Abhilasha Marketing Pvt Ltd And Ors vs State Of Maharashtra Thr Dept Of Revenue ...
2026 Latest Caselaw 2381 Bom

Bombay High Court

Abhilasha Marketing Pvt Ltd And Ors vs State Of Maharashtra Thr Dept Of Revenue ... on 9 March, 2026

Author: N. J. Jamadar

Bench: N. J. Jamadar

                                                            2 WP-728-26.DOC

       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
               CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     WRIT PETITION NO. 728 OF 2026


Pravin Nimba Wani                                          ..Petitioner
      Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors.                          ...Respondents

                                AND
                    WRIT PETITION NO. 733 OF 2026

Abhilasha Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.                      ..Petitioners
      Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors.                          ...Respondents

                                AND
                    WRIT PETITION NO. 751 OF 2026

Chandrakant Mulchandbhai Patel & anr.                     ..Petitioners
      Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors.                          ...Respondents

                                AND
                    WRIT PETITION NO. 750 OF 2026

Nimantran Horticulture Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.                   ..Petitioners
      Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors.                          ...Respondents

                                AND
                    WRIT PETITION NO. 874 OF 2026

Suvarna Eknath Tambe & Ors.                               ..Petitioners
      Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors.                          ...Respondents

Mr. Nitin G Thakkar, Sr. Counsel a/w Mr. Pradeep Thorat, Ms.
     Aditi Naikare, Mr. Vivek M Punjabi & Mr. Priyansh R
     Jain, for Petitioner in WP/728/2026 & WP/874/2026.
Mr. Ravi Kadam, Sr. Advocate a/w Mr. Pradeep Thorat, Ms.
     Aditi Naikare, Mr. Aniesh Jadhav, for petitioner in
     WP/733/2026.

SAINATH, PA                         1/22



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                                                                         2 WP-728-26.DOC

Mr. Girish S Godbole, Sr. Advocate, Mr. Pradeep Thorat, Ms.
     Aditi Naikare, Ms. Niharika Chandoorkar, for petitioner
     in WP/750/2026 & WP/751/2026.
Mr. Suresh Shah, Sr. Advocate, a/w Mr. Sandeep Shinde, for
     Respondent No. 3 in WP/728/2026.
Mr. Prasad S Dani, Sr. Advocate, a/w Mr. Sandeep Shinde, for
     Respondent No. 4 in WP/733/2026.
Mr. Umesh Iyer, for the Respondent No. 3 in WP/751/2026.
Mr. Sandeep D Shinde a/w Mr. Wasim Sayyed, for Respondent
     No. 3 in WP/750/2026 & WP/874/2026
Ms. Neha Bhide, G.P. a/w Mr. O A Chandurkar, Addl. G.P.,
     Smt. Mamta S. Srivastav, A.G.P., Ms. Snehal S Jadhav,
     A.G.P. for State.

                   CORAM                     :     N. J. JAMADAR, J.
                   HEARD ON                  :     25th FEBRUARY 2026
                   PRONOUNCED ON :                 09th MARCH 2026


ORDER:

1. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.

2. As common questions of facts and law arise for

consideration in these petitions, the parties were heard on the

point of grant of interim relief.

3. These petitions assail the legality, validity and correctness

of an order passed by the Tahsildar, Nashik, purportedly under

Section 84C of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural

Lands Act, 1948 ("the MT and AL Act, 1948") in respect of final

Plot No. 541 which admeasured 24H 62R, comprising of Survey

2 WP-728-26.DOC

Nos. 750, 751 and 755 situated at Trimbak Road, Nashik ('the

larger property').

4. By the impugned order the Tahsildar/Agricultural Land

Tribunal ("ALT") has held that, the acquisition of the larger

property by late Manohardas Raghavji Thakker and others

under the registered conveyance dated 17th November, 1988 was

in breach of the provisions contained in Section 63 of the MT

and AL Act, 1948 as the purchasers were not agriculturists and

the purchase was without the permission of the Collector.

Resultantly, in view of the provisions contained in Section 84C,

(1), the Tahsildar passed an order declaring the said transfer to

be invalid and further directed that, the larger property shall be

deemed to vest in the State Government. On the following day,

the name of the State Government came to be mutated to the

record of rights of the subject properties.

5. Being aggrieved, the petitioners who are the successor in

interest and/or transferees of the purchasers, have directly

invoked the writ jurisdiction. Primarily, a two-fold challenge is

mounted on behalf of the petitioners. First, in view of the

notification issued by the State Government under Section 88(1)

(b) on 09th November, 2000, the subject properties stood

2 WP-728-26.DOC

exempted from the provisions of MT and AL Act, 1948 and,

consequently, none of the provisions of MT and AL Act, 1948

including Section 63 and 84C had any application to the subject

properties. Second, the issue of transfer of the subject

properties in alleged breach of the provisions contained in

Section 63 and the applicability of the provisions contained in

Section 84C of the MT and AL Act, 1948 stood conclusively

determined by the authorities under the MT and AL Act, 1948

and, therefore, it was legally impermissible to reopen the said

issue which had attained finality.

6. At this juncture, a brief resume of the factual backdrop in

which controversy arises may be apposite before adverting to the

submissions on behalf of the parties.

6.1 The larger property was owned by the Khatib family. Under

three registered instruments dated 17th November 1988 late

Manohardas Raghavji Thakker and others purchased the

subject property. The owners paid nazrana to the Government.

Eventually, on 09th November, 2000, the State Government (R-1)

issued a notification under Section 88(1)(b) of the MT and AL

Act, 1948 by which Survey Nos. 750, 751 and 755 were reserved

for non-agricultural development.

2 WP-728-26.DOC

6.2 Onkar Trilokchand Ahirwar - the tenant, had filed

applications before the ALT under Section 84C of the MT and AL

Act, 1948, alleging that, the purchase was in breach of the

provisions contained in Section 63 of the MT and AL Act, 1948.

By an order dated 06th February 2001, ALT dismissed the

applications filed by the tenant. An appeal preferred by the

tenant was allowed and the matter was remitted back to the ALT

for fresh inquiry. By an order dated 30 th June 2004, the ALT

dismissed the applications filed by the tenant holding that, the

tenants had surrendered their rights in favour of the landlord.

6.3 Proceedings under Section 84C were initiated at the

instance of the State Government. Pursuant to the orders

passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 10137/2004 and

other connected matters, the Chief Secretary passed an order

transferring the inquiry under Section 84C to the Tahsildar to

be appointed by the Principal Secretary, Revenue.

6.4 A Special Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry under

Section 84C and by an order dated 02 nd March, 2007 closed the

proceedings in view of the notification issued by the State

Government under Section 88(1)(b) of the MT and AL Act, 1948.

2 WP-728-26.DOC

6.5 Being aggrieved, the Tahsildar, Nashik preferred a revision

application before the Special Revisional Authority. By a

judgment and order dated 15th February, 2010, the Revision

Application was dismissed by the Special Revisional Authority

concurring with the view of the Tahsildar that the notification

under Section 88(1)(b) had retrospective operation and,

therefore, the action under Section 84C was not tenable.

6.6 The successor in interest of the tenant (R-3) filed Special

Civil Suit No. 482/2013 under Section 6 of the Specific Relief

Act seeking restoration of possession of the subject property. By

a judgment and order dated 09th January, 2023 the Special Civil

Suit No. 482/2013 came to be dismissed.

6.7 Revision Application No. 208/2023 thereagainst came to

be dismissed by this Court holding inter alia that, the

Respondent No. 3/tenant and his family members had

surrendered their tenancy rights and received an amount of Rs.

4 Crores and a plot admeasuring 2000 sq. yards, in lieu of the

said surrender.

6.8 In the meanwhile, the applications were filed with the

Revenue Minister by Mr. Devendra Kale seeking an inquiry

under Section 84C of the MT and AL Act, 1948 on the ground

2 WP-728-26.DOC

that, late Thakker had purchased the subject properties in

breach of the provisions contained in Section 63 of the MT and

AL Act, 1948. Initially, the Revenue Authorities declined to

conduct further inquiries opining that, the issues stood

concluded by previous orders. However, in one of the

applications, Tahsildar, Nashik (ALT) proceeded to conduct an

inquiry and pass the impugned order.

7. I have heard Mr. Ravi Kadam, the learned Senior Advocate

for the petitioners in WP/733/2026, Mr. Nitin Thakker, the

learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners in WP/728/2026

and WP/874/2026, Mr. Girish Godbole, the learned Senior

Advocate for the petitioners in WP/750/2026 and 751/2026,

Ms. Neha Bhide, the learned Government Pleader for the State

in all the petitions, Mr. Surel shah, the learned Senior Advocate

for the Respondent No. 3 in WP/728/2026, Mr. Prasad Dani,

the learned Senior Advocate for the Respondent No. 4 in

WP/733/2026, Mr. Umesh Iyer, the learned Counsel for

Respondent No. 3 in WP/751/2026, Mr. Sandeep Shinde the

learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3 in WP/750/2026 and

WP/874/2026.

2 WP-728-26.DOC

8. The submissions on behalf of the petitioners can be

encapsulated as under:-

i) It is a settled legal position that, the notification under

Section 88(1)(b) has retrospective operation.

ii) Once the notification under Section 88(1)(b) is issued,

none of the preceding provisions i.e. Section 1 to 87A, apply to

the land in respect of which the said notification is issued.

iii) The issue of sale being allegedly invalid, in view of the

provisions contained in Section 63 and 84C (1), stood concluded

by multiple orders passed by the authorities under MT and AL

Act, 1948.

iv) Thus, the principle of res judicata applies even in respect

of orders passed by the quasi-judicial authorities.

v) The erstwhile tenant having lost the proceedings, on all

fronts, have resorted to disingenuous methods to reopen the

issues which stood concluded.

vi) The impugned actions and order suffer from legal

malafide.

vii) The impugned order was passed sans jurisdiction and also

in violation of fundamental principles of natural justice and

judicial process. Consequently, the bar of alternate efficacious

remedy does not operate.

2 WP-728-26.DOC

9. The submissions on behalf of the respondents proceeded

on the following lines:

i) The petitioners have an efficacious statutory remedy under

Section 74(1)(u) of the MT and AL Act, 1948 and, therefore, the

petitioners must be relegated to exhaust the statutory remedy.

ii) No case for exercise of the writ jurisdiction despite the

availability of an efficacious statutory remedy is made out.

iii) The impugned order is in consonance with law in as much

as it is not the case of the petitioners that the purchasers were

indeed agriculturists.

iv) The fact that a notification came to be subsequently issued

under Section 88(1)(b) of the MT and AL Act, 1948 does not cure

the illegality and invalidity qua the transactions executed prior

to issue of the notification.

v) Once a transaction is void for being in violation of the

provisions contained in Section 63 of MT and AL Act, 1948, the

subsequent notification does not infuse legality and validity in to

such void transaction.

vi) It was controverted that, the provision contained in

Section 88(1)(b) has retrospective operation. At best, it has

retroactive operation.

2 WP-728-26.DOC

vii) In any event all these issues can be determined by the

competent statutory authority under MT and AL Act, 1948.

viii) Lastly, as the subject properties are deemed to have been

vested in the State Government under Section 84C(3), no

interim relief can be granted to restore status quo ante.

10. The provisions contained in Section 88(1)(b) read as

under:-

"S. 88. Exemption to Government lands and certain other lands:

[(1)] [Save as otherwise provided in sub- section (2), nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act] shall apply,

(a) ....

(b) to any area which the State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify as being reserved for non-agricultural or industrial development ;

              (c)        ....
              (d)        ....

11. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions would indicate

that, the State Government has been empowered to exempt any

area from the operation of the provisions of the Act, 1948 by

publishing a notification in the official gazette to the effect that,

the said area is reserved for non-agricultural or industrial

2 WP-728-26.DOC

development. The avowed object of empowering the State

Government to grant exemption from the operation of the

provisions of the Act, 1948, as is discernible from the plain

reading of the aforesaid provisions, is to promote industrial and

non-agricultural development. Once the land is exempted, by

virtue of the notification under Section 88(1)(b), the provisions

of Section 1 to 87A of MT and AL Act, 1948, which are the

foregoing provisions qua Section 88, the former provisions will

have no application to the particular area reserved for non-

agricultural or industrial development.

12. The debate at the bar centered around the question as to

whether the provisions of Section 88(1)(b) have retrospective

operation in the sense that, once a notification is issued

thereunder, the provisions of the Act, 1948 would have no

application at all.

13. Mr. Dani, the learned Senior Advocate would urge that,

the provisions of Section 88 (1)(d); the precursor of Section 88(1)

(b) have been held to be prospective and not retrospective. In

contrast, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 88(1), which came to

be amended by Bombay Act No. 13 of 1956, were held to apply

as they were at the date of the enactment. Reliance was placed

2 WP-728-26.DOC

on the following observations of the Supreme Court in the

Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Mohanlal Chunilal

Kothari vs Tribhovan Haribhai Tamboli & Ors.1 :

"5. It will be noticed that cls. (a), (b) and (c) of S.88(1) apply to things as they were at the date of the enactment, whereas cl. (d) only authorised the State Government to specify certain areas as being reserved for urban non- agricultural or industrial development, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time. Under cls. (a) to (c) of S. 88(1) it is specifically provided that the Act, from its inception, did not apply to certain areas then identified; whereas cl. (d) has reference to the future. Hence, the State Government could take out of the operation of the Act such areas as it would deem should come within the description of urban non-agricultural or for industrial development. Clause (d), therefore, would come into operation only upon such a notification being issued by the State Government. The portion of the judgment, quoted above, itself makes it clear that the provisions of S. 88 were never intended to divest vested interests. To what extent the decision of this Court is really against the appellants. It is clear that the appellants cannot take advantage of what was a mere slip in so far as cl.(d) was added to the other clauses of S. 88(1), when that clause really did not fall to be considered with reference to the controversy in that case. In other words, this Court never intended in its judgment in Sakharam's case, Civil Appeal No. 185 of 1956, D/-19-4-1961: (AIR 1963 SC 354) (supra) to lay down that the provisions of cl. (d) of S. 88(1) aforesaid were, only prospective and had no retrospective operation. Unlike cls. (a), (b) and (c) of S. 88(1), which this Court held to be clearly prospective, those of cl. (d) would

1 1963 AIR SC 538

2 WP-728-26.DOC

in the context have retrospective operation in the sense that it would apply to land which could be covered by the notification to be issued by the Government from time to time so as to take those lands out of the operation of the Act of 1948, granting the protection. So far as cls. (a), (b) and (c) are concerned, the Act of 1948 would not apply at all to lands covered by them. But that would not take away the rights conferred by the earlier Act of 1939 which was being repealed by the Act of 1948. This is made clear by the provision in S. 89(2) which preserves existing rights under the repealed Act, Sakharam's case, Civil Appeal No. 185 of 1956, D/-19-4-1961: (AIR 1963 SC 354) (supra) was about the effect of cl (c) on the existing rights under the Act of 1939 and it was in that connection that this Court observed that S. 88 was prospective. But cl. (d) is about the future and unless it has the limited retrospective effect indicated earlier it will be rendered completely nugatory. The intention of the legislature obviously was to take away all the benefits arising out of the Act of 1948 (but not those arising from the Act of 1939) as soon as the notification was made under cl.(d). This is the only way to harmonise the other provisions of the 1948-Act, conferring certain benefits on tenants with the provisions in cl. (d) which is meant to foster urban and industrial development. The observations of the High Court to the contrary are, therefore, not correct."

(emphasis supplied)

14. In contrast, the learned Counsel for the petitioners placed

reliance on a subsequent Constitution Bench judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of S. N. Kamble Vs. Sholapur

Borough Municipality & Anr.2, wherein the aforesaid

2 AIR 1966 SC 538

2 WP-728-26.DOC

observations in the case Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari (supra),

were explained. The relevant observations in Paragraph Nos. 10

and 11 of the judgment in the case of S. N. Kamble (supra) read

as under:-

"10. .......It may be mentioned that Section 88(1)(a) applies not only to lands held on lease from a local authority but also to lands held on lease from the State, and one can visualise situations where the State may need to get back lands leased by it in public interest. It mus therefore have been in the interest of the public that a provision like Section 88(1)(a) was made with respect to lessees from a local authority or the State who had become protected tenants under the 1939-Act. We are supported in the view we have taken by the decision of this Court in Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari case where it was held that Section 88(1)(d) would be rendered completely ineffective if it was not to be applied retrospectively, though it was added in that case that it did not affect the rights acquired under the earlier Act of 1939. The latter observation, with respect, does not seems to be correct for there could be no new protected tenants under the 1948-Act to whom even Section 88(1)(d) could have applied. Further if a notification under Section 88(1) (d) could be retrospective upto the date of the 1948-Act we can see no reason on the language of this section to hold that it was retrospective only upto 1948 and would not affect the rights acquired under the 1939-Act.

11. We may also mention that by an over sight it was stated in Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari case that clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 88(1) apply to things as they were at the date of the enactment. It is

2 WP-728-26.DOC

however clear that clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 88 (1) also apply in the future. For example clause (a) lays down that nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply to lands held on lease from Government, a local authority or cooperative society. The words "held on lease" in this clause are only descriptive of the lands and are not confined to lands held on lease on the date of the Act came into force; they equally apply to lands leased before or after the Act became law and the distinction that was drawn in Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari case that clauses (a), (b) and (c) applied to things as they were at the date of the enactment whereas clause (d) was with respect with future, with respect, does not appear to be correct."

(emphasis supplied)

15. In the case of S. N. Kamble (supra), the Constitution

Bench of the Supreme Court has clarified that, the decision of

the Supreme Court in the case of Mohanlal Kothari (supra),

wherein it was held that, Section 88(1)(d) (the precursor of

clause (b) of sub-Section 1 of Section 88 as it stands now) would

be rendered completely ineffective, if it would not apply

retrospectively, was the correct position in law. However, later

observations in the case of Mohanlal Kothari (supra), that

Section 88(1)(d) did not affect the rights acquired under the

earlier Act, 1939, did not seem to be correct. The Supreme

Court has further clarified that, the distinction that was drawn

2 WP-728-26.DOC

in Mohanlal Kothari (supra), that clauses (a), (b) and (c) applied

to things as they were at the date of the enactment whereas

clause (d) was with respect to future, did not appear to be

correct.

16. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nilesh

Construction Company & Anr. Vs. Gangubai w/o Bablya

Choudhary & Ors3., after following the Constitution Bench

judgment in the case of S. N. Kamble (supra) has enunciated

that, that the effect of a notification under Section 88(1)(b) is to

exempt lands from the operation of provisions of Tenancy Act

retrospectively is now settled by the decision of the Supreme

Court in the case of S. N. Kamble (supra). The observations in

Para No. 16 and 17 of the decision in the case of Nilesh

Construction Company (supra), read as under:-

"16. Now we have already referred to the Notification which was issued by the State Government under Section 88 (1)

(b) on 29th March, 1957 under which 20 villages were reserved for non-agricultural and industrial development and Kurar was one of the twenty villages so notified. Kurar is the village in which the land in dispute is situated. The effect of this Notification of 29th March, 1957 issued under Section 88(1)(b) of the Tenancy Act is that the lands in village Kurar including the lands in question have been totally excluded from the operation of the provisions of the Tenancy Act, because the imperative words of section 88

3 1982 Mah LJ 664

2 WP-728-26.DOC

are, "Nothing in the foregoing provisions of the Act shall apply" to the area reserved for non-agricultural or industrial development. The "foregoing provisions" are Sections 1 to 87-A and, therefore, the moment a Notification is issued under section 88(1)(b), none of the provisions of Tenancy Act will apply in the case of any area which has been specified as being reserved for non-Agricultural or industrial development. That the effect of a Notification under section 88(1)(b) is to exempt lands from the operation of the provisions of the Tenancy Act retrospectively is now settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in S. N. Kamble v.

Sholapur Borough Municipality.

17. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs that the Notification dated 29th March 1957 cannot deprive the plaintiffs of the rights which had vested in them a tenants. This argument presupposes that on the date of the coming into force of the Tenancy Act the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-title was a tenant and certain rights under the Tenancy Act had vested in him. It is not necessary to go into this question because, even assuming that Bablya had any rights under the Tenancy Act, having regard to the mandatory provisions of section 88 (1) (b), no rights under any of the provisions of sections 1 to 87-A of the Tenancy Act could be claimed by the plaintiffs."

(emphasis supplied)

17. In view of the aforesaid clear exposition of law, at this

juncture, this Court is inclined to proceed on the premise that,

the notification under Section 88(1)(b) has the retrospective

operation. Thus, the ALT was, prima facie, in error in holding

that, the illegality and invalidity of the transfer before the

issuance of notification under Section 88(1)(b) would vitiate the

2 WP-728-26.DOC

transactions completely and the provisions of Section 84C could

be enforced despite the said notification.

18. Secondly, on the aspect of the finality to the determination

of the question of applicability of the provisions contained in

Section 84C of the Act, 1948, this Court prima facie finds

substance in the submissions on behalf of the petitioners. As

noted above, an inquiry under Section 84C was conducted by a

Special Inquiry Officer; pursuant to the directions passed by the

High Court, and a finding was returned on 02 nd March, 2007

that, the said inquiry under Section 84C was not tenable in view

of the notification issued under Section 88(1)(b) by the State

Government. The order passed in revision preferred by the

Tahsildar, Nashik against the said determination by the Special

Inquiry Officer, indicates that the Special Revisional Authority

has adequately delved into the issues that arose for

consideration, on the aspect of the tenability of the proceedings

under Section 84C, in the light of the notification under Section

88(1)(b), and recorded a categorical finding that, the action

under Section 84C cannot continue. These orders have attained

finality.

2 WP-728-26.DOC

19. On first principles, these findings preclude reopening of

the very same issue. It is trite the principle of res judicata

applies equally to the quasi-judicial bodies. In this context, the

reliance placed by Mr. Godbole on a judgment in the case of

Faime Makers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. District Deputy Registrar, Co-

operative Societies (3), Mumbai & Ors.4, appears well founded.

In the said case, it was enunciated that, it has been settled by

the Supreme Court that the principles of res judicata apply to

quasi-judicial bodies. Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial

tribunal gives a finding on law or fact, its findings cannot be

impeached collaterally or in a second round and are binding

until reversed in appeal or revision or by way of writ

proceedings.

20. On the aforesaid two principal grounds, the impugned

order appears prima facie legally infirm. Moreover, none of these

grounds have been dealt with by the ALT in the impugned order.

21. Once this Court records a prima facie view that, upon the

issuance of the notification under Section 88(1)(b), the

provisions contained in the MT and AL Act, 1948 had no

application, the ALT cannot be said to have jurisdictional

4 (2025) 5 SCC 772

2 WP-728-26.DOC

competence to pass the impugned order under Section 84C of

the Act, 1948.

22. Having recorded these prima facie findings, this Court

need not elaborately delve into the aspect of the entertainability

of the petition as the principles in this branch of law are well-

nigh settled. If the impugned order appears to have been passed

in breach of an express statutory provision, which takes away

the jurisdiction of the ALT to hold an inquiry under Section

84C, this Court would be justified in entertaining the writ

petitions.

23. Suffice to note that, there are other grounds of challenge

like breach of the principles of natural justice in as much as

notices were not issued to few of the petitioners; whose names

were mutated to the record of rights of the subject properties,

legal malafide and colourable exercise of power by the

authorities under the MT and AL Act, 1948. However, it would

be superfluous to delve into all these issues at this stage.

24. In the totality of circumstances, this Court finds that, in

view of the reservation of the subject properties for non-

agricultural development, the finality to the dispute having been

reached by the orders passed by the Special Revisional

2 WP-728-26.DOC

Authority and the subsequent developments, the element of

balance of convenience also firmly tilts in favour of the

petitioners. As substantial development has taken place over the

subject properties and third party rights and equities have

intervened in a significant measure, if the execution, operation

and implementation of the impugned order is not stayed, the

petitioners would suffer irreparable loss. Therefore, till the final

disposal of these petitions, the execution, operation and

implementation of the impugned order is required to be stayed.

25. Hence, the following order:-

::ORDER::

       i]      There shall be an interim relief in the

       following terms:-


       a)      The execution, operation and implementation

of the impugned order dated 07th January, 2026,

passed by the Tahsildar, Nashik/ALT in Tenancy

Case No. 894/2025 shall remain stayed till the final

disposal of these petitions.

b) An entry be made in the record of rights of

the subject properties that there is stay to the

2 WP-728-26.DOC

execution, operation and implementation of the

order dated 07th January, 2026, pursuant to which

the name of the State Government is mutated to

the subject properties, till the final disposal of

these writ petitions.

c) The respondents are at liberty to file affidavit-

in-reply within a period of four weeks and serve

copies thereof on the petitioner(s).

d) Rejoinder(s), if any, be filed within a period of

two weeks, thereafter.

       e)      Stand over to 20th April, 2026.




                                             [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]