[Cites 29, Cited by 0]

Bombay High Court

Swayam Realtors And Traders Llp vs State Of Maharashtra Through Its ... on 6 May, 2026

Author: Ravindra V. Ghuge

Bench: Ravindra V. Ghuge

2026:BHC-OS:11643-DB
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                            IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
          PURTI
          PRASAD               ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
          PARAB
         Digitally signed
         by PURTI
         PRASAD PARAB                 WRIT PETITION NO. 3274 OF 2025
         Date: 2026.05.06
         17:08:28 +0530                       ALONGWITH
                                  INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 7585 OF 2026
                                                   IN
                                      WRIT PETITION NO. 3274 OF 2025


                    Swayam Realtors & Traders LLP
                    a limited liability partnership firm
                    registered under the Limited
                    Liability Partnership Act, 2008,
                    formerly known as Swayam
                    Realtors & Traders Ltd., having
                    its registered office at
                    801, 8th Floor, Shikhar Complex,
                    Shrimali Society, Near Mithakhali
                    Six Road, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad,
                    Gujarat, India - 380 009.                                 ... Petitioner
                           Versus
                    1. State of Maharashtra
                    Through its Government Pleader
                    Original Side, Mumbai - 400 001.

                    2. Inspector General of Registration
                    & Controller of Stamps,
                    Maharashtra State, Near New
                    Administrative Building,
                    Opp. Old Vidhan Bhavan,
                    Firoj Gandhi Chowk,
                    Pune - 411 001.

                    3. Deputy Inspector General of
                    Registration and Controller of
                    Stamps, Maharashtra State
                    having its office at Ground Floor,
                    Old Customs House, Fort,
                    Mumbai - 400 001.

                    4. Joint Sub-Registrar, Mumbai
                    City - I, having its office at

                    Purti Parab                            1

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Ground Floor, Old Customs House,
Fort, Mumbai - 400 001.

5. Jt. Sub-Registrar, Borivali - II
MTNL Building. 1st Floor,
Behind Technical Hakoba Compound,
Borivali (East), Mumbai - 400 066.

6. Settlement Commissioner and
Director of Land Records
through its City Survey Officer,
Borivali, D.N.R. Karode Marg,
Natakwala Lane, S.V. Road,
Borivali (West), Mumbai - 400 093.

7. City Survey Officer, Borivali
D.N.R. Karode Marg,
Natakwala Lane, S.V. Road,
Borivali (West), Mumbai - 400 093.

8. Talathi, Borivali
D.N.R. Karode Marg,
Natakwala Lane, S.V. Road,
Borivali (West), Mumbai - 400 093.

9. Khatau Makanji Spinning &
Weaving Mills Limited,
a company registered under the
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956
having its registered office at
Laxmi Building, 6 Shoorji Vallabhdas
Marg, Ballard Estate,
Mumbai - 400 038.                                 ... Respondents

                                   ****
Mr. Fredun DeVitre, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Ajay Khattawala,
Mr.Karan Rukhana, Mr.Nirav Shah, Mr. Anuj Jaiswal and Ms. Niharika
Singh i/b Little and Co. for the Petitioner.
Mr. Jay Sanklecha, B - Panel Counsel a/w Mr. Prashant Kamble, AGP
for Respondent Nos. 1 to 8 - State of Maharashtra.
                                   ****




Purti Parab                             2

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                         CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE AND
                                 HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, JJ.

                         RESERVED ON : 17th APRIL, 2026
                         PRONOUNCED ON : 6th MAY, 2026

JUDGMENT (PER HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, J.) :

1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. By consent of

learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the Petition is taken up for

final disposal.

2. At the outset, we take on record the statement made on

behalf of the Petitioner that the relief concerning mutation is not pressed

at this stage, with liberty reserved. We also record that the correct date

of the BIFR sanction order is 26th February, 2007 as mentioned by the

Petitioner in separate note of statement and verified from the records.

3. The present Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India seeks, inter alia, a Writ of Mandamus directing the Respondent

authorities to register, under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908,

the orders dated 26th February, 2007 and 3rd January, 2013 passed by the

Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) in Case No.

135 of 1989, whereby, pursuant to a sanctioned scheme of revival-cum-

demerger under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act,

1985, ("the SICA Act") the immovable properties of Respondent No. 9

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stood transferred to and vested in the Petitioner with effect from 1 st

April, 2006. Consequential directions were also sought for registration

of the declaration-cum-indemnity dated 28th November, 2024 and for

mutation of revenue records reflecting the Petitioner's title. Of which

now on the basis of the statement made before us as recorded above by

the Petitioner, this prayer pertaining to mutation of the Petitioner's name

in the Revenue Records does not survive.

4. It is submitted that the Petitioner, originally incorporated as

a company under the Companies Act, 1956 and subsequently converted

into a limited liability partnership under the Limited Liability Partnership

Act, 2008, has at all material times acted bonafide and diligently. It was

emphasized that the rights of the Petitioner in respect of the subject

properties do not emanate from any voluntary instrument but arise by

operation of law, pursuant to a statutory scheme sanctioned by BIFR,

which has attained finality. The transfer and vesting of the properties, it

was submitted, stood completed upon sanction of the scheme, and the

requirement of registration is merely consequential to reflect such

vesting in public records.

5. Tracing the chronology, the learned Senior Counsel on

behalf of the Petitioner submitted that Respondent No. 9, being a sick

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industrial company, had approached BIFR under the SICA Act, and by

its order dated 26th February, 2007, a scheme of revival-cum-demerger

was sanctioned. Under the said scheme, the subject immovable

properties stood transferred to the Petitioner with retrospective effect

from 1st April, 2006. Clause 11.1(d)(e) of the scheme specifically

obligated the State of Maharashtra to treat such demerger at par with

reconstruction under Section 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 for stamp

duty purposes and to give effect to the transfer. However, despite

binding directions, the State authorities failed to act in compliance,

compelling the Petitioner to initiate further proceedings before BIFR,

resulting in the order dated 3rd January, 2013 reiterating and enforcing

the obligation upon the State authorities to compute and recover stamp

duty in accordance with the scheme and to register the properties.

6. The Petitioner and its counsel further submitted that instead

of complying with the binding BIFR directions, the stamp authorities

acted contrary thereto by raising exorbitant and untenable demands of

stamp duty and penalty, culminating in an adjudication order dated 18 th

December 2015. The Petitioner, it was urged, was constrained to

challenge such illegal demands through multiple proceedings, including

Writ Petitions before this Court and statutory appeals under the

Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. Ultimately, the Chief Controlling

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Revenue Authority, by its order dated 8 th July, 2024, allowed the

Petitioner's Appeal and set aside the earlier adjudication, and

conclusively determined that only nominal stamp duty of Rs. 100/- was

payable. The Petitioner promptly complied with the said order and paid

the requisite Stamp duty on 17th July, 2024, whereupon the certificate

under Section 32 of the Stamp Act was issued on 2nd August, 2024.

7. On the strength of this adjudication, it was submitted that

the Petitioner immediately approached the registering authorities on 22 nd

August, 2024 with the duly stamped documents for registration.

However, the authorities refused to accept the same on the ground that

the presentation was beyond the time prescribed under Section 23 of the

Registration Act. The learned Senior Counsel characterised such refusal

as ex facie illegal, arbitrary, and contrary to settled legal principles. It

was argued that the Petitioner could not have presented the document for

registration prior to adjudication and payment of proper stamp duty, as

the statutory scheme under the Stamp Act mandates that an instrument

must be duly stamped before it can be acted upon or registered.

Therefore, according to the Petitioner, the period of limitation for

presentation could only commence upon completion of the adjudication

proceedings and certification of stamp duty.

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8. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that it is well

settled, through a consistent line of authorities of this Court, that the time

consumed in adjudication of stamp duty is liable to be excluded while

computing the period under Sections 23 and Section 25 of the

Registration Act. Reliance was placed upon decisions such as:-

1. Nestor Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra.

2. Snehanjali Electronics and Trading Pvt. Ltd. vs. Inspector of

General of Registration and Controller of Stamps and Ors.

3. Purnima Bhanuprasad Gohil vs. State of Maharashtra.

4. Vijay Laxmi Ravi Kumar vs. Revenue Control Authority of

Bombay High court.

9. In support of the contention that where delay is occasioned

by pendency of adjudication before stamp authorities, such period must

be excluded, and the document, if presented within four months

thereafter, must be accepted for registration. Applying these principles,

the learned Senior Counsel submitted that in the present case, the

adjudication proceedings commenced as early as June 2007 and were

concluded only on 8th July, 2024, with the issuance of the certificate on

2nd August, 2024. The entire period between 2007 and 2024, being

attributable to the inaction and unlawful conduct of the State authorities,

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is liable to be excluded. Once this principle is applied and limitation is

computed thus, then the presentation of the document on 22 nd August,

2024 and thereafter within four months is squarely within limitation. It

was emphasized that the Petitioner has acted with due diligence

throughout, and the delay, if any, is wholly attributable to the

Respondent authorities, and they cannot be permitted to take advantage

of their own wrong.

10. The learned Senior Counsel while dealing with the

Respondents' contention raised in the affidavit in reply, regarding the

2015 adjudication order and the delay in challenging the same, it is

submitted that the said order stood merged in the appellate order dated

8th July, 2024 under the doctrine of merger, as recognised in Omprakash

Verma and Others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others 1, and

therefore ceased to have independent existence. It was further contended

that the Respondents themselves had prolonged the dispute by

challenging the BIFR directions before appellate forums, the proceedings

which culminated only in 2018, and even thereafter, they failed to act in

compliance, thereby contributing substantially to the delay.

11. It was then urged before us that the impugned action of the

1 (2010) 13 Supreme Court Cases 158

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registering authorities is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, being

arbitrary, unreasonable, and contrary to statutory mandate. The object of

the Registration Act, is mainly to ensure certainty and transparency in

transactions relating to immovable property and if the Respondent

authorities are permitted to act arbitrarily and deny the Registration of

the document of the Petitioner then the very object of the Registration

Act would be defeated inspite of the cases where the title is undisputed

and has vested by operation of law. It was submitted that the authorities

have failed to discharge their statutory duties and have acted in defiance

of binding orders passed by BIFR, which continue to operate and bind

the parties.

12. In conclusion, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the

petitioner has established a complete and satisfactory explanation for the

entire period in question, and there is neither negligence nor lack of bona

fides on its part. The delay, if any, stands fully accounted for and is

liable to be excluded in law. It was therefore prayed that this Court, in

exercise of its writ jurisdiction, be pleased to direct the Respondent

authorities to accept and register the BIFR orders along with the

declaration-cum-indemnity and to grant consequential reliefs, as sought

in the Petition.

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13. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the

Respondent authorities, advanced detailed submissions, both oral and

written, opposing the reliefs sought by the Petitioner. At the outset, it

was contended that Part IV of the Registration Act, 1908 specifically

governs the aspect of "time of presentation" of documents for

registration. Reliance was placed upon Sections 23 and Section 25 of the

said enactment to submit that the statutory scheme is clear and

mandatory in nature. It was urged that every document required to be

registered must ordinarily be presented before the competent registering

authority within a period of four months from the date of its execution.

The statute, in limited circumstances such as urgent necessity or

unavoidable accident, permits an extension of a further four months,

subject to payment of the prescribed fine. However, beyond this

aggregate outer limit of eight months, the statute does not contemplate or

confer any power upon the registering authority to accept a document for

registration. It was thus emphatically submitted that the legislative intent

makes no scope for discretion beyond the prescribed time limit

boundary.

14. In support of the above proposition, reliance was placed

upon the decision in Atul Projects Pvt Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 2,

2 Writ Petition (L) No.12995 of 2024.

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particularly Paragraph Nos. 19 to 24 thereof, wherein the Court has

reiterated the mandatory character of the limitation prescribed under the

Registration Act. It was further submitted that the limitation period

contemplated under the statute is with respect to the presentation of the

document and not the Act of Registration per se. Once a document is

validly presented within time, then its subsequent registration may occur

at a later stage. For this proposition, reliance was placed on the

judgment in Shama Charan Das vs. Joyenoolah3, wherein it is held that,

upon proper presentation, the running of limitation ceases or stops.

15. The learned Counsel for the Respondents then addressed the

Petitioner's contention that the document could not have been presented

for registration in the absence of proper stamping. This submission was

strongly refuted as being contrary to the statutory framework,

particularly placing reliance on Rule 46 of the Maharashtra Stamp Rules,

1961. It was argued that the said rule explicitly provides the procedure to

be followed where an insufficiently stamped document is presented for

registration. In such a case, the registering officer is obliged to impound

the document under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 or the

Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, and thereafter follow the prescribed

procedure, including making necessary endorsements under Rules 39

3 (1885) ILR 11 Cal 750

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and 43 read with Section 58 of the Registration Act, before forwarding

the document to the Collector for adjudication. It was emphasized that

the statute does not prohibit presentation of an inadequately stamped

document; rather, it provides a complete mechanism for its

regularisation. Therefore, according to the Respondents, there was no

legal impediment preventing the Petitioner from presenting the

document within the prescribed period, and had such presentation been

made, the limitation would have stood arrested.

16. The Respondents' Counsel further submitted that our Court,

in catena of decisions, has carved out a limited exception to the rigid

timelines prescribed under the Registration Act by excluding periods

during which the delay is attributable to impossibility or to acts of the

Court or statutory authorities. According to him this principle is founded

upon well-settled maxims, namely actus curiae neminem gravabit and

lex non cogit ad impossibilia. In Support of this contention, reliance was

placed upon the following decisions :-

1. Nestor Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra,

2. Kirti Mulani vs. State of Maharashtra,

3. Purnima Bhanuprasad Gohil vs. State of Maharashtra, and

4. Grand Centrum Realty LLP vs. State of Maharashtra.

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17. Accordingly, the learned Counsel argued that such

exclusion is permissible only to the extent of the actual period during

which the matter remained pending before the competent authority for

adjudication, and not beyond. Applying the above principles to the facts

of the present case, the learned Counsel submitted that the BIFR order

dated 11th January, 2007 was required to be presented for registration

within the statutory period. Though an application for adjudication of

stamp duty was filed on or about 13th June, 2007, the adjudication

culminated in an order dated 18th December, 2015. He Further

emphasized that the Petitioner admittedly did not challenge the said

adjudication order for nearly nine years. The period between 2015 and

2024, during which no proceedings were pending before the stamp

authorities, cannot be excluded for the purpose of computing limitation.

The Petitioner's subsequent challenge to the adjudication order, initiated

only in 2024, was characterised as belated, misconceived, and lacking in

bonafides. It was further pointed out that even earlier proceedings

initiated in 2019 did not assail the adjudication order, thereby

demonstrating a clear lack of diligence on the part of the Petitioner. It

was then contended that although the appellate authority ultimately set

aside the adjudication order on 8 th July, 2024, such condonation of delay

in filing the Appeal does not create any legal fiction whereby the Appeal

is deemed to have been filed within the original limitation period. The

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effect of condonation, it was submitted, is merely to revive the remedy;

it does not obliterate the intervening period of inaction nor render it non

est in law. Consequently, there was, in fact, no adjudication proceeding

pending between 18th December, 2015 and May 2024, and this entire

period must be counted against the Petitioner.

18. The Respondents further disputed the Petitioner's assertion

regarding the date of presentation of the document. It was submitted that

the claim of the Petitioner about presentation on 22 nd August, 2024 is not

borne out by any contemporaneous record. On the contrary, the official

inward register and token records maintained by the registering authority

indicate that the document was presented only on 25 th October, 2024. In

the absence of cogent evidence to the contrary, the latter date must be

accepted. Reliance in this regard was placed upon Snehanjali

Electronics and Trading Pvt. Ltd. vs. Inspector of General of

Registration and Controller of Stamps and Ors. 4 wherein the Court

recognised the written application date as determinative of presentation.

19. In conclusion, the learned Advocate for the Respondents

submitted that the Petitioner has been grossly negligent and has failed to

pursue available remedies within the prescribed time. The delay in the

4 (2017) SCC Online Bom 6755 (DB)

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present case is neither bonafide nor beyond the control of the Petitioner.

It was urged that equitable considerations cannot override explicit

statutory mandates. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj & Anr. vs. Special Land

Acquisition Officer5, particularly Paragraph No.12, to submit that

limitation provisions must be applied with full rigour, irrespective of

hardship or inconvenience. It was thus contended that this Court lacks

the jurisdiction to extend limitation on equitable grounds, and

accordingly, the Writ Petition deserves to be dismissed.

20. Having considered the rival submissions and upon taking

into consideration the factual aspect it is clear that the controversy must

be resolved not merely on a literal application of statutory timelines, but

on a principled synthesis of constitutional discipline, statutory hierarchy,

and the jurisprudence governing period of limitation in such cases.

21. At the outset, we are of the opinion that the impugned

action must firstly, withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the

Constitution of India. The discipline of non-arbitrariness is not a formal

requirement but it is a substantive constitutional command. In Kumari

Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others 6,

5 (2013) 14 SCC 81 6 (1991) 1 SCC 212

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the Hon'ble Supreme Court authoritatively held that every State action

must be informed by reason and must eschew arbitrariness, the ratio

being that arbitrariness is the very antithesis of equality. This principle

was constitutionally deepened in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union

of India and Another7, where it was held that procedure established by

law must be just, fair, and reasonable, and not arbitrary, fanciful or

oppressive. Again the emerging principle is that statutory interpretation

cannot be divorced from its consequences, particularly where those

consequences are shaped by the conduct of the State itself. Viewed in

this light of Constitution Principles, the refusal of registration in the

present case cannot be assessed in isolation. The State, having failed to

comply with binding statutory directions and having compelled the

Petitioner to undergo prolonged adjudicatory processes, cannot

subsequently permitted to invoke period of limitation as a bar for getting

the document of the Petitioner registered in accordance with the

Registration Act. To countenance such a position would be to legitimize

State-induced prejudice which constitutional doctrine does not permit.

22. The principle that a party cannot take advantage of its own

wrong is a foundational equitable doctrine which is equally applicable in

public law along with Administrative Law. In Union of India and

7 (1978) 1 SCC 248

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Others vs. Major General Madan Lal Yadav (Retd.) 8, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court thus has held that a party responsible for delay cannot

rely upon that delay to defeat the rights of the opposite party. Thus, in

clear terms the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that equity does not permit

a litigant, particularly the State, to derive advantage from its own default.

In the present case, the delay is not merely incidental but it is structurally

attributable to the conduct of the State authorities themselves. The

invocation of limitation in such circumstances is therefore legally

untenable.

23. The second limb of analysis concerns the statutory

framework under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)

Act, 1985. The Record admittedly indicates that the document in

question is not ordinary instrument which is executed between two

parties but an order passed by the competent tribunal BIFR under the

Central Legislation thereby sanctioning the revival cum demerger

scheme by which, the subject immovable properties stood transferred to

the Petitioner with retrospective effect from 1 st April, 2006. Once this is

the factual position then Section 32 of SICA Act come in operation,

which confers overriding effect upon a sanctioned scheme,

notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law. In

8 (1996) 4 SCC 127

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Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others vs. Corromandal

Pharmaceuticals and Others9, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a

sanctioned scheme prevails over all other enactments to the extent of

inconsistency. This judgment clearly holds that the legislative intent

underlying SICA is to ensure that revival mechanisms are not defeated

by procedural or fiscal impediments. This principle was reaffirmed in

Raheja Universal Limited vs. NRC Limited and Others 10, wherein the

Court held that a sanctioned scheme is binding on all stakeholders,

including State authorities, and must be implemented in its entirety. The

series of Dictums thus underscores the supremacy and binding force of

such schemes. The consequence in the present case is therefore evident

that once the scheme mandated vesting and directed the State to act in a

particular manner, the authorities were under a statutory obligation to

give effect to it. Their prolonged inaction of not registering the document

for one or the other reason cannot dilute the legal efficacy of the scheme.

24. The third and determinative issue pertains to period of

limitation under the Registration Act, 1908. Section 23 and Section 25

prescribe the period within which a document is required to be

presented. Section 23 and Section 25 are reproduced as below :-

9 (1997) 10 SCC 649 10 (2012) 4 SCC 148

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23. Time for presenting documents:- Subject to the provisions contained in section 24, 25 and 26, no document other than a will shall be accepted for registration unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution:

Provided that a copy of a decree or order may be presented within four months from the day on which the decree or order was made, or, where it is applicable within four months from the day on which it becomes final.

23A. Re-registration of certain documents:- Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, if in any case a document requiring registration has been accepted for registration by a Registrar or Sub-Registrar from a person not duly empowered to present the same, and has been registered, any person claiming under such document may, within four months from his first becoming aware that the registration of such document is invalid, present such document or cause the same to be presented, in accordance with the provisions of Part VI for re -registration in the office of the Registrar of the District in which the document was originally registered; and upon the Registrar being satisfied that the document was so accepted for registration from a person not duly empowered to present the same, he shall proceed to the re - registration of the document as if it had not been previously registered, and as if such presentation for re-registration was a presentation for registration made within the time allowed therefore under Part IV, and all the provisions of this Act, as to registration of documents, shall apply to such re- registration; and such document, if duly re-registered in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall be deemed to have been duly registered for all purposes from the date of its original registration:

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Provided that, within three months from the twelfth day of September 1917, any person claiming under a document to which this section applies may present the same or cause the same to be presented for re - registration in accordance with this section, whatever may have been the time when he first became aware that the registration of the document was invalid.

25. Provision where delay in presentation is unavoidable:-

(1) If, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, any document executed, or copy of a decree or order made, in India is not presented for registration till after the expiration of the time hereinbefore prescribed in that behalf, the Registrar in cases where the delay in presentation does not exceed four months, may direct that, on payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper registration - fee, such document shall be accepted for registration.

(2) Any application for such direction may be lodged with a Sub-Registrar, who shall forth-with forward it to the Registrar to whom he is subordinate.

25. Before considering these two Sections it is necessary to

consider the jurisprudence on the subject of period of limitation, which

in our view has consistently evolved to recognise that limitation cannot

be computed in abstraction from legal capability.

26. In Nestor Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs.

State of Maharashtra and Ors.11, a Division Bench of this Court held

11 (2015) SCC Online Bom 3480 (DB)

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that the period spent in adjudication of stamp duty must be excluded

while computing limitation. Thus, this judgment clarifies that a

document which is not duly stamped is incapable of lawful registration,

and therefore limitation cannot run during a period when the law itself

prohibits registration.

27. This principle was reiterated in Snehanjali Electronics and

Trading Private Limited (supra), where it was held that delay attributable

to statutory adjudication processes cannot prejudice the party seeking

registration. This judgment emphasises that such time must necessarily

be excluded.

28. The position has been restated with clarity in Purnima

Bhanuprasad Gohil vs. State of Maharashtra and Others12, wherein it

was held that limitation begins only when the document becomes

capable of lawful registration, that is to say, upon completion of stamp

adjudication. These decisions, when read together, establish that

limitation under the Registration Act is not a rigid or mechanical

computation of time, but must yield to the legal impossibility of

registration. Therefore the legal maxim referred by the Respondent in

his written submission "lex non cogit ad impossibilia" infact supports

12 (2024) SCC Online Bom 3185

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the case of the Petitioner. The above doctrine was considered by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul

Khayumsab vs Mr. Kumar & Ors.13, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme

Court recognised the applicability of this maxim by referring to the

earlier judgments and held that the law does not compel a person

performing an act which is impossible. Applying the said principle to

the present case, the Petitioner cannot be penalised for not presenting the

document through a period when, owing to pending stamp adjudication

and the conduct of the statutory authorities due to which lawful

registration was not practical or legal possible.

29. This principle when applied to the present case, where

registration was legally impermissible pending adjudication, the law

cannot penalise the Petitioner for not performing an act which could not

have been lawfully done. Therefore, the submission of the Respondents

that the Petitioner ought to have presented the document in an unstamped

form cannot be accepted. While such a course may be permissible in a

routine case, it cannot be elevated into a mandatory obligation in the

present case particularly when the very basis of stamp liability was under

contest and the State itself was asserting inconsistent positions. It has to

be endorsed that judicial reasoning cannot compel procedural formalism

13 2006 (1) SCC 46

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at the cost of substantive justice. The reliance therefore placed by the

learned Advocate for the Respondent on the judgment of Basawaraj and

Another (supra), is therefore completely misplaced. In the Case of

Basawaraj and Another (supra) it is held that delay attributable to

negligence or inaction cannot be condoned. The present case stands on a

fundamentally different footing, it is not a case of negligence or in-action

on the part of the Petitioner but here is the case where the delay is

institutional and State-induced. The doctrinal basis of Basawaraj and

Another (supra) is therefore inapplicable.

30. One more argument of the Petitioner that requires

consideration is the argument of Doctrine of merger, which further

fortifies the Petitioner's case. While considering and applying this

Doctrine in Kunhayammed and Others vs. State of Kerala and

Another14, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, that once an appellate

authority passes an order, the original order merges into it and ceases to

have independent existence. The ratio of this judgment is that the

operative order is the appellate order. Consequently, the first

adjudication order in the present case dated 18th December, 2015 must

be regarded as having merged into the appellate order dated 8th July,

2024, and the document became legally capable of registration only

14 (2000) 6 SCC 359

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thereafter. The contention of the Respondents Advocate that original

adjudication order dated 18th July, 2015 was never challenged for almost

nine years and hence that period cannot be excluded is completely

misplaced for the reason that the order of final adjudication by the

appellate Authority was delivered in July 2024 thereby setting aside the

order dated 18th December, 2015 and hence the first adjudication order

gets merged in the final adjudication order of Appellate authority.

31. Thus, when viewed cumulatively on all the above referred

premises and legal positions, along with a factual chronology reveals a

consistent pattern of diligence on the part of the Petitioner and

corresponding inaction on the part of the State. The delay stands fully

explained and is legally excludable. The refusal of registration is

therefore not merely erroneous in law but also arbitrary in its effect.

32. Thus, in our considered view, the period under Section 23

and Section 25 of the Registration Act must be computed from the date

on which the document became capable of lawful registration, namely

upon final adjudication of stamp duty on 8th July, 2024 or, at the latest,

upon issuance of the certificate on 2nd August, 2024. The presentation

thereafter is clearly within limitation. Even otherwise, any marginal

delay stands sufficiently explained in the facts of the present case.

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33. Hence, we proceed to pass following Order :-

ORDER

(i) The Writ Petition is allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and

(b), subject to the clarification recorded above.

(ii) Respondent Nos. 4 and 5, or the competent Registering authority,

shall accept for registration the BIFR sanctioned scheme/order dated 26th

February, 2007, the order dated 3rd January, 2013, and the declaration-

cum-indemnity dated 28th November, 2024, along with all annexures

required in law.

(iii) The Registering authority shall not refuse registration on the

ground that the document is beyond the period prescribed under Section

23 and Section 25 of the Registration Act, 1908.

(iv) The time consumed in adjudication of stamp duty, connected

proceedings before statutory authorities, and proceedings arising from

the dispute regarding proper stamp duty shall stand excluded for the

purpose of computing the period of presentation.

(v) The Registering authority shall complete the process of

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registration in accordance with law within four weeks from the date the