Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 5428 Bom
Judgement Date : 22 May, 2026
1 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
SECOND APPEAL NO.308 OF 2012
1] Bharat Raghunath Lanjewar,
Aged 28 years, Occupation,
R/o. Nimba, Tahsil-Kamptee,
District-Nagpur.
2] Smt. Rukhmabai w/o Raghunath
Lanjewar, Aged 58 years,
Occupation-Agriculture Labour,
R/o. Nimba, Tahsil-Kamptee,
District-Nagpur.
3] Sau. Vandana w/o Prakash Bhanare,
Aged 32 years, Occupation-Household,
R/o. Telipura Khewta, Itwari, Nagpur.
4] Sau. Sunita w/o Prakash Dorle,
Aged 30 years, Occupation-Household.
R/o. Binaki Mangalwari, Nagpur.
5] Lalita w/o Sanjay Dhawde,
Aged 28 years, Occupation-Household,
Tahsil-Khewta Colony, Telephone Exchange
Chowk, Nagpur. ..
Appellants
.. Versus ..
1] Raghunath s/o Kisan Lanjewar,
R/o. Plot No.1 and 2, Swagat Nagar,
Near Believers Church, Bhandewadi,
Pardi, Nagpur.
2] Smt. Jayawantibai w/o Hansraj Gajbhiye,
Aged Major, R/o. Nimba, Tahsil-Kamptee,
District-Nagpur. ..
Respondents
2 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
Shri P.C. Marpakwar, Advocate for Appellants.
Shri A.A. Sambaray, Advocate for Respondents
CORAM : ROHIT W. JOSHI, J.
DATE : 22.05.2026.
1. The present Second Appeal arises out of
judgment and decree dated 24.4.2009 passed by
the learned 5th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division,
Nagpur in Special Civil Suit No.351/2006 and
judgment and decree dated 2.8.2011 passed by the
learned District Judge-4, Nagpur in Regular Civil
Appeal No.339/2009.
2. The appellants are the original plaintiffs.
The respondents are original defendants. The
parties will be referred as plaintiffs and defendants
hereinafter.
3. The plaintiff no.1 is son, plaintiff no.2 is
wife and plaintiff nos.3 to 5 are daughters of the
defendant no.1. The defendant no.1 had agreed to
sell part of the suit property bearing Survey No.124
admeasuring 0.81 H.R., and survey No.125/2 ad-
measuring 0.30 H.R., to the defendant no.2 vide
agreement of sale dated 29.6.1989. The defendant 3 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
no.2 has filed a suit for specific performance of
contract against the defendant no.1 which was
registered as Special Civil Suit No.428/1989. This
suit for specific performance of contract was
decreed by the learned 4th Joint Civil Judge, Senior
Division, Nagpur, vide judgment and decree dated
14.3.1991. Appeal preferred by the defendant
no.1, being Regular Civil Appeal No.293/1991 was
partly allowed by setting aside the decree for
specific performance of contract and granting a
decree for refund of consideration. The defendant
no.2 preferred Second Appeal No.105/1996 before
this Court which came to be allowed on 1.12.2005.
This court has confirmed the decree for specific
performance of contract passed by the learned Trial
Court.
4. In this backdrop the plaintiffs who are son,
wife and daughters of the defendant no.1/vendor
filed a suit for partition and separate possession in
which the sale transaction interse between the
defendant nos.1 and 2 is also challenged on the
ground of the sale being without legal necessity. 4 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
The case of the plaintiff is that the suit property is
ancestral property and that in the absence of any
legal necessity, the defendant no.1 acting as Karta
could not have alienated the same in favour of the
defendant no.2. The defendant no.1 filed written
statement admitting that the suit property was an
ancestral property. The defendant no.2/purchaser
filed his written statement opposing the suit. The
defendant No.2 denied the claim of the plaintiffs.
She made reference to findings recorded in the suit
for specific performance of contract filed by her
against the defendant No.1 wherein it was held that
the transaction was entered into by the defendant
No.1 acting as Karta of the family in order to satisfy
legal necessity.
5. Based on rival pleadings, the learned Trial
Court framed the issues and recorded evidence of
the parties. The defendant nos.1 and 2 did not
enter the witness box. The learned Trial Court held
that the suit properties were ancestral properties
and further held that the plaintiff had established
his right over the suit properties bearing Gat No.59 5 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
which was included in Schedule B of the plaint.
Decree for partition and separate possession
accordingly came to be passed only with respect to
suit property bearing Gat No.59. The suit was
dismissed with respect to land bearing Gat No.124,
ad-measuring 0.81 HR and Gat No.125/2
admeasuring 0.30 HR.
6. The learned Trial Court has held that the
issue as to whether the sale deed was executed by
defendant no.1 for legal necessity or not had
assumed finality between the parties in the earlier
suit for specific performance of contract and the
same operated as res judicata. The learned Trial
Court accordingly dismissed the suit with respect to
land bearing Gat No.124/1 and 125/2 which were
subject matter of agreement of sale between
defendant nos.1 and 2 and passed a decree for
partition and separate possession with respect to
land bearing Survey No.59. The prayer for
declaration that the judgment and decree in suit for
specific performance of contract was not binding on
the plaintiff is rejected. Likewise, the prayer for 6 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
preemption with respect to land bearing Gat
No.124/1 and 125/2 is also rejected.
7. Aggrieved by aforesaid decree, the plaintiff
preferred appeal being Regular Civil Appeal
No.339/2009. The learned First Appellate Court has
dismissed the appeal by maintaining the judgment
and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. The
learned first Appellate Court has observed that the
challenge to the decree passed in a suit for specific
performance was premature since the agreement
had not fructified into a completed sale transaction
since sale deed was not registered.
8. In this backdrop, the original plaintiffs have
preferred the present Second Appeal challenging
the aforesaid decree passed by the learned Trial
Court. The subject matter of the Second Appeal is
restricted to the suit properties bearing Gat No.124
and 125/2 which are subject matter of the
agreement of sale and suit for specific
performance.
7 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
9. The Second Appeal came to be admitted
vide order dated 22.4.2016 on the following
substantial questions of law :
(1) Whether the Judgment and decree passed in earlier proceeding between the Respondent No.1 and 2 bearing RCS No.408/1989 for specific performance of contract an execution thereof is pending for execution of sale deed through Court amounts to alienation.?
(2) Whether the Appellate Court has considered the scope and effect of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, as amended by Hindu Succession (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1994 and Section 6 of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which confers the status of coparcener on a daughter from the date of her birth.?
Substantial question of law No.1 :
(1) Whether the Judgment and decree passed in earlier proceeding between the Respondent No.1 and 2 bearing RCS No.408/1989 for specific performance of contract an execution thereof is pending for execution of sale deed through Court amounts to alienation.?
10. This question arises for consideration
in the peculiar backdrop of facts were the
defendant no.1, as vendor, had entered into an
agreement of sale with respect to the suit property 8 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
with the defendant No.2 as purchaser, and the
property is found to be an ancestral property and
suit for specific performance filed by defendant
No.2 came to be decreed against the defendant
No.1. The plaintiffs filed a general suit for partition
in which the transaction between defendant Nos.1
and 2 is also challenged. The learned First
Appellate Court has held that since sale deed is not
executed and registered pursuant to decree for
specific performance is not maintainable since the
sale is not completed. It is held that right of co-
paceners to challenge alienation accrues only once
the property is alienated.
11. Having regard to the aforesaid the
first substantial question of law is rephrased as
under:-
"Whether a coparcener has a right to challenge a decree for specific performance of contract passed against Karta of the family with respect to a joint hindu family property although sale deed is not executed in terms of decree for specific performance?"
12. The defendant no.1 is the eldest male
member and Karta of the family. The defendant
no.2 filed suit for specific performance against the 9 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
defendant no.1 which has been decreed. The
plaintiffs want to avoid the transaction between the
defendant nos.1 and 2 and had accordingly
impugned the transaction in a general suit for
partition which includes properties other than the
properties forming subject matter of agreement of
sale between defendant Nos.1 and 2 with respect
to which decree for specific performance is passed.
13. It is well settled that a Karta of does
not have absolute right to alienate properties of
Joint Hindu Family. However, he has a qualified
right to transfer ancestral properties in case of
legal necessity, discharge of debt etc. It is also well
settled that alienation of ancestral properties by
Karta is not void ab initio even in the absence of legal
necessity. A coparcener is required to challenge an
alienation of property by Karta and have it set
aside if the alienation is not for reason sufficient to
authorise a Karta to alienate ancestral property.
The alienation can be challenged in a general suit
for partition or by filing a suit limited for
challenging the alienation.
10 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
14. In a suit for specific performance of
contract, the Court adjudicates upon right of the
plaintiff to purchase property forming subject
matter of the agreement. Once the suit is decreed,
the plaintiff is entitled to sale deed with respect to
suit property. In the event the defendant does not
execute sale deed in compliance of decree, the
same can be executed and registered through
process of Court. The title is transferred upon
execution and registration of sale deed.
15. It is well settled that alienation of
ancestral property by a Karta can be questioned in
a general suit for partition. When a coparcener
does not agree with act of a Karta of entering into
agreement of sale with respect to an ancestral
property he will be well within his right to institute
a suit for partition. In order to file such a general
suit for partition, the coparcener need not wait till
the sale transaction being completed. Sale of an
ancestral property is not a conditition precedent for
finling suit for partition. A coparcener can file a suit
for partition as and when he deems it appropriate 11 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
to have his share separated. In a suit for partition
all the properties of the family will have to be
included, which implies that properties forming
subject matter of agreement of sale by Karta will
also have to be included. In cases where a Karta
enters into agreement of sale with respect to
ancestral property, right to institute suit for
partition cannot be deferred till completion of the
transaction of sale. In the considered opinion of this
Court, the learned First Appellate Court has erred in
holding that the suit was premature and without
cause of action with respect to suit properties
forming subject matter of agreement of sale
between defendant No.1 as Karta/vendor and
defendant No.2 as purchaser.
16. The fact that a Karta enters into
agreement of sale, in the opinion of a coparcener
without legal necessity, that by itself will offer the
coparcener a right to institute suit for partition. In
such suit for partition, a challenge that the
alienation of property sold by Karta was not for
legal necessity can be raised. In case of agreement 12 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
of sale without legal necessity, which is not
fructified into a sale deed, the coparcener may well
institute a suit for partition based on his
apprehension that the coparcenery properties are
not safe and may be alienated without legal
necessity by the Karta. Such act of Karta entering
into agreement of sale can offer a coparcener right
to file a general suit for partition.
17. The suit filed by the plaintiff is,
therefore, maintainable as the agreement of sale
and subsequent decree for specific performance
did offer a cause of action to institute the suit for
partition. In this suit for partition it was necessary
to decide the question of legal necessity or such
other cause authorizing the Karta to sell the suit
property or as in the present case enter into
agreement of sale with respect to suit property.
The first substantial question of law is answered
accordingly.
Substantial question of law No.2
Whether the Appellate Court has considered the scope and effect of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, as amended by Hindu Succession 13 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
(Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1994 and Section 6 of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which confers the status of coparcener on a daughter from the date of her birth?
18. The second substantial question of law
pertains to Section 29-A of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was
amended with respect to its applicability to the
State of Maharashtra vide Hindu Succession
(Maharashtra Amendment) Act by introducing
Section 29-A which provided that a daughter in a
Joint Hindu Family was entitled to right in ancestral
properties as a coparcener if her marriage is
solemnized after commencement of the said Act
which came into force on 22.6.1994. It will also
pertinent to state that since then Section 6 of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is also amended by
virtue of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005
which has come into force with effect from
9.9.2005. The amended provision confers status of
a coparcener on a daughter from the date of her
birth. The second substantial question of law is
therefore modified as under :
14 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
(2) Whether the Appellate Court has considered the scope and effect of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, as amended by Hindu Succession (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1994 and Section 6 as amended by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which confers the status of coparcener on a daughter from the date of her birth.?
19. As stated above, the dispute in the
Second Appeal is restricted the properties which
form subject matter agreement of sale dated
14.12.198 and decree for specific performance
passed in favour of defendant No.2 on 14.3.1991.
The decree is since then confirmed by this court
vide judgment dated 01.12.2005. As per proviso to
Section 6 of HSA, alienations made prior to
20.12.2004 are not subject to the amended
provisions of Section 6. Likewise, as per Section
29-A of HSA as introduced by the Maharashtra
amendment, daughter is entitled to share in
ancestral property if her marriage is solemnized
after 22.06.1994. In view of these provisions it is
required to be considered as to from which date the
decree for specific performance of contract will
become effective since the said issue will have
bearing on the share of parties with respect to the 15 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
properties forming subject matter of agreement of
sale.
20. This Court has in the case of Prataprai
Trambaklal Mehta Vs. Jayant Nemchand Shah, reported
in 1996 (2) Mh.L.J 885 held that when a suit for
specific performance of contract is decreed in
favour of the plaintiff, the title of plaintiff relates
back to the date of agreement. Similar view is
taken by the Punjab High Court in the case of
Gurdial Singh and ors Vs. Sewa Singh and ors., reported in
AIR 1973 P&H 254.
21. The agreement in question is dated
14.03.1988 and decree for specific performance is
passed on 14.03.1991. Both these dates are prior
to introduction of Section 29-A as also amended
Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. Although the
title will finally pass in favour of defendant No.2
only upon registration of sale deed pursuant to
decree for specific performance passed in her
favour, the decree will relate back to the date of
agreement or at best from the date on which 16 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
decree for specific performance is passed by the
learned Trial Court.
22. In case of alienation of property by a
Karta with respect to ancestral property it is found
that the same was without legal necessity still the
the alienation will be valid to the extent of share of
the Karta as on the date of alienation and not the
share that he may be entitled to on the date of
decree for partition. Legal position in this regard is
settled by Full Bench judgment of this Court in the
case of Sakarchand Satidas Vs. Narayan Salva Vani and
ors, reported in AIR 1951 BOM 10.
23. It is, therefore, necessary to
determine the share of the defendant
no.1-Karta/Vendor as on the date of agreement or
the date on which the decree for specific
performance was passed. As on the said date,
there were two coparceners in the family namely
plaintiff and defendant no.1 and wife of the
Karta/defendant no.2. It is well settled that in a
partition of joint hindu family property, the wife of
Karta is also entitled to one share equal to share of 17 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
coparceners. In view of the aforesaid, as on the
date of agreement and even as on the date of
decree for specific performance by the learned Trial
Court, the plaintiff nos.1 and 2 and defendant no.1
will have 1/3rd share each in the suit property. It is
well settled that alienation of suit property by Karta
is valid to the extent of his share, even if it is
without legal necessity. The 1/3rd share of the
defendant no.1 Vendor must go to the defendant
no.2 who is the purchaser. It is also well settled
that in case of alienation of undivided property by a
coparcener, in a suit for partition, if possible, the
property alienated by the coparcener should be
allotted to his share and the same should then be
allotted to the purchaser.
24. Since Section 29-A and amended
Section 6 of HSA have come into force after the
date of agreement of sale and decree for specific
performance passed by the learned Trial Court, the
share of defendant No.2 in the properties forming
subject matter of agreement with respect to which
decree for specific performance is passed will have 18 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
to be determined ignoring the said provisions.
Substantial question of law No.2 is decided
accordingly.
25. The learned Trial Court has held that
the findings recorded in the earlier suit for specific
performance will amount to res judicata and has
accordingly upheld the sale transaction between
the defendant nos.1 and 2. The learned First
Appellate Court has recorded that the decree for
specific performance did not amount to alienation
since sale deed was not executed pursuant to
decree for specific performance. Thus, the issue of
legal necessity is not dealt with by the learned
Courts.
26. The plaintiff No.1, who is a coparcener
is entitled to share in the coparcenary property
since birth in his individual right. He does not claim
the property through his father, the defendant
No.1. Plaintiff No.1 was not party to earlier suit for
specific performance. In view of the above,
following additional substantial questions of law are
required to be framed in the appeal:-
19 19 SA 308.12 (J).odt
I. Whether plaintiff No.1 claims right in the suit property which according to him is an ancestral property through his father, defendant No.1 or in his individual right as a coparcener?
II. Whether finding with respect to legal necessity recorded in suit for specific performance of contract filed by defendant No.2 against defendant No.1 i.e. Special Civil Suit No.428 of 1989 operate as res judicata in subsequent suit for partition filed by the plaintiffs although they are not parties to the earlier suit for specific performance?
27. List the appeal for further consideration on
09.06.2026.
28. Since the order is pronounced during
vacation and learned advocates for the respective
parties are not present, Office is directed to sent a
separate communication to the respective learned
advocates who are not present on their registered
email address and cell phone numbers.
(ROHIT W. JOSHI, J.)
Gulande/TANMAY
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!