Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 4939 Cal
Judgement Date : 10 August, 2023
1
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
(Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Rajasekhar Mantha
And
The Hon'ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
FA 253 of 2010
Smt. Draupadi Poira and another
Vs.
Sri Bhagabat Chandra Poira and others
For the appellants : Mr. Gopal Chandra Ghosh
Mr. Soumen Kumar Dutta
Mr. Sabyasachi Bhattacharjee
For the respondents : Mr. Anit Rakshit
Mr. Amit Baran Dash Ms. Ankana Sarkar
Heard On : 18.07.2023
Judgement Delivered On : 10.08.2023
Supratim Bhattacharya, J.:-
1. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs being
aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the Judgment and order passed by the
Ld. Civil Judge Sr. Divn. Purba Medinipur in the Title Suit 31 of 1993 on
16.06.2010.
2. Through the aforementioned Judgment the Ld. Trial Judge has been
pleased to dismiss the said suit.
3. The lis involves declaration and partition along with mandatory
injunction.
4. The appellants/plaintiffs namely Draupadi Poira and Santilata Giri,
being the wife and daughter of Ganesh Chandra Poira, contends that
one Narendra Nath Poira was the father of Ganesh Chandra Poira and
Bhagabat Chandra Poira.
5. The said Ganesh Chandra Poira died an unnatural death on 03.01.1993,
during the absence of his wife who had gone to her father's house at that
point of time.
6. Till 03.01.1993 both Ganesh Chandra Poira and his elder brother
Bhagabat Chandra Poira were residing in joint mess. Names of both of
them were recorded in the record of rights. Bhagabat Chandra Poira
being the elder brother was acting as the head of the family and used to
look after all the properties.
7. On 02.01.1993 the appellant no.1 namely Draupadi Poira went to her
paternal house and returned to her matrimonial house on 05.01.1993.
After returning she came to know that the said Ganesh Chandra Poira
has expired and the body has already been cremated. On enquiry she
came to know that the death of Ganesh Chandra Poira was unnatural.
The matter was reported to the police.
8. Subsequently after lapse of time the said appellant/plaintiff no.1
requested the defendant no. 1 to have partition of the suit properties
when the defendant no. 1 refused to have partition and expressed that
Ganesh Chandra Poira has transferred his share in favour of the
respondents no. 2 and 3 namely Bibhutibhusan Poira and Padmabati
Poira the son and wife respectively of the said Bhagabat Chandra Poira,
in the year 1977 and 1979 by executing a Deed of Nirupan and a sale
deed.
9. Thereafter the appellant/plaintiff obtained the certified copy of the Deed
of Nirupan dated 20.9.1977 in respect of the A schedule land and the
sale deed dated 05.03.1979 in respect of the B schedule land.
10. The contentions of the respondents/defendants is that the A
schedule property originally belonged to Ganesh Chandra Poira and
Bhagabat Chandra Poira having equal share in respect of the same. On
20.09.1977 Ganesh Chandra Poira transferred his share through a Deed
of Nirupan being no. 6152 absolutely in favour of Bibhutibhusan Poira
and also transferred life interest in favour of Padmavati Poira. Bhagabat
Chandra Poira.
11. It is also the contention of the respondents that on 05.03.1979
Ganesh Chandra Poira sold the B schedule property by a registered deed
of sale being deed no. 2177 in favour of Bibhutibhusan Poira to repay the
loan taken by Ganesh Chandra Poira for the marriage of his daughter.
12. The appellants/plaintiffs have alleged that both the deeds have
been procured by way of misrepresentation. On the basis of the said
allegations the appellants/plaintiffs have sought for declaring both the
deeds as illegal and void being vitiated by fraud, undue influence and
misrepresentation.
13. As such the appellants /plaintiffs claim share and partition in
respect of the scheduled mentioned properties
14. The Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants/plaintiffs
during his submission has submitted that the appellants and the
respondents used to live in a joint mess and the respondent namely
Bhagabat Poira being the elder brother used to look after the properties
while the properties were recorded jointly in the name of both the
brothers namely Ganesh Chandra Poira and Bhagabat Chandra Poira.
He has further submitted that the said Ganesh Chandra Poira could only
sign but he was not a literate person.
15. The Ld. Counsel has further submitted that during the
subsistence of the life of Ganesh Chandra Poira no question was raised
by the respondents as regards to individual possession of the suit
properties on the basis of the Deed of Nirupan or on the basis of the deed
of sale which now are being claimed to have been executed by the said
Ganesh Chandra Poira during his lifetime.
16. He has further submitted that it is curious to note that after the
death of Ganesh Chandra Poira the Deed of Nirupan and the Deed of Sale
have come out of the blue which was not heard of to have been executed
by Ganesh Chandra Poira.
17. The Ld. Counsel has further submitted that the said two deeds
being Deed of Nirupan and the Sale Deed on the basis of which the
respondents are seeking the said properties if at all had ever been
executed by the said Ganesh Chandra Poira those have been executed on
the basis of misrepresentation and fraud, which has been committed by
the respondents upon the said Ganesh Chandra Poira.
18. The Ld. Counsel has further submitted that the said two deeds are
spurious which have been corroborated by the fact that the said Ganesh
Chandra Poira sustained an unnatural death and that too during the
absence of his wife. He has further submitted that the last nail on the
coffin has been hammered by the respondents by the fact that the body
of the said Ganesh Chandra Poira has been cremated in the absence of
his wife and daughter.
19. Relying upon the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Ld.
Counsel has tried to impress upon the Court that the Judgment passed
by the Ld. Trial Judge is not in accordance with the facts and law and is
to be set aside. The Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants
has cited the following judgments, which are as follows:
i) AIR 1975 Madras 333, ii) AIR 1975 Madras 88, iii) AIR 1962 SC 814, iv) AIR 1977 All 36, v) AIR 1998 SC 310
20. The Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted
that the Judgement passed by the Ld. Trial Judge is in accordance with
law and is not dehors of the facts and circumstances which
circumscribed the instant fact of the lis.
21. He has further submitted that the said Ganesh Chandra Poira had
executed the registered deed of sale in favour of the
respondent/defendant no.2 namely Bibhuti Bhusan Poira that is the son
of Bhagabat Chandra Poira for the purpose of repaying loan which he
had obtained for the purpose of his daughter's marriage.
22. The Ld. Counsel has further submitted that the appellant/plaintiff
no. 1 namely Draupadi Poira is not the wife of Ganesh Chandra Poira
instead one Durgamani is the wife of the said Ganesh Chandra Poira. He
has further submitted that the onus of proving misrepresentation lied
upon the appellants/plaintiffs who have alleged as regards to the said
misrepresentation.
23. In the instant case the appellants have not been able to prove that
the two deeds in question which are being alleged to have been executed
by way of misrepresentation have been obtained by the respondents after
performing misrepresentation. As such he has prayed for dismissal of the
instant appeal.
24. The moot point for consideration is as to whether the Deed of
Arpan and the Deed of Sale are genuine or as to whether the said two
deeds have been obtained by misrepresentation and undue influence.
25. This Court first takes up the fact as to who have deposed on behalf
of the appellants/plaintiffs. On behalf of the appellants/plaintiffs the
witnesses are Rabindra Nath Giri, PW1, who is the son-in-law of Ganesh
Chandra Poira, Sri Haricharan Jana, another PW1(as is reflected from
the deposition sheets) who is the brother of Draupadi Poira, Bhaskar
Chandra Shee, PW2 a neighbour of the plaintiffs, Adhir Kumar Poira,
PW3, another neighbour of the plaintiffs, Biswanath Shee, PW4 another
neighbour of the plaintiffs and Amalendu Sasmal, PW5 an Advocate who
conducted local inspection commission.
Thus from the list of witnesses it reveals that neither the wife nor
the daughter of Ganesh Chandra Poira has deposed in this case who
might have had the knowledge as because these two persons were the
best persons who had been with the said Ganesh Chandra Poira, instead
the son-in-law who has become a part of the family later on and not
been in the thick of things since the beginning has been placed to
adduce evidence.
26. This fact of withholding the main witnesses that is the wife and the
daughter of Ganesh Chandra Poira since deceased, does not help the
appellants/plaintiffs. Among the appellants/ plaintiffs who could have
presented the clear picture before the Court and could have helped the
Court, has not come up before the Court to depose. This raises doubt in
the mind of this Court and adverse inference is to be taken into
consideration as to for what reason best known to them they being the
wife and the daughter withheld themselves from deposing.
27. The evidence of Rabindranath Giri is based entirely on the fact of
knowledge obtained from others. On going through the evidence of the
said PWs it reveals that none of the witnesses appearing on behalf of the
appellants/plaintiffs have been able to prove the fact of
misrepresentation or undue influence at the time of execution of the said
Deed of Nirupan and Sale deed.
28. None of the witnesses during cross examination has deposed that
he has himself seen or was present at the time of execution of the said
two deeds in question or that the appellants/plaintiffs were present at
the time of execution of the either the Deed of Nirupan or the Sale deed.
29. In this context this Court relies upon the authority reported in
(2010) 10 SCC 512, in the case between Man Kaur (dead) by LRS Vs.
Hartar Singh Sangha, wherein it has been stated as follows:
"14. In Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao [(1999) 3 SCC 573] this Court reiterated the following well-recognised legal position: (SCC pp. 583-84, para 17)
17. Where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a
presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct....
17. To succeed in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove: (a) that a valid agreement of sale was entered into by the defendant in his favour and the terms thereof; (b) that the defendant committed breach of the contract; and (c) that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the obligations in terms of the contract. If a plaintiff has to prove that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, that is, to perform his obligations in terms of the contract, necessarily he should step into the witness box and give evidence that he has all along been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and subject himself to cross-examination on that issue. A plaintiff cannot obviously examine in his place, his attorney-holder who did not have personal knowledge either of the transaction or of his readiness and willingness. Readiness and willingness refer to the state of mind and conduct of the purchaser, as also his capacity and preparedness on the other. One without the other is not sufficient. Therefore a third party who has no personal knowledge cannot give evidence about such readiness and willingness, even if he is an attorney-holder of the person concerned.
18. ... A landlord who seeks eviction of his tenant, on the ground of his "bona fide" need and a purchaser seeking specific performance who has to show his "readiness and willingness" fall under this category. There is however a recognised exception to this requirement. Where all the affairs of a party are completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney (who may happen to be a close family member), it may be possible to accept the evidence of such attorney even with reference to bona fides or "readiness and willingness". Examples of such attorney-holders are a husband/wife exclusively managing the affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old and infirm parent, a father/mother exclusively managing the affairs of a son/daughter living abroad.
21. The plaintiff who ought to have given evidence never appeared and gave evidence. As his attorney-holder PW 1 had no knowledge of the transaction, the plaintiff solely relied on the evidence of the property dealer Balraj Singh (PW 2) to prove the execution of the agreement, the terms of the agreement, his readiness and
willingness to perform the agreement and the alleged breach by the defendant. But Balraj Singh cannot become a substitute for the plaintiff to give evidence about the finances or intentions or the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff which were within the personal knowledge of the plaintiff. Balraj Singh was a property dealer engaged by the plaintiff and supporting the plaintiff. He was not an attorney-holder acting on behalf of the plaintiff. Therefore, neither the evidence of Jagtar Singh (PW 1) nor the evidence of Balraj Singh (PW 2) can be relied upon to prove that plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his obligations under the contract, in terms of the contract. Therefore, it has to be held that though there were necessary averments in the plaint about the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff, and though PW 1 and PW 2 gave evidence about his readiness and willingness, the suit has to fail for failure to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, as there was no acceptable or valid evidence of such readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the obligations in terms of the contract.
22. The respondent relied upon the following observation of this Court in P. D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu [(2004) 6 SCC 649] : (SCC p. 650f-h)
"It is indisputable that in a suit for specific performance of contract the plaintiff must establish his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. The readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract would also depend upon the question as to whether the defendant did everything which was required of him to be done in terms of the agreement for sale. The question as to whether the onus was discharged by the plaintiff or not will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No straitjacket formula can be laid down in this behalf.
23. The respondent next relied upon the following observations of this Court in Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha [(2005) 7 SCC 534] : (SCC p. 540, para 12)
"12. The basic principle behind Section 16(c) read with Explanation
(ii) is that any person seeking benefit of the specific performance of contract must manifest that his conduct has been blemishless
throughout entitling him to the specific relief. The provision imposes a personal bar. The court is to grant relief on the basis of the conduct of the person seeking relief. If the pleadings manifest that the conduct of the plaintiff entitles him to get the relief on perusal of the plaint he should not be denied the relief.""
30. Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances it is
apparent that none of the witnesses appearing on behalf of the
appellants/ plaintiffs had personal knowledge about the two deeds in
question and as such the appellants plaintiffs have not been able to
prove the fact that the two deeds that is the deed of Nirupan and the
deed of sale which the appellants are seeking to be adjudged as void have
been executed by misrepresentation or by committing fraud.
31. It is settled law that the appellants/plaintiffs are to prove their own
case and they cannot bank upon the laches on the part of the
respondent/defendants. In this instant lis initially the onus of proof lied
upon the appellants /plaintiffs to prove the fact that the two deeds that
is the Deed of Nirupan and the Deed of Sale were executed under
abnormal circumstance and had been executed on the basis of
misrepresentation as because the appellants /plaintiffs have prayed for
cancellation of the said deeds as such the question of shifting of the
burden of proof has not arisen in this instant lis.
32. The judgments cited on behalf of the appellants/plaintiffs have
been taken into consideration and have been found to be not applicable
in this instant case, as because the citations stress upon the point of
shifting of burden of proof.
33. The question of shifting of burden of proof arises when the
appellants/plaintiffs proves his contentions. In this instant lis the
appellants/plaintiffs have not been able to prove their contentions and
have not discharged their responsibility as such the question of shifting
of burden of proof upon the respondents/opposite parties does not arise
at all.
34. As such this Court finds no reason to interfere with the Judgment
and Order passed by the Ld. Trial Court.
35. FA 253 of 2010 stands accordingly dismissed.
36. Parties shall be entitled to act on the basis of the server copy of the
judgment and order placed on the official website of the Court.
37. Urgent Xerox certified photo copies of this judgment, if applied for,
be given to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities.
I agree,
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.) (Rajasekhar Mantha, J.)
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