Pratap Manohar Naik vs Sanjay Bapu Kesavkar And Ors
2026 Latest Caselaw 2520 Bom

Bombay High Court

Pratap Manohar Naik vs Sanjay Bapu Kesavkar And Ors on 11 March, 2026

Author: Amit Borkar

Bench: Amit Borkar

2026:BHC-AS:11987
                                                                                           44-wp-4186-2012.doc


                              Shabnoor
                                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                                     WRIT PETITION NO.4186 OF 2012

                              Pratap Manohar Naik                            ... Petitioner
                                        V/s.
                              Sanjay Bapu Kesavkar & Ors.                    ... Respondents


      SHABNOOR
                              Mr. Shubham Shinde i/b Mr. Surel Shah, for the
      AYUB                    Petitioner.
      PATHAN
       Digitally signed by
       SHABNOOR AYUB
       PATHAN
                              Mr. S. L. Babar, AGP, for the State - Respondent.
       Date: 2026.03.11
       19:08:22 +0530




                                                              CORAM    : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                                              DATED    : MARCH 11, 2026
                              P.C.:

1. The challenge in the present petition arises from an order passed by the Second Appellate Authority while exercising powers under Section 19(3) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. The background of the dispute shows that certain proceedings were initiated under the provisions of the said Act seeking information from the petitioner's company. The matter travelled through the statutory stages provided under the Act and ultimately reached the Second Appellate Authority. While deciding the appeal, the Second Appellate Authority went beyond the limited question regarding supply of information and proceeded to direct initiation of prosecution against the petitioner's company. The petitioner has approached this Court questioning the legality of such a direction.

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2. The principal issue therefore which arises for consideration is whether, in the exercise of powers under Section 19(3) of the Right to Information Act, the Second Appellate Authority is competent to direct initiation of criminal prosecution against a party. The scheme of the Act makes it clear that the appellate authority is primarily required to examine whether the information sought has been rightly denied or whether the public authority has complied with its statutory obligation to furnish such information. The authority may issue directions regarding disclosure of information and may also consider the aspect of penalty in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act. However, the power to initiate prosecution is not expressly conferred upon the appellate authority while deciding an appeal under Section 19(3). When a statute creates a specific procedure and defines the nature of powers that may be exercised by an authority, such authority must remain within the limits prescribed by the statute itself.

3. In the present case, the order passed by the Second Appellate Authority indicates that the authority, while deciding the appeal, directed initiation of prosecution against the petitioner's company. Such a direction travels beyond the scope of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated under Section 19(3). The authority was expected to confine its examination to the question whether the information sought by the applicant ought to be furnished and whether there was any failure on the part of the concerned authority under the Act. The statute does not indicate that the appellate authority may, in the course of such proceedings, direct criminal prosecution against the concerned party. Therefore, the

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impugned direction cannot be sustained in law.

4. The petitioner has therefore questioned the order primarily on the ground that the Second Appellate Authority exceeded its jurisdiction while exercising powers under the Act. Upon consideration of the material placed before the Court, it appears that the appellate authority treated the proceedings under the Right to Information Act as if it possessed wider disciplinary or criminal jurisdiction. This approach is not supported by the statutory framework. The RTI Act does not confer upon the appellate authority a general power to order prosecution in the absence of a specific statutory provision permitting such action.

5. The Court is therefore required to examine the impugned order in light of the statutory limits placed upon the authority. When a statutory authority exercises powers beyond the scope granted by the statute, the resulting order becomes vulnerable to judicial review. The role of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is to ensure that such authorities act within the boundaries of law. In the present case, once it is noticed that the Second Appellate Authority issued a direction which is not supported by the provisions of the Act, the order to that extent cannot be allowed to stand. The impugned direction directing initiation of prosecution against the petitioner's company therefore deserves to be set aside.

6. In view of the above discussion, the petition deserves to be allowed. The impugned order passed by the Second Appellate Authority, insofar as it directs initiation of prosecution against the

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petitioner's company, cannot be sustained in law. Rule is therefore made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b).

7. The writ petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

8. There shall be no order as to costs.

(AMIT BORKAR, J.)