[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
High Court On Its Own Motion vs Nitin Kale And Anr. on 24 March, 2026
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2026:BHC-AS:13866-DB
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AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
ATUL
GANESH
KULKARNI WRIT PETITION NO.13006 OF 2025
Digitally signed by
ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.03.24 Anuj Cooperative Housing Society Limited,
11:59:15 +0530
having address at 96, August Kranti Marg,
Gowalia Tank Road, Mumbai 400 036, ... Petitioners
Vs.
1. District Deputy Registrar of Coop.
Societies-1, Malhotra House,
6th Floor, Opposite G.P.O.
Mumbai 400 001
2. Deputy Registrar of Cooprative
Societies-D Ward, Malhotra House,
6th Floor, Oppoiste G.P.O.,
Mumbai 400 001.
3. Parul Nitin Gothi,
Flat No.401, Anuj Coop. Housing
Society Limited, 96, August Kranti
Marg, Gowalia Tank Road,
Mumbai 400 036
4. Minister of Cooperative & Textile,
5th Floor, Mantralaya,
Mumbai - 400 022 ... Respondents
WITH
SUO MOTO CONTEMPT PETITION NO.1 OF 2026
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.13006 OF 2025
High Court on its own motion ... Petitioner
Vs.
1
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1. Nitin Kale, District Deputy Registrar of
Coop. Societies-1, Malhotra House,
6th Floor, Opposite G.P.O.
Mumbai 400 001
2. Rajesh Lavhekar, Deputy Registrar
of Cooprative Societies-D Ward,
Malhotra House, 6th Floor,
Oppoiste G.P.O., Mumbai 400 001. ... Respondents
Mr. Aditya Lele with Mr. Atul Mishra for the petitioner.
Ms. Neha Bhide, Government Pleader with Mr. O.A.
Chandurkar, Additional G.P. & Mr. S.L. Babar, AGP for
the respondent Nos.1,2, & 4-State.
Mr. Sahil Ansari with Mr. Kailash N. Baug for
respondent No.3.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : MARCH 7, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : MARCH 24, 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. The petitioner, a co-operative housing society, has instituted
the present writ petition impugning the judgment and orders
passed by the Revisional Authority in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act,
1960. By the said orders, the Revisional Authority has affirmed the
decision rejecting the petitioner's application for issuance of a
certificate under Section 154B-29 of the said Act.
2. By an order dated 5 January 2026, this Court issued notice
under Rule 9 of the Contempt of Courts (Bombay High Court)
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Rules, 1994 to the alleged contemnors, upon forming a prima facie
view that a binding order of this Court had not been complied with
and stood disobeyed.
3. The facts giving rise to the present petition, in brief, are that
the petitioner-society had preferred an application under Section
154B-29 of the MCS Act on 5 April 2023, accompanied by
requisite documents, seeking adjudication of its dues. Respondent
No.2, by order dated 26 September 2023, rejected the said
application. The rejection was founded on several grounds. It was
observed that the order dated 28 June 2011 passed by this Court
in Writ Petition No.925 of 2011 would cease to operate upon
expiry of six months, and that such legal position had not been
brought to the notice of the High Court. It was further noted that
the petitioner-society had not challenged the order dated 17
February 1998 cancelling its registration. Additionally, it was
recorded that the petitioner had failed to satisfactorily explain
certain amounts deposited by respondent No.3 with the society. It
was also noted that an earlier application under Section 101 had
been rejected on 4 December 2012.
4. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-society preferred
Revision Application No.178 of 2023 before the Revisional
Authority. The Revisional Authority, by its impugned order,
confirmed the decision of respondent No.2. It reiterated the view
that the interim orders dated 28 January 2011 and 28 June 2011
passed by this Court, staying the order of the Divisional Joint
Registrar, would remain operative only for a period of six months,
and that this aspect had not been brought to the notice of the High
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Court. On this basis, it was concluded that the order cancelling the
registration of the petitioner-society continued to subsist. It is in
these circumstances that the present writ petition has been filed.
5. Upon consideration of the matter, this Court, by order dated
5 January 2026, issued notice under Rule 9 of the Contempt of
Courts (Bombay High Court) Rules, 1994 to respondent Nos.1 and
2. The Court recorded a prima facie finding that the order dated
28 June 2011 in Writ Petition No.925 of 2011 was a final order
disposing of the petition. The language employed therein clearly
indicated that the ad-interim relief, staying the order of
cancellation of registration, was to continue till the final disposal
of the revision application. The interpretation adopted by
respondent Nos.1 and 2 was found to be directly contrary to the
express terms of the order passed by this Court. In view thereof,
and having regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme
Court in Union of India vs. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56 , notice
was issued calling upon them to show cause as to why
departmental proceedings should not be initiated and why action
under the Contempt of Courts Act should not be taken.
6. In response to the said notice, both in the writ proceedings
and in the suo motu contempt proceedings, respondent Nos.1 and
2 have filed an affidavit. In the affidavit, they have tendered an
unconditional apology. At the same time, they have sought to
explain the circumstances which led to the passing of the
impugned orders. It is contended that there was no wilful or
deliberate disobedience of the order of this Court. The respondents
submit that their observation regarding the limited duration of the
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stay order was based on their understanding of the law laid down
by the Supreme Court in Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private
Limited vs. Central Bureau of Investigation(2018) 16 SCC 299 and
(2022) 1 SCC 299. According to them, the error was bona fide and
unintentional. They assert that there was no intention to overreach
or disregard the authority of this Court. On this basis, they have
prayed that their unconditional apology be accepted and that the
contempt proceedings be dropped.
7. Mr. Lele, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the
petitioner, submitted that the order of this Court granting stay to
the cancellation of registration of the petitioner-society had been
specifically brought to the notice of respondent Nos.1 and 2.
Despite this, the said respondents, in complete disregard of the
final order of this Court, which according to him is clear and self-
explanatory, proceeded to ignore and act contrary to the same. It is
his submission that such conduct amounts to deliberate
disobedience, thereby attracting action under the provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act. He further submitted that the petitioner-
society is seeking recovery of an amount of Rs.32,57,777/-, being
dues for the period from 1 October 2005 till 31 December 2022.
According to him, the authorities under the Act have committed a
patent error of law in rejecting the application preferred by the
petitioner.
8. Per contra, Mr. Ansari, learned Advocate appearing for
respondent No.3, supported the impugned order. He contended
that the proceedings initiated by the petitioner against respondent
No.3 are actuated with an intent to harass her. It is submitted that
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respondent No.3 has incurred substantial expenditure towards
repairs and waterproofing of the terrace and other common areas
of the building. However, instead of reimbursing such expenditure,
the petitioner-society has sought to recover maintenance charges
from her. It is further submitted that, on the contrary, the
petitioner is liable to pay an amount of approximately Rs.40 lakhs
to respondent No.3, for which a civil suit has already been
instituted. On these premises, it is contended that the impugned
order does not warrant any interference and is in accordance with
law.
9. Mr. Chandurkar, learned Additional Government Pleader,
submitted that respondent Nos.1 and 2 have fairly admitted the
error on their part. It is submitted that the impugned observations
were made under a bona fide but erroneous understanding of the
legal position, particularly in light of the judgment of the Supreme
Court. He submitted that the respondents have tendered an
unconditional apology and there was no intention to disobey or
overreach the order of this Court.
REASONS AND ANALYSIS:
10. Having heard the learned Advocates for the respective
parties, and for the purpose of adjudicating the issues arising in
the present writ petition, it becomes necessary to set out the
material facts in some detail. The matter raises a serious question
about the respect that must be shown to an order of this Court,
especially by authorities who are expected to know the law and
apply it with care. The relevant sequence is as follows. The
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petitioner-society was initially de-registered. Thereafter, by an
order dated 2 July 2005, the society came to be re-registered.
Subsequently, by an order dated 23 December 2010, the Divisional
Joint Registrar set aside the order of re-registration. Aggrieved
thereby, the petitioner preferred a revision application before the
Minister for Cooperation, though no interim relief was granted
therein. The petitioner, therefore, approached this Court by filing
Writ Petition No.925 of 2011. By an order dated 28 January 2011,
this Court stayed the operation of the order dated 23 December
2010 till the next date. Thereafter, by a further order dated 28
June 2011, this Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction
to the Revisional Authority to decide the pending revision
application expeditiously and within a stipulated period. It was
further directed that the ad-interim order dated 28 January 2011
shall continue to operate till the revision application is heard and
finally decided, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of
the parties. This Court in paragraphs 2 and 3 observed as under:
"2. In the light of the above, interest of justice will be
service if this petition is disposed of with a direction to the
Revisional Authority to dispose of the pending revision
application as expeditiously as possible and within two
months from the date of first appearance of parties.
3. Since both sides are represented before me, they are
directed to appear before Revisional Authority on 1st July
2011 at 10.30 a.m. The Revisional Authority to then decide
the application within two months from that date. Ad-
interim order dated 28th January 2011 to continue till the
revision application is heard and disposed of but without
prejudice to the rights and contentions of both sides. It is
clarified that this court has not expressed any opinion on
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merits of the controversy."
11. It is an admitted position that the revision application filed
before the Minister for Cooperation has not yet been decided and
continues to remain pending.
12. The petitioner says that respondent Nos.1 and 2, despite
having the earlier order of this Court before them, chose to read it
in a manner which the order itself does not permit. According to
the petitioner, this was not a mere error of reading. It was a clear
disregard of a binding judicial direction. The petitioner therefore
submits that the impugned orders are not only wrong on merits,
but also show a tendency to overreach the authority of this Court.
13. The first aspect which requires careful attention is the true
nature and effect of the order dated 28 June 2011. This was a final
order by which the writ petition itself was disposed of. While doing
so, the Court consciously protected the rights of the petitioner by
directing that the earlier ad interim stay shall continue till the
revision application is heard and finally decided. The language
used by the Court is unambiguous. It does not leave scope for two
interpretations. There is no indication anywhere that such
protection was to last only for six months. There is also no
suggestion that the stay would automatically come to an end by
operation of law. Therefore, the order has to be read as it is
written, and not in a manner convenient to the authority reading it
later.
14. In this background, when respondent Nos.1 and 2 proceeded
on the footing that the stay order expired after six months, it
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cannot be said to be a possible view. It is not a case where two
interpretations were equally available. What has been done is that
something has been added into the order which the Court itself
never stated. Such an approach is not permissible. When the Court
has clearly indicated the duration of its order, it is not open for any
authority to substitute that duration with another period based on
its own understanding. That would amount to rewriting the order,
which is beyond the authority of such officers.
15. The submission of the petitioner, therefore, deserves
acceptance on this point. Once a Court passes a final order and
specifically links the continuation of interim protection to the
outcome of the revision proceedings, the authority dealing with
that revision cannot ignore that clear command. It cannot fall back
on general legal principles to defeat a specific direction. Law
always gives primacy to what is directly ordered in a case. If
general impressions from other judgments are allowed to override
clear directions in a binding order, then no order will remain
certain. Each authority will start applying its own understanding.
That will lead to confusion and uncertainty in administration of
justice, which cannot be permitted.
16. The petitioner has also pointed out that while rejecting the
application under Section 154B-29, the authorities have travelled
beyond the limited scope of the inquiry. The claim of the society
was for recovery of specific dues, supported by documents,
covering a defined period. The rejection, however, is not based on
examination of those dues in the proper manner. Instead, it is
largely influenced by the view that the earlier order of this Court
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had come to an end. If that very basis is incorrect, then the entire
reasoning built upon it becomes unsustainable. In such a situation,
the rejection order cannot be allowed to stand, as it rests on a
fundamentally erroneous assumption regarding the status of the
Court's order.
17. The arguments advanced on behalf of respondent No.3 stand
on a separate footing. The question here is not about the inter se
financial disputes between the society and respondent No.3. The
question is whether the authorities were justified in treating the
order of this Court as having expired. If the answer to that
question is in the negative, then the order passed by the
authorities cannot be sustained, irrespective of any private
disputes between the parties. A defective legal foundation cannot
be cured by introducing unrelated factual disputes. The validity of
the order must be tested on the reasons recorded in it, and not on
external considerations.
18. I am, therefore, unable to accept the submission of
respondent No.3 as a justification for the impugned order. Her
claims, if any, can be pursued in accordance with law before the
competent forum. But they cannot support an order which
proceeds on a misunderstanding of a binding judicial direction.
19. The submission made on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2,
through the learned Additional Government Pleader, also requires
careful consideration. It is stated that the respondents have
realised their mistake and have tendered an unconditional apology.
It is further stated that their understanding was based on a
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judgment of the Supreme Court, and that they were under a bona
fide impression regarding the duration of stay orders. According to
them, there was no intention to disobey the order of this Court.
They say that the error was unintentional and arose out of a
mistaken understanding of law.
20. This explanation cannot be accepted without scrutiny.
Officers holding such positions are expected to read and apply
orders of this Court with due care. A bona fide mistake may
explain the conduct, but it does not completely justify it. The duty
to follow the order as it stands remains, and any departure from it
must be viewed with seriousness.
21. The idea of apology in contempt matters has been explained
in detail by the Supreme Court in the case of Balwantbhai
Somabhai Bhandari v. Hiralal Somabhai (2023) 17 SCC 545. The
Court has looked into Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971, which provides for punishment in cases of contempt. At the
same time, the proviso to that section gives power to the Court to
discharge the person or reduce the punishment if an apology is
made and the Court is satisfied with it. The Explanation further
makes it clear that even if the apology is not fully unconditional,
still it should not be rejected straightaway, so long as it is made in
good faith. From this scheme of law, it becomes clear that
accepting an apology is not something automatic. It is fully within
the discretion of the Court. Even if the apology is conditional or
not perfectly worded, the Court can still consider it, but only if it
appears genuine. At the same time, such discretion cannot be
exercised casually. The Court has to keep in mind that contempt
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power is meant to protect the authority of the Court and to ensure
that the system of justice is not disturbed.
22. In the present case, when the conduct of respondent Nos.1
and 2 is carefully seen, it appears that the matter is not a small or
casual lapse. They were dealing with a direct order of this Court.
Such order is not to be handled lightly. Officers in such position
are expected to read every word properly and understand its
meaning as it is written. Here, the order clearly stated that the ad
interim protection would continue till the revision application is
finally heard and decided. Therefore, to say that the stay came to
an end after six months is not a proper reading of the order. It is
something which the order itself does not say. It is also necessary
to keep in mind that such officers cannot substitute the Court's
words with their own perceptions. Especially when the order is
passed in final disposal of a writ petition. If officers start changing
the meaning of clear directions, then the authority of the Court
will weaken.
23. The legal position on this aspect is already very clear from
earlier decisions. The judgments in East India Commercial Co. Ltd.
v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta reported in AIR 1962 SC 1893 ,
Bharadakanta Mishra v. Bhimsen Dixit reported in (1973) 1 SCC
446, and Priya Gupta v. Ministry of Health & Family Welfare,
(2013) 11 SCC 404 leave no doubt. Authorities and tribunals
working under the jurisdiction of this Court are bound to follow its
decisions. They cannot choose which part to follow and which part
to ignore. They also cannot say that because some other
interpretation is possible, they will not follow the specific order
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passed in the case before them. If such an approach is allowed,
then the orders of this Court will lose their binding force. They will
become like suggestions, which is not acceptable in law.
24. The judgment in Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2
SCC 56 also throws light on this issue. It clearly says that even
when an officer is acting in a quasi-judicial role, he is not
completely protected from action. If his conduct shows lack of
care, recklessness, or disregard for law, then action can still be
taken. Applying these principles to the present case, the position
becomes quite clear. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 were not deciding a
complicated dispute requiring complex interpretation. They only
had to give effect to an existing order of this Court. If there was
some minor confusion, that could be understood. But here, they
treated the order as expired on a ground which the order itself
does not mention. This touches the authority of this Court directly.
It also creates difficulty for the petitioner, who was entitled to rely
on the protection granted by this Court. Further, it sends a wrong
signal to other authorities, who are expected to strictly follow
binding orders.
25. At the same time, I cannot ignore that respondent Nos.1 and
2 have filed an affidavit of apology. They have not denied their
action. They have accepted that a mistake has occurred. They have
explained that they were influenced by their understanding of
another judgment. They have also stated that there was no
intention to disregard the order of this Court. However, it is
equally true that apology alone cannot remove the effect of the
wrong. The Court must see whether the apology is genuine or only
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a way to avoid consequences. In the present case, the apology does
not fully remove the seriousness of the conduct. But it does show
that the respondents are no longer standing by their earlier view.
They have accepted that something went wrong.
26. The submission of respondent No.3 does not change this
position. Her disputes with the society, whether about repairs or
recovery of money, are separate issues. Those matters can be
decided in proper proceedings. They cannot justify an order which
is otherwise based on an incorrect understanding of a binding
direction of this Court. Even if a party has a strong claim, it must
still be pursued within the limits of law. It cannot support an action
which ignores a clear order of the Court.
27. Looking at the entire material, only one conclusion is
possible. The view taken by respondent Nos.1 and 2 that the stay
order had come to an end after six months is not correct. The
order of this Court clearly provided otherwise. The authorities
were required to follow it till the revision application was decided.
Their failure to do so cannot be approved. The petitioner was
therefore right in challenging the action before this Court.
Accordingly, I hold that the interpretation adopted by respondent
Nos.1 and 2 was incorrect and contrary to the clear language of
the order of this Court. Their conduct is serious in nature and is
sufficient to attract contempt jurisdiction.
28. The next question which arises is whether the case warrants
imposition of a punishment. In my view, the answer must be in
the affirmative.
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29. The conduct of respondent Nos.1 and 2 cannot be treated as
a mere technical error. The order expressly directed that the
interim protection shall continue till disposal of the revision
application. In spite of this, the respondents proceeded to hold that
the stay had lapsed after six months. Such a conclusion reflects
lack of due care and proper application of mind. The position in
law is well settled that authorities exercising quasi-judicial powers
are bound by the orders of superior courts. In the present case, the
petitioner was entitled to rely upon the order of this Court. By
treating the order as having expired, the respondents effectively
denied the petitioner the benefit of a judicial order. It is true that
respondent Nos.1 and 2 have tendered an apology and have stated
that their understanding was based on a judgment of the Supreme
Court. However, the explanation does not fully answer the lapse. A
impression of law cannot override a specific direction issued in a
particular case. The duty of the authority was to apply the order as
it stands. Failure to do so shows a negligence which cannot be
ignored.
30. The law laid down in Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan makes
it clear that even in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions,
disciplinary action is permissible where there is recklessness, lack
of good faith, or failure to observe essential conditions governing
the exercise of power. The present case falls within that category.
The error committed is not about the correctness of a decision on
facts. It concerns the manner in which a binding judicial order was
treated. In such circumstances, the ends of justice would be met by
imposing a minor punishment. This would serve as a reminder of
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the duty owed by all authorities to comply with judicial orders in
their true letter and spirit. It would also ensure that such lapses do
not recur.
31. For these reasons I am of the considered view that a minor
punishment is warranted, so as to uphold the dignity of this Court
and to ensure adherence to the rule of law.
32. In view of the aforesaid discussion and reasons recorded
hereinabove, I proceed to pass the following order:
(i) The writ petition is partly allowed;
(ii) The impugned order dated 26 September 2023 passed
by respondent No.2 and the order passed by the Revisional
Authority in Revision Application No.178 of 2023 are
quashed and set aside;
(iii) It is declared that the order dated 28 June 2011 passed
by this Court in Writ Petition No.925 of 2011 continued to
remain in operation till final disposal of the revision
application, and the contrary view taken by respondent
Nos.1 and 2 is held to be unsustainable;
(iv) The application filed by the petitioner under Section
154B-29 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960
is restored to the file of respondent No.2, who shall decide
the same afresh, in accordance with law and in the light of
observations made herein, within a period of twelve weeks;
(v) Having regard to the reasons recorded in
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the judgment, respondent Nos.1 and 2 are held liable for
minor punishment;
(vi) Accordingly, respondent Nos.1 and 2 are issued a
formal censure. The competent authority shall place a copy
of this order on their service record;
(vii) Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are directed to remain careful
in future and to strictly adhere to binding judicial orders
passed by this Court;
(viii) The suo motu contempt proceedings stand disposed of
in the above terms;
(ix) Rule is made partly absolute. No order as to costs.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
