Vinod Shah vs Ravindra @ Ravi Ganguwar
2022 Latest Caselaw 6439 Chatt

                                                                        NAFR

          HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

                     First Appeal No.27 of 2018

                Judgment Reserved on :     24.8.2022
                Judgment Delivered on :   21.10.2022

1. Vinod Shah, S/o Kishanlal Shah, aged about 59 years, R/o Katora
   Talab, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
2. Varun Shah, S/o Vinesh Shah, aged about 50 years, R/o Katora Talab,
   Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3. Mansingh Verma, S/o Bhauram Verma, aged about 55 years, R/o
   Bohardih, Tahsil Berla, District Durg, Chhattisgarh
                                                       ---- Appellants
                                 versus
1. Ravindra @ Ravi Ganguwar, S/o Late Rajeshwar Rao Ganguwar,
   aged about 51 years, R/o 110, Ampress Mill Society, Shrinagar,
   Nagpur, Maharashtra, through his power of attorney holder Prashant
   Dongaonkar, S/o Late Laxman Rao Dongaonkar, aged about 38 years,
   R/o Motipara, Near Narayan Niwas, Durg, Tahsil and District Durg,
   Chhattisgarh
2. Suresh Dongaonkar, S/o Late Pandurang Dongaonkar, aged about 52
   years, R/o Village Kauhadiya, Patwari Halka No.40, Anandgaon, Post
   Budheli, Tahsil Berla, District Durg, Chhattisgarh At present R/o Bock
   No.13-14, Building No.B-20, Girdhar Nagar, In front of Girdhar Nagar,
   Pune, Maharashtra
3. Smt. Daya Choudhari, w/o Amar Singh Choudhari, aged about 42
   years, R/o House No.25, Sector 17, Panchkula, Tahsil and Police
   Station and Post Panchkula, Haryana
4. Dilbag Singh, S/o Tarif Singh, aged about 59 years, R/o 47E-8, Marla
   Pik House, Sonipath, Tahsil, Police Station and Post Sonipath,
   Haryana
5. Sukhvir Singh, S/o Charan Singh, aged about 48 years, R/o Khedijath,
   Rahsil Police Station and Post Jhajjar, Haryana
6. Kuldeep Singh, S/o Deewan Singh, aged about 44 years, R/o New
   Sabji Mandi, Dilli Kharkhoda, Tahsil, Police Station and Post
   Sabjimandi Kharkhoda, Haryana
7. I.C.L. Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Through its Partner, Roshanlal Sharma,
   S/o Jairam Sharma, aged about 40 years, R/o Mahendragarh, Tahsil
   and District Mahendragarh, Haryana, Corporate Office 372, Industruak
   Area, Phase No.1, Panchkula, Haryana
8. State of Chhattisgarh     through   Collector,   Durg,    District   Durg,
   Chhattisgarh
                                                            --- Respondents
                                                    2



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For Appellants : Shri Manoj Paranjpe, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Shri Tarendra Kumar Jha, Advocate For Respondent No.8 : Shri Ghanshyam Patel, Govt. Advocate For Other Respondents : None

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Singh Chandel

C.A.V. JUDGMENT

1. The instant appeal arises out of the judgment and decree dated

29.11.2017 passed by the Additional District Judge, Bemetara,

District Bemetara in Civil Suit No.7A of 2016.

2. Facts of the case, in short, are that the plaintiff/Respondent 1 filed a

suit, being Civil Suit No.7A of 2016 for declaration and injunction

with respect to the land bearing Khasra No.742 and 753 area 1.40

hectares and 2.39 hectares, respectively situated at Village

Kauhadiya, Tahsil Berla, District Durg (now District Bemetara). In

the plaint, relief of declaration was sought to the effect that the sale

deed dated 20.2.2004 executed by defendant 1 in favour of

defendants 2 to 5 is illegal and void and is not binding upon the

plaintiff. Relief of injunction was also sought to the effect that

defendants 2 to 5 be restrained from interfering with the title and

possession of the land in question. It was pleaded by the plaintiff

that the plaintiff is the owner of the land in question. It was alleged

that defendant 1 has executed the sale deed dated 20.2.2004 in

respect of the property in question in favour of defendants 2 to 5 by

impersonating himself to be the power of attorney holder of the

plaintiff. It was alleged that no power of attorney was executed at

any time in favour of defendant 1. The power of attorney is a

forged document and on the basis of said forged document the sale

deed has been executed by defendant 1, who has no right or title

over the property in question. During pendency of the civil suit,

defendant 6 and defendants 8, 9 and 10 were also added as

defendants on the basis of subsequent sale of the suit property

firstly by defendants 2 to 5 to defendant 6 and secondly by

defendant 6 to defendants 8, 9 and 10.

3. After submission of his written statement, defendant 1 did not

appear before the Trial Court and the Trial Court proceeded ex

parte against him. In his written statement, defendant 1 pleaded

that on the basis of the power of attorney made by the plaintiff, he

sold the land to defendants 2 to 5. It is further pleaded that before

sale of the land and after the sale also he had informed the plaintiff

about the sale. The plaintiff made a false and fabricated report

against defendant 1. A closure report has already been filed by the

police in the criminal case. It is further pleaded that on the basis of

sale deed, defendants 2 to 5 are in possession of the suit land.

Without claiming relief of possession the suit merely for declaration

is not maintainable.

4. No written statement was filed by defendants 2 to 5 and defendant

6 and they remained ex parte before the Trial Court.

5. Defendants 8, 9 and 10, i.e., the Appellants filed a joint written

statement and denied all the allegations made in the plaint. It was

pleaded by them that the plaintiff has duly executed the power of

attorney in favour of defendant 1 and on the basis of the said power

of attorney, defendant 1 first sold the land to defendants 2 to 5 after

getting the full consideration amount. Thereafter, the suit land was

sold by defendants 2 to 5 to defendant 6. Further, defendant 6 sold

the land to defendants 8, 9 and 10 through a registered sale deed.

Since beginning defendants 8, 9 and 10 are in possession of the

suit land. They have developed the land and invested a huge

amount in it. Their names are also mutated in the land records.

Before purchasing the property, defendants 8, 9 and 10 had invited

objections through newspapers. The plaintiff did not raise any

objection and after a lapse of 8-10 months, defendants 8, 9 and 10

purchased the property from defendant 6. Since then they are in

possession. They are the bona fide purchasers and have

purchased the property after due verification. It was further

pleaded that after their impleading as defendants no relief can be

sought by the plaintiff against them. Therefore also, no relief can

be granted against defendants 8, 9 and 10.

6. On the basis of the pleadings, the Trial Court framed issues. After

recording evidence of the parties and hearing the arguments

raised, the Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff.

Hence, the instant appeal.

7. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants/defendants 8, 9 and

10 submitted that the Trial Court has wrongly fastened the burden

on the defendants. The Trial Court has grossly erred in holding that

no power of attorney was executed in favour of defendant 1. The

plaintiff has failed to prove that the power of attorney executed in

favour of defendant 1 is a forged document. The entire claim of the

plaintiff is based on that document, i.e., the power of attorney. But,

neither the forgery has been proved nor was the original copy of the

said document produced before the Trial Court. The burden of

proof that the allegation of fraud by defendant 1 was on the plaintiff

and the plaintiff has failed to discharge the said burden. The Trial

Court wrongly fastened this burden on the defendants. It was

further submitted by the Learned Counsel that the suit filed by the

plaintiff only for declaration without seeking the relief of possession

is hit by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and the suit for

declaration simplicitor would not be maintainable because on the

date of filing of the suit defendants 2 to 5 were in possession of the

land in question. The Trial Court has also grossly erred in holding

that the plaintiff is in possession of the property in question. No

document or other evidence has been adduced to prove the

possession of the plaintiff. Therefore, the finding of the Trial Court

in this regard is not sustainable. It was further submitted by the

Learned Counsel that the Trial Court has also failed to appreciate

that the plaintiff has not paid the proper ad valorem Court fee and,

therefore, on this ground also, the suit is liable to be dismissed.

The Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the sale deed executed

in favour of defendants 8, 9 and 10 was neither challenged by the

plaintiff nor was there any pleading in respect of the execution of

the said sale deed. In absence of specific challenge to the sale

deed executed in favour of defendants 8, 9 and 10, the suit cannot

be decreed. The Trial Court grossly erred in holding that the

plaintiff is in possession of the property though names of

defendants 8, 9 and 10 are recorded in the revenue records. They

are in actual possession of the suit property after purchase thereof.

It was further argued that during pendency of the civil suit, the

application for amendment in the pleadings of the plaint was filed

by the plaintiff for claiming relief of possession also, but, the

application was dismissed by the Trial Court and, therefore,

admittedly, the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property.

Therefore, without claiming relief of possession of the suit land, the

suit preferred by the plaintiff is not maintainable.

8. Learned Counsel appearing for Respondent 1/plaintiff supported

the impugned judgment passed by the Trial Court. It was argued

that as the plaintiff was not a party in the sale deed executed by

defendant 1, therefore, for declaring the said sale deed as null and

void, no ad valorem Court fee is required. It was further submitted

that as defendant 1 did not produce himself before the Trial Court

nor did he produce any evidence and further defendants 2 to 5 also

failed to produce the power of attorney on the basis of which the

sale deed was executed, therefore, the Trial Court has rightly held

that no such power of attorney was in existence and, therefore,

rightly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff.

9. Learned Counsel appearing for the State supported the impugned

judgment.

10. I have heard Learned Counsel appearing for the parties and

perused the entire evidence adduced by the parties before the Trial

Court with due care.

11. The whole civil suit preferred by the plaintiff was based upon the

power of attorney allegedly executed by the plaintiff in favour of

defendant 1. Undisputedly, the original power of attorney or

certified copy thereof was not placed before the Trial Court by any

of the parties. From perusal of the sale deed executed by

defendant 1, it appears that the sale deed was executed by power

of attorney holder defendant 1 on the basis of power of attorney

executed by the plaintiff in his favour. It also appears that one

Notary G.D. Sundarani has certified the said power of attorney on

16.12.1996 which is mentioned in the sale deed. The original

power of attorney or its certified copy has not been produced by

any of the parties. It was the allegation of the plaintiff that he did

not execute the said power of attorney and the power of attorney is

a forged document. Thus, the burden to prove these facts was

upon the plaintiff only. Contrary to this, the Trial Court has shifted

the burden to prove these facts upon the defendants.

12. In Rattan Singh v. Nirmal Gill, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 936, it was

observed by the Supreme Court as under:

"44. The requirement regarding shifting of burden onto the defendants had been succinctly discussed in Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, wherein this Court had held that for shifting the burden of proof, it would require more than merely pleading that the relationship is a fiduciary one and it must be proved by producing tangible evidence. The relevant extract of the said decision is reproduced as thus:

"8. The initial burden of proof would be on the plaintiff in view of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, which reads as under:

"101. Burden of proof.--Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which

he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.

When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person."

9. In terms of the said provision, the burden of proving the fact rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative issues and not the party who denies it. The said rule may not be universal in its application and there may be an exception thereto. The learned trial court and the High Court proceeded on the basis that the defendant was in a dominating position and there had been a fiduciary relationship between the parties. The appellant in his written statement denied and disputed the said averments made in the plaint.

10. Pleading is not evidence, far less proof. Issues are raised on the basis of the pleadings. The defendant- appellant having not admitted or acknowledged the fiduciary relationship between the parties, indisputably, the relationship between the parties itself would be an issue. The suit will fail if both the parties do not adduce any evidence, in view of Section 102 of the Evidence Act. Thus, ordinarily, the burden of proof would be on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue and it rests, after evidence is gone into, upon the party against whom, at the time the question arises, judgment would be given, if no further evidence were to be adduced by either side.

11. The fact that the defendant was in a dominant position must, thus, be provided by the plaintiff at the first instance.

xxx xxx xxx

14. But before such a finding is arrived at, the averments as regards alleged fiduciary relationship must be established before a presumption of undue influence against a person in position of active confidence is drawn. The factum of active confidence should also be established.

15. Section 111 of the Evidence Act will apply when the bona fides of a transaction is in question but not when the real nature thereof is in question. The words "active confidence" indicate that the relationship between the parties must be such that one is bound to protect the interests of the other.

16. Thus, point for determination of binding interests or which are the cases which come within the rule of active

confidence would vary from case to case. If the plaintiff fails to prove the existence of the fiduciary relationship or the position of active confidence held by the defendant- appellant, the burden would lie on him as he had alleged fraud. The trial court and the High Court, therefore, in our opinion, cannot be said to be correct in holding that without anything further, the burden of proof would be on the defendant."

(emphasis supplied)

13. Looking to the facts of the present case, it appears that the original

power of attorney or its certified copy has not been produced by

any of the parties. It was the plaintiff, who claimed that the power

of attorney is a forged document and he has not executed the said

power of attorney and, therefore, the initial burden to prove that the

power of attorney executed is a forged document is upon him.

There is a mention of the power of attorney in the sale deed and on

the basis of the said power of attorney the sale deed has been

executed. It is also mentioned in the sale deed that the power of

attorney is certified by Notary G.D. Sundarani on 16.12.1996. As at

the time of recording of evidence he had died, his statement could

not be recorded before the Trial Court. Therefore, it was the

burden of the plaintiff to produce any other evidence in this regard.

He has not summoned any of the officials of the office of the

Registrar of the Registration Department nor has summoned any of

the registers of the office of the said Registrar. Despite that, the

Trial Court has shifted this burden on the defendants, which is not

in accordance with law.

14. Dealing with the issue in Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353,

the Supreme Court observed thus:

"27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption."

15. In Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale v. Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale,

(2009) 12 SCC 101, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

"12. All the four deeds executed on 2.7.1955 are registered documents. They carry a presumption of valid execution. There is no proof to show that the said documents were sham or nominal. The learned courts below have clearly held that the appellant failed to discharge the heavy onus on him. We would however consider the contentions raised before us independently."

16. In Jamila Begum (Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. Shami

Mohd. (Dead) Through Legal Representatives, (2019) 2 SCC 727,

the Supreme Court observed thus:

"16. Sale deed dated 21.12.1970 in favour of Jamila Begum is a registered document and the registration of the sale deed reinforces valid execution of the sale deed. A registered document carries with it a presumption that it was validly executed. It is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to show that the transaction is not valid in law. In Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353, it was held as under: (SCC pp. 360-61, para 27) "27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption."

The above judgment in Prem Singh case has been referred to in Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale v. Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale, (2009) 12 SCC 101."

17. In the light of the above observations made by the Supreme Court,

in the instant case, a presumption in favour of the purchasers can

also be drawn. The sale deed in question is a registered document

and, therefore, it would prima facie be valid in law. Thus, the onus

of proof would be upon the plaintiff, who leads evidence to rebut the

presumption. But, in this case, the plaintiff has not been able to

rebut the said presumption also. Therefore, the finding of the Trial

Court in this regard is not in accordance with law and the Trial

Court has wrongly shifted the burden to prove this fact on the

defendants.

18. With regard to the argument advanced by Learned Counsel for the

Appellants that the suit filed by the plaintiff only for declaration and

injunction without seeking the relief of possession is hit by Section

34 of the Specific Relief Act and the suit for declaration simplicitor

would not be maintainable, undisputedly, before the Trial Court,

after filing of the suit, the plaintiff moved an application for

amendment in the pleadings with regard to grant of consequential

relief of possession also, but, the amendment application moved by

the plaintiff was dismissed by the Trial Court. Thus, it is well

established that the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit land.

Despite that, the Trial Court has held that the possession of the

defendants is only permissive. In Executive Officer, Arulmigu

Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust, Virudhunagar v. Chandran, (2017)

3 SCC 702, the Supreme Court observed as under:

"34. In the present case, the plaintiff having been found not to be in possession and having only sought for declaratory reliefs, the suit was clearly not maintainable and has rightly

been dismissed by the trial court. In this context the reference is made to the judgment of this Court in Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi, (1973) 2 SCC 60, wherein in paras 1 and 4 following was stated: (SCC pp. 60-61) "1. This is a plaintiffs' appeal by special leave. Ram Saran and Raghubir Saran, the plaintiffs are brothers. They jointly owned suit property with Chhabili Kuer, widow of Lalita Prasad. After the death of Chhabili Kuer on 8.2.1971, Ganga Devi, the defendant in the suit came forward as the legal representative of Chhabili Kuer and got the mutation effected in her name in the place of the deceased Chhabili Kuer. In 1958, the plaintiffs brought this suit for a declaration that they are the sole owners of the suit properties. They did not claim possession of either the entire or even any portion of the suit properties.

* * *

4. We are in agreement with the High Court that the suit is hit by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. As found by the fact-finding courts, Ganga Devi is in possession of some of the suit properties. The plaintiffs have not sought possession of those properties. They merely claimed a declaration that they are the owners of the suit properties. Hence the suit is not maintainable."

35. The plaintiff, who was not in possession, had in the suit claimed only declaratory relief along with mandatory injunction. The plaintiff being out of possession, the relief of recovery of possession was a further relief which ought to have been claimed by the plaintiff. The suit filed by the plaintiff for a mere declaration without relief of recovery of possession was clearly not maintainable and the trial court has rightly dismissed the suit. The High Court neither adverted to the above finding of the trial court nor has set aside the above reasoning given by the trial court for holding the suit as not maintainable. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC could not have reversed the decree of the courts below without holding that the above reasoning given by the courts below was legally unsustainable. We, thus, are of the view that the High Court committed error in decreeing the suit."

19. In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148, the Supreme

Court observed as follows:

"55. The section provides that courts have discretion as to declaration of status or right, however, it carves out an exception that a court shall not make any such declaration of status or right where the complainant, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.

56. In Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi, (1973) 2 SCC 60 this Court had categorically held that the suit seeking for declaration of title of ownership but where possession is not sought, is hit by the proviso of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter called "the Specific Relief Act") and, thus, not maintainable. In Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra 1993 Supp (3) SCC 129 this Court dealt with a similar issue where the plaintiff was not in exclusive possession of property and had filed a suit seeking declaration of title of ownership. Similar view has been reiterated observing that the suit was not maintainable, if barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. (See also Gian Kaur v. Raghubir Singh, (2011) 4 SCC 567.)

57. In view of the above, the law becomes crystal clear that it is not permissible to claim the relief of declaration without seeking consequential relief.

58. In the instant case, the suit for declaration of title of ownership had been filed, though Respondent 1-plaintiff was admittedly not in possession of the suit property. Thus, the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and, therefore, ought to have been dismissed solely on this ground. The High Court though framed a substantial question on this point but for unknown reasons did not consider it proper to decide the same."

20. In the light of above observations made by the Supreme Court also,

in the instant case, without seeking the relief of possession, the suit

preferred by the plaintiff only for grant of relief of declaration and

injunction is not maintainable and the finding of the Trial Court in

this regard is also not in accordance with law.

21. Apparently, the suit was filed by the plaintiff only against

defendants Suresh Dongaonkar, Smt. Daya Choudhary, Dilbagh

Singh, Sukhvir Singh and Kuldeep Sigh and the relief was sought

by the plaintiff for declaring the sale deed dated 20.2.2004

executed by defendant 1 Suresh Dongaonkar in favour of

defendants 2 to 5 as null and void and not binding upon the plaintiff

and injunction was also sought against these defendants.

Subsequently, on the basis of the fact that the suit land was sold by

defendants 2 to 5 to defendant 6 and thereafter defendant 6 sold

the suit land to defendants 8, 9 and 10, they have been impleaded

as defendants in the suit. But, the plaintiff has not made any

pleadings against these defendants nor has sought any relief

against them. Undisputedly, at present, the Appellants/defendants

8, 9 and 10 are in possession of the suit land. They have

purchased the suit land through registered sale deed. Without

claiming any relief against them, the Trial Court has declared the

sale deed executed in their favour also null and void and further

without seeking any relief against these defendants again the Trial

Court has granted a decree for injunction. In Ibrahim Uddin case

(supra), it was observed by the Supreme Court thus:

"77. This Court while dealing with an issue in Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. C.P. Joshi, (2011) 11 SCC 786, after placing reliance on a very large number of its earlier judgments including Trojan & Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235, Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal, (2002) 2 SCC 256, Ishwar Dutt v. Collector (LA), (2005) 7 SCC 190 and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 518, held that relief not founded on the pleadings cannot be granted. A decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. No evidence is permissible to be taken on record in the absence of the pleadings in that respect. No party can be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. It was further held that where the evidence was not in the line of the pleadings, the said evidence cannot be looked into or relied upon."

22. In the light of above observation also, the judgment passed by the

Trial Court in the instant case against the subsequent purchasers is

not sustainable.

23. With regard to the Court fee, in Suhrid Singh alias Sardool Singh v.

Randhir Singh, (2010) 12 SCC 112, it was observed by the

Supreme Court as under:

"7. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non- executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to A and B, two brothers. A executes a sale deed in favour of C. Subsequently A wants to avoid the sale. A has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if B, who is not the executant of the deed wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by A is invalid/void and non est/illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non- binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If A, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If B, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs.19.50 under Article 17(iii) of the Second Schedule of the Act. But if B, a non-executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad valorem court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act."

24. In the case in hand also, the plaintiff is not shown as executant of

the sale deed. Rather, the sale deed has been executed by the

power of attorney holder defendant 1 on the basis of power of

attorney. Therefore, the plaintiff is not required to pay any ad

valorem Court fee. Thus, in this regard, the finding of the Trial

Court is in accordance with law.

25. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and

decree are set aside.

26. A decree be drawn up accordingly.

Sd/-

(Arvind Singh Chandel) JUDGE Gopal