R.C. Verma vs State Of Chhattisgarh And Others
2021 Latest Caselaw 825 Chatt

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                                                                      NAFR
            HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
                Writ Petition (S) No.880 of 2009
    R.C. Verma, aged 54 years, Son of late Bharat Chandra
    Verma, Lecturer, Govt.Girls Higher Secondary School,
    Ambagarh Chauki, District Rajnandgaon (Chhattisgarh)
                                                     ­­­­ Petitioner
                              Versus
  1. State   Government    of   Chhattisgarh,   Through­The
     Secretary, Tribal Welfare (S.C., S.T., O.B.C. &
     Minority) Mantralaya, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur (CG)
  2. Commissioner   Tribal     Welfare       (S.C.S.T.,       Minority)
     Distt. Raipur (CG)
  3. Assistant Commissioner Tribal Welfare (S.C.,                    S.T.,
     O.B.C. & Minority), Distt.Rajnandgaon (CG)
  4. Sub­Divisional   Officer        (Revenue)      Mohla,     District
     Rajnandgaon (CG)
  5. Principal Government Higher Secondary School, Manpur,
     Distt.Rajnandgaon (CG)
                                                    ­­­­ Respondents

For Petitioner : Mr.Vinod Kumar Sharma, Advocate For Respondents/State : Mr.Ravi Bhagat, Dy.G.A.

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Order on Board

5.7.2021

1. Proceedings of this matter have been taken­up through

video conferencing.

2. Mr.Vinod Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the

petitioner, would submit that in a regular

departmental enquiry held against the petitioner, by

order dated 3.3.2008 (Annexure P­2) he was inflicted

with penalty of stoppage of one increment without

cumulative effect, against which, he preferred appeal

before the appellate authority under Rule 23 (i) of

the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification,

Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 (hereinafter called as

'Rules of 1966') before the State Government and his

appeal was required to be considered by the appellate

authority under Rule 27(2) of the Rules of 1966, but

that has not been considered and appeal has been

dismissed by order dated 14.1.2009 (Annexure P­1) and

thereafter, he has been reverted on lower post, as

such, the appellate order is contrary to the

provisions contained in Rule 27(2) of the Rules of

1966 which deserves to be set aside.

3. On the other hand, Mr.Ravi Bhagat, learned Deputy

Government Advocate for the respondents/State, would

support the impugned order and submit that appeal

filed by the petitioner has been considered and it has

rightly been dismissed by the appellate authority, as

such, no interference is called for.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and

considered their rival submissions made hereinabove

and also went through the records with utmost

circumspection.

5. Against the order dated 3.3.2008 (Annexure P­2)

imposing minor penalty, the petitioner preferred an

appeal under Rule 23(i) of the Rules of 1966, which

was required to be considered under Rule 27(2) of the

Rules of 1966. Rule 27 of the Rules of 1966 provides

as under:­

"27. Consideration of appeal.­(1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of rule 9 and having regard to the circumstances of the case, the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly.

(2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 10 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rule, the appellate authority shall consider,­

(a) whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been complied with and if not, whether such non­compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice;

(b) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the records; and

(c) whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe, and pass orders­

(i) confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty; or

(ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case...."

6. A careful perusal of the impugned order would show

that the appellate authority firstly quoted the facts

of the case and thereafter in brief order considered

the appeal and dismissed it.

7. In the instant case, the petitioner has been inflicted

penalty of stoppage of one annual increment without

cumulative effect and as such, the appellate authority

was required to consider the appeal filed by the

petitioner in accordance with Rule 27 of the Rules

1966 and could have clearly discussed after holding

that the procedure laid down in the Rules of 1966 has

been complied with, firstly, whether non­compliance of

the rules has resulted in the violation of any

provisions of the Constitution of India or in the

failure of justice, secondly, whether the findings of

the disciplinary authority are warranted by the

evidence on the records and thirdly, whether the

penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe and

pass orders confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting

aside the penalty.

8. It is well settled position of law that the appellate

authority in disciplinary proceeding acts in quasi­

judicial capacity and order passed has to be reasoned

one and showing application of mind to the question

raised by the appellant and if it is not done, the

appellate order is vitiated. (See Divisional Forest

Officer, Kothagudem and others v. Madhusudhan Rao1).

9. The Supreme Court reiterated this principle of law by

observing that an appellate authority by deciding

statutory appeal is not only required to give hearing

to the Government servant, but pass a reasoned order

1 (2008) 3 SCC 469

dealing with the contention raised in the appeal. (See

Deokinandan Sharma v. Union of India and others2).

10. Even if the appellate order is in agreement with

that of the disciplinary authority it may not be

speaking order, but the authority passing the same

must show that there had been proper application of

mind in compliance with the requirement of law while

exercising his jurisdiction particularly when the

rules required application of mind on several factors

and several contentions had been raised and he was

bound to assign reasons so as to enable the Court

reviewing its decision to ascertain as to whether he

had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the

rule required to do. (See Narinder Mohan Arya v.

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others3).

11. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the

light of aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the

Supreme Court in above­stated judgments, it is quite

that the appellate authority did not consider whether

the procedure laid down in the Rules of 1966 has been

complied with, whether non­compliance of the rules has

resulted in the violation of any provisions of the

Constitution of India or in the failure of justice,

whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are

2 (2001) 5 SCC 340 3 (2006) 4 SCC 713

warranted by the evidence on the records and whether

the penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe

and pass orders confirming, enhancing, reducing or

setting aside the penalty and thereafter could have

passed an order.

12. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid

discussion, the order dated 14.1.2009 (Annexure P­1)

passed by the appellate authority is hereby set­aside.

Appeal filed by the petitioner herein is restored to

the file of the appellate authority. The appellate

authority is directed to consider the appeal of the

petitioner in accordance with Rule 27 of the Rules of

1966 within 3 months from the date of receipt of a

copy of this order and will decide the same after

hearing the petitioner and other side, strictly in

accordance with law. The petitioner is at liberty to

file additional documents, if any, in support of his

appeal and take all possible grounds.

13. The writ petition is partly allowed to the extent

indicated hereinabove. No order as to cost(s).

Sd/­

(Sanjay K.Agrawal) Judge

B/­