Baban Nivrutti Satav And Ors. vs Laxman Jijaba Satav (Decd.)By Lrs.- ... on 6 January, 2026

Author: Amit Borkar

Bench: Amit Borkar

2026:BHC-AS:198
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                          Shabnoor
                                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                                  WRIT PETITION NO.4818 OF 2009

   SHABNOOR               Baban Nivrutti Satav & Ors.                                  ... Petitioners
   AYUB
   PATHAN
   Digitally signed by
   SHABNOOR AYUB
   PATHAN
   Date: 2026.01.06
                                           V/s.
   17:29:58 +0530



                          Laxman Jijaba Satav
                          (Deceased through LRs)
                          Balasaheb Laxman Satav & Ors.                                ... Respondents

                          Mr. Kishor Patil a/w Mr. Ashwin R. Kopadnis, for the
                          Petitioners.
                          Mr. Omkar Nagwekar i/b Mr. Kalpesh U. Ptail, for
                          Respondent No.1.
                          Mr. Prathamesh Bhargude, for Respondent Nos.2 to 22.
                          Mr. M. M. Pable, AGP, for the State - Respondent Nos.
                          23 to 26.



                                                           CORAM    : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                                           DATED    : JANUARY 6, 2026

                          ORAL JUDGMENT:

1. The present writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It arises from an order passed by the Revisional Authority. By that order, the revision application filed by the contesting respondents was allowed, and the order passed by the Deputy Director of Land Records under Section 32 of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of

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Holdings Act, 1947 was set aside.

2. The brief facts leading to the petition are these. A consolidation scheme for Village Wagholi was implemented in the year 1973. After many years, the petitioners approached the appellate authority by filing an appeal under Section 247 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. They alleged that serious errors had occurred in the implementation of the consolidation scheme. By order dated 9 April 2001, the Appellate Authority set aside the mutation entry and further directed that the land position be restored to the status existing prior to the consolidation scheme.

3. The contesting respondents, being aggrieved, carried the matter in appeal before the Deputy Director of Land Records. The Deputy Director confirmed the order dated 9 April 2001 passed by the Superintendent of Land Records and directed modification of the consolidation scheme by invoking powers under Section 32(1) of the said Act. Thereafter, the contesting respondents filed Revision Application No. 3406 of 2006. By the impugned judgment and order, the Revisional Authority allowed the revision and held that the Superintendent of Land Records ought not to have entertained a challenge to the consolidation scheme after a delay of 28 years in the absence of sufficient cause. It is this order which is under challenge in the present petition.

4. Mr. Patil, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners, submitted that the order by which delay was condoned by the authorities below was never challenged in the revision application.

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According to him, no specific ground was raised questioning the condonation of delay. On this basis, it was argued that the Revisional Authority exceeded its jurisdiction in allowing the revision solely on the ground that the petitioners had failed to show sufficient cause for seeking modification of the consolidation scheme after a lapse of 28 years.

5. On a careful reading of the record, it becomes clear that the Superintendent of Land Records had directed modification of the consolidation scheme. This modification was challenged by the contesting respondents by filing an appeal. When that appeal failed, they carried the matter further in revision. The Revisional Authority allowed the revision for one clear reason. The challenge to the consolidation scheme was raised after a gap of 28 years. The authority found that such a long delay was far beyond any reasonable time limit. The record did not show any convincing explanation for this delay. This view is consistent with earlier decisions of this Court, which have repeatedly held that stale claims cannot be entertained, even if the statute does not prescribe a fixed limitation period.

6. The petitioners argued that the revision application did not contain a specific ground challenging the order by which delay was condoned. This submission does not merit acceptance. When a final order is under challenge, the legality of every step leading to that order can be examined. Limitation is a pure question of law. It goes to the root of the matter. Such an issue can be raised even during oral arguments. Therefore, the Revisional Authority was justified in examining whether the delay of 28 years was properly

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explained, even if the revision application did not contain a separate and specific ground on that aspect.

7. The legal position on this issue is no longer open to debate. A Division Bench of this Court in Gulabrao Bhaurao Kakade v. Nivrutti Krishna Bhilare 2001 (Supp.) Bom.C.R. 688 has clearly held that an application seeking modification of a consolidation scheme must be made within a reasonable time. This requirement applies even where the Act does not prescribe a specific limitation period. The same principle was reiterated in Dattu A. Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2006 (6) Bom.C.R. 246 where an application filed after 27 years was strongly disapproved. These decisions are based on the scheme of the Act itself. The Rules of 1959 require publication of the consolidation scheme. Publication gives notice to all concerned and brings finality to land arrangements. Allowing challenges after several decades would unsettle settled rights and defeat the very purpose of consolidation.

8. The petitioners also contended that their challenge was confined only to the mutation entry and that no real modification of the consolidation scheme was ordered. This argument is not supported by the record. The orders passed by the Superintendent of Land Records and confirmed by the Deputy Director of Land Records clearly go beyond mere correction of mutation. Both authorities directed restoration of the land position as it existed prior to the consolidation scheme. Such a direction necessarily amounts to modification of the consolidation scheme itself. Therefore, the substance of the orders cannot be diluted by describing the challenge as one limited only to mutation entries.

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9. The appeal filed by the petitioners was admittedly under Section 247 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. The power to examine, vary, or modify a consolidation scheme is specifically governed by the provisions of the Consolidation Act. That power is conferred only on authorities designated under that Act. The Supreme Court, in Fulchand Bhagwandas Gugale v. State of Maharashtra(2005) 1 SCC 193, has clearly explained this legal position. The Court held that even if the same officer holds posts under two different statutes, the source of power matters. When an officer acts under a particular statute, he acts only within the limits of that statute. His orders are controlled by that statute alone and not by another law merely because he is a revenue officer. Therefore, an order passed by an officer while acting under one statute cannot be treated as an order under another statute so as to attract appellate or revisional powers under a different enactment. This principle directly applies to the present case.

10. Applying this settled principle, it becomes clear that once an authority acts under the Consolidation Act, the remedies against such action must also flow only from that Act. An appeal under Section 247 of the MLRC cannot be used as a substitute to challenge or modify a consolidation scheme. Permitting such a course would amount to bypassing the statutory framework of the Consolidation Act and would create overlapping jurisdictions, which the law does not permit.

11. In the present matter, the record shows that the officer exercising powers under the MLRC issued directions which had the effect of altering the consolidation scheme. A Government

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Resolution dated 31 August 2001 was relied upon to contend that the Deputy Director of Land Records was empowered under Section 32(1) of the Consolidation Act. However, the first order was not passed by the Deputy Director. It was passed by the Superintendent of Land Records. The Deputy Director merely affirmed that order later. Therefore, the foundation itself is flawed. The authority which initiated the action was not shown to be duly empowered to exercise powers under the Consolidation Act.

12. There is another important aspect. The Government Resolution relied upon appears to have been issued in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Consolidation Act. Despite this, the petitioners consciously invoked Section 247 of the MLRC. Under Schedule E to Section 247, the appellate power is conferred on the Sub Divisional Officer. The Superintendent of Land Records does not find place in that scheme. An authority cannot assume powers merely because it deals with land records. Jurisdiction must flow from the statute, and in this case, it clearly did not.

13. Viewed from this angle, the Revisional Authority was right in interfering with the orders passed by the authorities below. The Revisional Authority correctly held that exercise of powers under Section 32 of the Consolidation Act after a lapse of 28 years was not permissible. The delay was gross, unexplained, and contrary to the settled requirement of finality in consolidation proceedings. The Revisional Authority also noticed that the very assumption of jurisdiction was questionable.

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14. For these reasons, the impugned order does not call for any interference.

15. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

(AMIT BORKAR, J.)