. Charcha, District Koriya,
Chhattisgarh. Permanent Address: Ledari, Badi Dafai, P.S.
Jhagarakhand, District Koriya, Chhattisgarh.
---Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh through Police Station Charcha,
District Koriya, Chhattisgarh.
---Respondent
2
For Appellant :- Dr. Kumaresh Tiwari, Advocate
For State :- Mr. Avinash Singh, P.L.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Judgment on Board
02/01/2023
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
1. Since common question of law and fact is involved in both
of these appeals and since both of them have arisen out of
the impugned judgment dated 22/25/2013 passed by
learned Special Judge, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Koriya,
Baikunthpur in Special Sessions Trial No. 15/2009,
therefore, both of these appeals have been clubbed
together, heard together and are being decided by this
common judgment.
2. The two appellants namely Nanku Uraon (A-1) and
Gajanand (A-2) have preferred Criminal Appeal No.
116/2015 whereas the sole appellant namely Brijbhan
Singh (A-3) has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 655/2013
calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of
the impugned judgment by which they have been
convicted for offences punishable under Sections 302 read
with Section 34 of IPC and Section 201 of IPC and they
have been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with
fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine,
additional R.I. for 6 months; and R.I. for 7 years with fine
of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine, additional
R.I. for 6 months, respectively.
3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 05/04/2008 at
about 9 PM at Shivpur (Kathoutiyapara) within the ambit
of Police Station Charcha, the appellants herein, in
furtherance of their common intention, assaulted
Heerasingh Gond and murdered him, knowing fully well
that he belonged to Scheduled Tribe and in order to screen
themselves from the offence, they threw his dead body on
railway line and they, thereby, committed the aforesaid
offences.
4. Further case of the prosecution is that on 05/04/2008 at
noon, deceased Heerasingh, son of complainant Patango
Bai (P.W.-13) left his house to go the house of his maternal
uncle Hariprasad, but did not return to his house in the
next two days upon which his mother and family members
thought that he must still be at his uncle's house. On
07/04/2008, Sohan (P.W.-5), brother of Patango Bai
(P.W.-13), informed her that deceased was in the company
of Nanku Uraon (A-1) and Brijbhan Singh (A-3) and on
05/04/2008, deceased consumed liqour at the house of
Gajanand along with the appellants/accused persons.
Thereafter, on 06/04/2008, information was received by
the Police from the Stationmaster that a dead body of
unknown person was lying on the railway line pursuant to
which merg intimation was registered vide Ex. P/14 and
panchnama proceeding was conducted vide Ex. P/4 and
the dead body was cremated. Pursuant thereof, a written
report was lodged by Patango Bai (P.W.-13) at the Police
Station regarding murder of her son Heerasingh
committed by the three appellants/accused persons and
she also identified the clothes of the deceased on the basis
of which first information report was lodged against them
vide Ex. P/27 for offences punishable under Sections
302,201/34 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989.
Father of the deceased, Prahlad Singh (P.W.-15) moved an
application before the SDM and after his permission, the
dead body of deceased Heerasingh was exhumed, which
was identified by Patango Bai (P.W.-13). Pursuant thereof,
the dead body was subjected to postmortem which was
conducted by Dr. Rameshwar Sharma (P.W.-7) and as per
the postmortem report (Ex. P/8), cause of death is said to
be coma due to head injury. Memorandum statement of
appellant/accused Brijbhan Singh (A-3) was recorded vide
Ex. P/10 and pursuant thereof recovery of wooden club
was made at his instance vide Ex. P/11. After due
investigation, the three appellants/accused persons were
charge-sheeted for offences punishable under Sections
302/34 and 201 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of
1989 which was committed to the Court of Special Judge
for trial in accordance with law. The appellants/accused
persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence.
5. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined
as many as 26 witnesses and brought on record 45
documents. Statements of the appellants/accused persons
were taken under Section 313 of CrPC wherein they
denied guilt, however, they examined none in their defence
and exhibited three documents.
6. Learned Special Judge, after appreciating the oral and
documentary evidence on record, though acquitted the
three appellants/accused persons for offence punishable
under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989, however,
convicted them for offences punishable under Sections
302/34 and 201 of IPC and sentenced them as aforesaid.
7. Mr. Anil Gulati and Dr. Kumaresh Tiwari, learned counsel
for the appellants/accused persons, would submit that
the appellants/accused persons have been erroneously
convicted by the trial Court without there being any
evidence of prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The only evidence of last seen given by Kalawati (P.W.-16)
is not direct evidence rather it is hearsay evidence.
Moreover, though pursuant to the memorandum
statement of Brijbhan Singh (A-3), recovery of wooden club
has been made vide Ex. P/11, but it has not been sent for
FSL in order to prove whether it contained any human
blood, much less, any blood at all and thus, it would not
corroborate the evidence of last seen. As such, the
appellants/accused persons deserve to be acquitted of the
charges levelled against them.
8. Per contra, Mr. Avinash Singh, learned State counsel,
would submit that prosecution has been able to prove the
offence beyond reasonable doubt and as such, learned
Special Judge has rightly convicted the
appellants/accused persons for the aforesaid offences.
Therefore, both of the instant appeals deserve to be
dismissed.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered
their rival submissions made herein-above and went
through the records with utmost circumspection.
10. The first question for consideration would be whether the
death of deceased Heerasingh was homicidal in nature ?
11. Learned Special Judge has recorded an affirmative finding
in this regard and held the death of deceased Heerasingh
to be homicidal in nature relying upon the postmortem
report (Ex. P/7) which has been proved by Dr. Rameshwar
Sharma (P.W.-7) wherein he has clearly stated that the
cause of death is coma due to head injury, however, he
has not opined as to whether the death of the deceased
was homicidal in nature or not. In his cross-examination,
he has stated that the death of the deceased could have
been caused by train accident, however, looking to the
description of the injury that the deceased had suffered in
his head as described in the postmortem report (Ex. P/7),
we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court has
rightly held the death of the deceased to be homicidal in
nature, more so, when it has not been seriously disputed
by learned counsel for the appellants. We hereby affirm
the finding recorded by the trial Court that the death of
deceased Heerasingh was homicidal in nature.
12. The next question for consideration would be whether the
trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants/accused
persons for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC,
holding them to be the perpetrators of the crime in
question ?
13. The conviction of the appellants/accused persons is
mainly based upon the evidence of last seen together given
by Kalawati (P.W.-16).
14. In the matter of Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa1, the
Supreme Court has noted the fact that at the stage of
inquest, the important incriminating circumstance
namely, the deceased was last seen in the company of the
accused, was not noted and that is not there in the
inquest report. Thereafter, in view of the above fact and
other evidence on record, their Lordships have held that
the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused
is not established beyond reasonable doubt.
15. In the matter of In the matter of Arjun Marik v. State of
Bihar2, it has been held by their Lordships of the
Supreme Court have held that conviction cannot be
1 (1991) 3 SCC 27 2 1994 Supp (2) SCC 372
made solely on the basis of theory of 'last seen together'
and observed in paragraph 31 as under :-
"31. Thus the evidence that the appellant had gone to Sitaram in the evening of 19-7-1985 and had stayed in the night at the house of deceased Sitaram is very shaky and inconclusive. Even if it is accepted that they were there it would at best amount tothough a number of witnesses have been examined be the evidence of the appellants having been seen last together with the deceased. But it is settled law that the only circumstance of last seen will not complete the chain of circumstances to record the finding that it is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and, therefore, no conviction on that basis alone can be founded."
16. Likewise in the matter of State of Goa v. Sanjay
Thakran3 the Supreme Court has held that the
circumstance of last seen together would be a relevant
circumstance in a case where there was no possibility of
any other persons meeting or approaching the deceased
at the place of incident or before the commission of
crime in the intervening period. It was observed in
paragraph 34 as under :-
"34. From the principle laid down by this Court, the circumstance of last-seen together would normally be taken into consideration for finding the accused guilty of the offence charged with when it is established by the prosecution that the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were found together alive and when the deceased was found dead is so small that possibility of any other person being with the deceased could completely be ruled out.
The time gap between the accused persons seen in the company of the deceased and the detection of the crime would be a material consideration for appreciation of the evidence and placing reliance 3 (2007) 3 SCC 755
on it as a circumstance against the accused. But, in all cases, it cannot be said that the evidence of last seen together is to be rejected merely because the time gap between the accused persons and the deceased last seen together and the crime coming to light is after a considerable long duration. There can be no fixed or straight jacket formula for the duration of time gap in this regard and it would depend upon the evidence led by the prosecution to remove the possibility of any other person meeting the deceased in the intervening period, that is to say, if the prosecution is able to lead such an evidence that likelihood of any person other than the accused, being the author the crime, becomes impossible, then the evidence of circumstance of last seen together, although there is long duration of time, can be considered as one of the circumstances in the chain of circumstances to prove the guilt against such accused persons. Hence, if the prosecution proves that in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no possibility of any other person meeting or approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of the crime, in the intervening period, the proof of last seen together would be relevant evidence. For instance, if it can be demonstrated by showing that the accused persons were in exclusive possession of the place where the incident occurred or where they were last seen together with the deceased, and there was no possibility of any intrusion to that place by any third party, then a relatively wider time gap would not affect the prosecution case. "
17. Similarly, in the matter of Kanhaiya lal v. State of
Rajasthan4, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have
clearly held that the circumstance of last seen together
does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference
that it was the accused who committed the crime and
there must be something more establishing connectivity
between the accused and the crime. Mere non-
explanation on the part of the appellant in our
4 (2014) 4 SCC 715
considered opinion, by itself cannot lead to proof of guilt
against the appellant. It has been held in paragraphs 15
and 16 as under :-
"15. The theory of last seen - the appellant having gone with the deceased in the manner noticed hereinbefore, is the singular piece of circumstantial evidence available against him. The conviction of the appellant cannot be maintained merely on suspicion, however strong it may be, or on his conduct. These facts assume further importance on account of absence of proof of motive particularly when it is proved that there was cordial relationship between the accused and the deceased for a long time. The fact situation bears great similarity to that in Madho Singh v. State of Rajasthan5.
16. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, it is not possible to sustain the impugned judgment and sentence. This appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant- accused Kanhaiya Lal are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge by giving benefit of doubt. He is directed to be released from the custody forthwith unless required otherwise."
18. In the matter of Anjan Kumar Sarma v. State of
Assam6 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have
clearly held that in a case where other links have been
satisfactorily made out and circumstances point to guilt
of accused, circumstance of last seen together and
absence of explanation would provide an additional link
which completes the chain. In absence of proof of other
circumstances the only circumstance of last seen
together and absence of satisfactory explanation, cannot
be made basis of conviction.
5 (2010) 15 SCC 588 6 (2017) 14 SCC 359
19. Finally in the matter of Navneethakrishnan v. State by
Inspector of Police7, their Lordships of the Supreme
Court have clearly held that evidence of last seen is an
important piece of evidence, but accused cannot be
convicted solely on the basis of evidence of last seen
together and it requires corroboration and held as
under:-
"18. ... It is a settled legal position that the law presumes that it is the person, who was last seen with the deceased, would have killed the deceased and the burden to rebut the same lies on the accused to prove that they had departed. Undoubtedly, the last seen theory is an important event in the chain of circumstances that would completely establish and/or could point to the guilt of the accused with some certainty. However, this evidence alone can't discharge the burden of establishing the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt and requires corroboration."
20. In the matter of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and
another8, their Lordships of the Supreme Court found
that there was considerable time gap of approximately
8½ hours when the deceased was last seen alive with
the accused persons and their Lordships held that there
being a considerable time gap between the persons seen
together and the proximate time of crime, the
circumstance of last seen together, even if proved,
cannot clinchingly fasten the guilt on the accused.
21. In the instant case, as per the statement of Kalawati
(P.W.-16), deceased Heerasingh was last seen with
7 (2018) 16 SCC 161 8 (2007) 3 SCC 755
Nanku (A-1) on 05/04/2008 at 4 PM whereas the dead
body of the deceased was recovered on 06/04/2008 at
10:30 PM and thereafter, merg intimation was registered
vide Ex. P/14 and the body was cremated holding it to
be the body of an unknown person. As such, there is a
considerable time gap between the time when the
deceased was last seen with Nanku (A-1) and the time
when his dead body was recovered. Furthermore, as per
the statement of Kalawati (P.W.-16), on 05/04/2008,
when the deceased had come to her house, only Nanku
(A-1) came and called him and deceased Heerasingh left
the house with him and after two days, a village boy
named Babua informed Kalawati (P.W.-16) that
someone has killed Heerasingh and left his body on the
Shivpur railway line. She has further stated that
thereafter, she went to the said railway line along with
her husband Hariprasad but did not find the body of the
deceased and then she went to the house of the
deceased and informed his mother Patango Bai (P.W.-
13) that on 05/04/2008, Nanku (A-1) had come to her
house to call the deceased and he left with him at 4 PM
and thereafter, she did not know anything about the
deceased. Pursuant to that, she visited the house of
Gajanand (A-2)) wherein his wife informed her that
deceased was at their house and he was drinking
alcohol along with Gajanand (A-2), Nanku (A-1) and
Brijbhan (A-3) and some dispute arose between them
and thereafter, she did not know where all the four of
them went. As such, though Kalawati (P.W.-16) has
proved that deceased was last seen with Nanku (A-1)
but there is a considerable time gap between last seen
together and the time when the dead body of the
deceased was recovered, which is more than 12 hours.
Therefore, it cannot be held that only appellant/accused
Nanku (A-1) is the perpetrator of the offence and
moreover, Kalawati (P.W.-13) has stated that wife of
Gajanand (A-2) told her that deceased was last seen
with Nanku (A-1), Gajanand (A-2) and Brijbhan (A-3),
however, wife of Gajanand has not been examined
before the Court for the reasons best known to
prosecution. As such, we are of the considered opinion
that prosecution has failed to prove the circumstance of
last seen together beyond reasonable doubt and on that
basis, it cannot be held that appellants/accused
persons are the perpetrators of the crime in question.
22. It is also the case of the prosecution that pursuant to
memorandum statement of Brijbhan Singh (A-3)
recorded vide Ex. P/10, recovery of wooden club has
been made at his instance vide Ex. P/11, which
corroborates the evidence of last seen together.
However, though the recovery of wooden club was made
from Brijbhan Singh (A-3), but the said wooden club
has not been sent for FSL to prove that it was stained
with human blood and to prove that it was used by the
appellants/accused persons in commission of the crime
in question. As such, there is no other corroborating
evidence available on record to connect the
appellants/accused persons with the crime in question
and therefore, it cannot be held that appellants/accused
persons are the perpetrators of the crime in question.
23. Reverting to the facts of the case in light of the aforesaid
legal position, it is quite vivid that prosecution has only
been able to establish that deceased Heerasingh was
last seen with Nanku (A-1) and except that, no other
incriminating links have been satisfactorily made out
and no other incriminating circumstance which leads to
the hypothesis of guilt against the appellants/accused
persons has been proved. As such, in absence of proof
of other circumstances or chain of circumstances, only
the theory of last seen together cannot be made sole
basis for conviction of the appellants/accused persons
as it would be unsafe to rest conviction only on the
theory of last seen together. Therefore, we are of the
considered opinion that learned Special Judge is
absolutely unjustified in convicting the
appellants/accused persons for offences punishable
under Sections 302/34 and 201 of IPC. We hereby set
aside the conviction so recorded and the sentences so
awarded by the Special Judge to the appellants/accused
persons vide the judgment impugned. The
appellants/accused persons are acquitted of the
charges levelled against them and since they are already
on bail, they need not surrender, however, their bail
bonds shall remain in operation for a period of six
months in view of the provision contained under Section
437A of CrPC.
24. Accordingly, both of these criminal appeals stand
allowed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge Judge
Harneet
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