[Cites 14, Cited by 0]

Bombay High Court

Sambhaji Balkrishna Zambre vs Chhaya Balkrishna Zambre on 6 May, 2026

2026:BHC-KOL:3563
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                          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
                                  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                 WRIT PETITION NO. 12120 OF 2025

                  Shri. Sambhaji Balkrishna Zambre,
                  Age: 46 Years, Occupation: Business,
                  Residing at C.S.No. 471 Western side,
                  Khanbhag, Sangli, Taluka: Miraj,
                  District: Sangli.                                          ....Petitioner
                          VERSUS
                  Smt. Chhaya Balkrishna Zambre,
                  Age: 67 Years, Occupation: Business,
                  Residing at R.S.No. 23/1, Anand Vihar
                  Colony, Near Joshi Wadewale
                  Bangalow, Dwarkai Bangalow, No.4,
                  Hingane Khurd, Sinhagad Road, Pune.                       ....Respondent


                  Mr. Prashant Bhavake, advocate for the Petitioner
                  Mr. Suryajeet P. Chavan, advocate for the Respondent

                                                 CORAM :      SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.
                                                 DATE :       6th MAY 2026.

                  JUDGMENT:

1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent of

the parties. Petition is decided finally at admission stage.

2. The Petitioner assails the order dated 23/09/2025 rendered

by the Appellate Officer, Senior Citizens Welfare Tribunal and

District Magistrate Sangli in Appeal bearing No. Jeshtha Nagrik

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Appeal/SR-01/2025 dismissing the appeal presented by the

Petitioner and endorsing the order passed by presiding Officer,

Senior Citizen Welfare Tribunal in Application bearing No.

MAG/J.Na./SR/20/2022.

3. The litigating parties are deeply interconnected yet stand as

two opposing sides. The Respondent is the aged mother of the

Petitioner, and the dispute pertains to the estate left behind by the

Petitioner's father who passed away on 02-06-2007. The subject

matter involves several properties, including Revision Survey No.

159 situated in Kupwad and various City Survey numbers in Sangli,

which the Petitioner claims to be a combination of ancestral and

self-acquired assets. Following the demise of the father, the

Petitioner's two sisters executed a registered relinquishment deed in

2013, which was followed by the Respondent-mother executing the

registered relinquishment deeds in favour of the Petitioner

respectively in the year 2015 and 2018.

4. Subsequently, the Petitioner transferred a portion of the suit

property in favour of his wife, purportedly in compliance with a

maintenance decree passed by the Family Court, Sangli, in 2020.

During this period, the Respondent initiated Special Civil Suit No.

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1056/2020 before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangli, seeking

the cancellation of the relinquishment deeds on the grounds of

fraud. Simultaneously, the Respondent filed an application under

the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act,

2007, before the Welfare Tribunal seeking maintenance and the

setting aside of the subject deeds.

5. The Welfare Tribunal allowed the Respondent's application,

resulting in the cancellation of the registered relinquishment deeds

and a direction to the Petitioner to pay a monthly maintenance of

₹10,000. The Petitioner challenged this decision before the

Appellate Officer and District Magistrate, Sangli, after hearing

litigating sides, dismissed the appeal and upheld the findings of the

lower Tribunal. As such, the Petitioner is before this Court.

6. Learned counsel for the Petitioner Mr. Bhavake, submits that

the impugned orders are legally unsustainable as the Senior Citizens

Welfare Tribunal in absence of the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon

the validity of the relinquishment deeds while Special Civil Suit No.

1056 of 2020 was already pending before a competent Civil Court

for the same relief. He contends that the relinquishment deeds of

2015 and 2018 were executed voluntarily without any express

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stipulation/condition of maintenance, and therefore, the summary

powers under Section 23 of the 2007 Act could not have been

invoked to void registered instruments. Furthermore, it is argued

that the Tribunal failed to consider that a portion of the property

had already been transferred to a third party, the Petitioner's wife,

under a Family Court decree, and gloss cannot be created on such

rights in a summary proceeding. Counsel further asserts that the

Petitioner has consistently cared for the Respondent and that the

direction to pay monthly maintenance of ₹10,000/- is arbitrary,

excessive, and was passed without a proper inquiry into the

Petitioner's financial means or the Respondent's actual requirements.

7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that in

absence of specific conditions in the gift deed for providing

maintenance to the mother-transferor, the deed could not have been

revoked. To buttress the same, has placed reliance upon the Sudesh

Chhikara Vs. Ramti Devi and Anr1 and Veena Singh Vs. District

Registrar/Additional Collector and anr2.

8. Per contra, Mr. Chavan, learned counsel for the senior citizen

has vehemently opposed the petition submitting that failure and 1 2022 SCC Online SC 1684 2 (2022) 7 SCC 1

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neglect on the part of the Petitioner to maintain his own natural

mother, a senior citizen would dis-entitle the Petitioner to claim any

relief much less the reliefs claimed in the present petition. It is

further submitted that the fact finding authorities have rendered a

positive finding in relation to neglect and incoherence with the

object of the provisions of the Act of 2007, especially Section 23,

therefore prayed for a dismissal of the petition.

9. Upon hearing the respective counsel for the litigating sides

and perusing the material on record, it is necessary to record that

there is no dispute regarding the fundamental facts governing the

relationship. It is admitted that the Respondent is the widowed

mother of the Petitioner and that, following the demise of the

patriarch Balkrishna Zambre, the parties continued to reside

together as a joint family unit. This familial proximity is a crucial

factor, as it provided the Petitioner with the position of trust and

influence necessary to facilitate the execution of the relinquishment

deeds in his favour. The record clearly establishes that the

Respondent, in her twilight years, was entirely dependent on the

Petitioner for her emotional and physical well-being.

10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of S. Vanitha v. Deputy

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Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Ors3 has observed as

under:

"Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress on providing care for the elderly. However, due to withering of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being looked after by their family. Consequently, many older persons, particularly widowed women are now forced to spend their twilight years all alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to lack of physical and financial support. This clearly reveals that ageing has become a major social challenge and there is a need to give more attention to the care and protection for the older persons. Though the parents can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both time- consuming as well as expensive. Hence, there is a need to have simple, inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim maintenance for parents."

11. Thus, the statute recognizes the right of parents and senior

citizens for maintenance. The Tribunal can pass an order of

maintenance under Section 9, whereas Section 23 which is primarily

aimed to empower the Tribunal to declare the transfer made by

senior citizen upon fulfillment of certain conditions. Section reads as

under.

"23. Transfer of property to be void in certain

circumstances

1. Where any senior citizen who, after the

3 (2021) 15 SCC 730

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commencement of this Act, has by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal.

2. Where any senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part, thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against the transferee for consideration and without notice of right.

3. If any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights under sub-sections (1) and (2), action may be taken on his behalf by any of the organisation referred to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 5."

12. A reading of Section 23(1) of the Act of 2007 establishes that

when a property is transferred by a senior citizen, whether by gift or

otherwise, it is both implicitly vis-a-vis explicitly subject to the

condition that the transferee shall provide the transferor with basic

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amenities and physical needs. The statute incorporates a legal

fiction that if the transferee, after obtaining the benefit of the

transfer, fails to fulfill these essential obligations, the transfer is

deemed to have been vitiated by fraud, coercion, or undue

influence. This deeming fiction operates upon the breach while not

providing maintenance. Consequently, in cases of such non-

compliance by the transferee, the Tribunal is statutorily empowered

to declare the transfer void at the option of the senior citizen,

ensuring that property rights do not supersede the fundamental

right to survival and dignity.

13. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the

Petitioner, suggesting that the senior citizen has disputed the very

execution of the relinquishment deeds. However, this submission is

premised upon misleading and misconstruction of the pleadings.

14. A careful perusal of the Respondent's application

unequivocally establishes that applicant has narrated the specific

circumstances, under which the deeds were executed, rather than

issuing an express denial of her signatures or the act of execution

itself. Since the challenge is rooted in the circumstances of the

transfer and the subsequent failure to provide maintenance, the

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"deeming fiction" under Section 23 is attracted. Consequently, the

Petitioner's reliance on the Veena Singh (Supra) judgment is

misplaced, as the facts of the present case do not pertain to a

dispute over the factum of execution, but rather in relation to the

failure of Petitioner to maintain a senior citizen.

15. The submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that

the filing of a substantive civil suit precludes the senior citizen from

taking recourse to the provisions of Section 23 is similarly devoid of

merit. The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens

Act, 2007, was enacted to give effect to the guarantees of social

security and dignity for the elderly through a simplified,

inexpensive, and expeditious mechanism. Its provisions are

supplemental and operate in a distinct field, primarily the

immediate protection of a senior citizen's life and property. The

mere pendency of a protracted civil litigation cannot be used as a

weapon/tool to deny a senior citizen the summary and remedial

reliefs provided under this special statute, as doing so would

frustrate the very objective of providing urgent relief to those in

their twilight years.

16. At this juncture, it is imperative to refer to the verdict of the

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Hon'ble Apex Court in Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit and Ors 4.,

wherein the Court, after considering the principles laid down in

Sudesh Chikara, delved into the nuances of Section 23 of the Act.

The Apex Court reiterated that beneficial legislations, such as the

Act of 2007, must receive a liberal and purpose-oriented

construction in consonance with social objectives. A literal

interpretation that defeats the legislative intent must be avoided;

instead, the Court's duty is to discern the underlying "mischief" the

statute seeks to remedy, in this case, the abandonment and financial

exploitation of the elderly and adopt a construction that suppresses

the problem while advancing the remedy.

17. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bharat Singh v. New

Delhi Tuberculosis Centre5 and Indian Performing Right Society Ltd.

v. Sanjay Dalia6, once the legislative intent is clear, the statute must

receive a functional interpretation. This principle ensures that

exemption clauses or technicalities do not provide a "deceptive

ground" for evading statutory obligations. In the context of the

Consumer Protection Act, as seen in Kozyflex Mattresses (P) Ltd. v.




        4   (2025) 2 SCC 787
        5   (1986) 2 SCC 614
        6   (2015) 10 SCC 161


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SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd7, and the Medical Termination of

Pregnancy Act in X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi) 8, the judiciary has

consistently held that where two views are possible, the one that

favours the beneficiary of the social welfare legislation must prevail.

Consequently, the provisions of the Act of 2007 cannot be

interpreted in a narrow, pedantic manner that leaves a senior citizen

remediless.

18. In the backdrop of the legislative history discussed, I am of the

considered view that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the

Act, which defines the protective purpose of the enactment, has

been restated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in S. Vanitha (Supra). The

preamble of the Act unequivocally declares its intent to provide a

more effective and robust framework for the maintenance and

welfare of parents and senior citizens, rights that are both

guaranteed and recognised under the Constitution. As a beneficial

piece of legislation, the Act is specifically designed to secure the

dignity of senior citizens against the unique vulnerabilities and

abandonment they often face in the twilight of their lives.

19. Consequently, the submission of the learned counsel for the 7 2024 INSC 234 8 (2023) 9 SCC 433

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Petitioner, that the authorities below should have stayed their hands

due to the pendency of a civil suit, cannot be accepted. To hold

otherwise would be to allow procedural technicalities to defeat the

very "fast-track" social security net that the legislature has

introduced, created and conferred upon senior citizens like the

Respondent.

20. Adopting the same view, the verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court

in Urmila Dixit (Supra), lends significant support to the findings of

the authorities below. Consequently, the Petitioner's plea that the

absence of a specific "maintenance clause" incorporated in the text

of the relinquishment deeds or the lack of pleadings regarding the

breach of such an obligation should defeat the Respondent's claim,

cannot be accepted.

21. In a beneficial piece of legislation such as the Act of 2007, the

focus is on the substantive reality of the senior citizen's

abandonment rather than the formalistic perfection of the

pleadings. This Court must ensure to fulfill the primary aim and

object of the statute, which is to ensure the immediate protection

and subsistence of the senior citizen. To allow the Petitioner to rely

on the silence of the deeds to evade his natural and statutory duty

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would be to frustrate the very "deeming fiction" that the legislature

has incorporated to prevent the exploitation of parents.

22. Similarly, the submission that the mere payment of

maintenance, whether under a Family Court decree or the Tribunal's

order, would absolve the Petitioner from the applicability of Section

23 is entirely without merit, as such, does not warrant

consideration. The statutory obligation to provide maintenance is a

distinct and continuous duty that runs parallel to the consequences

of property transfers contemplated under the Act.

23. Section 23 is a statutory safeguard designed to restore the

property to a senior citizen when a transfer has been misused to

leave them destitute or vulnerable. Therefore, the subsequent

payment of a monthly sum does not "cure" or negate the underlying

breach of the condition of care that initially triggered the Tribunal's

power to declare the relinquishment deeds void. To accept the

Petitioner's argument would allow a transferee to strip a parent of

their life's assets and then seek to "buy off" the statutory protection

of the parent's property rights.

24. Regarding the challenge to the Appellate Authority's order on

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the grounds that it is merely a concurring view lacking independent

reasoning, a perusal of the record makes it apparent that the

Appellate Authority specifically considered the execution of the

relinquishment deeds and the subsequent departure on the part of

the Petitioner from his duty to provide basic amenities and physical

needs to his natural mother.

25. In any event, the legal position regarding concurring orders is

no longer res integra. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India9 has settled that an

appellate or revisional authority, while affirming an order, is not

required to record elaborate or separate reasons if it finds itself in

agreement with the reasoning contained in the order under

challenge. The requirement for detailed recording of reasons is

paramount at the original stage to ensure transparency; since the

Senior Citizens Welfare Tribunal's original order was exhaustive and

well-reasoned, the Appellate Authority's endorsement of those

findings does not suffer from any legal infirmity or lack of

jurisdiction. Consequently, the Petitioner's grievance that the

impugned order is "non-speaking" is flawed and legally

9 (AIR 1990 SC 1984)

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unsustainable.

26. Insofar as the Petitioner's contention that he has subsequently

transferred the subject property in favour of his wife is concerned, it

is evident that any such transfer is purely derivative of the

petitioner's title. Upon lawful revocation of the original gift deed

under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and

Senior Citizens Act, 2007, the very basis of the petitioner's title

stands divested, and consequently, any transfer effected by him

would not, prima facie, create an indefeasible or superior right in

favour of the transferee. At the same time, since the petitioner's wife

is not a party to the present proceedings, this Court refrains from

rendering any conclusive adjudication upon her rights, if any, and

leaves it open for her to avail such remedies as may be permissible

in law.

27. Resultantly, taking into account the totality of the

circumstances narrated hereinabove, and specifically the conduct of

the Petitioner in abdicating his fundamental obligation to provide

basic amenities and physical needs to the Respondent-mother, as

such, no case for interference is made out. The record demonstrates

that the Petitioner, rather than fulfilling his natural and statutory

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duties, as such, has chosen to drag an aged/mother, a senior citizen

through protracted and multi-layered litigation, effectively depleting

her resources and peace of mind in her twilight years. Such conduct

further disentitles the Petitioner from seeking any relief, much less

the equitable and discretionary relief under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India.

28. The petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed. Rule is discharged.

29. Considering that the Petitioner has left no stone unturned in

harassing the Respondent, age old mother and depleting her meager

resources through persistent litigation in her twilight years, I am of

the considered view that this is a fit case to impose exemplary costs

to discourage such challenges against welfare orders. The

Petitioner's attempt of layering litigation while the Respondent

struggles for basic maintenance is a clear abuse of the legal process.

Accordingly, the Petitioner is directed to pay costs quantified at

₹50,000/- to the Respondent. This amount shall be deposited with

the Tribunal or paid directly to the Respondent within four weeks

from today, failing which the same shall be recovered as arrears of

land revenue.


                                         [SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.]


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30. At this stage, the learned counsel for the Petitioner prays for

the stay of this judgment and the continuation of the interim relief

previously granted. However, considering the findings recorded

hereinabove regarding the Petitioner's persistent failure to fulfill his

statutory obligations and the urgent, non-negotiable need of the

senior citizen for both maintenance and the restoration of her

property rights, I am of the opinion that further stay would only

serve to prolong the Respondent's hardship.

31. The request for continuation of interim relief, therefore, does

not warrant consideration and is accordingly rejected.

[SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.]

IRESH