[Cites 16, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Jitendra P Maru vs The Central Bureau Of Investigation And ... on 27 March, 2026
2026:BHC-AS:14841-DB
Judgment-WP.5542.2025.doc
JVS.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Digitally
signed by
BALAJI
BALAJI GOVINDRAO
GOVINDRAO PANCHAL
PANCHAL Date:
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 5542 OF 2025
2026.03.27
17:20:45
+0530
Jitendra Punamchand Maru } Petitioner
Vs.
The Central Bureau of Investigation }
& Ors. } Respondents
Mr. Rajendra Desai a/w Mr. Kunal Bhanage i/by
Mr.Akshay Pawar, Advocates for the Petitioner.
Mr. Amit Munde, SPP a/w Mr. Jai Vohra for Respondent
No.1-CBI.
Mr. Anil C. Singh, Additional Solicitor General a/w
Ms.Neha N. Patil, AOR a/w Mr. Aditya Thakkar,
Mr.Krishnakant Deshmukh, Adarsh Vyas, Rama Gupta
& Mr. Rajdatt Nagre for Respondent No.2-UoI.
Mr. S. V. Gavand, Additional Public Prosecutor for
Respondent No.3-State.
Mr. Harish Salve, Senior Advocate, through V.C., a/w
Mr. Vikram Nankani, Senior Advocate, Mr. Rubin Vakil,
Mr. Ashwin Dave, Mr. Rishit Badiani & Mr. Gaurav
Gangal i/by A. S. Dayal & Associates, Advocates for
Respondent No. 4.
CORAM: SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, CJ. &
SUMAN SHYAM, J.
RESERVED ON : 23rd MARCH 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 27th MARCH 2026
JUDGMENT
Per, Shree Chandrashekhar, CJ:
The petitioner is seeking a direction to the Central Bureau of
Investigation (in short, CBI) to register a First Information Report
for commission of the offences under sections 378, 379, 403, 409,
410, 411, 413, 414 read with section 120B of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 by the Reliance Industries Limited (in short, RIL), its
Judgment-WP.5542.2025.doc
owners/Directors and all other known and unknown accused
persons and investigate the matter against them.
2. The petitioner states that the private companies were
permitted under the New Exploratory Licensing Policy to enter the
exploration business for extracting minerals and petroleum from
high seas. Under a contract awarded to the RIL, it was permitted
exploration of the Krishna Godavari basin over an area of 7645
square kms. According to the petitioner, the RIL started tapping gas
from the oil wells of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (in short,
ONGC) through sideways drilling into the adjacent ONGC wells. It is
stated that a complaint was made in this regard by the ONGC to
the Government of India and the RIL put forth a stand that it was
within its contractual rights to extract the migratory gas from the
ONGC wells. Later on, the dispute between the parties was sought
to be resolved by appointing M/s. De Golyer and Macnaghten for a
report on the allegations and counter allegations by the parties. The
petitioner further states that in the report dated 19 th November
2015 the said Firm stated that the RIL had tapped and extracted
gas from the ONGC wells without authority. When the said report
was made available to the Central Government, it constituted a
Committee comprising of Chief Justice A. P. Shah (Retd.) to
evaluate the said report and make recommendations as regards the
future course of action to be taken by the Government of India.
According to the petitioner, the Committee concluded that the RIL
had illegally extracted gas worth about USD 155207106.80 from
the ONGC wells but the RIL did not pay the quantified amount and
invoked the arbitration proceedings. The petitioner lodged a
complaint with the CBI for registration of First Information Report
but no action thereon was taken by the CBI. Constrained, he filed
Judgment-WP.5542.2025.doc
the present writ petition.
3. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the CBI, it is stated that the
dispute between the RIL and ONGC was brought before the Delhi
High Court in Writ Petition (C) No.3054 of 2014 but, in the
meantime, both parties entered into an agreement for appointment
of an independent third party to study the alleged migration of gas.
The CBI affirms that the preliminary report prepared by M/s. De
Golyer and Macnaghten was forwarded by the RIL to the Central
Government and the final report dated 31 st January 2003 was also
sent to the Director General of Hydrocarbons. The CBI states that
the allegations set-forth in the complaint made by the petitioner,
prima facie, appear to be a civil dispute. It further states that the
order passed by the High Court of Delhi does not indicate any
direction for registration of a First Information Report. The
complaint filed by the petitioner was accordingly closed and an
intimation was given to him through letter dated 30 th September
2025. The CBI takes an objection to the prayers made in this writ
petition on the ground that no complaint has been made by the
ONGC or the Union of India, which may alone hold any outstanding
demand against the RIL. The CBI has taken a position that the
ONGC is in possession of all relevant documents and agreements
and it may take a decision in the matter if it deems appropriate.
4. In the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the RIL, it is stated
that the petitioner has deliberately suppressed vital facts in the
petition and he is guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi. The
petitioner is an interloper who has filed this writ petition with an
oblique motive for a collateral purpose to bring the Company into
disrepute and garner publicity for himself. The petitioner has made
irresponsible statements and mala fides of the petitioner in
Judgment-WP.5542.2025.doc
instituting this writ petition are ex facie apparent on the face of the
record. The allegation by the petitioner that there was theft of gas or
that the ONGC ever alleged that its wells were drilled sideways are
just figment of the petitioner's imagination. The Production Sharing
Contract (in short, PSC) was executed on 12 th April 2000 between
the Union of India, RIL and NIKO Resources Limited (in short,
NIKO). Later on, BP Exploration (Alpha) Limited (in short, BP) also
became a party to the PSC and NIKO assigned its participating
interest in the RIL to BP. The Block KG-D6 developed by the RIL
and BP was the first ultra deep-water development of a
hydrocarbon field in the country. The successful discovery and
development of gas in Block KG-D6 marked a major milestone in
India's upstream petroleum sector. The RIL has narrated the
genesis of the dispute and states that the very basis of this writ
petition is derived from a contractual dispute. The RIL asserts that
the present writ petition is, therefore, misconceived, devoid of any
merit, not maintainable and liable to be dismissed.
5. Mr. Rajendra Desai, the learned counsel for the petitioner
commenced his arguments with an objection that the RIL has no
right of hearing at this stage. He referred to the decision in "Anju
Chaudhary"1 and, in particular, paragraph nos. 30 to 35
whereunder the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
30. Section 154 of the Code places an unequivocal duty upon the
police officer-in-charge of a police station to register FIR upon receipt
of the information that a cognizable offence has been committed. It
hardly gives any discretion to the said police officer. The genesis of
this provision in our country in this regard is that he must register
the FIR and proceed with the investigation forthwith. While the
position of law cannot be dispelled in view of the three-Judge Bench
judgment of this Court in State of U.P. v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi
[AIR 1964 SC 221 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 140] , a limited discretion is
1 Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.: (2013) 6 SCC 384
Judgment-WP.5542.2025.doc
vested in the investigating officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry
pre-registration of an FIR as there is absence of any specific
prohibition in the Code, express or implied. The subsequent
judgments of this Court have clearly stated the proposition that
such discretion hardly exists. In fact the view taken is that he is
duty-bound to register an FIR. Then the question that arises is
whether a suspect is entitled to any pre-registration hearing or any
such right is vested in the suspect.
31. The rule of audi alteram partem is subject to exceptions. Such
exceptions may be provided by law or by such necessary
implications where no other interpretation is possible. Thus rule of
natural justice has an application, both under the civil and criminal
jurisprudence. The laws like detention and others, specifically
provide for post-detention hearing and it is a settled principle of law
that application of this doctrine can be excluded by exercise of
legislative powers which shall withstand judicial scrutiny. The
purpose of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Penal Code, 1860
is to effectively execute administration of the criminal justice system
and protect society from perpetrators of crime. It has a twin
purpose; firstly to adequately punish the offender in accordance
with law and secondly, to ensure prevention of crime. On
examination, the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code does not
provide for any right of hearing at the time of registration of the first
information report. As already noticed, the registration forthwith of
a cognizable offence is the statutory duty of a police officer-in-
charge of the police station. The very purpose of fair and just
investigation shall stand frustrated if pre-registration hearing is
required to be granted to a suspect. It is not that the liberty of an
individual is being taken away or is being adversely affected,
except by the due process of law. Where the officer-in-charge of a
police station is informed of a heinous or cognizable offence, it will
completely destroy the purpose of proper and fair investigation if the
suspect is required to be granted a hearing at that stage and is not
subjected to custody in accordance with law. There would be
predominant possibility of a suspect escaping the process of law.
The entire scheme of the Code unambiguously supports the theory
of exclusion of audi alteram partem pre-registration of an FIR. Upon
registration of an FIR, a person is entitled to take recourse to the
various provisions of bail and anticipatory bail to claim his liberty in
accordance with law. It cannot be said to be a violation of the
principles of natural justice for two different reasons : firstly, the
Code does not provide for any such right at that stage, secondly,
the absence of such a provision clearly demonstrates the legislative
intent to the contrary and thus necessarily implies exclusion of
hearing at that stage. This Court in Union of India v. W.N. Chadha
Judgment-WP.5542.2025.doc
[1993 Supp (4) SCC 260 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 1171] clearly spelled out
this principle in para 98 of the judgment that reads as under : (SCC
p. 293)
"98. If prior notice and an opportunity of hearing are to be given to
an accused in every criminal case before taking any action against
him, such a procedure would frustrate the proceedings, obstruct the
taking of prompt action as law demands, defeat the ends of justice
and make the provisions of law relating to the investigation lifeless,
absurd and self-defeating. Further, the scheme of the relevant
statutory provisions relating to the procedure of investigation does
not attract such a course in the absence of any statutory obligation to
the contrary."
32. In Samaj Parivartan Samudaya v. State of Karnataka [(2012) 7
SCC 407 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 365] , a three-Judge Bench of this
Court while dealing with the right of hearing to a person termed as
"suspect" or "likely offender" in the report of the CEC observed that
there was no right of hearing. Though the suspects were already
interveners in the writ petition, they were heard. Stating the law in
regard to the right of hearing, the Court held as under : (SCC p. 426,
para 50)
"50. There is no provision in CrPC where an investigating
agency must provide a hearing to the affected party before
registering an FIR or even before carrying on investigation prior
to registration of case against the suspect. CBI, as already
noticed, may even conduct pre-registration inquiry for which
notice is not contemplated under the provisions of the Code, the
Police Manual or even as per the precedents laid down by this
Court. It is only in those cases where the court directs initiation
of investigation by a specialised agency or transfer
investigation to such agency from another agency that the
court may, in its discretion, grant hearing to the suspect or
affected parties. However, that also is not an absolute rule of
law and is primarily a matter in the judicial discretion of the
court. This question is of no relevance to the present case as
we have already heard the interveners."
33. While examining the abovestated principles in conjunction with
the scheme of the Code, particularly Sections 154 and 156(3) of the
Code, it is clear that the law does not contemplate grant of any
personal hearing to a suspect who attains the status of an accused
only when a case is registered for committing a particular offence or
the report under Section 173 of the Code is filed terming the suspect
an accused that his rights are affected in terms of the Code.
Absence of specific provision requiring grant of hearing to a suspect
and the fact that the very purpose and object of fair investigation is
Judgment-WP.5542.2025.doc
bound to be adversely affected if hearing is insisted upon at that
stage, clearly supports the view that hearing is not any right of any
suspect at that stage.
34. Even in the cases where report under Section 173(2) of the Code
is filed in the court and investigation records the name of a person
in column (2), or even does not name the person as an accused at
all, the court in exercise of its powers vested under Section 319 can
summon the person as an accused and even at that stage of
summoning, no hearing is contemplated under the law.
35. Of course, situation will be different where the complaint or an
application is directed against a particular person for specific
offence and the court under Section 156 dismisses such an
application. In that case, the higher court may have to grant hearing
to the suspect before it directs registration of a case against the
suspect for a specific offence. We must hasten to clarify that there is
no absolute indefeasible right vested in a suspect and this would
have to be examined in the facts and circumstances of a given case.
But one aspect is clear that at the stage of registration of a FIR or
passing a direction under Section 156(3), the law does not
contemplate grant of any hearing to a suspect.
6. As the petitioner seeks registration of First Information Report
against the RIL, its Directors etc. for commission of the specific
offences, the objection raised on behalf of the petitioner to the grant
of hearing to the RIL was overruled on 23 rd March 2026 and the
following order was passed by this Court :-
"On 10th March 2026, we passed the following order:
"Mr. Kunal Bhanage, the learned vice counsel for the
petitioner is seeking adjournment on the ground of personal
difficulty of Mr.Rajendra Desai.
2. On 24th February 2026, the learned counsel for the petitioner
responding to the objection taken on behalf of Reliance
Industries Limited stated that this corporate entity is not
required to be heard at this stage in this writ petition as there
are judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to this effect.
However, the learned counsel for the petitioner was directed to
supply a copy of the writ petition to the learned counsels
appearing for the parties.
3. It is stated at the Bar by Mr. Vikram Nankani, the learned
senior counsel that a copy of the writ petition has been served to
his assisting counsel and a reply-affidavit has been made
ready. Let a copy of the reply-affidavit be served upon the
Judgment-WP.5542.2025.doc
learned vice counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsels
appearing for the other respondents.
4. Mr.Kunal Bhanage, the learned vice counsel for the petitioner
states that there was a determination by the Delhi High Court in
FAO(OS) (COMM) 201/2023 titled "Union of India v. Reliance
Industries Limited & Ors.", a copy of which has ben annexed
vide Exhibit-"A" at running page no. 23. Mr.Kunal Bhanage, the
learned vice counsel for the petitioner further states that the
order passed in FAO(OS) (COMM) 201/2023 has been
challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, there is
not mention about any such proceeding pending before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
5. Having regard to the facts and circumstances in the case,
Reliance Industries Limited is added as respondent no.4 in the
present proceedings. Necessary amendment be carried out by
Mr.Kunal Bhanage, the learned vice counsel for the petitioner
with red ink in course of the day.
6. Post the matter on 23 rd March 2026 to be listed First on
Board."
2. The petitioner is present in the Court and states that previously
he was engaged in the business of sale of plastic. But presently there is
no business activity carried out by him. On a Court's query,
Mr.Rajendra Desai, the learned counsel for the petitioner, who is present
in the Court, states that all facts stated in this writ petition have been
derived from the judgment of the Delhi High Court in FAO(OS) (COMM)
201/2023 tilted "Union of India v. Reliance Industries Limited & Ors.".
3. Except stating that the petitioner has right in law to file a
complaint seeking registration of a First Information Report, no
argument has been advanced by Mr. Rajendra Desai, the learned
counsel for the petitioner.
4. On a further query from the Court why the petitioner waited for
about 15 years before approaching this Court with a prayer for
registration of a First Information Report, the learned counsel for the
petitioner states that only after a judgment was delivered by the Delhi
High Court rendering a finding as to fraud played upon Government of
India, the petitioner has approached this Court. Mr. Rajendra Desai, the
learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision in "Anju
Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr." (2013) 6 SCC 384 and
submitted that the private respondent has no right in law at this stage
to be heard by this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred
to several paragraphs in "Anju Chaudhary" to support this submission.
However, on a glance at the decision in "Anju Chaudhary", we gather
that the said decision was delivered in a peculiar facts and
circumstances in the case. A First Information Report was already
Judgment-WP.5542.2025.doc
lodged and the complaint filed by one Parvez Parwaz under section
156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was rejected by the
jurisdictional Magistrate. In paragraph no.35 of the said decision after
dwelling upon the powers of the Court to entertain a petition filed under
section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has in no uncertain words indicated that where a complaint has
been filed against a particular individual, the High Court is required to
hear that person.
5. Mr. Anil C. Singh, the learned Additional Solicitor General states
that the petitioner himself had stated in this petition that he filed a
private complaint in the District Court at Silvassa which he later on
withdrew. Mr. Vikram Nankani, the learned senior counsel for the
respondent no.4 submits that filing of this writ petition is an abuse of
the process of the Court. The petitioner has approached this Court with
a prayer for registration of a First Information Report with an oblique
motive.
6. Judgment is reserved."
7. The petitioner states that his right to file a complaint to set
the criminal law in motion is recognized in law. However, if the writ
petition seeking registration of a First Information Report is
entertained on the basis of certain observations made by the Court,
as claimed by the petitioner, there shall be serious consequences
and repercussions. In our opinion, this is not in public interest
that a writ petition based on certain observations made by the
Court is entertained and a direction for registration of a First
Information Report is issued by the High Court. The registration of
a criminal case is a very serious matter and it entails drastic
consequences to the proposed accused person. There is no reason
indicated in the writ petition and the petitioner who was present in
the Court could not offer any explanation why he did not approach
the Court earlier if at all he had a genuine reason to believe that
any crime was committed in respect of the tapping of gas from
ONGC oil wells.
8. In a writ petition of this nature, the High Court is required to
examine whether the petitioner is seeking any personal gain or
Judgment-WP.5542.2025.doc
there is private or oblique motive behind filing of the petition. The
professed cause and the purpose behind this petition which is
masked as the public cause are mere pretentious projections. The
petitioner stated in the Court that he was previously engaged in the
business of sale of plastics but he could not disclose any details of
such a business. Interestingly, the petitioner further stated that he
was not carrying on any business activity as of now. He also stated
that he is a social worker but failed to apprise this Court about any
social activity by him. This writ petition is in the nature of a public
interest litigation which does not serve any public purpose. There
must be a public law element involved in the writ petition because
the High Court takes a decision only upon considerations germane
to the public law. It is the duty of the High Court to examine the
relevant materials and bestow its considerations as to whether the
prayer if granted would serve any public cause. This is the
experience across the High Courts that the writ petitions of this
kind or a petition masked as a public interest litigation is filed at
the behest of the failed competitor or a rival business house or a
disgruntled person. A petition like the present one causes serious
harm to the reputation and business prospects of any Corporate
entity. An attempt like this carries an inbuilt threat which may
percolate into the minds of the business partners of any Corporate
entity and thus threatening a present or future business
partnership.
9. This writ petition is clearly an abuse of the process of the
Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the
petitioner gathered information from a newspaper report about
commission of the crime pertaining to the ONGC wells. Merely
because the petitioner makes certain allegations in this writ
Judgment-WP.5542.2025.doc
petition, he cannot claim to have a right in law to seek registration
of the First Information Report against the fourth respondent, its
officers, Directors etc. The justification sought to be put-forth by
the petitioner for approaching this Court more than a decade after
the dispute erupted between the RIL and Union of India is false
explanation. There was an arbitral award made on 24th July 2018
in favor of the RIL. A challenge made to this arbitral award by the
Union of India before the Delhi High Court failed and the petition
under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was
dismissed by an order dated 9 th May 2023. However, a Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court interfered with and overturned the
judgment dated 9th May 2023 in an appeal filed under section 37 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This order has been
challenged by the RIL before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the
Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.17584 of 2025 is pending
consideration.
10. The powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are
exercised by the High Court in public interest and not to effectuate
any private interest. A person approaching the writ Court must
establish his bona fides. He must come clean to the Court and not
with soil hands which has suppressed material facts from the
Court. He must also prima facie demonstrate that he is entitled for
the reliefs as claimed in the petition. This writ petition fails on each
count and has been filed with a tainted motive.
11. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this
writ petition which is, accordingly, dismissed.
[SUMAN SHYAM, J.] [CHIEF JUSTICE]
