Lobhan Verma vs State Of Chhattisgarh And Ors
2021 Latest Caselaw 3094 Chatt

                                  1



                                                            NAFR

                HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

                           CRR No. 821 of 2012

     • Lobhan Verma S/o Shri Ghasiya Verma Aged About 48
       Years R/o Village Kanhera, Post Office Khandsara, PS
       ­ Bemetara Distt. Durg C.G.

                                                  ­­­­ Applicant

                               Versus

     1. State Of Chhattisgarh     Through SHO, Bemetara Distt.
        Durg C.G.

     2. Rohit Verma S/o Dhruv Verma Aged About 28 Years R/o
        Padumsara, PS Bemetara, Distt. Durg C.G.

     3. Dhruv Verma S/o Jhagru Verma Aged About 48 Years R/o
        Padumsara, PS Bemetara, Distt. Durg C.G.

     4. Indra Bai D/o Dhruv Verma Aged About 30 Years R/o
        Padumsara, PS Bemetara, Distt. Durg C.G.

     5. Milapa Bai W/o Dhruv Verma Aged About 45 Years R/o
        Padumsara, PS Bemetara, Distt. Durg C.G.

     6. Santoshi Bai D/o Dhruv Verma Aged About 29 Years R/o
        Padumsara, PS Bemetara, Distt. Durg C.G.

                                                 ­­­­ Respondents


For Applicant          :    Shri Ajay Chandra, Advocate
For State              :    Shri Sanjay Pathak, Panel Lawyer


       D.B.:­      Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and
                   Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Singh Chandel

                           Order On Board

Arvind Singh Chandel, J.

11/11/2021

1. Heard on I.A.No.1/12, application for condonation of delay in filing the criminal revision.

2. The revision is delayed by 168 days.

3. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and

considering the fact that earlier, the applicant had filed

CrMP against impugned judgment of acquittal which was

withdrawn on 13/04/2010, delay in filing this revision is

condoned.

4. Heard on admission.

5. Invoking jurisdiction under Section 397 read with

Section 401 of the CrPC, this revision has been preferred

by the applicant questioning the judgment of acquittal

passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bemetara,

District - Durg (CG) on 22/08/2009 in Sessions Trial

No.287/06.

6. According to the case of the prosecution, the

deceased Rani @ Indrani Bai was married to accused/Rohit

Verma in the year 1999. After marriage, the deceased was

harassed by her husband, mother­in­law, father­in­law and

sister­in­laws in connection with demand of dowry and

finally, she committed suicide by burning herself. The

matter was reported to the police and offence was

registered against the respondents/accused under Section

304(B) of IPC. After filing of charge sheet before the

Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bemetara,

criminal case was registered against all the

accused/respondents. After committing the case to the

Court of Sessions Judge, Bemetara, charges were framed

against them under Section 304(B) IPC and they were

prosecuted for the said offence. In order to prove its

case, the prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses.

7. After appreciating oral and documentary evidence on

record, learned Trial Court acquitted the respondents /

accused vide order dated 22/08/2009 extending benefit of

doubt holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its

case beyond reasonable doubt, against which, this criminal

revision has been filed by the father of the deceased.

8. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the

learned Trial Court is absolutely unjustified in

acquitting the respondents herein extending benefit of

doubt holding that the prosecution did not prove its case

under Section 304­B of IPC beyond reasonable doubt.

Learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondents by

recording totally a perverse finding overlooking the

material available on record and as such, the judgment of

acquittal is based on totally irrelevant consideration

omitting the admissible evidence available on record.

Therefore, the judgment of acquittal deserves to be set

aside and the matter may be remitted to the Trial Court

for re­trial/fresh consideration.

9. On the other hand, Mr. Sanjay Pathak, learned State

counsel, would submit that the scope of revision against

the judgment of acquittal is extremely limited and would

not go beyond the permissible ground as mentioned by the

Supreme Court in the matter of Sheetala Prasad and others

v. Sri Kant and another1 and as such, learned Trial Court

has rightly held that it is the case where no offence has

been committed by present respondents and even otherwise,

benefit of doubt has rightly been extended to them in view

of the fact that they have falsely been implicated in the

crime in question by the applicant. He would also rely

upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of

Logendranath Jha and others v. Shri Polai Lal Biswas2

(para­7).

10. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the

parties, considered their rival submissions made

hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost

circumspection.

11. In order to judge the correctness of the judgment

of acquittal recorded by the trial Court, it would be

appropriate to notice the categories exhaustive on which

the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised by this 1 (2010) 2 SCC 190 2 AIR 1951 SC 316

Court at the instance of a private complainant, which

has been authoritatively laid down by Their Lordships of

the Supreme Court in Sheetala Prasad (supra) in which,

in para­12, Their Lordships have laid down the

categories on which this Court can exercise the

revisional jurisdiction filed at the instance of a

private complainant.

12. In the matter of Sheetala Prasad (supra), it has

been held that this Court can exercise the revisional

jurisdiction (i) where the trial Court has wrongly shut

out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce,

(ii) where the admissible evidence is wrongly brushed

aside as inadmissible, (iii) where the trial court has

no jurisdiction to try the case and has still acquitted

the accused, (iv) where the material evidence has been

overlooked either by the trial court or the appellate

court or the order is passed by considering irrelevant

evidence, and (v) where the acquittal is based on the

compounding of the offence which is invalid under the

law. Their Lordships observed as under:­

"12. The High Court was exercising the revisional jurisdiction at the instance of a private complainant and, therefore, it is necessary to notice the principles on which such revisional jurisdiction can be exercised. Sub­Section (3) of Section 401 of Code of

Criminal Procedure prohibits conversion of a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Without making the categories exhaustive, revisional jurisdiction can be exercised by the High Court at the instance of private complainant (1) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce,

(2) where the admissible evidence is wrongly brushed aside as inadmissible,

(3) where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case and has still acquitted the accused,

(4) where the material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or the appellate court or the order is passed by considering irrelevant evidence and

(5) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law.

15. The High Court has further concluded that no offence punishable under Section 324 IPC is committed by the appellants. This finding could have been recorded only in an appeal filed by the appellants. In the face of prohibition contained in Section 401(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was all the more incumbent upon the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method. Further, the matter is remitted to the learned Additional Sessions Judge for the purpose of passing fresh order of conviction and imposition of sentence on the appellants in the light of what is observed in the impugned judgment."

13. In Logendranath Jha (supra), the Supreme Court has

held that the High Court, while dealing with a revision

petition by a private party against an order of

acquittal, cannot interfere to it in absence of error on

point of law.

14. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the

light of the aforesaid judgment delineating the scope of

interference in the judgment of acquittal recorded by

the learned Trial Court, it would appear that learned

Additional Sessions Judge, while acquitting the

respondents, has recorded following findings ­

(i) That, the marriage of the deceased was solemnized in April, 1999 whereas the death of deceased Rani @ Indrani Bai took place on 15/06/2006 which is beyond the period of 7 years as contained under Section 304 (B) of IPC.

(ii) That, in the dying declaration, the deceased did not make any charge upon the respondents herein and that the prosecution did not examine Ms. Neha (daughter of the deceased) as she was the eye witness of the incident as stated by the prosecution witness Lobhan Verma (PW6), father of the deceased and applicant herein.

(iii) That there is no evidence on record to hold that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death on account of demand of dowry.

15. We have carefully considered the submission of

learned counsel for the parties and evidence available

on record. Learned Trial Court, after appreciating oral

and documentary evidence on record, came to the

conclusion that the death of Rani @ Indrani Bai happened

after 7 years of her marriage and in her dying

declaration, she did not make any allegation against the

respondents herein and the eye witness (her daughter -

Neha) has not been examined and further, finding has

been recorded that there is no material evidence to hold

that soon before her death, the deceased was subjected

to cruelty in connection with demand of dowry. The

abovestated findings recorded by the learned Trial Court

are duly supported by material available on record.

Those findings are neither perverse nor contrary to

records.

16. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, we are of the

considered opinion that the applicant has failed to make

out a case in terms of para­12 (1 to 4) of Sheetala

Prasad's case (supra) to warrant interference in the

judgment of acquittal passed by learned Additional

Sessions Judge and there is no error of law in the order

of acquittal. We do not find any merit in this criminal

revision.

17. Accordingly, the criminal revision deserves to be

and is hereby dismissed.

                     Sd/­                       Sd/­

              (Sanjay K. Agrawal)       (Arvind Singh Chandel)
                     Judge                     Judge

Deepti