[Cites 26, Cited by 0]

Bombay High Court

Om Salve Singh vs The State Of Maharashtra on 26 March, 2026

Author: N. J. Jamadar

Bench: N. J. Jamadar

2026:BHC-AS:15680
                                                                                        17-WP321-2026.DOC

                                                                                                       Santosh

                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                          CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                                              WRIT PETITION NO. 321 OF 2026

                        Om Salve Singh                                                        ...Petitioner
                                                   Versus
                        The State Of Maharashtra                                          ...Respondent

                        Ms. Kusum Pandey, through VC, for the Petitioner.
  SANTOSH               Mr. A. R. Metkari, APP for the State.
  SUBHASH               Mr. Rangnath Gite, PSI, Nalasopara Police Station, present.
  KULKARNI
  Digitally signed by
  SANTOSH SUBHASH
  KULKARNI
                                                                CORAM:       N. J. JAMADAR, J.
  Date: 2026.04.02
  18:39:29 +0530                                                DATED:       26th MARCH, 2026

                        JUDGMENT:

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, and with the

consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.

2. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India assails the legality, propriety, and

correctness of an order dated 24 th November, 2025 passed by

the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, Mumbai, in

Appeal No.15/2025 whereby the appeal preferred by the

petitioner against an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner

of Police, Zone-III, Mira-Bhayander, Vasai-Virar Police

Commissionerate, thereby externing the petitioner from the

limits of Palghar, Thane, Mumbai City, and Mumbai Suburban

17-WP321-2026.DOC

districts for a term of two years under Section 56(1)(a)(b) of the

Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 ("the Police Act, 1951"), came to be

dismissed.

3. On 24th November, 2024, an externment proceeding was

initiated against the petitioner alleging that the movements or

acts of the petitioner were causing or calculated to cause alarm,

danger, and harm to persons and property, and that there were

reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner was engaged

or was about to be engaged in the commission of offences

involving force or violence and offences punishable under

Chapters XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("the

Penal Code"), and the witnesses were not willing to come

forward to give evidence in public against the petitioner fearing

the safety of their persons and property.

4. Eventually, by an order dated 7th January, 2025, the

competent authority proceeded to extern the petitioner from the

limits of Thane, Palghar, Mumbai City and Mumbai Suburban

Districts for a term of two years. The competent authority took

into account the fact that during the period from 2022 to 2024,

four crimes were registered against the petitioner for the

offences punishable under Chapters XVI and XVII of the Penal

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Code, and the witnesses were not willing to come forward to give

evidence in public against the petitioner.

5. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal against

the order of externment before the Divisional Commissioner,

under Section 60 of the Police Act, 1951. By the impugned

order, the Divisional Commissioner dismissed the appeal,

finding no fault with the order passed by the competent

authority.

6. Being further aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred this

petition.

7. I have heard Ms. Kusum Pandey, the learned Counsel for

the petitioner, and Mr. Metkari, the learned APP for the State.

With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I

have perused the material on record.

8. Ms. Pandey, the learned Counsel for the petitioner,

submitted that the order of externment suffers from the vice of

non-application of mind. In two crimes, arrayed against the

petitioner, the proceedings stood terminated. In C.R. No.434 of

2022 registered with the Nalasopara Police Station, for offences

punishable under Sections 365, 143, 147, 149, 323, 504 and

506 of the Penal Code, a N.C. final report was filed. Whereas in

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C.R. No. 208 of 2023, the petitioner came to be acquitted. The

offences for which the petitioner has been arraigned in CR

No.333/2024 do not form part of the offences punishable under

Chapters VIII, XVI, or XVII of the Penal Code. Thus, on the

basis of only one crime, an extreme measure of externment was

ordered. Secondly, the externment order also manifests an

arbitrary exercise of powers. Although all the offences were

registered against the petitioner at Nalasopara Police Station,

the petitioner came to be externed from an expansive area

covering four districts sans any jurisdiction, and that too for the

full term of two years without ascribing any reasons for the

same.

9. Mr. Metkari, the learned APP, attempted to support the

impugned order. It was submitted that within a span of two

years, four offences have been registered against the petitioner.

Thus, on the basis of the frequency of violent acts indulged in

by the petitioner and the unwillingness of witnesses to come

forward to give evidence against the petitioner in public, the

competent authority was justified in externing the petitioner,

submitted Mr. Metkari.

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10. Evidently, the action was initiated against the petitioner on

the basis of the following crimes registered against the

petitioner:

Sr. Police C. R. No. Sections Current status No. Station 1 Nalasopara 434 of 2022 365, 143, 147, 149, 323, Pending 504 and 506 of IPC 2 Nalasopara 208 of 2023 324, 323, 427, 504, 506, Pending 141, 143, 147, 148 and 149 of the IPC 3 Nalasopara 142 of 2024 324, 323, 504, 506, 425 Pending and 34 of IPC 4 Nalasopara 333 of 2024 223(A), 223(B), 285, 221 Pending a/w 37(1)(3) and 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

11. In regard to the crime at Sr. No.1 indisputably, a NC final

report was filed. In CR No.208/2023 (Sr. No.2) for the offences

punishable under Sections 324, 323, 427, 504, 506, 141, 143,

147, 148 and 149 of the IPC, the petitioner was acquitted on 4 th

February, 2025. It is true that, when the externment order was

passed the prosecution arising out of the said CR No.208/2023

was sub-judice. However, the Appellate Authority did note that

the petitioner was acquitted from the said prosecution. The

crime registered at CR No.333/2024 (Sr.No.4) for the offences

punishable under Sections 223(A), 223(B), 285, 221 a/w 37(1)(3)

and 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act, does not fall within the

ambit of the offences which form part of Chapter XVI or XVII of

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the Penal Code. Those offences are primarily in the nature of

disobedience of the lawful orders issued by the public servants

and the negligent conduct.

12. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the submission on

behalf of the petitioner that only the crime registered at CR

No.142/2024 for the offences punishable under the Sections

324, 323, 504, 506, 425 read with Section 34 of IPC satisfy the

description of the offences covered by clause (b) of Section 56(1)

of the Police Act appears well founded.

13. It is trite, mere registration of multiple offences is not

sufficient to sustain the measure of externment. When the

power of externment is invoked under clause (b), sub-section (1)

of Section 56, in addition to the involvement of the proposed

externee in the offences involving force or violence, or the

offences punishable under Chapter VIII, XVI and XVII, of the

Penal Code, the Competent Authority must form an opinion

based on an objective material that the witnesses were

dissuaded from coming forward to give evidence in public

against the proposed externee on account of the reign of terror

created by the proposed externee. In the case at hand, apart

from the bald assertion in the externment order that the

witnesses were not coming forward to give evidence against the

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petitioner in public fearing for the safety of their persons or

property, it does not seem that any objective material was

considered by the Competent Authority in arriving at the said

opinion. Undoubtedly, the opinion of the Competent Authority

is subjective. However, such subjective opinion has to be formed

on the basis of objective material and it cannot be the mere ipsi

dixit of the Competent Authority.

14. The measure of externment is extraordinary. It impinges

upon the cherished fundamental freedoms guaranteed under

the Constitution. Thus, the personal liberty and the

fundamental rights of the citizen cannot be curtailed by passing

an externment order in a mechanical manner. In the case at

hand, as noted above, out of the four crimes arrayed against the

petitioner, three crimes could not have been taken into account

at all. Moreover, the Competent Authority has not ascribed any

justifiable reasons for externing the petitioner from an extensive

area of four districts when the alleged offending activities of the

petitioner were confined to the limits of the Nalasopara Police

Station. There is no consideration at all as regards the term of

the externment. The externment order gives an impression that

the Competent Authority was even not alive to the fact that it

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was required to record satisfaction regarding the term of the

externment order based on objective material.

15. A useful reference in this context can be made to the

decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Deepak s/o

Laxman Dongre V/s. State of Maharashtra and Ors.1. The

Supreme Court after adverting to the provisions of Section 58 of

the Act, 1951, underscored the necessity of arriving at the

subjective satisfaction regarding the term of externment also on

the basis of objective material. It was ruled that, where the

externee is externed for a maximum permissible period of two

years, without recording the subjective satisfaction regarding

the necessity of the externment for a full term, it would amount

to imposing unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental

rights guaranteed under clause (d) of Article 19(1) of the

Constitution of India. The observations in paragraph No.16 of

the said judgment are instructive, and, hence, extracted below :

"16. On a plain reading of Section 58, it is apparent that while passing an order under Section 56, the competent authority must mention the area or District or Districts in respect of which the order has been made. Moreover, the competent authority is required to specify the period for which the restriction will remain in force. The maximum period provided for is of two years. Therefore, an application of mind on the part of the competent authority is required for deciding the duration of the restraint order under Section 56. On the basis of objective assessment of the material on record, the authority has to record its subjective satisfaction

1 (2023) 14 SCC 707.

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that the restriction should be imposed for a specific period. When the competent authority passes an order for the maximum permissible period of two years, the order of extrnment must disclose an application of mind by the competent authority and the order must record its subjective satisfaction about the necessity of passing an order of externment for the maximum period of two years which is based on material on record. Careful perusal of the impugned order of externment dated 15 December 2020 shows that it does not disclose any application of mind on this aspect. It does not record the subjective satisfaction of the respondent No.2 on the basis of material on record that the order of externment should be for the maximum period of two years. If the order of externment for the maximum permissible period of two years is passed without recording subjective satisfaction regarding the necessity of extending the order of externment to the maximum permissible period, it will amount to imposing unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right guaranteed under clause (d) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India."

(emphasis supplied)

16. For the foregoing reasons, I am impelled to hold that the

externment of the petitioner was wholly unjustified. The

Divisional Commissioner was also in error in not inferring with

such arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power by the

Competent Authority. Resultantly, the petition deserves to be

allowed.

17. Hence, the following order:

:ORDER:

(i)     The petition stands allowed.









                                                        17-WP321-2026.DOC

(ii)    The impugned order as well as the order dated 7 th