Ct. No. 30 Ananda Offset Private ... vs Dr. Dibyendu Kumar Ray
2023 Latest Caselaw 4065 Cal

04.07.2023
Piya (PA)
Item no. 4                        CRR 639 of 2019
Ct. No. 30                    Ananda Offset Private Ltd.
                                        Vs.
                              Dr. Dibyendu Kumar Ray


                    Mr. Sandipan Ganguly, Sr. Adv.
                    Mr. Somopriyo Chowdhury
                    Mr. Soumitra Datta
                                       ...............For the petitioner

                    Mr. Mayukh Mukherjee
                    Ms. G. Goswami
                                   ............... For the Opposite Party


                       The present revision has been preferred praying for

             quashing of proceedings in Case No. C/89786 of 2018 pending

             before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 8th Court at

             Calcutta under Sections 500/501/120B of the Indian Penal

             Code and all orders passed therein including the orders dated

             12th      October,     2018     and     21st    December,        2018.

                       The petitioner's case is that the petitioner is a Director

             of ABP Private Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the company') a

             company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 2013

             having its registered office at 6, Prafulla Sarkar Street,

             Kolkata-700 001.       The company owns and runs two leading

             dailies    published    in    Bengali   and    English   vernacular

             respectively under the name and style of 'Anandabazar Patrika'

             and 'The Telegraph'.

                       The   petitioner    has   been   falsely   arraigned    and

             implicated in the instant case at the behest of the opposite

             party who filed a petition of complaint before the learned Chief

             Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata, inter alia, alleging offences

             under Sections 500/501/120B of the Indian Penal Code
                                  2




against the petitioner and other persons.        In the petition of

complaint the opposite party/complainant, inter alia, alleged

as follows:-

         "That he is a renowned neurosurgeon having distinct
        academic and professional career. That he had received
        Fellowship from different universities in the United
        States of America including University of Virginia,
        University of Illinois, College of Medicine. That on or
        about September, 2011 the opposite party returned to
        the State of West Bengal and served the people and
        joined the West Bengal Medical Education Service. He
        also joined AMRI Hospital, Salt Lake as a consultant
        neurosurgeon. That suddenly on or about 10th January,
        2016 he found that the accused persons had printed
        and published a news article in „Anandabazar Patrika‟
        at page no. 18 under the heading „Brain Death Eo
        Nachhar Bitorke Dami Chikitsa‟. That the news
        article was written by Soma Mukhopadhyay (accused
        No.4) edited by accused no.2, (Editor) and the petitioner
        herein and printed by accused nos.5 & 6, i.e., one
        Satellite Printing Pvt. Ltd. and one Ananda Offset Pvt.
        Ltd.. That on perusal of the article the opposite party
        was shocked and surprised to find that most of the
        contents of the article were false, fake and frivolous and
        the accused persons had printed and published that the
        complainant/opposite party had admitted that he has
        operated on a brain dead patient though no such
        statement was ever made by the opposite party. That
        before publishing the article the accused persons did not
        care to verify the facts that the opposite party had
        lodged a written complaint on 19th January, 2016 with
        the Press Council of India, New Delhi and on the basis of
        the complaint a show cause notice was issued to the
        accused persons calling upon them to submit their
        written statement. After hearing the parties the Enquiry
        Committee of the Press Council of India came to the
        finding that the accused persons should publish the
        version of the opposite party along with reply of the
        correspondent and disposed of the enquiry. That on 27th

September, 2018 the opposite party issued a notice on the accused persons to forthwith withdraw the defamatory statements and to tender a written apology."

Cognizance was taken by the learned Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta on 12th October, 2018 and

the file of the case was transferred to the Metropolitan

Magistrate, 8th Court at Calcutta for trial and disposal.

On 21st December, 2018 the learned Metropolitan

Magistrate, 8th Court, Calcutta directed issuance of process

inter alia, against the petitioner herein after examining the

opposite party and one Dr. Rajarshi Roy (witness on behalf of

the opposite party) on solemn affirmation.

From the allegations made in the petition of complaint

it transpires that the opposite party had approached the

Press Council of India much prior to filing of the impugned

petition of complaint i.e. in the year 2016. The Press Council

of India did not accept the case of the opposite party alleging

defamation or inappropriate/false report but only suggested

that the version of the opposite party/complainant and the

reply of the correspondent should be published in the

newspaper.

The opposite party, who was unable to obtain any relief

before the Press Council of India has now filed the impugned

complaint after lapse of more than 2 years since the date of

publication on 10th January, 2016.

It is submitted that the order of cognizance was passed

by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate most

mechanically and without due application of mind. Similarly

while passing the order issuing process the learned

Metropolitan Magistrate, 8th Court, Calcutta failed to consider

that when the alleged defamation has been caused by an

article published in a newspaper owned by a publisher,

except for the 'Editor' (whose name has been declared under

Section 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867) no

prosecution can continue against any other designation

holder as no presumption of vicarious liability is application

against others.

Although the petitioner has been depicted as the

'Editor-in-Chief' of 'Anandabazar Patrika', in the petition of

complaint, the learned Magistrate could not have permitted

the prosecution to continue against the petitioner as there is

no presumption of vicarious liability against the 'Editor-in-

Chief' of the news paper when there is a statutorily declared

Editor and Publisher of such news paper existing on the date

of publication and filing of complaint.

That it is no longer res integra that when admittedly a

publication has been made in a news paper owned by a

company or publishing house presumption under Section 7 of

the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 attracting

vicarious liability is only available against an Editor. The Act

does not recognize any other legal entity for raising the

presumption. Even if the name of the 'Chief Editor' or 'Editor-

in-Chief' is published in the newspaper there is no

presumption against such person under Section 7 of the Act.

Mr. Sandipan Ganguly, learned senior counsel

appearing for the petitioner has submitted that initiation

and continuation of the impugned proceeding has amounted

to gross abuse of the process of law.

The order of cognizance and order issuing process have

resulted out of manifest illegally and material irregularity and

ought to be quashed.

The manner in which the learned Magistrate has

permitted the prosecution to continue has caused manifest

injustice to the petitioner and thus the impugned order is

otherwise bad in law and liable to be and should be set

aside/quashed.

Mr. Ganguly has submitted that the matter is to be

heard first on the point of non-compliance of the

mandatory provision of section 202 Cr.P.C. by the learned

Magistrate while issuing process, which has resulted in

miscarriage of justice.

The present case is under Sections 500/501/120B of

IPC relating to an alleged defamatory article in the

'Anandabazar Patrika' dated 10th January, 2016.

The order issuing process is reproduced here:-

"CS/89786/18

Order date: 21.12.2018

Today is fixed for S/A.

Today the complainant namely, Dibyendu Kumar Ray and the witness namely Rajarshi Roy are present with their Ld. Advocate.

Dibyendu Kumar Ray and Rajarshi Ray as PW-1 and PW-2 have been initially examined on S.A. u/s 200 Cr.P.C.

It appears that the allegations u/s 500/501/120B of IPC have been established prima facie against the accused persons.

Issue summon at once u/s 204 Cr.P.C. upon the accused at once.

To 05.03.2019 for S/R.

Complainant is directed to file requisites at once.

Sd/-

M.M., 8th Court, Calcutta Metropolitan Magistrate 8th Court, Calcutta"

Mr. Mayukh Mukherjee, learned counsel for the

opposite party has submitted that the said order is in

accordance with law and needs no interference by this Court.

On perusal of the said order dated 21.12.2018 issuing

process, it appears that the complainant and one witness

have been examined under Section 200 Cr.P.C. From the copy

of the petition of complaint on record, it appears that the

complaint has been filed before the Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate, Calcutta. The address of the accused nos.1, 2, 3

& 4 are within the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate. But

accused nos.5 & 6 are outside the jurisdiction of the learned

Court. As such admittedly an enquiry under Section 202

Cr.P.C. is mandatory in this case, in respect of accused

no. 5 and 6.

Mr. Mukherjee, on behalf of the complainant has

submitted that though an inquiry under section 202 Cr.P.C.

is to be conducted in respect of accused Nos.5 & 6, the

process was rightly issued in respect of the present petitioner

as his address is within the jurisdiction of the Court which

issued the process and as such the case should be permitted

to proceed against the petitioner.

Mr. Ganguly, on the other hand has submitted that the

mandatory provision under Section 202 Cr.P.C. is to be

complied with first and only then the case can be proceeded

with.

Section 202 Cr.P.C. lays down:-

"202. Postponement of issue of process:- (1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit, [and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction] postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding: Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made-

(a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session; or

(b) where the complaint has not been made by a Court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under Section 200.

(2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath :

Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath.

(3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station except the power to arrest without warrant."

In Vijay Dhanuka Etc vs Najima Mamtaj Etc,

Criminal Appeal Nos. 678-681 of 2014, on 27 March,

2014, the Supreme Court held that:-

"...............the next question which falls for our determination is whether the learned Magistrate before issuing summons has held the inquiry as mandated under Section 202 of the Code. The word "inquiry" has been defined under Section 2(g) of the Code, the same reads as follows: "2. xxx xxx xxx

(g)"inquiry" means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court;

xxx xxx xxx" It is evident from the aforesaid provision, every inquiry other than a trial conducted by the Magistrate or Court is an inquiry. No specific mode or manner of inquiry is provided under Section 202 of the Code. In the inquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code, the witnesses are examined whereas under Section 200 of the Code, examination of the complainant only is necessary with the option of examining the witnesses present, if any. This exercise by the Magistrate, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, is nothing but an inquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code. In the present case, as we have stated earlier, the Magistrate has examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and the two witnesses and only thereafter he had directed for issuance of process................."

In the present case the Magistrate has examined the

complainant and one witness.

In Shivjee Singh vs Nagendra Tiwary and others,

Criminal Appeal No. 1158 of 2010 (arising out of SLP

(Crl.) No. 1416 of 2009) on July 6, 2010, the Supreme

Court held that:-

"7. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that when a complaint is presented before a Magistrate, he can, after examining the complainant and his witnesses on oath, take cognizance of an offence. This procedure is not required to be followed when a written complaint is made 9 by a public servant, acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties or when a Court has made the complaint or if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry/trial to another Magistrate under Section 192. Section 202(1) empowers the Magistrate to postpone the issue of process against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person which he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there exists sufficient ground for proceeding. By Amending Act No.25 of 2005, the postponement of the issue of process has been made mandatory where the accused is residing in an area beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned Magistrate. Proviso to Section 202(1) lays down that direction for investigation shall not be made where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions or where the complaint has not been made by a Court unless the complainant and the witnesses have been examined on oath under Section 200. Under Section 202(2), the Magistrate making an inquiry under sub-section (1) can take evidence of the witnesses on oath. If the Magistrate thinks that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions then in terms of proviso to Section 202, he is required to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. Section 203 empowers the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint if, after considering the 10 statements made by the complainant and the witnesses on oath and the result of the inquiry or investigation, if any, made under Section 202(1), he is satisfied that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. The exercise of this power is hedged with the condition that the Magistrate should record brief reasons for dismissing the complaint.

Section 204, which talks of issue of process lays down that if the Magistrate taking cognizance of

an offence is of the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding then he may issue summons for attendance of the accused in a summons- case...........

8. The object of examining the complainant and the witnesses is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint and determine whether there is a prima facie case against the person who, according to the complainant has committed an offence. If upon examination of the complainant and/or witnesses, the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied that a case is made out against the person accused of committing an offence then he is required to issue process. Section 202 empowers the Magistrate to postpone the issue of process and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he may think fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Under Section 203, the Magistrate can dismiss the complaint if, after taking into consideration the statements of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the inquiry/investigation, if any, done under Section 202, he is of the view that there does not exist sufficient ground for proceeding. On the other hand, Section 204 provides for issue of process if the Magistrate is 12 satisfied that there is sufficient ground for doing so. The expression "sufficient ground" used in Sections 203, 204 and 209 means the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the person accused of committing an offence and not sufficient ground for the purpose of conviction. This interpretation of the provisions contained in Chapters XV and XVI of Cr.P.C. finds adequate support from the judgments of this Court in R.C. Ruia v. State of Bombay, 1958 SCR 618, Vadilal Panchal v. Duttatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar (1961) 1 SCR 1, Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose (1964) 1 SCR 639, Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal (1973) 3 SCC 753, Kewal Krishan v. Suraj Bhan (1980) Supp SCC 499, Mohinder Singh v. Gulwant Singh (1992) 2 SCC 213 and Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. (2008) 2 SCC 492.

11. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Mohinder Singh v. Gulwant Singh (supra) in the following words:

"The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely restricted only to finding out the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint in order to determine whether process should issue or not under Section 204 of the Code or whether the complaint should be dismissed by resorting to Section 203 of the Code on the footing that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding on the basis of the statements of the complainant and of his witnesses, if any. But the enquiry at that stage does not partake the character of a full dress trial which can only take place after process is issued under Section 204 of the Code calling upon the proposed accused to answer the accusation made against him for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the said accused person. Further, the question whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of the enquiry contemplated 14 under Section 202 of the Code. To say in other words, during the course of the enquiry under Section 202 of the Code, the enquiry officer has to satisfy himself simply on the evidence adduced by the prosecution whether prima facie case has been made out so as to put the proposed accused on a regular trial and that no detailed enquiry is called for during the course of such enquiry."

(emphasis supplied)

13. ...............The High Court held that the order of committal was vitiated due to violation of the mandate of proviso to Section 202(2). Before this Court, the issue was considered by a two-Judge Bench. M.B. Shah, J., referred to Sections 200 and 202, the judgment of this Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Pepsu AIR 1959 SC 843 and held:

"Further, it is settled law that the inquiry under Section 202 is of a limited nature. Firstly, to find out whether there is a prima facie case in issuing process against the person accused of the offence in the complaint and secondly, to prevent the issue of process in the complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass such a person. At that stage, the evidence is not to be meticulously appreciated, as the limited purpose being of finding out "whether or not there

is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinising the evidence is also not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges. At the stage of inquiry under Section 202 CrPC the accused has no right to intervene and that it is the duty of the Magistrate while making an inquiry to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the interests of an absent accused person, but also with a view to bring to book a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made."

In the present case, the Magistrate while conducting

the examination under Section 200 Cr.P.C. admittedly did

not consider the document on which the total complaint

case is based (Anandabazar Patrika, publication dated

10.01.2016).

The thought and purpose behind the amendment of

2005 of Section 202 Cr.P.C. was to decide whether or not

there exists sufficient ground for proceeding on being

satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the

accused of committing the offenses alleged.

In Birla Corporation Ltd. vs Adventz Investments

and Holdings Ltd. and Ors., (2019) 16 SCC 610, on May

9, 2019, the Supreme Court held:-

28. In Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda and Others (2015) 12 SCC 420, the scope of enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. and the satisfaction of the Magistrate for issuance of process has been considered and held as under:-

"2. Chapter XV Cr.P.C. deals with the further procedure for dealing with "Complaints to Magistrate". Under Section 200 Cr.P.C, the Magistrate, taking cognizance of an offence on a

complaint, shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses, if any, present and the substance of such examination should be reduced to writing and the same shall be signed by the complainant, the witnesses and the Magistrate. Under Section 202 Cr.P.C, the Magistrate, if required, is empowered to either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a competent person "for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding". If, after considering the statements recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C and the result of the inquiry or investigation under Section 202 Cr.P.C, the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he should dismiss the complaint, after briefly recording the reasons for doing so.

3. Chapter XVI Cr.P.C deals with "Commencement of Proceedings before Magistrate". If, in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, the Magistrate has to issue process under Section 204(1) Cr.P.C for attendance of the accused."

29. Reiterating the mandatory requirement of application of mind in the process of taking cognizance, in Bhushan Kumar and Another v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another (2012) 5 SCC 424, it was held as under:-

"11. In Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. (SCC p. 499, para 19) the expression "cognizance" was explained by this Court as "it merely means „become aware of‟ and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes „to take notice of judicially‟. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone." It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons. Under Section 190 of the Code, it is the application of judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting

the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then the Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process under Section 204 of the Code."

In Birla Corporation Ltd. vs Adventz Investments

and Holdings Ltd. and Ors., (Supra), the Supreme Court

held:-

"33. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The application of mind has to be indicated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. Considering the duties on the part of the Magistrate for issuance of summons to accused in a complaint case and that there must be sufficient indication as to the application of mind and observing that the Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of the complaint, in Mehmood Ul Rehman, this Court held as under:-

"22. ....the Code of Criminal Procedure requires speaking order to be passed under Section 203 Cr.P.C. when the complaint is dismissed and that too the reasons need to be stated only briefly. In other words, the Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of each and every complaint filed before him and issue process as a matter of course. There must be sufficient indication in the order passed by the Magistrate that he is satisfied that the allegations in the complaint constitute an offence and when considered along with the statements recorded and the result of inquiry or report of investigation under Section 202 Cr.P.C., if any, the accused is answerable before the criminal court, there is ground for proceeding against the accused under Section 204 Cr.P.C., by issuing process for appearance. The application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. If there is no such indication in a case where the Magistrate proceeds under Sections 190/204 Cr.P.C., the High Court under Section 482 Cr.PC. is bound to invoke its inherent power in order to prevent abuse of the power of the criminal court. To be called to appear before the criminal court as an accused is serious matter affecting one‟s dignity, self-respect and image in society.

Hence, the process of criminal court shall not be made a weapon of harassment."

34. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others (1998) 5 SCC 749, the Supreme Court has held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and that the order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of 26 the case and law governing the issue. In para (28), it was held as under:-

"28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."

The principle that summoning an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and that as a matter of course, the criminal case against a person cannot be set into motion was reiterated in GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust v. India Infoline Limited (2013) 4 SCC 505."

From the order dated 21.12.2018, it is evident that

there has been no application of mind by the Magistrate,

as even the basic material on which the total case is

based has not been considered. There has been no proper

consideration even under Section 200 Cr.P.C.

The next point to be addressed is whether the case

should proceed in respect of the accused persons against

whom an inquiry under Section 202 is not required.

The present case rests on allegations which apply to

all the accused persons.

Thus, when an inquiry is to be carried out under

Section 202 Cr.P.C. in respect of allegations against one of

the accused person who has been charged with the same

allegations/offences as that of all the other accused

persons, the enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. is to be

conducted in respect of all the accused persons, to decide

whether or not there exists sufficient ground for

proceeding on being satisfied that a prima facie case is

made out against the accused persons of committing the

offenses alleged.

In the present case, as the allegations are the same

against all the accused persons, Section 202 Cr.P.C.

becomes applicable in respect of all the accused persons.

An inquiry (mandatory) regarding the same allegations to

decide whether sufficient ground exists to proceed, becomes

applicable to all the accused persons, if the mandatory (shall)

inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. is applicable to any one of

them.

Section 202 Cr.P.C lays down that the Magistrate may

conduct an inquiry in respect of an accused within its

jurisdiction but shall conduct an enquiry in respect of an

accused outside the jurisdiction of the Court. This exercise

has to be carried out to ensure that persons staying out

of the jurisdiction of the Court are not harassed on the

basis of false and motivated allegations. As the said

inquiry has to be conducted for those outside the

jurisdiction, the same becomes mandatory (shall) and not

(may) for also those within the jurisdiction as the inquiry

is in respect of the same allegations against all the

accused persons.

In the present case no enquiry under Section 202

Cr.P.C. has been conducted. The documents on which the

case is based has also not been considered, by Magistrate.

The order passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate,

8th Court at Calcutta under Sections 500/501/120B of the

Indian Penal Code, dated 21st December, 2018 is hereby set

aside and quashed.

CRR 639 of 2019 is thus disposed of.

The learned Magistrate shall conduct an inquiry under

Section 202 of Cr.P.C. in respect of the allegations against all

the accused persons including the petitioner herein,

preferably within two months from the date of this order in

Case No. C/89786 of 2018.

All connected applications stand disposed of.

Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

Let a copy of the order be sent to the learned Trial

Court forthwith for necessary compliance.

Urgent certified website copy of this order, if applied for,

be immediately made available to the parties subject to

compliance with all requisite formalities.

(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)