Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 1175 Cal/2
Judgement Date : 12 February, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
(Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction)
ORIGINAL SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Krishna Rao
G.A. No. 1 of 2023
In
CS No. 83 of 2022
Sujata Jalan
Versus
Smt. Kanak Himatsingka & Ors.
Mr. Utpal Bose, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Aniruddha Mitra, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Zeeshan Haque
Mr. Kaushik Banerjee
Ms. Rashmita Sen
... For the plaintiff.
Mr. Anuj Singh
Mr. Saubhik Chowdhury
Ms. Tapasi Bose
Mr. P. Sinha
Mr. S. Banerjee
... For the defendants.
2
Hearing Concluded On : 22.01.2025
Judgment on : 12.02.2025
Krishna Rao, J.:
1. The plaintiff has filed the present application being G.A. No.1 of 2023 in
C.S. No. 83 of 2022 praying for judgment upon admission for a sum of
Rs. 50,00,000/- along with interest at the rate of 15% per annum from
1st January, 2018 till realization of the said amount.
2. As per the case made out by the plaintiff, the original defendant since
deceased Srawan Kumar Himatsingka, the husband of the substituted
defendant no.1(a) and the father of substituted defendant no.1(b) and
1(c) had approached the plaintiff for a short term loan/ financial
assistance of Rs. 50,00,000/- for the purpose of expanding his
business. Due to the close proximate relations between the plaintiff and
the original defendant and the assurances given by the original
defendant, the plaintiff has paid Rs. 50,00,000/- in two tranches on
29th August, 2013, an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- and on 6th
September, 2013, an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- by way of bank
transfer.
3. On receipt of the loan amount, the original defendant has acknowledged
the receipts and had issued postdated cheques to the plaintiff and also
agreed that the said loan amount would carry interest at the rate of
17% per annum. As per the request of the original defendant, time for
repayment of loan was extended from time to time and finally, it was
agreed between the parties that the interest would be 15% per annum
instead of 18% per annum with effect from 1st October, 2017.
4. The original defendant has also issued a cheque no. 077969 for Rs.
50,00,000/- dated 1st April, 2018 but on presentation, the said cheque
was dishonored with the reasons "Funds Insufficient". The original
defendant had also issued two cheques for Rs. 1,66,439/- and Rs.
1,68,287/-, each dated 15th September, 2018 and 30th September, 2018
being the interest from 1st January, 2018 to 31st March, 2018 and 1st
April, 2018 to 30th June, 2018 after deducting TDS. On presentation of
the said cheques, the same were also dishonored with the reasons
"Funds Insufficient". The original defendant has paid interest only uptill
30th January, 2017.
5. The original defendant had issued another cheque No. 096614 dated 1st
April, 2019 for an amount of Rs. 50,00,000/- and the plaintiff has
presented the said cheque but the same was dishonored with the
endorsement "Insufficient Funds".
6. The plaintiff had sent an advocate's notice to the original defendant on
10th September, 2021 calling upon the original defendant for refund of
entire amount together with interest at the rate of 15% per annum but
inspite of receipt of notice neither the original defendant has paid the
amount nor has sent any reply.
7. Mr. Utpal Bose, Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff
submits that during the pendency of the suit, the original defendant
passed away and accordingly, the legal heirs of the defendant were
substituted as defendants and the plaint is also amended.
8. Mr. Bose submits that payment of an amount of Rs. 50,00,000/- is
admitted from the bank transaction and the acknowledgement of the
original defendant. He further submits that from the correspondences
between the plaintiff and the original defendant, it is clear that the
original defendant had agreed to pay interest initially at the rate of 17%
per annum and the original defendant has paid interest till 30th
December, 2017 by deducting TDS. He further submits that as per
request of the original defendant, the rate of interest was reduced to
15% per annum with effect from 1st October, 2017.
9. Mr. Bose submits that the original defendant has issued cheques for
the principal amount as well as for the interest but the cheques were
dishonored. He submits that from the documents, it is clear that there
is an unequivocal admission of liability on behalf of the original
defendant. He submits that the defendant no. 1(b) has filed affidavit-in-
opposition in the present application but he has not stated that the
original defendant has not left behind any assets. He submits that a
mere statement has been made by the defendant no.1(b) that he has
not inherited any of the assets left behind by the original defendant.
10. Mr. Bose submits that the last letter from the original defendant
acknowledging the loan is dated 28th December, 2017 and last cheque
for repayment of principal amount of Rs. 50,00,000/- is dated 1st April,
2019 and the last date of deposit of TDS is 12th December, 2020. He
submits that the plaintiff has filed the suit on 31st March, 2022. He
submits that the plaintiff has filed the suit within the limitation period.
He further submits that the plaintiff is also entitled to get the benefit of
the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the suo moto case
dated 10th January, 2022 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court extended
the period of limitation during the Covid-19 pandemic.
11. Mr. Bose in support of his submissions relied upon the following
judgments:
(i) Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United
Bank of India and Ors. reported in (2000) 7
SCC 120.
(ii) Dolly Mazumder & Ors. vs. Zee Telefilms Ltd.
reported in 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 9764.
(iii) Rahul S. Shah vs. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi & Ors. reported in (2021) 6 SCC 418.
12. Mr. Anuj Singh, Learned Advocate representing the defendants submits
that there is no pleading in the plaint or in the application alleging any
admission by the substituted defendants. He submits that there is no
pleading in the amended plaint or in the application that the
substituted defendants have inherited any part of the estate of the
deceased. He submits that the purported admission of the original
defendant cannot be fastened upon the substituted defendants.
13. Mr. Singh submits that after the death of the original defendant, the
present defendants have been added as substituted defendants but the
question with regard to the right to sue to be decided in course of trial
only. He submits that whether the substituted defendants have
inherited any estate of the deceased and to what extent can be decided
at the time of trial only. He submits that the substituted defendants did
not have any occasion to deal with the documents relied by the plaintiff
in the affidavit-in-reply.
14. He submits that the defendant no. 1(b) is not aware of privy to the
transactions between the plaintiff and the original defendant. He
submits that the defendant no. 1(b) has not inherited any estate of the
deceased.
15. He submits that the admission, if any, is made by the original
defendant during his life time, cannot bind the defendant no. 1(b) who
was neither party to the transactions nor party to the concerned
agreements between the plaintiff and the original defendant. He
submits that no cause of action disclosed against the substituted
defendants. He further submits that the suit filed by the plaintiff is
barred by limitation.
16. Mr. Singh submits that the amended application contained no pleading
and/or disclosure, demonstrating if the substituted defendants were
indeed intermeddling with the estate of the deceased and/or inherited
any estate of the deceased against which, if judgment upon admission
were passed, could be enforced.
17. Mr. Singh submits that whether the 'right to sue' survives is an issue in
the suit, which cannot be decided in a summary manner. In support of
his submissions, Mr. Singh relied upon the judgment in the case of
Puran Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Others reported in
(1996) 2 SCC 205.
18. The plaintiff has filed the suit against the Srawan Kumar Himatsingka
for recovery of an amount of Rs. 92,85,170/- along with interest
pendente lite and interest upon judgment at the rate of 18% per
annum. The present application is also filed during the life time of the
original defendant. The original defendant has filed Affidavit-in-
Opposition to the present application through his Constituted Attorney,
namely, Nakul Himatsingka, who is the son of the original defendant
and the defendant no. 1(a) herein. After the death of original defendant,
the legal heirs have been substituted as defendant no. 1(a), 1(b) and
1(c).
19. The defendant no. 1(b) has raised an issue in the present application
that, whether the defendants have inherited any estate of the deceased
i.e. the original defendant and what extent can be decided only in
course of trial of the suit and not in the present application for
summary judgment.
20. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defined the legal
representative which reads as follows:
"2(11) "legal representative" means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased
person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued."
It is clear that the legal representatives of a deceased are liable
only to the extent of the estate which they inherit.
In the case of Custodian of Branches of Banco National
Ultramarino Vs. Nalini Bai Naique reported in (1989) Supp (2) SCC
275, it was observed that the expression "legal representative" as
defined in CPC is applicable to proceedings in a suit. It means a person
who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any
person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a
party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom
the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The
definition is inclusive in character and its scope is wide as it is not
confined to legal heirs only, instead, it stipulates a person who may or
may not be an heir, competent to inherit the property of the deceased or
he should represent the estate of the deceased person. It includes heirs
as well as persons who represent the estate even without title, either as
executors or administrators in possession of the estate of the deceased.
All such persons would be covered by the expression "legal
representative". If there are many heirs, those in possession bona fide,
without there being any fraud or collusion, are also entitled to represent
the estate of the deceased.
21. The aforesaid judgment refers to representation of an estate of a
deceased person which would devolve on his legal representatives and
where the decree has to be executed vis-a-vis such an estate. In such a
case, the heirs of the deceased judgment debtor would be under a legal
obligation to discharge their duties to satisfy the decree or an order
from the estate of the deceased.
22. If the estate of the deceased becomes liable then the legal
representatives who in law represent the estate of a deceased person or
any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where
a party sues or is sued in a representative character, the person on
whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued is
liable to the extent the estate has devolved. Hence, what is crucial is
that the estate of a deceased person which becomes liable and the legal
representatives must discharge their liability to a decree holder or a
person who has been granted an order to recover from the estate of the
deceased which they would represent and not beyond it.
23. This position is also clear on a reading of Section 50 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 which reads as follows:
"50. Legal representative .-(1)Where a judgment-debtor dies before the decree has been fully satisfied, the holder of the decree may apply to the Court which passed it to execute the same against the legal representative of the deceased.
(2)Where the decree is executed against such legal representative, he shall be liable only to the extent of the property of the deceased which has come to his hands and has not been duly disposed of; and, for the purpose of ascertaining such
liability, the Court executing the decree may, of its own motion or on the application of the decree-
holder, compel such legal representative to produce such accounts as it thinks fit."
24. This Court finds that any decree which is relatable to the extent of the
property of the deceased which has come to the hands of the legal
representative and has not been duly disposed of, the same would be
liable for execution by a decree holder so as to compel the legal
representatives to satisfy the decree.
25. The plaintiff has relied upon the money transactions between the
original defendant and the plaintiff, interest paid by the deceased
defendant during his life time to the plaintiff, TDS paid with respect to
the interest, communications made between the plaintiff and the
deceased defendant and the cheques issued by the deceased defendant.
The defendant no. 1(b) has taken a specific defence that he has not
inherited any estate of the deceased.
26. The plaintiff has relied upon certain documents in their affidavit-in-
reply but in an application under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, the same cannot be taken into consideration as the
defendants could not get an opportunity to deal with the said
documents.
27. There is no evidence on record to say that any estate devolves upon the
defendant nos. 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) on the death of the original defendant.
28. In the case Puran Singh & Ors. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that:
"4. A personal action dies with the death of the person on the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona. But this operates only in a limited class of actions ex delicto, such as action for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, and in other actions where after the death of the party the granting of the relief would be nugatory. (Girja Nandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury) But there are other cases where the right to sue survives in spite of the death of the person against whom the proceeding had been initiated and such right continues to exist against the legal representative of the deceased who was a party to the proceeding. Order 22 of the Code deals with this aspect of the matter. Rule 1 of Order 22 says that the death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives. That is why whenever a party to a suit dies, the first question which is to be decided is as to whether the right to sue survives or not. If the right is held to be a personal right which is extinguished with the death of the person concerned and does not devolve on the legal representatives or successors, then it is an end of the suit. Such suit, therefore, cannot be continued. But if the right to sue survives against the legal representative of the original defendant, then procedures have been prescribed in Order 22 to bring the legal representative on record within the time prescribed. In view of Rule 4 of Order 22 where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application being made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representatives of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. If within the time prescribed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963 no application is made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 4, the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant. This rule is based not only on the sound principle that a suit cannot proceed against a dead person, but also on the principle of natural justice that if the original
defendant is dead, then no decree can be passed against him so as to bind his legal representative without affording an opportunity to them to contest the claim of the plaintiff. Rule 9 of Order 22 of the Code prescribes the procedure for setting aside abatement."
29. In the present case, the plaintiff has filed the suit originally against
Srawan Kumar Himatsingka for recovery of loan amount along with
interest. Upon the death of the original defendant, the present
defendants have been substituted as legal representatives of the
original defendant. Once the legal representatives have been
substituted as defendants in place of the original defendant upon the
death of the original defendant against whom the plaintiff has made
claim for recovery of money, the Court has to decide the first issue
whether the right to sue survives or not. This Court finds that the said
issue can only be decided by leading evidence.
30. Section 37 of the Contract Act, 1872 reads as follows:
"Section 37. Obligations of parties to contract.- The parties to a contract must either perform, or offer to perform, their respective promises, unless such performance is dispensed with or excused under the provisions of this Act, or of any other law.
Promises bind the representatives of the promisor in case of the death of such promisors before performance, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract."
The said provision states that a promise made by a promisor is
binding on his representatives in the case of his/her death unless a
contrary intention appears from the contract. Legal representatives are
liable for the debts of their predecessor, but their liability is limited to
the extent of the estate of the deceased inherited by them. Therefore,
the representatives of a promisor are bound to perform the promisor's
contract to the extent of the assets of the deceased falling in their
hands. But they are not personally liable under the contracts of the
deceased and are also not liable for personal contracts of the deceased.
Thus, a contract can be performed vicariously by the legal
representatives of the promisor depending upon the subject-matter of
the contract and the nature of performance that was stipulated thereto.
31. This is also an issue in the present case to what extent the defendant
nos. 1(a) to 1(c) have inherited the estate of the deceased.
32. This Court considered the judgments relied by the plaintiff. The
judgment in the case of Uttam Singh Duggal (supra) is
distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case as
unless it is not decided whether the estate of the deceased defendant is
devolved upon the legal representatives and after the death of the
original defendant, right to sue survives or not are the matter of trial.
As regard to the Judgment of Dolly Mazumder (supra), this Court at
this stage has not decided the documents relied by the plaintiff. As
regard to the judgment in the case of Rahul S. Shah (supra), the
plaintiff in the present application has only prayed for judgment upon
admission and has not prayed for any interim order to invoke Section
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
33. In view of the above, the plaintiff is not entitled to get judgment on
admission as prayed for.
34. G.A. No. 1 of 2023 is dismissed.
(Krishna Rao, J.)
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