[Cites 33, Cited by 0]

Calcutta High Court

Madhurina Mitra vs The State Of West Bengal And Others on 11 February, 2026

Author: Supratim Bhattacharya

Bench: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, Supratim Bhattacharya

2026:CHC-OS:52-DB

In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Original Side

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya

APO No. 82 of 2025
With
IA No: GA 1 of 2025

arising out of
WPO No. 624 of 2008

Madhurina Mitra

- Versus -

The State of West Bengal and Others

For the appellant : Mr. Partha Pratim Roy,
Mr. Kushal Chatterjee,
Mr. Oishik Chatterjee,
Mr. Debrup Chowdhury,
Mr. Biswajyoti Mitra, ... Advs.

For the State : Mr. Lalit Mohan Mahata, Sr. Govt. Adv.,
Mr. Ziaul Haque,
Mr. Prasanta B. Mahata, ... Advs.

For the KMDA : Mr. Kishore Dutta, Ld. Adv. General,
Mr. Satyajit Talukdar,
Mr. Avishek Guha,
Mr. Suvojit Das, ... Advs.

Heard on : 17.12.2025, 07.01.2026,
21.01.2026 & 28.01.2026

Reserved on : 28.01.2026

Judgment on : 11.02.2026
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Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The present appeal has been preferred against a judgment dated

September 17, 2025 passed in WPO No. 624 of 2008, whereby the

appellant's writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge.

2. The primary relief sought in the writ petition was a declaration that

there has been no acquisition proceeding in respect of the subject-

plots, bearing Dag Nos. 3775, 3777 and 3788 in Mouza - Kasba, JL

No.13, and that the respondent-Authorities never acquired any

right, title and interest to deal with the said land or part thereof in

any way.

3. As per the State-respondent and the KMDA, the requiring authority,

upon due compliance of Section 3 of the West Bengal Land

(Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (for short, "Act II of 1948"),

the subject-plots were acquired under Section 4 of the said Act and

thereafter handed over to the requiring authority, the KMDA, upon

which the KMDA has granted a licence in favour a third party being

M/s. Haldiram Limited to fructify the purpose for which the land

was first requisitioned and then acquired.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that service of notice of

requisition under Section 3(2) of Act II of 1948 is mandatory. Since,

in the present case, no such notice was served on the predecessor-

in-interest of the appellant, the subsequent acquisition was itself

vitiated and ought to be set aside.
3

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5. Learned counsel, in support of his argument as to the mandatory

nature of notice under Section 3(2), cites a co-ordinate Bench

decision of this Court in the matter of Samarendra Nath Paul & Ors.

v. Collector, Hooghly & Addl. District, Magistrate & Ors., reported at

(1997) 1 Cal LJ 370, as well as two other co-ordinate Bench

judgments of this Court in the matters of Sri Sailendra nath Pal &

Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Others, reported at (2010) 2 Cal LJ 15,

and Mihir Kumar Sarkar and others v. State of West Bengal and

others, reported at AIR 1972 Cal 8.

6. Apart from those, learned counsel cites S.M. Nandy and others v.

The State of W.B. and others, reported at (1971) 1 SCC 688, where a

Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court turned down a

challenge to the vires of Act II of 1948, inter alia on the ground that

there is a provision for service of notice on the owner/occupier

under Section 3(2) of the said Act and, consequentially, the said

owner/occupier can make a representation to the State

Government.

7. Learned counsel also places reliance on the language of Section

3(2), which uses the expression "shall", stating that the same

indicates the mandatory nature of the provision. As per sub-section

(2) of Section 3, it is contended, such notice has to be served in the

prescribed manner.

8. Rules 3 and 4 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition)

Rules (hereinafter referred to as "the 1948 Rules"), respectively
4

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provide the mode and manner in which such notice is required to be

served. Thus, it is reiterated that since no proper notice under the

said provisions was served on the predecessor-in-interest of the

appellant, the acquisition proceeding is itself ought to have been set

aside by the learned Single Judge.

9. Secondly, it is contended by learned counsel appearing for the

appellant that in the facts of the present case, it is evident that no

notice under Section 3(2) was served. It is pointed out that the

State, in its supplementary affidavit filed at the hearing stage before

the Writ Court, had relied on a document purporting to be a notice

under Section 3(2). However, the said contention cannot be

accepted on several counts. First, there is no signature of the

authority on the first page of the said notice. Secondly, the space

provided for service in the aforesaid requisition order is left vacant.

Thirdly, the notice is not in Form-I, as provided in the 1948 Rules.

Fourthly, it is argued that only a Special Land Acquisition Collector

was authorised under Act II of 1948 to issue such notice, whereas it

is the Land Acquisition Collector who apparently signed the

document in the present case, on its second page.

10. Moreover, learned counsel for the appellant submits that on the

second page of the purported order under Section 3(2), apparently

the seal of the LA Collector, "24 - Parganas (South)" was depicted,

whereas the undivided District of 24 Parganas was divided into

North and South 24 Parganas only in the year 1983, with effect
5

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from 1986. The notice-in-question was purportedly signed in 1973,

when such division of the said District had not yet taken place.

Thus, the very mention of the District 24 - Parganas (South) in the

purported notice indicates that the said notice is fraudulent.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant goes on to argue that upon

specific query by the appellant under the Right to Information Act,

2005, the appropriate authority of the KMDA wrote to the appellant

on September 2, 1996 and March 6, 1999 that there was no

requisition order in respect of the subject-plots in the year 1973 and

the requisition order, if any, was cancelled. Furthermore, it was

informed that such requisition took place between 1978 and 1980,

therefore belying the case of the State that the requisition took place

in 1973. It is pointed out that the KMDA has never disputed such

information or issuance of such letter on its behalf.

12. Learned counsel for the appellant next submits that the

predecessor-in-interest of the appellant was the recorded owner as

per the concerned RS Records of Rights. The State merely contends

that there is a mismatch of the same with the extract of the present

Records of Rights as supplied by the BL & LRO, Kolkata. The use of

the expression "present" clearly indicates that the State does not

deny the recording of the name of the appellant's predecessor-in-

interest at the relevant point of time.

13. Learned counsel for the appellant also cites a suo motu proceeding

undertaken by the appropriate authority under Section 44(2a) of the
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West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (in brief, "the 1953 Act"),

in which it was ultimately found that the recording of the subject-

plots in the name of one Ram Lal Mondal was incorrect, whereas it

should have been in the name of Prafulla Kumari Dutta, the

predecessor-in-interest of the appellant. The papers of the

corresponding case, bearing Case No. 01 of 2005, are relied on in

such context.

14. Learned counsel next submits that the extracts of the Records of

Rights which are sought to be relied on by the State are certified

copies of the year 2000, whereas the Records of Rights relied on by

the appellant are certified copies of the year 1983, which are prior in

point of time. Moreover, it is contended that the extracts of Records

of Rights produced by the State are bereft of the stamp/seal of the

concerned Department.

15. The State takes a stand on the basis of allegedly finally published

Records of Rights of the year 1955 in support of its case that the

name of the appellant's predecessor was not recorded therein.

However, the 1953 Act was enforced from February 12, 1954 and

was continuing in the year 1955. The RS (Revisional Settlement)

operation started much later. As such, it is contended that there

could not even exist any entry in the RS Records in the year 1955.

16. Learned counsel for the appellant further argues that the KMDA has

not denied, in its affidavit-in-opposition, the issuance of information

regarding there being no requisition of the subject-plot in 1973.
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Moreover, in the written statement filed by the KMDA in an

independent civil suit bearing Title Suit No. 90 of 2009, it was

admitted that the title in respect of the subject-plots was yet to be

cleared by the LA Department.

17. Furthermore, in the licence deed dated May 22, 2003, executed by

the KMDA (then "CMDA") in favour of M/s. Haldiram Limited, after

the alleged handing over of possession to the said requiring body, it

was categorically mentioned that the scheduled land was "in the

process of requisition by the State of West Bengal; as such, the

authority is not in a position to grant lease of the plot-in-question".

18. Such statements of the KMDA, it is submitted, belie the State's

claim of acquisition of the subject-plots under Section 4 of Act II of

1948.

19. Learned Advocate General (AG), appearing on behalf of the KMDA,

contends that a notification of acquisition under Section 4(1a) of Act

II of 1948 was duly published in the Official Gazette in respect of

the subject-plots vide Notification No. 21901-LA(P.W.)2R-157/74

dated October 17, 1974. Thereafter, the land was duly acquired

and handed over to the KMDA of December 18, 1973. It is further

submitted that awards were duly passed and compensation paid to

the land losers under the appropriate provisions of law. Thus, the

remedy of anybody aggrieved by the awards, after the acquisition

proceeding culminated in such awards, would be only by way of a

challenge under Section 8 of Act II of 1948, read with Section 18 of
8

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the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, "the LA Act"). The

appellant never undertook any such challenge and, as such, is

debarred now from challenging the acquisition itself at this

advanced stage, particularly when the requiring body had already

taken over possession and executed appropriate licence deed to a

third-party.

20. Learned AG next relies on the stand taken by the State in the

affidavit-in-opposition filed before the writ court, to the effect that

the Section 3(1) notice was duly served on the persons recorded in

the Records of Rights to be in occupation of the subject-plots.

Awards were also published in the names of such recorded owners.

Hence, the appellant cannot argue that there was no compliance of

Sections 3 or 4 of Act II of 1948.

21. Learned AG argues that no ground of non-compliance of Section

3(2) of Act II of 1948 was taken in the writ petition.

22. Secondly, it is argued that a notice under Section 3(2) of the said

Act is not mandatory, since no serious consequence follows if no

such service is effected. The only remedy to a land loser would be to

file an objection at the stage of acquisition under Section 4 of Act II

of 1948 and/or Section 8 of the said Act, read with Section 18 of the

LA Act, after the award was passed.

23. It is contended that no substantial prejudice is caused to the land

loser by non-service of a notice under Section 3, since such notice is

merely an intimation of requisition and nothing beyond.
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24. Drawing analogy from Section 9(3) of the LA Act, learned AG cites

M/s. Hunuikeri Bros. v. Asst. Commissioner, Dharwar Divisioin, and

another, reported at 1961 SCC OnLine Kar 146, where a similar

provision was being considered, and May George v. Special Tahsildar

and Others, reported at (2010) 13 SCC 98.

25. Learned AG next argues that the decision in Samarendra Nath Paul

& Ors. (supra)1, rendered by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, was

set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Palani Velayutham

and others v. District Collector, Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu and others,

reported at (2009) 10 SCC 664. Thus, the said judgment of the co-

ordinate Bench is no longer good law.

26. Learned AG further argues that the purported suo motu proceeding

under Section 44(2a) of the 1953 Act took place much after the

awards were declared and payments were duly made in respect of

the compensation payable to the land losers in the present

acquisition proceeding. Thus, the acquisition cannot be invalidated

post facto on the basis of such subsequent suo motu proceeding or

any order passed therein.

27. Learned AG points out that Prafulla Kumari Dutta, the predecessor-

in-interest of the appellant, admittedly died in the year 1950.

Hence, no proceeding could be initiated in her name post-1950. It

is submitted that the appellant's name was never recorded in the

Records of Rights even after the death of Prafulla Kumari Dutta.

1
Samarendra Nath Paul & Ors. v. Collector, Hooghly & Addl. District, Magistrate
& Ors., reported at (1997) 1 Cal LJ 370
10

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28. Learned Senior Government Advocate (SGA), representing the State,

pleads that the reliance of the appellant on purported extracts from

Records of Rights in the name of Prafulla Kumari Dutta, allegedly

attested on December 10, 1968 and December 10, 1983, were

palpably erroneous, since Prafulla, the predecessor-in-interest of the

appellant, admittedly died in the year 1950.

29. The case under Section 44(2a) of the 1953 Act, bearing No. 1 of

2005, mentioned Prafulla Kumari Dutta in the order-sheet when she

had already expired. It is argued that the said sou motu proceeding

was not for the purpose of correcting Records of Rights, since its

scope was only to detect illegalities or fraud.

30. Whereas Prafulla Kumari Dutta died in the year 1950, no

application was ever made by her heirs to proceed with or

incorporate their own names as legal heirs in any proceeding or in

the Records of Rights. Thus, the recording of the name of Prafulla

Kumari Dutta in the purported extracts of Records of Rights

submitted by the appellant are fictitious.

31. Learned SGA further contends that it will be evident from the

annexures to the State's affidavit-in-opposition, filed before the Writ

Court, that the RS Records of Rights stood in the name of

Radharani Debi and others at the relevant point of time. The

Possession Certificate duly issued and Gazette Notification under

Section 4 of Act II of 1948, which were also produced before the Writ

Court, clearly mentioned the persons authorised under Section
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3(1A) of Act II of 1948. Thus, the appellant's plea that the Land

Acquisition Collector concerned did not have authority at the

relevant juncture is unlawful.

32. Learned SGA also relies on documents relating to payment of

compensation, which were part of the documents produced by the

State before the Writ Court. Thus, it is argued, the acquisition

process was duly initiated after initial requisition by giving notice to

the recorded owners, and culminated in awards being passed and

the lands-in-question vesting in the State. Such proceeding, thus,

cannot be reopened at this belated stage.

33. With regard to the compliance of Section 3 of Act II of 1948, learned

SGA submits that the actual recorded owners never raised any

objection in respect of non-issuance of Section 3(2) notice. In fact,

such notice was duly served on them.

34. Secondly, it is contended that there is no pleading in the writ

petition as to how the appellant inherited the subject-plots. Prafulla

Kumari Dutta, the alleged predecessor-in-interest of the appellant,

died on February 7, 1950; thus, the said deceased could not have

written a letter to the Special Secretary on January 9, 1997, which

is sought to be relied on by the appellant. The said document, it is

submitted, is a forged one.

35. Lastly, learned SGA submits that absolutely no document of title

has been filed by the appellant to support her claim in respect of

title to the subject-plots. The plinth of the appellant's claim to title
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is only certain irregular and illegal entries in the Records of Rights.

Thus, the appellant does not have any locus standi to question the

requisition under Section 3 and subsequent acquisition under

Section 4 of Act II of 1948.

36. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the court arrives at

the following conclusions:

Whether non-service of notice under Section 3(2) of Act II of

1948 vitiates the subsequent acquisition under Section 4 of

the said Act

37. Both sides have relied on certain decisions on this issue.

38. Adopting the process of elimination, we first take up the judgment

of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court passed in Samarendra Nath

Paul & Ors. (supra)2. The KMDA, during its arguments, has pointed

out that the said judgment was set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in State of W.B. and others v. Samarendra Nath Paul and

others, reported at (1997) 6 SCC 492. Thus, the said judgment

cannot be relied on as such. However, although the judgment of the

co-ordinate Bench in the said matter cannot bind the parties, in

view of the same having been set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court, we are to examine as to whether any binding proposition of

law was laid down in Samarendra Nath Paul & Ors. (supra)2 and, if

so, whether such proposition itself would otherwise have

2
Samarendra Nath Paul & Ors. v. Collector, Hooghly & Addl. District, Magistrate
& Ors., reported at (1997) 1 Cal LJ 370
13

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precedential value which was upset or overruled by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court.

39. The first question which fell for consideration before the co-ordinate

Bench in the said judgment was whether the entire requisition

proceeding was vitiated in law owing to non-service of notice upon

the petitioners.

40. In the said matter, the defence taken by the authorities was that a

notice was served under Certificate of Posting, which was held by

the co-ordinate Bench not to be good service, since it was not one of

the modes contemplated under Rule 3 of the 1948 Rules. A

thorough perusal of the relevant paragraphs of the report, in

particular Paragraph Nos. 10 and 11 thereof, would reveal that the

pivot of such consideration was the mode of service and not the

service itself. The Hon'ble Supreme Court reversed such finding on

the ground that service by registered post was only one of the

contemplated modes of service, whereas in the said matter, service

had otherwise been affected by affixing a copy of the order under

Section 3(1) on a conspicuous part of the land-in-question.

41. On such premise, it was observed that the service was proper and

the co-ordinate Bench erred in holding that there was no such

service of notice.
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42. Hence, the issue under consideration in Samarendra Nath Paul &

Ors. (supra)3 was somewhat different from the present case, where

the mode of service is not germane at all but the substantive

question of non-service is under consideration.

43. It would also be of some relevance here to consider the observations

made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while setting aside the co-

ordinate Bench judgment in Samarendra Nath Paul & Ors. (supra)3

in Paragraph 13 of the Supreme Court's judgment. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court observed there that it is not the case of the

respondents that the power of requisition which was exercised by

the State respondents was mala fide or outside the purview of the

Act. The Supreme Court further observed that it did not think that

the Court, in the exercise of its Constitutional powers of judicial

review, should hasten to set aside the order of the authorities on

some supposed grounds when the facts clearly speak for themselves

and the authorities act within the scope of their powers as conferred

upon them by law.

44. Hence, by necessary implication, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

reiterated that unless there were mala fides or some act de hors the

purview of the Act, there ought not to be any interference with an

Executive action merely for the asking.

3
Samarendra Nath Paul & Ors. v. Collector, Hooghly & Addl. District, Magistrate
& Ors., reported at (1997) 1 Cal LJ 370
15

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45. Moving on to Mihir Kumar Sarkar (supra)4, which has also been cited

by the appellant, the said judgment, rather than aiding the

appellant, enures against the proposition sought to be mooted by

learned counsel appearing for the appellant. In Paragraph 22 of the

said judgment, the co-ordinate Bench observed that it also appears

from Section 3(2) that it does not require notice to be given to the

owner or occupier before the order of acquisition is made, although

it requires that the order of requisition, after having been made,

shall be served in the prescribed manner on the owner and/or the

occupier of the land.

46. Although there may be doubt about such proposition in view of the

language of Section 3(3), which provides that if a person fails to

comply with an order made under sub-section (1), the authorized

Collector or Magistrate may enforce the delivery of possession and

the provision of Section 4(1), which, in turn, starts with the

expression "Where any land has been requisitioned under Section

3", which mandates compliance of Section 3 before acquisition

under Section 4 of Act II of 1948, the observations made by the co-

ordinate Bench in the subsequent paragraphs are worthy of note.

The following paragraphs of the said judgment, which are relevant

in the context, are quoted below:

"28. The real enquiry therefore in this appeal is whether
the West Bengal Land (Requisition & Acquisition) Act, 1948

4
Mihir Kumar Sarkar and others v. State of West Bengal and others, reported at
AIR 1972 Cal 8
16

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specifically or by necessary implication excludes the provision of
notice as part of natural justice claimed by the appellants. In order
to determine this question the words used in this statute, the nature
of the power used or conferred and the purpose for which it is
conferred and the effect of the exercise of such power are all
relevant considerations.
29. I, therefore, proceed to examine this scheme of West
Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 to determine
whether notice is expressly or by necessary implication excluded so
far as requisition is concerned, I find from the analysis of this
Statute that there is conscious and deliberate departure in the Act
from the natural justice of giving prior notice in the case of
requisition. This becomes apparent when the contrast is made
between acquisition where the statute expressly provides for notice
and requisition where it deliberately avoids provision for notice. I
have already quoted Section 3 which does not mention any notice
before requisition under this Act. On the other hand acquisition
under the Act is provided in Section 4. In Section 4(1) (a) it is
expressly provided that the State Government may acquire any land
requisitioned under Section 3 by public notice in the official gazette
that such land is required for public purpose referred to in sub-s. (1)
of Section 3. Immediately upon such publication the requisitioned
land vests absolutely in the State Government free from all
encumbrances and the period of requisition ends by reason of the
provision of sub-sec. (2) of Section 4 of this Act. Section 4
immediately follows Section 3 of the Act. When Section 3 deals with
requisition it does not mention the requirement of notice to be given
before requisition, but immediately in the next Section when
acquisition is mentioned in Section 4 there is the express provision
for notice. I read these two sections in close juxtaposition to indicate
the object and purpose of the statute to exclude notice in the case of
requisition and to include notice in the case of acquisition.
***

34. Apparently the order of requisition under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 is of a similar

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nature. It is not in the nature of an order in judicial proceedings. Therefore, absence of express provision for notice before requisition of land under Section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 cannot ordinarily vitiate such requisition either on the ground of principles of natural justice or on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights of property under the Constitution of India.

***

43. As at present advised this Court is not prepared to subscribe to the doctrine that there is no distinction between judicial or quasi-judicial decisions on the one hand and purely executive and administrative decisions on the other. The very nature of the writs like mandamus on the one hand and Certiorari or Prohibition on the other stems from that distinction. If all administrative or executive decisions were to follow judicial or quasi-judicial procedures then that would in this Court's view lead to utter confusion and an impossible state of affairs and will mean disregard of the basic principles of executive action and judicial action which do not represent a merely formal or theoretical distinction but a qualitative distinction springing from the nature of the act itself. No doubt Lord Parker's observation that good and honest administration must act fairly is basic to law and any good legal administration but that only means that the executive or the administrative action should not be mala fide or for collateral purpose. Lord Parker's proposition must be read subject to the express limitations that the learned Lord Chief Justice himself used and which I have quoted above. Lord Denning's observations that the distinction is no longer valid, following as they did Lord Parker's view, must be read subject to the same limitations. As at present advised this Court is of the opinion that an executive decision or action or an administrative decision is liable to be struck down if it is used mala fide or for a collateral purpose, on that ground alone, and not on the ground that there is no legal and juristic distinction between executive action and the judicial action. In any event in the case of an area completely covered by a special statute and

2026:CHC-OS:52-DB

specially in a field which is not covered by the common law I maintain the view, that the statute must govern and its language and words are the determining factors. Many principles of natural justice today have been overcome by dictates of statute passed because of the needs of modem society and social welfare. To conclude where a statute either expressly or by necessary implication excludes notice to the aggrieved party in case of requisition of land for public purpose as in the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, is to fly in the face of this statute, Where there is statutory silence there is scope for applying the principles of natural justice but where on a proper interpretation of the statute itself, expressly or by necessary implication, such notice is excluded then it will not be justifiable for any court to re- introduce it on the ground of principles of natural justice. That is also how read the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 500 of 1967 (reported in (1971) 1 SCC 657 : AIR 1971 SC 963) quoted above."

47. Upon the above observations, the co-ordinate Bench ultimately went

on to hold, in Paragraph 46 of the report, that it may also be borne

in mind that the whole statute is for the object of "speedy

acquisition and requisition".

48. The appellant also cites Sri Sailendra nath Pal (supra)5, where the

issue at hand in the instant case was clearly dealt with by the co-

ordinate Bench and it was ultimately held that the order or

requisition passed in respect of the land-in-question would be held

to be invalid for not complying with the required provision under

Section 3(2) of Act II of 1948 and Rule 3 of the corresponding Rules

Sri Sailendra nath Pal & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Others, reported at (2010) 2 Cal LJ 15

2026:CHC-OS:52-DB

of 1948 and therefore, all subsequent steps taken for acquisition of

land-in-question cannot be held also to be valid.

49. Evidently, the co-ordinate Bench, while deciding Sri Sailendra nath

Pal (supra)6 was not favoured with the benefit of the proposition laid

down in the earlier judgment of Mihir Kumar Sarkar (supra)7, which

clearly distinguished between a judicial/quasi-judicial and an

administrative decision.

50. Moreover, in Sri Sailendra nath Pal (supra)6, the necessity and effect

of a notice under Section 3(2) of Act II of 1948 was not considered at

length.

51. Section 3 of the said Act is quoted hereinbelow:

"S.3. Power to requisition.--(1) If the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas or for providing proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage, or for the creation of better living conditions in rural or urban areas, not being an industrial or other areas excluded by the State Government by a notification in this behalf, by the construction or reconstruction of dwelling places in such areas, or for purpose connected where with or incidental thereto the State Government may, by order in writing, requisition any land and may make such further orders as appear to it to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisition :

Sri Sailendra nath Pal & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Others, reported at (2010) 2 Cal LJ 15

Mihir Kumar Sarkar and others v. State of West Bengal and others, reported at AIR 1972 Cal 8

2026:CHC-OS:52-DB

Provided that no land used for the purpose of religious worship or used by an educational or charitable institution shall be requisitioned under this section.

(1A) A Collector of a district, an Additional District Magistrate or the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, when authorized by the State Government in this behalf, may exercise within his jurisdiction the powers conferred by sub- section (1).

(2) An order under sub-section (1) shall be served in the prescribed manner on the owner of the land and where the order relates to land in occupation of an occupier, not being the owner of the land, also on such occupier.

(3) If any person fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (1), the Collector or any person authorized by him in writing in this behalf shall execute the order in such manner as he considers expedient and may,-

(a) if he is a Magistrate, enforce the delivery of possession of the land in respect of which the order has been made to himself, or

(b) if he is not a Magistrate, apply to a Magistrate or, in Calcutta as defined in clause (11) of section 5 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, to the Commissioner of Police, and such Magistrate or Commissioner, as the case may be, shall enforce the delivery of possession of such land to him."

52. On a careful perusal of the language of the said Section, it is evident

that there has to be an order under Section 3(1) for the purpose of

requisition. Although sub-section (2) of Section 3 provides for

service of such order in the prescribed manner on the owner or the

occupier of the land, there is no sanction provided in the statute for

non-observance of such provision. In other words, it is not provided

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within the four corners of the statute that in the event such a notice

is not given, such non-compliance would be visited by the

requisition, or for that matter the subsequent acquisition, itself

being vitiated.

53. Moreover, the purpose behind giving a notice under sub-Section (2)

is also to be considered. There is complete absence of any

opportunity to the owners/occupier, even after service of a notice

under sub-Section (2) of Section 3, to give a representation or to

have a right of hearing at all.

54. Rather, the purpose of a notice under sub-section (2) is only to

notify a person that possession of his land would be taken. Sub-

section (3) provides that if a person fails to comply with an order

under sub-section (1), delivery of possession can be enforced by

executing the said order.

55. Thus, it is not the notice under sub-section (2) in compliance of

which a person has to vacate the property, but the order under sub-

section (1).

56. If the language of sub-section (3) required that a person has to fail

to comply with a notice under sub-section (2) for invocation of sub-

section (3), it might possibly have been argued that such prior

notice is a mandatory pre-requisite of possession. However, sub-

section (2) lies in the middle of sub-sections (1) and (3), which are

directly connected to each other by a linguistic bridge. Hence, the

due procedure laid down in Section 3, as per its scheme, is that an

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order under sub-section (1) has to be declared and if a person, who

is either the owner or the occupier, fails to comply with such order,

delivery of possession may be enforced by the appropriate authority

under sub-section (3). Hence, the notice contemplated under sub-

section (2) is merely an intermediate step to facilitate delivery of

possession by giving the owner/occupier an opportunity to

peacefully vacate the subject land, and not intended to give a

further right of hearing to the owner/occupier, which the

owner/occupier already has at the subsequent stage of Section 4 of

the said Act.

57. The statute does not confer any right on the owner/occupier to say

"no" or resist an order under Section 3(1), by filing any

representation or otherwise. If an order under Section 3(1) is not

complied with, possession can be enforced straightway under

Section 3(3). Article 300A of the Constitution of India clearly

empowers the Legislature to enact law to deprive a person of his

right to property "by authority of law" which, in case of land reforms

legislations is for the greater public good.

58. Sub-section (1a) of Section 4 of Act II of 1948 provides that land

requisitioned under Section 3 may be acquired by publishing a

notice in the Official Gazette that such land is required for a public

purpose referred to in sub-Section (3)(1).

59. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 provides that where a notice as

aforesaid is published, the requisitioned land shall, on and from the

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beginning of the day on which the notice is so published, vest

absolutely in the State Government, free from all incumbrances and

the period of requisition of such land shall end.

60. Sub-section (1) of Section 5 provides that after the publication of a

notice under Section 4(1a), the Collector shall cause a public notice

to be given at convenient places on or near the land acquired,

stating that the State Government has acquired the land, and that

claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made

to him. The subsequent provisions of Section 5 provide for an

opportunity to the persons interested in the land to present their

respective interests in the land and amount and particulars of their

claims, for the limited purpose of assessment of compensation.

61. Thus, where the Legislature intends opportunity of hearing to be

given, it has been given under Section 5 of Act II of 1948, for the

limited purpose of assessing and apportioning compensation.

62. However, no such right of hearing or opportunity of representation

is given in consequence of a notice under Section 3(2) of the Act. On

the contrary, the enforcement of delivery of possession under sub-

section (3) of Section 3 follows upon non-compliance of the order

under Section 3(1), and not a notice under Section 3(2).

63. Thus, a threadbare examination of the aforesaid provisions

indicates that a notice under Section 3(2) is merely to facilitate

implementation of the order under Section 3(1), in order to avoid

unnecessary hindrances in the possession being taken under sub-

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section (3). Sub-section (2), thus, was never meant to afford any

opportunity of hearing to the owner/occupier.

64. Thus, in any event, no prejudice whatsoever would be caused to the

owner/occupier by non-service of a notice under Section 3(2). Sub-

section (2) of Section 3 is designed to aid the State Government, to

facilitate implementation of an order under Section 3(1), and not

meant for the owners/occupier, whose opportunity of representation

comes later under Section 5 for the limited purpose of

compensation.

65. Accordingly, the argument of violation of principles of natural

justice is not attracted, since the administrative requirement of sub-

section (3)(2), as distinguished from a judicial/quasi-judicial

decision, as held in Mihir Kumar Sarkar (supra)8, does not attract

the principle of audi alteram partem at all.

66. This view is further strengthened by the judgment of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in May George (supra)9. In the said report, while

considering Section 9 of the LA Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

held as follows:

"14. Section 9 of the Act provides for an opportunity to the "person interested" to file a claim petition with documentary evidence for determining the market value of the land and in case a person does not file a claim under Section 9 even after receiving the notice, he still has a right to make an application for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore,

Mihir Kumar Sarkar and others v. State of West Bengal and others, reported at AIR 1972 Cal 8

May George v. Special Tahsildar and Others, reported at (2010) 13 SCC 98

2026:CHC-OS:52-DB

the scheme of the Act is such that it does not cause any prejudicial consequence in case the notice under Section 9(3) is not served upon the person interested.

15. While determining whether a provision is mandatory or directory, in addition to the language used therein, the Court has to examine the context in which the provision is used and the purpose it seeks to achieve. It may also be necessary to find out the intent of the legislature for enacting it and the serious and general inconveniences or injustice to persons relating thereto from its application. The provision is mandatory if it is passed for the purpose of enabling the doing of something and prescribes the formalities for doing certain things.

***

25. The law on this issue can be summarised to the effect that in order to declare a provision mandatory, the test to be applied is as to whether non-compliance with the provision could render the entire proceedings invalid or not. Whether the provision is mandatory or directory, depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language for which the intent is clothed. The issue is to be examined having regard to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provisions in question. The Court may find out as to what would be the consequence which would flow from construing it in one way or the other and as to whether the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions and as to whether the non-compliance is visited by small penalty or serious consequence would flow therefrom and as to whether a particular interpretation would defeat or frustrate the legislation and if the provision is mandatory, the act done in breach thereof will be invalid.

26. The instant case is required to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal provision. In fact, failure of issuance of notice under Section 9(3) would not adversely affect the subsequent proceedings including the award and title of the

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Government in the acquired land. So far as the person interested is concerned, he is entitled only to receive the compensation and therefore, there may be a large number of disputes regarding the apportionment of the compensation. In such an eventuality, he may approach the Collector to make a reference to the Court under Section 30 of the Act.

27. In G.H. Grant (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1966 SC 237] this Court has held that if a "person interested" is aggrieved by the fact that some other person has withdrawn the compensation of his land, he may resort to the procedure prescribed under the Act or agitate the dispute in suit for making the recovery of the award amount from such person.

28. In fact, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances when possession is taken under Section 16 of the Act. Once land is vested in the State, it cannot be divested even if there has been some irregularity in the acquisition proceedings. In spite of the fact that Section 9 notice had not been served upon the person interested, he could still claim the compensation and ask for making the reference under Section 18 of the Act. There is nothing in the Act to show that non- compliance therewith will be fatal or visit any penalty.

29. The view taken by us hereinabove stands fortified by a large number of judgments of this Court wherein it has been held that if there is an irregularity in service of notice under Sections 9 and 10, it could be a curable irregularity and on account thereof, award under Section 11 would not become invalid (see State of T.N. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal [(1996) 7 SCC 269] and Nasik Municipal Corpn. v. Harbanslal Laikwant Rajpal [(1997) 4 SCC 199] ).

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67. A Division Bench of the Mysore High Court also held in similar tune

in M/s Hunuikeri Bros (supra)10.

68. The appellant relies on a Constitution Bench judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.M. Nandy (supra)11. The

Constitutionality of Act II of 1948 was challenged therein. While

holding the statute to be intra vires, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

inter alia took into consideration that there is nothing in the

impugned Act which prevents a person on whom an order has been

served under Section 3(2) to make representation to the Collector or

the State Government against the order of requisition.

69. In Paragraph 4 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

held that it was not concerned with the acquisition in the said case

but may mention that the State Government may acquire any land

requisitioned under the Act by publishing a notice in the Official

Gazette that such land is required for a public purpose referred to

in sub-section (1) of Section 3.

70. In such context, in Paragraph 9 of the judgment, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court observed that it is difficult to hold that restrictions

imposed by the impugned Act are unreasonable. While doing so, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court also found that it is true that there is no

express provision to make a representation against an order of

M/s. Hunuikeri Bros. v. Asst. Commissioner, Dharwar Divisioin, and another, reported at 1961 SCC OnLine Kar 146

S.M. Nandy and others v. The State of W.B. and others, reported at (1971) 1 SCC 688

2026:CHC-OS:52-DB

requisition but there is no bar to a representation being made after

an order is served under Section 3(2) of the Act. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court expressed that it had no doubt that if the

representation raises a point which overrides the public purpose it

would be favourably considered by the State Government or other

Government Authorities as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied for

stress in this paragraph).

71. Thus, while expressing the expectation that if a representation was

made which overrode the public purpose, it would be favourably

considered by the State Government, simultaneously, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court clearly laid down that there is no express provision

to make a representation against an order of requisition.

72. In the present case, the appellant seeks to argue that the

subsequent acquisition proceeding itself was vitiated on the ground

of non-service of notice under Section 3(2). Thus, to have a

favourable order on such score, the appellant has to show that she

had a legal right in the first place which has been infringed by such

non-service.

73. In view of the observation of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in S.M. Nandy (supra)12, to the effect that there is no

express provision to make a representation against an order of

requisition under Section 3(1), the principle laid down in May

S.M. Nandy and others v. The State of W.B. and others, reported at (1971) 1 SCC 688

2026:CHC-OS:52-DB

George (supra)13, is squarely applicable. Thus, it is evident that the

co-ordinate Bench judgment of this court in Sri Sailendra nath Pal

(supra)14, relied on by the appellant, is not good law.

74. The dilemma which we now face is whether to refer the question to a

Larger Bench or to decide ourselves, being a co-ordinate Bench, that

the judgment rendered in Sri Sailendra nath Pal (supra)14, was per

incuriam.

75. If a doubt was expressed for the first time by us regarding the

proposition laid down in Sri Sailendra nath Pal (supra), which was

not corroborated by any other judgment of this Court or the

Supreme Court, definitely the only course of action left for us would

be to refer the matter to a Larger Bench, expressing our specific

doubt with regard to the proposition laid down in the earlier

judgment and formulating the same as the point of reference.

76. However, the law of precedence is otherwise when an earlier

judgment is contrary to and in the teeth of a still-earlier proposition

laid down by a Bench of same strength or larger strength.

77. As discussed above, the proposition laid down in Sri Sailendra nath

Pal (supra) was patently contrary to that mooted in Mihir Kumar

Sarkar (supra)15, which was an earlier decision of a co-ordinate

Bench. Moreover, although rendered in the context of the LA Act,

May George v. Special Tahsildar and Others, reported at (2010) 13 SCC 98

Sri Sailendra nath Pal & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Others, reported at (2010) 2 Cal LJ 15

Mihir Kumar Sarkar and others v. State of West Bengal and others, reported at AIR 1972 Cal 8

2026:CHC-OS:52-DB

the universal proposition laid down in Paragraphs 14, 15, 25, 26

and 28 of May George (supra)16 hold good and bind us. Thus, by

necessary implication, May George (supra)16, decided on May 25,

2010, overruled the proposition laid down by the co-ordinate Bench

of this Court in Sri Sailendra Nath Pal (supra) on March 24, 2010.

78. Hence, with utmost respect, we hold that the proposition laid down

in Sri Sailendra nath Pal (supra)17, is per incuriam, being contrary to

that enunciated in Mihir Kumar Sarkar (supra)18, which was

rendered by a still-earlier equal strength Bench of this Court, and

impliedly overruled by the proposition laid down subsequently in

May George (supra)19, by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

79. Hence, this issue is decided against the appellant. We hereby hold

that non-service of a notice under Section 3(2) of Act II of 1948 does

not vitiate the requisition and/or the subsequent acquisition

proceeding.

Whether, in the facts of the present case, there was due

compliance with Section 3 and Section 4 of Act II of 1948.

80. Before deciding this issue, we are to take note of the fact that this

Bench is sitting in an intra-court appeal over a view already

expressed by a competent learned Single Judge of the same Court.

May George v. Special Tahsildar and Others, reported at (2010) 13 SCC 98

Sri Sailendra nath Pal & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Others, reported at (2010) 2 Cal LJ 15

Mihir Kumar Sarkar and others v. State of West Bengal and others, reported at AIR 1972 Cal 8

May George v. Special Tahsildar and Others, reported at (2010) 13 SCC 98

2026:CHC-OS:52-DB

Thus, this Bench does not have the liberty to operate on the wider

footing of the original Writ Court but has to be restricted to an

inquiry as to whether the view taken by the learned Single Judge

was plausible or not.

81. Viewed from such perspective, we cannot lose sight of some of the

cardinal facets of the present case, which are enumerated below:

(i) Prafulla Kumari Dutta, the predecessor-in-interest of the

appellant, admittedly died in the year 1950. However, the

purported extracts of Records of Rights relied on by the

appellant who, being the writ petitioner, was the dominus litis

in the case, were attested much subsequent to 1950. Thus,

the veracity of such recording of the name of a deceased

person comes under the scanner.

(ii) The appellant relies on a suo motu proceeding initiated under

Section 44(2a) of the 1953 Act in the year 2005. Even if we go

by the same, the directions of the appropriate authority in the

said proceeding, indicating that the name of the predecessor-

in-interest Prafulla Kumari Dutta was originally recorded and,

to such extent, the Records of Rights should be corrected,

came much subsequent to the culmination of the acquisition

proceeding-in-question. The Notification under Section 4(1a)

of Act II of 1948 was published on October 17, 1974, vide no.

21901-LA (P. W.) 2R-157/74.

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Thereafter, the land was duly acquired and handed over to the

requiring body/KMDA on December 18, 1973. Admittedly, a license

was executed by the requiring body in favour of a third party, to

fructify the public purpose for which the land was acquired, on May

22, 2003.

82. Thus, neither the Records of Rights nor the order passed under

Section 44 (2a) of the 1953 Act could operate to vitiate the present

acquisition.

83. The State has produced documents to indicate that at the relevant

point of time, the Records of Rights stood in the name of persons

other than either the appellant or her predecessor-in-interest.

Possession certificate has been produced to show that possession

was duly taken from such recorded owners.

84. A Gazette Notification in respect of the publication under Section

4(1a), clearly mentioning the person authorised, was also placed

before the Writ Court. Hence, the argument as to the concerned LA

Collector not being the appropriate authority, raised by the

appellant, is also an afterthought and cannot be accepted.

85. Even documents of payment of compensation in terms of the award

to the recorded owners have been produced by the State.

86. The actual owners never raised any objection regarding non-

issuance of notice under Section 3(2) or non-compliance of the

provisions of Section 3 of Act II of 1948.

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87. The argument as to the seal of the LA Collector 24-Parganas (South)

appearing in the Section 3 (2) notice cannot vitiate the same, since

the notice contains the seal of the LA Collector 24-Parganas as well

and there might have been a subsequent superfluous entry with

regard to 24-Parganas (South). However, in the absence of anything

else, it would be too much to hold that the notice itself is vitiated by

fraud on the ground of such minor discrepancy alone.

88. As to the space for address of noticee being left vacant in the notice,

the second page of the same, which is the notice part [the first page

being the order under Section 3(1)], clearly contains all particulars,

thus negating such argument of the appellant.

89. Again, the appellant insinuates that the order under Section 3 (1)

directed possession to be handed over, which, according to the

appellant, is a step-jump, bypassing the scheme of sub-Section (2)

of Section 3 of Act II of 1948. However, such argument is not

tenable in the eye of law, since sub-Section (2) does not contemplate

any "notice" as such but merely requires a copy of the "order"

passed under sub-Section (1) to be served. Such service, as is

obvious from the scheme of the Section, is to facilitate

implementation of the order passed under sub-Section (1).

90. The language of sub-Section (3) is that "if any person fails to comply

with an order made under sub-section (1)", possession shall be

enforced in terms thereof.

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91. Sub-section (1) empowers the appropriate authority not only to

requisition the subject-land by such order, but also to make "such

further orders as appear to be necessary or expedient in connection

with the requisitioning".

92. The aforementioned provisions, read in conjunction, thus

contemplate that the order passed under sub-Section (1) ought also

to contain a missive to the owner/occupier to deliver vacant

possession; otherwise, there would be no scope for the

owner/occupier "failing to comply" with the order, triggering into

operation sub-Section (3) to "enforce delivery of possession".

93. Even otherwise, there is no substantial pleading in the writ petition

as to how the appellant inherited the property from her predecessor-

in-interest, nor has any document of title of either the appellant or

her alleged predecessor-in-interest, namely Prafulla Kumari Dutta

(since deceased), been produced before the court.

94. Moreover, Records of Rights have been produced by the State, which

are contrary to those produced by the appellant, to indicate that

other persons than the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant were

the recorded owners of the subject-plots at the relevant point of

time.

95. The argument that RS operations had not started in the year 1955

is incorrect, since such operations had started around that time, on

the coming into force of the 1953 Act.

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96. In S. Palani Velayutham (supra)20, cited by the KMDA, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court delineated the scope of enquiry by a Collector in an

acquisition proceeding. It was held therein that there is no

obligation on the part of the Collector to hold an enquiry to find out

whether there are any other persons interested in the land or

whether there are any vested remaindermen, in addition to those

whose names are entered as the owners/holders/occupiers of the

acquired land, nor does the Collector have any obligation to issue

notices to persons whose names are not entered in the Revenue

Records.

97. It was held that this does not mean that the persons whose names

are not entered in the Revenue Records do not have any right in the

acquired land or that they lose their claim to compensation. Their

interests on rights in regard to compensation are protected by the

provision relating to apportionment of compensation and provision

for referring the disputes to a Civil Court for such apportionment.

98. The Collector, it was held, is not expected to hold any enquiry to

find out whether the persons whose names are disclosed (other than

those whose names are entered in the Revenue Records) are persons

interested in the acquired land or not. Therefore, it was observed, no

person has any right to assert that the Collector should recognise

him to be a person interested in the acquired land and issue notice

to him, merely because someone informs the Collector that such

S. Palani Velayutham and others v. District Collector, Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu and others, reported at (2009) 10 SCC 664

2026:CHC-OS:52-DB

person is also having an interest, if his name is not entered in the

Revenue Records.

99. Although there is some distinction between the language of Section

9 (3) of the LA Act, which was being considered in the said report

and contemplates service of notice on persons "believed" to be

interested in the acquired land, and that of the present Act, that is

Act II of 1948, where the "owner or occupier" is to be served, fact

remains that the Collector, while making such an enquiry, does not

assume the character of a Civil Court.

100. The Collector, for the limited purpose of ascertaining the

owners/occupier, has only to look at the Records of Rights as those

existed at the relevant point of time, and not to undertake a roving

enquiry into the question as to there are any persons other than the

recorded owners who may be interested in the land.

101. Thus, since sufficient prima facie material was produced before the

Writ Court in the present case to show that the entries in the

Records of Rights were in the names of persons other than the

appellant or her predecessor-in-interest at the relevant point of

time, which is further strengthened by the fact that there was a suo

motu correction under Section 44(2a) of the 1953 Act much

thereafter, there was no flaw in compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of

Act II of 1948 in the present case,

102. Hence, a perfectly plausible view was taken by the learned Single

Judge while passing the impugned order, taking into consideration

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all materials placed before the said Court. Accordingly, we hold this

issue against the appellant as well, coming to the finding that

sufficient prima facie material was produced before the Writ Court

to show that there was due and substantial compliance of Section 3

and Section 4 of Act II of 1948.

Locus Standi and alternative remedy

103. We take up the above two questions together for the sake of

convenience and brevity.

104. As held in May George (supra)21, as well as Mihir Kumar Sarkar

(supra)22, respectively by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and a co-

ordinate Bench of this Court, sufficient remedy is available to the

owner/occupier of a land, even if his or her name is not recorded in

the Records of Rights and/or a notice under Section 3(2) of Act II of

1948 is not given, to ventilate their grievance under Section 5 of the

said Act, in response to a notice under Section 4(1a) thereof. Even

subsequently, after the award is passed, grievances may be

ventilated before the Reference Court under Section 8 of Act II of

1948, read with Section 18 of the LA Act, with regard to entitlement,

apportionment and other issues relating to the grant of award.

105. However, under Section 4(2) of Act II of 1948, where a notice is

published in the Official Gazette under Section 4(1a) of the said Act,

May George v. Special Tahsildar and Others, reported at (2010) 13 SCC 98

Mihir Kumar Sarkar and others v. State of West Bengal and others, reported at AIR 1972 Cal 8

2026:CHC-OS:52-DB

the requisitioned land vests absolutely in the State Government free

from all encumbrances. The expressions "vests absolutely" and "free

from all incumbrances", categorically clarify that once vested, the

land cannot be divested.

106. Thus, after the stage of publication of Notification under Section 4

(1a) is crossed, the appropriate remedy available to an aggrieved

party is to seek a reference under Section 8 of the said Act, read

with Section 18 of the LA Act. The clock cannot be set back by

challenging the entire acquisition proceeding itself on the flimsy

ground that no notice under Section 3(2) of the said Act was served.

107. Hence, after the award was passed, the remedy before the present

appellant was to seek a reference as indicated above, and not by

way of a writ petition.

108. Also, on the ground of locus standi, the appellant has miserably

failed to produce a single title deed in her favour or in favour of her

predecessor-in-interest, Late Prafulla Kumari Dutta. The sole

document on which the appellant rests her case of title is the

Records of Rights produced by the appellant, which is also

shrouded in suspicion, since the entries therein, in the name of the

appellant's predecessor-in-interest, were apparently attested at a

point of time when the said predecessor was already deceased.

109. The technical flaws sought to be raised by the appellant in the order

under Section 3(1) were never raised at any point of time prior to

filing the writ petition, that is, after the entire requisition,

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acquisition and vesting was over, awards had been declared in the

name of the recorded owners and compensation had substantially

been disbursed in their favour. The subject-plots had even been

handed over to the requiring body and licence had been granted by

the said requiring body in favour of a third party in pursuance of

the public purpose for which the land was initially requisitioned and

thereafter acquired.

110. Hence, the appellant has failed to substantiate her locus standi to

challenge the preceding requisition, having not challenged the

subsequent acquisition process in due course of law and having

failed to substantiate her right, title and interest in the property-in-

question.

111. Accordingly, the writ petition was also otherwise barred due to

availability of alternative remedy and due to lack of locus standi of

the appellant to prefer the same.

CONCLUSION

112. In fine, in view of the above findings, this Court comes to the

conclusion that the learned Single Judge adopted one of the

plausible views on the basis of the materials before the said Court in

dismissing the writ petition of the appellant. Hence, particularly

within the limited confines of an intra-court appeal, there is no

scope whatsoever of interfering with the impugned judgment.

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113. Accordingly, APO No. 82 of 2025 is dismissed on contest, thereby

affirming the judgment impugned therein.

114. Consequentially, IA No. GA 1 of 2025, stands disposed of as well.

115. No order as to costs.

116. Urgent certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties

upon compliance of due formalities.

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

I agree.

(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)