Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 3458 Chatt
Judgement Date : 3 December, 2021
1
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Judgment reserved on : 21/09/2021
Judgment delivered on: 03 /12/2021
CRA No. 125 of 2002
Maksudan Sahu S/o. Gendlal Sahu, aged about 24 years, R/o
Village Ghotiya, PO- Baldeopur, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
---- Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh, through District Magistrate,
Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
---- Respondent
For Appellant : Ms. Indira Tripathi, Adv.
For State
[[
: Ms. Ishwari Ghritlahre, PL
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey
CAV Order
03/12/2021
1. This appeal arises out of the impugned judgment of conviction
and order of sentence dated 24.01.2002 passed by learned
Special Judge, Rajnandgaon (SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities)
Rajnandgaon (C.G.) in Special Sessions Trial No. 138/2000 whereby
and whereunder, learned Special Judge acquitted the appellant
from Section 3(2)(V) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and convicted him under
Sections 366 and 376 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo
R.I. for 10 years with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and R.I. for 10 years with
fine of Rs. 5,000/- respectively, plus default stipulation.
2. Brief facts of the case are that on the date of incident
prosecutrix was going to her grandmother's house. On the way,
she met with the appellant Maksudan Sahu. Appellant told her to
go with him but the prosecutrix refused to go. Thereafter,
appellant hold her hand and promised to marry with her. Based on
the said promise she went with her and the appellant took her to
Khairagarh, his friend's house, where he committed sexual
intercourse with her and on the very next day he took the
prosecutrix to his aunt's (Bua's) house and from there he left her
to her father's house. On the next day, she narrated the whole
story to her parents. Thereafter, they lodged a report against the
appellant. The concerned police personnel got mark-sheet (Ex-P/1)
and caste certificate of the prosecutrix. In the mark-sheet (Ex. P/1)
date of birth of the prosecutrix was mentioned as 21.09.1983
(below 16 years at the time of incident). Thereafter, the
prosecutrix was sent for the medical examination and after
completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the
appellant and charge was framed under Sections 363, 366 & 376
of the IPC and Section 3(2)(V) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
3. So as to hold the accused/appellant guilty, the prosecution has
examined as many as 8 witnesses. Statement of the
accused/appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of the
Cr.P.C. in which he denied the charges leveled against him and
pleaded innocence and false implication in the case.
4. After examination of oral and documentary evidence, learned
Special Judge acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section
3(2)(V) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 and convicted him under Sections 366 and
376 of the IPC and sentenced him as mentioned above in para 1 of
this order. Hence, the present appeal filed by the appellant.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that findings of the
learned trial Court about age of the prosecutrix is erroneous
because school leaving certificate is not the conclusive proof
regarding the age of the prosecutrix. It is clear from the evidence
of the witnesses that prosecutrix went with the appellant and
resided with him of her own will therefore, ingredients of Section
376 and 366 of the IPC are not attracted. The conviction and
sentence care contrary to the material available on recored, as the
entire evidence shows that the prosecutrix was a consenting
party, therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned trial
Court be set-aside and the appellant may kindly be acquitted from
the alleged charges.
6. On the other hand, learned State counsel has supported the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence of the
Court below convicting the appellant under Section 366 and 376
of the IPC, being based on the material available on record, are
just and proper and do not call for any interference in this appeal.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
records including the impugned judgment.
8. Before the trial Court statement of the prosecutrix was recored.
The prosecutrix in her statement in paras 18 & 19 stated that:-
Þgekjs xkao ls [kSjkx< djhc 7&8 fdyksehVj nwj gSA eSa jkLrs esa fpYykus dh
dksf'k'k dj jgh Fkh rks vkjksih eq>s ekj jgk Fkk] vkSj esjk xyk nck jgk Fkk]
og /kedk fn;k fQj eSa pqipki lkFk pyh xbZA
[kSjkx< vkjksih ds nksLr ds ;gka igqps ml le; og eq>s idM dj ugha j[kk
Fkk ysfdu fcydqy ikl esa j[kk FkkA mlds ?kjokyksa usa vkjksih ls iwNk Fkk fd
dkSu gSA rc vkjksih esjs fy, cksyk Fkk fd esS mlds nksLr dh cgu gWwA nksLr
ds ?kjokyksa us iwNk Fkk fd jkr dks dSls vk;s gks vkjksih us dgk fd LVkbZQaM
ysus vk;s Fks vkSj esjs HkkbZ usa mlds lkFk eq>s nsj gks tkus ds dkj.k cl ls ys
tkus ds fy, dgk Fkk vkSj HkkbZ us dgk Fkk fd lkbZdy ls og ihNs ls vk jgk
gSA eSa cksyuk pkg jgh Fkh ysfdu vkjksih eq>s bl rjg ls ns[k jgk Fkk fd
tSls fd [kk tk;sXkkA mu yksxksa us dgk Fkk fd bruh jkr rd LVkbZQaM ugha
caVrk gSA fQj vkjksih le> x;k fd mldh ckr idM esa vk xbZ gS rks og
mlds nksLr vkSj nksLr ds firk dks lgh ckr crk;k fd Hkxkdj yk;s gSA fQj
nksLr ds firk vkjksih dks MkVs FksAß
9. Mantheer Das PW-7 has stated in para 2 of his cross-
examination that:
ß;g ckr lgh gS fd nksuks iSny tk jgs FksA nksuks vkil esa cksyrs crkrs tk
jgs FksA deys'ojh us Hkh ;g dgk fd og vdsyh viuh cqvk ds ?kj tk jgh
gS blfy;s edlwnu dks og MqejMhg lkFk pyus dks cksyh FkhA vxj
deys'ojh edlwnu ds ckjs esa crkrh fd og mls Hkxkdj ys tk jgk gS rc
ge yksx mls Fkkuk esa fjiksVZ djus ds fy, tkrsA geus mlls dkQh iwNrkN
dh ijarq mlus edlwnu ds f[kykQ dqN ugha crk;kAß
Thus, the abovementioned statement of Mantheer Das (PW-7)
clearly shows that the prosecutrix was a consenting party and she
was going with the appellant of her own will.
10. So far as the age of the prosecutrix is concerned, as per Ex.
P/1, mark-sheet of the prosecutrix, her age is about 16 years and
the same was also admitted by the prosecutrix. Kamalkant
Malviya (PW-5) was the Principal of the 'Shashkiya Purva
madhyamik Shala, Ghitiya' and stated that in Ex. P/11, 'Dakhil
Kharij', the age of the prosecutrix is registered as 21.09.1983. In
his cross-examination he admitted that:
Þ;g ckr lgh gS fd izn'kZ ih 12 esa deys'ojh dh vk;q 21-09-83 izkFkfed
ikB'kkyk ds frfFk ds vk/kkj ij ntZ dh xbZ gSA mDr frfFk vkt eSa ugha
yk;k gWawA Vh-Lkh- ds vykok i`Fkd ls deys'ojh dh vk;q ds laca/k esa esjs }kjk
dksbZ rlnhdh ugha dh xbZ gSA deys'ojh ckbZ dks izkFkfed 'kkyk esa fdl
O;fDr us HkrhZ djk;k fdl vk/kkj ij tUefrfFk fy[kk;k vkSj fdlus mldh
tUefrfFk ds bUnzkt HkrhZ ds le; fd;k ;g eSa ugha TkkurkA izkFkfed 'kkyk esa
deys'ojh dh vk;q dh rkjh[k rlnhd dj fy[kh x;h rFkk fcuk rlnhd ds
fy[kh xbZ eSa ugha crk ldrkAß
In this case, during investigation, radiological examination of the
prosecutrix for confirmation of her age was not done.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of Sudhari Alias
Shhivdhari Singh Vs. State of C.G. passed in 2006(2) CGLJ
328 held in para 11 that:-
11. The following facts thus emerge from the above
discussion:-
(A) It could not be ruled out that the age of the prosecutrix was 16 years or more on the date of occurrence.
(B) It also could not be ruled out that the appellant was falsely implicated.
(C) The testimony of the prosecutrix about rape on her was wholly unworthy of any credit in view of her conduct during the sexual act, if any, the fact that she was menstruating and also since it was not corroborated by medical evidence or by the report of F.S.L.
(D) The possibility that sexual intercourse, if any had been committed with the consent of the prosecutrix could also not be ruled out.
12. In this case the age of the prosecutrix is not proved by the
prosecution and testimony of the prosecutrix about rape on her
was rendered fully unworthy of credit since the medical evidence
has not supported the prosecution case. This Court find that the
prosecution has failed to establish the guilt against the appellant
beyond reasonable doubts.
13. For the reasons mentioned above the appeal is allowed. The
impugned judgment of the trial Court is set aside. The appellant is
acquitted of the charge levelled against him. The appellant is
reported to be on bail. His bail bond furnished by him stand
discharged.
Sd/-
(Rajani Dubey) JUDGE
V/-
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