Calcutta High Court
Gobinda Dey And Anr vs State Of West Bengal And Anr on 1 May, 2025
OD-2
WPO/786/2023
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
ORIGINAL SIDE
GOBINDA DEY AND ANR.
-VERSUS-
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR.
Appearance:
Mr. Debdutta Basu, Adv.
...for the petitioners.
Ms. Deblina Chattaraj, Adv.
Ms. Poulami Chattopadhyay, Adv.
...for the respondent.
BEFORE:
The Hon'ble JUSTICE PARTHA SARATHI CHATTERJEE
Date : 1st May, 2025
The Court: The dispute involved in this writ petition has its origin in a
selection process initiated by West Bengal Transport Corporation to fill up 16 (sixteen)
posts of Traffic Superintendent by way of promotion from the in-service candidates
holding rank not below the Traffic Inspector/Inspector-cum-Starter who were in 5 (five)
years satisfactory service.
Mr. Basu, learned advocate representing the petitioners, has alleged that
solemnity of the selection process has been compromised by changing the rule of game
in the mid-way. Drawing my attention to the notice inviting application from the eligible
candidates for the post, he argues that the notice indicated that the mode of selection
would be written test and interview and the eligibility of a candidate should be assessed
based on the marks secured by them in written test and interview.
As the petitioners met the prescribed eligibility criteria, they submitted their
candidature for the post and duly participated in the selection process. The petitioners
appeared in the written examination and, having emerged successful, were awaiting a
call to appear for the interview. However, during this period, a Circular dated 6th
January, 2023 was issued by the Joint Managing Director, introducing a new scoring
pattern which included allocation of additional marks for experience and seniority.
According to the petitioners, the respondent authorities lacked the
jurisdiction to introduce such modifications mid-way through the selection process. Mr.
Basu, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that had this revised scoring system,
particularly the provision for awarding marks for seniority, not been implemented at
that stage, both petitioners would have secured their places in the final list of selected
candidates. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on an unreported judgment
of a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in WPST No. 120 of 2019 (Avijit Das & Ors. vs.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.).
In response, Ms. Chattaraj, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the
respondents, defends the introduction of the revised scoring pattern and the inclusion of
marks for experience and seniority in the selection process. She submits that the notice
inviting applications clearly stipulated that the selection would be conducted on a merit-
cum-seniority basis. According to her, consideration of seniority is essential for
assessing the eligibility of candidates for the promotional post in a fair and effective
manner. Without taking seniority into account, it would not be possible to evaluate the
suitability of candidates for promotion in a comprehensive and proper manner.
Ms. Chattaraj further submits that, in order to identify the most suitable
candidates from among the eligible applicants, a decision was taken to introduce the
revised scoring pattern and to allocate marks for experience and seniority. She contends
that a candidate who has voluntarily participated in the selection process cannot
subsequently be permitted to challenge its validity after failing to secure a favourable
outcome. In support of her submission, she places reliance on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 344 (Tajvir Singh Sodhi and
Others vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others).
Heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the materials placed
before me.
Admittedly, it is a well-established principle that a candidate who has
participated in a selection process and, upon being unsuccessful, cannot subsequently
turn around and challenge the legality of that process. However, it is equally a settled
proposition of law that mere participation in a selection process does not amount to an
undertaking to accept any illegality that may have been committed during the course of
that process. A candidate is not precluded from questioning the validity of the selection
if the process is vitiated by illegality attributable to the actions of the selection
committee.
When a selection committee or employer issues a notification inviting
applications from eligible candidates to fill a vacancy, the terms and conditions
stipulated in such a notice acquire binding force upon both the employer and the
candidates who offer their candidature in response. Once the selection process is set in
motion in accordance with the prescribed terms, neither party is entitled to unilaterally
deviate from those terms mid-way through the process. This legal proposition has been
consistently affirmed in a catena of decisions rendered by this Hon'ble Court as well as
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, including Avijit Das & Ors. (supra) and Parimal Kumar
& Ors. (supra).
In the present case, the eligibility criteria which have been prescribed for the
posts is as follows:
"1. Minimum 5 years' working experience in the post of Traffic
Inspector/Inspector-cum-Starter.
2. Passed School Final/Madhyamik or equivalent course from a
recognized Board (self attested supporting paper to be given)
3. Satisfactory Service - The intending employee should have a
satisfactory record with no punishment awarded pursuant to a
departmental proceeding leading to a lower Post/no debarring of
increment(s)/no previous ban of promotion which is in force.
4. The successful aspirant will have to discharge duties and
responsibilities of a Traffic Superintendent and will have to perform
extensive indoor & outdoor duties."
The notice inviting applications clearly stipulated that candidates would
undergo a written test, followed by a personal interview, conducted in the order of merit
in the written test, with a ratio of 1:5, subject to securing the qualifying marks in the
written test. Furthermore, the notice specified that the final selection list would be
prepared based on the aggregate score of the written test and the interview. Notably, the
notice did not reserve any right to alter the scoring pattern, the mode of selection, or any
other aspect of the selection process during its course.
Admittedly, the conduct of the selection process falls within the domain of
the employer, and the scope of judicial review is limited. However, it is important to
note that if a Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, finds that there has been
illegality or irregularity in the decision-making process, the administrative action or
decision will be subject to judicial scrutiny. An administrative decision or action must
withstand the tests of illegality, irrationality, and unreasonableness. While the ultimate
objective of any selection process is to identify the best talent and the most suitable
candidate for the position, this objective does not confer unfettered discretion upon the
selection committee to alter the rules of the process, modify the mode of selection, or
make any other changes mid-way through the selection procedure.
Therefore, I find no justification for the respondent's action in introducing
the revised scoring pattern or in the decision to award marks for experience and
seniority mid-way through the selection process. As a result, the outcome of the
selection process cannot be considered lawful. Accordingly, the list of selected
candidates, prepared after the completion of the selection process, cannot be deemed
valid. The same is, therefore, set aside, and the Circular dated 6th January, 2023, which
altered the rules of the selection process mid-way, is hereby cancelled. Respondent No.
4 is directed to compile a new list of selected candidates in order of merit, based on the
aggregate marks obtained by the candidates in the written test and the interview, and to
publish the same in accordance with the law.
There can be no dispute in accepting the binding proposition set forth in the
decision of Tajvir Singh Sodhi and Others vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others
(supra); however, the same is distinguishable on facts.
Accordingly, WPO/786/2023 is disposed of.
(PARTHA SARATHI CHATTEJEE, J.)
A/s./sm.
