Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 1214 Cal
Judgement Date : 17 February, 2023
S/L 62
17.02.2023
Court No.652
SD
CO 481 of 2021
Prodip Kumar Dutta & Anr.
Vs.
The Authorised Officer & Anr.
Mr. Sounak Bhattacharya
Mr. Emon Bhattacharya
Ms. Pooja Sah
... for the Petitioners.
Ms. Soni Ojha
... for the Opposite Parties.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated
25.02.2020 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Kolkata
Debts Recovery Tribunal-III in S.A. No.65 of 2018, present
revisional application has been preferred.
By the order impugned, the learned Presiding Officer
was pleased to dismiss the case for non-compliance of
Tribunal's order and non-service of petition/notices to the
respondent during last two years.
Mr. Sounak Bhattacharya, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the petitioners, referring the order dated
11.3.2021 passed by this Court contended that this Court was
pleased to observe that the petition was served upon the
learned advocate for the respondents in the court room and
it also reveals that the service was not completed despite
various opportunities having been given to the petitioners.
Therefore, a prima facie case has been made out by the
petitioners that the court below ought to have given one last
chance for effecting the service instead of passing the
dismissal order.
In this context, he further contended that Section 18
of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 High
Court has its jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India and the revisional jurisdiction of the
High Court has not been curtailed by the said enactment.
He also referred the judgment passed by a Coordinate
Bench of this Court in CO 592 of 2021 wherein it was
observed that the High Court has limited scope to interfere
under Article 227 in appropriate cases. He also referred
another judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this
Court in WPA 13081 of 2022 wherein this Court was pleased
to pass restraining order wherein it was observed that
pending final order in the matter the respondent/bank could
not have issued the impugned notice of sale.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite
parties raised strong objection contending that an amount of
more than Rs.3 crores is lying outstanding. Furthermore, in
order to avoid the statutory deposit under the provision as
laid down in Section 18 of the securitization and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and enforcement of
security Interest Act, 2002 , (called as SARFAESI Act, 2002)
present application has been filed, with mala fide intention
to drag the proceeding.
She further submits that though it has been stated
that at the relevant point of time Debts Recovery Appellate
Tribunal was not functioning but in fact, one Judge of the
Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad was in charge
of that court. Even if the petitioner has any cause to be
aggrieved by the order impugned, he could have preferred
appeal before Appellate Tribunal who is in seisin by making
statutory deposit and as such, the revisional application is
not maintainable and is liable to be rejected.
Considered submissions made by the parties.
At the outset, Section 18 of the Act of 2002 is
reproduced hereinbelow:-
"18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal. - (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal [under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed] to an Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal.
[Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower:] [Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less;
Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the second proviso.] (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder."
In view of aforesaid specific provision of the Act of
2002, it is clear that any person aggrieved by any order may
prefer an appeal before the appellate tribunal within 30
days. Here instead of preferring appeal, the petitioners have
preferred this present revisional application. The authorities
of judgment has clearly laid down that although there is
limited scope for interference under Article 227 but in case
of gross miscarriage of justice, patent illegality or procedural
irregularity having been committed by a subordinate court
or tribunal and the like, the High Court can interfere by
exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
On perusal of the order impugned, it appears that the
Presiding Officer was of clear view that the petitioners were
not appearing in the said case for last five occasions and it
was taken on 28.02.2018 for recovery of claim of
Rs.3,26,23,508/- and the matter is pending since 2018 for
service of summon only and the applicant failed to serve the
same since last two years. According to respondents, the
copy of SARFAESI Act application only served in the court
room on that day. But before that he had taken so many
dates, i.e., 07.5.2018, 10.7.2018, 19.9.2018, 11.01.2019,
27.3.2019, 15.5.2019 and 06.8.2019 and accordingly, the
Presiding Officer was pleased to dismiss the application for
non-compliance of the order and non-service of the
petition/notice.
In my considered view, the said order neither involves
gross-miscarriage of justice nor relates to patent illegality or
procedural irregularity, so that the limited scope of
interference by this Court under Article 227, can attract in
the present circumstance. The observation of this court
dated 11.3.2021 is interlocutory in nature and was passed for
limited purpose.
Accordingly, I am of the view that when the
petitioners have efficacious relief and when statute makes
specific provision under Section 18 of the Act, then the
petitioners even if any cause to be aggrieved by any such
order they could have preferred appeal before the appellate
tribunal.
In view of the above, CO 481 of 2021 is dismissed.
However, such dismissal order will not preclude the
petitioners to prefer appeal before the appellate tribunal
against the order impugned in compliance of Section 18 of
the Act of 2002 and also subject to relevant provisions
including Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation
Act, before the appellate forum.
Petitioners will be at liberty to take back the certified
copy of the order impugned, as prayed for, on production of
an authenticated copy of the same.
There will be no order as to costs.
Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if
applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of all
necessary formalities.
(Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.)
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