Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 4487 Cal
Judgement Date : 2 September, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Arindam Sinha
And
The Hon'ble Justice Sugato Majumdar
S.A. 383 of 2019
+
IA No.CAN 1 of 2019 (Old No.CAN 10722 of 2019)
(not found)
(Via Video Conference)
r
Sri Shyamal Auddy & Ors.
Vs.
Sri Asit Kumar Haldar
For appellants : Mr. Buddhadev Ghosal, Adv.
For respondent : Mr. Gopal Chandra Ghosh, Adv.
Heard on : 2nd September, 2021. Judgment on : 2nd September, 2021.
Arindam Sinha, J.: Mr. Ghosal, learned advocate appears
on behalf of appellants and submits, the trial and lower appellate
Courts concurrently held against his clients for being evicted by
applying section 2(g) in West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.
He submits, his clients' father was original tenant. He died in
year 1989, when the 1997 Act was not there. Their mother then
became tenant. She died in year 2005. Under clause (h) in section
2 of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, his clients, having
had resided with their father in the demise, inherited the tenancy
alongwith their since deceased mother. A question of law arises
on whether such heritable right could be taken away by operation
of change in the law.
He submits further, another question of law arises.
This is on the factual premise. Even after the period of 5 years
upon commencement of the 1997 Act had been applied, thereafter
plaintiff participated in the proceeding in suit, under section 7 of
the later Act, regarding, inter alia, payment of rent, wherein he
admitted appellants were his tenants. That made his clients
tenants under the 1997 Act. He relies on order dated 11th
November, 2019 made by a coordinate Bench in SAT 306 of
2019 (Avijit Mukhopadhyay vs. Ashis Kumar Bose), the
paragraph therefrom reproduced below.
"As far as the ground under section 2(g) of the Act of 1997 is
concerned, it appears that in course of proceedings under
Section 7(2) of the said Act, the plaintiff admitted that the
defendant was a tenant. Once such admission was on
record, it was no longer open to the plaintiff to urge the
ground under Section 2(g) of the said Act."
Section 45 in the 1997 Act is the provision on repeal and
savings. Appellants' right claimed to be inherited under the old
Act, was not saved under the new Act. Instead the heritable
aspect of tenancy stood curtailed by the new Act. Both Courts
below found that appellants cannot seek protection after death of
original tenant, having been tenants only upto the period limited
and expired. So, the period of five years from date of coming into
effect of the new Act was applied and eviction decreed in favour of
plaintiff. Said Act being one that protects tenancies and in force,
was applied to deal with the suit and no question of law arises
thereby.
Section 7 proceeding in the suit was an interlocutory
proceeding. The purpose was to ascertain the facts and
circumstances relating to arrears and payment of rent with
reference to the landlord's grounds for eviction of appellants, as
his tenants, under section 6 of the 1997 Act. Even then the
issues in suit regarding eviction, on any of the grounds, including
default, could not be subject matter up for adjudication in the
proceeding. Upon the determination, if the tenant satisfies the
requirement in sub-section (4) of section 7, then, subject to the
proviso, in the suit there would be no order for eviction on
ground of default. The other protection available is the right to
defence on payment, pursuant to, as aforesaid, determination in
the proceeding. On pain of repetition it must be said that section
7 does not refer to meaning of tenant under section 2(g) but to
when a tenant can get protection against eviction in a suit on any
of the grounds in section 6. Applicability or operation of section
2(g) can by no stretch of imagination be a controversy to be
decided in the section 7 proceeding. As such, plaintiffs'
participation in the proceeding, in opposing it or otherwise,
cannot be seen to be admission made by him as proof of
acceptance of appellants as tenants against operation of section
2(g). That would then be decision in the suit at the interlocutory
stage, implying creation of new tenancy. Avijit Mukhopadhyay
(supra) was order passed at admission stage of the second appeal
tender. The appeal was not admitted. We don't see the same as
gives rise to a substantial question involved in this appeal.
There is no question that arises for admission of the
appeal.
SAT 383 of 2019 along with IA No. CAN 1 of 2019 (Old
No. CAN 10722 of 2019) (not found), if any pending, are
dismissed.
(Arindam Sinha, J.)
(Sugato Majumdar, J.)
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