B.D Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors
2022 Latest Caselaw 2564 Cal

                      IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                        Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
                                Appellate Side

Present :-   Hon'ble Mr. Justice Md. Nizamuddin

                              WPA 4305 of 2022
                                   With
                              WPA 4308 of 2022
                              B.D Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd.
                                             Vs.
                              The State of West Bengal & Ors.

      For the Petitioner            :- Mr. Pranit Bag, Adv.
                                       Mr. P.K. Jewrajaka, Adv.
                                       Ms. Pooja Jewrajaka, Adv.


      For the State                 :-   Mr.       A. Ray, Adv.
                                         Mr.       T.M. Siddiquie, Adv.
                                         Mr.       S. Mukherjee, Adv.
                                         Mr.       D. Ghosh, Adv.
                                         Mr.       N. Chatterjee


      Judgment on                   :-   06.05.2022


   MD. NIZAMUDDIN, J.

Heard learned Counsel appearing for the parties.

By the consent of the parties both the Writ Petitions being WPA No. 4305

of 2022 & WPA No. 4308 of 2022 are heard together and disposed of by this

common judgment in view of similarity of facts and points of law involve in

both the Writ Petitions and only difference is the year of assessment and both

these Writ Petitions arise out of the impugned orders dated 26th March, 2021

and 18th February, 2021 respectively passed by the Appellate authority

confirming the assessment orders dated 19th August, 2013 relating to

assessment years 2009-10 and 2007-08 respectively passed by the Agricultural

Income Tax Officer under Section 5 (3) of the Bengal Agricultural Income Tax

Act, 1944 and rectification order dated 8th August, 2016.

For the sake of convenience WPA No. 4305 of 2022 is taken up and

discussed.

In this Writ Petition, Petitioner has challenged the impugned order of the

first Appellate authority under Bengal Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1944,

dated 26th March, 2022, passed on the Appeal of the petitioner filed under

Section 34 (1) of the Bengal Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1944 confirming the

assessment order dated 19th August, 2013 and rectification order dated 8th

August, 2016 passed by the assessing officer.

On perusal of records, pleadings, grounds and prayers made in the Writ

Petition it appears that the petitioner itself at the first instance has chosen to

challenge the assessment order in question before the first Appellate authority

which has confirmed the said assessment order and instead of further

challenging the same before the second Appellate authority which is West

Bengal Taxation Tribunal, if so aggrieved, petitioner wants this Writ Court to

indirectly interfere with the aforesaid assessment order by interfering with the

impugned order of the first Appellate authority mainly on the ground that the

first Appellate authority has not considered its contention that while passing

the assessment order, assessing officer has wrongly interpreted law set out in

Bengal Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1944 and a circular in question published

through Gazette Notification dated 23rd August, 2006 and that the petitioner is

aggrieved by the method of computation adopted by the assessing officer in his

assessment as appears from the grounds taken in the Writ Petition.

From nowhere it appears on perusal of the pleadings and grounds in the

Writ Petition challenging the impugned order of the first Appellate authority

that the same is without jurisdiction or it has violated the principles of natural

justice while passing the impugned order or any procedural irregularity has

been committed by the first Appellate authority in passing the impugned order.

It is not the case of the petitioner that no alternative remedy is available before

any forum under the statute against the aforesaid impugned order or that the

alternative remedy available is not speedy and efficacious for redressal of its

grievance or that there is specific bar under the statute on the second appellate

authority/Tribunal to adjudicate the issues involved or arising out of the

impugned order of the first appellate authority or the nature of relief it has

asked for in the instant Writ Petition can't be granted by the Appellate Tribunal

or constitutional validity of any provision of law is involved in this writ Petition.

Petitioner's sole contention for avoiding the statutory alternative remedy

of Appeal before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal against the impugned order

of the first Appellate authority which it has voluntarily chosen at the first

instance to challenge the assessment order in question, mainly are that

alternative remedy is no bar in invoking constitutional writ jurisdiction of this

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India since there is erroneous

interpretation of law by the assessing officer in passing the assessment order in

question and wrong interpretation of law is a pure question of law and secondly

that it is aggrieved by the method of computation of income adopted by the

assessing officer in the assessment while determining the Agricultural Income

Tax and contends that even though it may not have challenged the said

assessment order before this Writ Court at the first instance and had gone to

the first Appellate authority against the said assessment order in question and

in spite of availability of further Appellate forum of West Bengal Taxation

Tribunal against the impugned order of the first Appellate authority and there

may not be any bar for the said Tribunal in adjudicating the issue involved and

in granting the nature of relief asked for by it in the instant Writ Petition, still it

can further challenge the impugned order of the first Appellate authority before

the Writ Court instead of approaching the Tribunal. In support of its such

contention, it relies on the following judgments:

a) Aircel Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer [WP (Civil) Nos. 1055 and 1057

of 2013]; [2016 (56) GST 306 (SC)]

b) UOI v. State of Haryana [2000 (10) SCC 482] @ p.3

c) Magadh Sugar and Energy Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. [2021 SCC

OnLine SC 801] @ para 29 (issue of jurisdiction is a pure question of

law)

Learned Advocate appearing for the respondents opposes this Writ

Petition by submitting that this Writ Petition is not maintainable since the

impugned order of the first Appellate authority is appealable before the West

Bengal Taxation Tribunal under Section 8 of the West Bengal Taxation

Tribunal Act, 1987, in view of Section 36 of the Bengal Agricultural Income Tax

Act, 1944 and further submits that under the said Tribunal Act, 1987

jurisdiction of a Single Bench of the High Court has been completely ousted

under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned Advocate further submits that

the instant Writ Petition should not be entertained since the main ground of

challenge before this Writ Court against the impugned order of the first

Appellate authority is about misinterpretation of relevant provisions of law by

the assessing officer in assessment proceeding and terming the same as pure

question of law, West Bengal Taxation Tribunal is competent enough under the

statute to decide such question of law as well as on merit of the assessment.

He also submits that when the petitioner itself has already chosen to avail the

alternative remedy at the first instance by preferring appeal before the first

Appellate authority against the assessment order in question and remedy

before the Taxation Tribunal by way of further Appeal is speedy and efficacious

and the Tribunal has got the power to grant any interim relief also as would

appear from the relevant provisions of West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act,

1987 and against which further remedy lies, if so aggrieved, before the Division

Bench of this Court. Learned Advocate for the respondents in support of his

contention, apart from relying on several relevant provisions of West Bengal

Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 and Bengal Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1944,

has also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of L.

Chandrakumar -vs- Union of India reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 particularly

Paragraphs 94, 95 and 100 of the said judgment. Respondents further submit

that the cases relied upon by the petitioner is not applicable to the present case

and are distinguishable in view of the facts and circumstances involved in the

present case which are different from the facts and circumstances involve in

the aforesaid decisions relied upon by the petitioner.

Before dealing with the submission of the parties and coming to the final

conclusion in the matter some relevant provisions of law are quoted

hereinbelow:

Relevant Sections of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987:

Section 2 (e) "High Court" means the High Court at Calcutta.

Section 2 (k) "specified State Act" means a State Act specified in the

Schedule to this Act.

It is to be noticed that the Bengal Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1944 is a

specified in the Schedule to this Act.

Section 2 (l) "State" means the State of West Bengal.

Section 2 (n) "Tribunal" means the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal

Constituted under Section 3.

Section 5: "The Tribunal, save as expressly provided under any specified

State Act and subject to the other provisions of this Act, shall, with effect from

such date as may he appointed by the State Government by notification in this

behalf, exercise jurisdiction, powers and authority in relation to all matters of

adjudication or trial of any disputes, complaints or offences with respect to levy,

assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax under any specified State Act

and of matters connected therewith or incidental thereto: and no Court except the

Supreme Court of India shall, with effect from such date, exercise any

jurisdiction, powers or authority in the matter of adjudication or trial of any

disputes, complaints or offences with respect to the aforesaid matters."

Section 6: (I) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the

Tribunal shall exercise, with effect from such date as may be specified by the

State Government by notification in this behalf, all the jurisdiction, powers and

authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts including the

High Court but excluding the Supreme Court of India for adjudication or trial

of disputes or complaints or offences with respect to all matters of levy,

assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax under any specified State

Act and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto:

Provided that where the matter relates to disposal of question of

constitutional validity of any provision of any specified State Act, the matter

shall be decided by a Bench constituted of at least three Members of which the

Chairman shall be one.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act, all

proceedings triable by any Court or Courts in accordance with the provisions of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall continue to be tried by such Court.

and the Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to try such proceedings.

Explanation.--For the purpose of this sub-section, proceedings shall

include proceedings under Chapter XXIX and Chapter XXX of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973"

Section 7: "If-- Reference (a) on application by any aggrieved person or

any authority, jurisdiction made in accordance with the provisions of any

specified State Act against an order passed by any other authority, the

appropriate authority refers to the Tribunal any question of law arising out of

such order, or

(b) the application for reference referred to in clause (a) is refused by the

appropriate authority under the said specified State Act, and on application to

the Tribunal, the case is referred to it in pursuance of its direction, the

Tribunal may call for further information and direct the appropriate authority

to make such addition or alteration to the statement made by the said

appropriate authority so as to make it sufficient to enable the Tribunal to

determine the question raised in the case referred to, and thereafter the

Tribunal shall hear such case, decide the question of law raised thereby as

expeditiously as possible and deliver its judgment thereon containing the

reasons on which such decision is founded."

Section 8: (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person

aggrieved by any order passed or action taken pertaining to any matter within

the jurisdiction of the Tribunal may make an application to it for the redressal

of his grievance on any of the grounds referred to in sub-section (3).

Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, "order" means an

order made by any authority under any specified State Act and "action" means

an action taken by any authority under any of the specified State Acts or by the

State Government in the matter of, and in relation to, levy, assessment,

collection and enforcement of any tax.

(2) Every application under sub-section (I) shall he made within sixty days from

the date of such order passed or action taken, as the case may be, or within

such further time as may be allowed by the Tribunal for cause shown to its

satisfaction, and shall be made in such form and accompanied by such

documents or other evidence and by such fee as may be prescribed:

Extraordinary jurisdiction.

Provided that an application may be entertained within sixty days from the

commencement of clause (a) of section 7 where the applicant proves to the

satisfaction of the Tribunal that the order or action by which he is aggrieved

was passed or taken, as the case may be, within sixty days prior to the

commencement of the aforesaid clause (a) of the said section and that he has

not moved the High Court against such order or action passed or taken under

the specified State Act.

(3) Save as provided expressly in this Act, the Tribunal shall not ordinarily

admit an application referred to in sub-section (1) unless it is satisfied that--

(a) the applicant has availed of all remedial measures available to him under

the relevant specified State Act; or

(b) the remedial measures available under the provisions of the relevant

specified State Act are not adequate and shall cause undue hardship to the

applicant; or

(c) the application referred to in sub-section (1) involves a substantial

question of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or the

specified State Act or rules framed thereunder or of jurisdiction of any of the

authorities under the said specified State Act.

(4) The Tribunal may, if satisfied after such enquiry as it may deem fit that the

requirements under this Act and the rules made thereunder are complied with

in relation to the application referred to in sub-section (1), admit such

application; but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may reject the

application summarily giving short reasons therefor.

(5) Where an application under sub-section (I) has been admitted by, or a case

has been transferred to, the Tribunal, it shall decide the subject-matter of the

application or the case, as the case may be, as expeditiously as possible, and

ordinarily within six months from the date of such admission or from the

receipt of records from the High Court in respect of cases transferred to the

Tribunal.

(6) While deciding the subject-matter or case under sub-section (5) the

Tribunal shall issue such direction or pass such order as it may deem fit.

(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or in

any other law for the time being in force, no interim order (whether by way of

injunction or stay or in any other manner) shall be made on, or in any

proceeding relating to an application made under sub-section (1) unless-- (a)

copies of such application and of all documents in support of the plea for such

interim order are duly furnished seven days in advance to the party against

whom such application is made or proposed to be made;

(b) such amount of tax, if any. involved in the matter or such amount of

security as may be deemed adequate by the Tribunal to safeguard the interest

of State revenue, is paid or furnished by the applicant; and

(c) opportunity of being heard is given to the party against whom such

application is made:

Provided that the Tribunal may dispense with the requirement of clause (b) and

pass an interim order as an exceptional measure if it is satisfied for reasons to

be recorded in writing that it is necessary so to do for preventing any loss being

caused to the applicant-which may dislocate, disrupt or lead to closure of his

business, or which cannot be adequately compensated in money, but if the

application referred to in sub-section (1) is not disposed of within a period of

six months from the date when the order was made, the interim order shall, if

it is not vacated earlier, stand vacated.

Section 15: "Transfer of the pending cases from High Court- (I) All

matters and proceedings including appeals relating to the levy, assessment,

collection and enforcement of tax and matters connected therewith or

incidental thereto, pending before the High Court on the date of coming into

force of sub-section (1) of section 6, shall stand transferred to the Tribunal for

disposal in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

Provided that, if any matter or any proceeding has been heard in part or

heard but judgment is not delivered on or before the aforesaid date, nothing in

this section shall apply to such matter or proceeding.

Explanation.--No application or proceeding shall be deemed to have been

heard in part only by reason of any interim order having been passed therein."

.................................................

Section 36 of the Bengal Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1944:

"36. Procedure of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. - (1) Any assessee

objecting to an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner under section 32

or section 35 may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within sixty days of the date

on which such order is communicated to him..

(2) The Commissioner may, if he objects to an order passed by the Assistant

Commissioner under section 35, direct the Agricultural Income-tax Officer to

appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order and in such case the

Agricultural Income-tax Officer shall make the appeal within sixty days from

the date on which the order is communicated to the Commissioner by the

Assistant Commissioner.

(3) The Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal after the expiry of the sixty

days referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) if [it] is satisfied that there was

sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.

(4) An appeal to the Appellate Tribunal shall be in the prescribed form and

shall be verified in the prescribed manner, and shall, except in the case of an

appeal referred to in sub-section (2), be accompanied by a fee of twenty-five

rupees.

[(4a)] The functions of the Appellate Tribunal may be discharged by any of the

members, sitting either singly or in Benches of two or more members, as may

be determined by the President.

[(4b)] If the members of a Bench are divided, the decision shall be the decision

of the majority, but if the members are equally divided, they shall state the

point or points on which they differ, and the case shall be referred by the

President of the Appellate Tribunal for hearing on such point or points to one

or more of the members of the Appellate Tribunal; and such point or points

shall be decided according to the majority of the members of the Appellate

Tribunal who heard the case including those who first heard it:

Provided that if at any time, the Appellate Tribunal consists of only two

members, the decision of the Appellate Tribunal shall be that of the President

in such case.

(5) The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both parties to the appeal an

opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it thinks fit, and shall

communicate such orders to the assessee and to the Commissioner.

(6) Save as provided in section 63 the orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal

on appeal shall be final.

(7) Where an appeal is made to the Appellate Tribunal under this section the

costs shall be in the discretion of the said Tribunal.

Relevant paragraphs from the judgment of L. Chandrakumar (supra) are

quoted hereinbelow:

Further, after the enactment of West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act and after

the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in L.

Chandrakumar vs Union of India [reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261: AIR 1997 SC

1125], a judgment running for..... pages, wherein the Tribunal is the very

remedy and not an alternative remedy. The Supreme Court in paragraphs 94,

95 and 100 of the said judgment very clearly states that the Tribunals would

act as the "court of first instance" from which a writ petition may lie but to a

Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court. As a court of first instance the

Tribunal completely ousts the jurisdiction of the single Bench of the respective

High Courts and the matters pending before the Single Bench of the High

Court from the date of the functioning of the Tribunal would stand transferred

to the Tribunal. The relevant passages from the said judgment are stated

hereinbelow-

"94. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on

the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear

matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in

discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the

Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional setup, been specifically

entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only

supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny

before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will

consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and

rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important

exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of

their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a

creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such

cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other

decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically

empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be

subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We

may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of

first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted.

By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the

High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations

(except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal

is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal."

"95. The directions issued by us in respect of making the decisions of Tribunals

amenable to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts will,

however, come into effect prospectively i.e. will apply to decisions rendered

hereafter. To maintain the sanctity of judicial proceedings, we have invoked the

doctrine of prospective over-ruling so as not to disturb the procedure in relation to

decisions already rendered."

........................................

"100. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that Clause 2(d) of Article

323A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction

of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the

Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of

jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles

323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction

conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme

Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure

of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and

Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred

by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created

under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the

competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All

decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a

Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned

Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first

instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It

will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even

in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the

legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the

jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and

constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated."

Learned Counsel appearing for the State respondents in support of his

contention that in the facts and circumstances of the case, instant Writ

Petitions against the impugned order of the first Appellate authority are not

maintainable, has relied on an unreported three Judges' Bench decision of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court, dated 3rd September, 2021, in the case of The

Assistant Commissioner of State Tax and Others -vs- M/s Commercial Steel

Limited (Civil Appeal No. 5121 of 2021) particularly on Paragraph 11 and 12

which are quoted as hereunder:

"11. The respondent had a statutory remedy under section 107. Instead of availing of the remedy, the respondent instituted a petition under Article 226. The existence of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional circumstances where there is:

(i) a breach of fundamental rights;

(ii) a violation of the principles of natural justice;

(iii) an excess of jurisdiction; or

(iv) a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation.

12. In the present case, none of the above exceptions was established. There was, in fact, no violation of the principles of natural justice since a notice was served on the person in charge of the conveyance. In this backdrop, it was not appropriate for the High Court to entertain a writ petition. The assessment of facts would have to be carried out by the appellate authority. As a matter of fact, the High Court has while doing this exercise proceeded on the basis of surmises. However, since we are inclined to relegate the respondent to the pursuit of the alternate statutory remedy under Section 107, this Court makes no observation on the merits of the case of the respondent."

Considering the submission of the parties, facts as appear from record

relevant provisions of law under West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 and

Bengal Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1944 and decisions relied upon by the

parties and in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances involved in these

Writ Petitions, I am not inclined to entertain these Writ Petitions for the

following reasons:

(i) It is well settled principle of law that availability of alternative remedy

is not absolute bar to maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India and on this proportion of law petitioners have relied on all

the aforesaid three judgments but at the same time law has also been laid

down as to what are the exceptional circumstances under which in spite of

availability of statutory alternative remedy by way of Appeal, Writ Petition is

maintainable and in my considered opinion the instant writ petitions do not fall

within the categories of those exceptional facts and circumstances and the

cases relied upon by the petitioner are totally different from the present case

particularly in the context of and relating to the ambit and scope of the West

Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987, Bengal Agricultural Income Tax Act and

further in none of the aforesaid cases of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which have

been relied upon by the petitioner, Constitution Bench decision of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandrakumar (supra) was referred or relied

by any of the parties in those decisions.

(ii) Other peculiar facts in these Writ Petitions are that at the first

instance petitioners have chosen to avail the alternative remedy by challenging

the assessment orders in question by way of statutory appeal before the first

Appellate authority and after the dismissal of the same and confirmation of the

assessment order instead of challenging the impugned orders of the first

Appellate authority before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal which is the

second Appellate authority, petitioner intends to challenge the same by these

Writ Petitions before the this Court of Single Bench and wants this Single

Bench of Writ Court to invoke its constitutional writ jurisdiction under Article

226 of the Constitution of India by interfering with the aforesaid impugned

orders of the first Appellate authority by setting aside/quashing its impugned

order which would be amounting to indirectly interfering with the assessment

orders in question which have been upheld by the first Appellate authority

while there is no prayer in the Writ Petitions for interfering or setting aside or

quashing of the assessment orders in question as appears from the prayers

made in this Writ Petition.

(iii) On perusal of relevant provisions under the West Bengal Taxation

Tribunal Act, 1987, I find that as per Section 36 of the Bengal Agricultural

Income Tax Act. 1944, West Bengal Taxation Tribunal is the competent forum

for adjudicating the nature of issues arise out of the impugned orders of the

first Appellate authority and the nature of reliefs petitioner has sought in these

Writ Petitions. Under The West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987, the

Tribunal has got exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the appeal relating to levy of

tax in any assessment under the Bengal Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1944 and

the impugned order of the first Appellate authority passed under Section 32 or

35 of the said Agricultural Income Tax Act. I further find on perusal of relevant

provisions of The West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987, that petitioner has

got speedy and efficacious remedy and even can get interim relief also.

(iv) I am not entertaining this Writ Petition by taking into consideration

the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of L.

Chandrakumar (supra) which in my considered opinion is applicable to the

facts and circumstances of the instant cases.

(v) I find that the impugned orders passed by the first Appellate authority

are neither without jurisdiction nor it is in violation of principle of natural

justice nor there is any procedural illegality during the impugned proceeding

before the first Appellate authority which petitioner intends to challenge in the

instant Writ Petitions on the ground of alleged wrongful interpretation of

relevant provisions of law and mode of computation of tax adopted by the

assessing officer which according to me cannot be a ground for invoking the

constitutional writ jurisdiction of this Court by avoiding the statutory

alternative remedy by further Appeal before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal

if petitioner is so aggrieved unless petitioner is able to make out a case that the

nature of dispute it wants adjudication by this Writ Court is specifically barred

under the statute for the adjudication by the Tribunal or the nature of relief

petitioners have asked in this writ proceeding could not be granted by the

Tribunal which is the second Appellate authority.

In view of the reasonings and discussion made above, I am not inclined to

entertain these Writ Petitions against the impugned orders of the first Appellate

authority dated 26th March, 2021 and 18th February, 2021 respectively and

both these Writ Petitions being WPA 4305 of 2022 with WPA 4308 of 2022 are

accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

However, dismissal of these Writ Petitions will not be a bar for the

petitioner to challenge the impugned orders of the first Appellate authority

before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal in accordance with law.

Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the

parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.

(Md. Nizamuddin, J)