[Cites 3, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Pavlas Kashiram Jadhav vs M/S.Xlo India Limited And Anr. on 27 February, 2026
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2026:BHC-AS:10106
wp3874-2006-J.doc
AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.3874 OF 2006
SHABNOOR 1. Kunda Paulas Jadhav,
AYUB
PATHAN Age 79 years, Occu.: Housewife,
Digitally signed by
SHABNOOR AYUB
PATHAN
having address at N-9/M/42/17/4,
Date: 2026.02.27
14:09:29 +0530
Near Pir Audumbar Chowk,
New CIDCO, Nashik
2. Suchita Subhash Waghmare,
Age 42 years, Occu.: Housewife,
having address at A/14, Gods Gift
Building, Maitree Park, Ambadi Road,
(Umela Bassein Road), Vasai (W),
District Palghar
3. Soloman Paulas Jadhav,
Age 40 years, Occu.: Service,
having address at N-9/M/42/17/4,
Near Pir Audumbar Chowk,
New CIDCO, Nashik ... Petitioner
V/s.
1. XLO India Limited,
Plot No.54, MIDC, Satpur,
Nashik
2. The Industrial Court at Nashik,
State of Maharashtra ... Respondents
Mr. Bhavesh Parmar with Ms. Reshma Nair and Mr.
Rajesh Sahani for the petitioner.
Mr. R.V. Paranjpe with Mr. T.R. Yadav for respondent
No.1.
1
::: Uploaded on - 27/02/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 27/02/2026 22:40:55 :::
wp3874-2006-J.doc
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : FEBRUARY 13, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : FEBRUARY 27, 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. By this writ petition filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner questions the legality and
correctness of the judgment and order dated 3 January 2006
passed by respondent No.2 in Revision Application (ULP) No.15 of
2005.
2. The facts necessary for deciding the petition are briefly
stated. The petitioner entered the service of respondent No.1
company on or about 23 June 1974 as a machine operator. His
service record remained clean. Over time he received promotions
and in the year 1992 he reached the position of Grade VI machine
operator. In the year 1983 he also became a member of the
managing committee of the union functioning in the establishment
of respondent No.1.
3. According to the petitioner, he consistently raised issues
relating to other workmen employed in the company. Because of
this activity he was subjected to harassment and victimisation. He
also asserts that he belongs to a backward community and that this
circumstance contributed to the treatment meted out to him.
4. On 31 May 1992 the petitioner was placed under suspension
with immediate effect. On the same day he was served a charge
sheet alleging misconduct dated 25 May 1992. Thereafter another
wp3874-2006-J.doc
charge sheet dated 9 June 1992 was issued alleging a separate
incident dated 4 June 1992. A common domestic enquiry was
conducted in respect of both charge sheets. After conclusion of the
enquiry, the company passed an order dated 16 October 1992
dismissing the petitioner from service.
5. Aggrieved by the dismissal order and the disciplinary
proceedings, the petitioner filed Complaint (ULP) No.391 of 1992
under Items 1(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) of Schedule IV of the MRTU
and PULP Act, 1971. After hearing both sides, the Labour Court at
Nashik by judgment dated 16 February 2005 allowed the
complaint.
6. By the said judgment the Labour Court held that respondent
No.1 had engaged in unfair labour practices under Items 1(b) and
1(g) of Schedule IV of the Act. The Court directed reinstatement of
the petitioner with continuity of service and full back wages from
the date of termination till actual payment. The company was
directed to comply with the order within two months, that is on or
before 16 April 2005.
7. The company challenged the said judgment by filing
Revision (ULP) No.15 of 2005 before the Industrial Court, Nashik.
By judgment dated 3 January 2006 the Industrial Court set aside
the Labour Court order and remanded the matter for fresh hearing
and decision. The petitioner has therefore approached this Court.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the
Industrial Court travelled beyond its limited jurisdiction under
Section 44 of the MRTU and PULP Act. In revision the Industrial
wp3874-2006-J.doc
Court cannot reassess the entire matter as an appellate authority.
The Labour Court had examined the evidence in detail and
therefore the order of remand is illegal and liable to be quashed.
9. It was further submitted that the Labour Court repeatedly
recorded that the alleged acts were minor and technical in nature
and that the punishment of dismissal was shockingly
disproportionate. These findings were clearly stated in several
paragraphs of the judgment consisting of twenty nine paragraphs.
10. It was argued that the Industrial Court wrongly observed in
paragraph 8 of its judgment that the Labour Court could only
consider Item 1(g) after holding the enquiry fair and findings not
perverse, and that remand was necessary to examine
proportionality. The Labour Court had already considered this
aspect and in paragraph 24 specifically held that dismissal was
shockingly disproportionate in view of the nature of charges and
past clean record. Hence remand was unnecessary.
11. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that once the
Labour Court accepted the enquiry as fair and the findings as
supported by evidence, it could not re examine the question
whether the acts constituted misconduct. Under Part I the Court
only examines fairness of enquiry and existence of evidence. Under
Part II it can only consider proportionality of punishment and not
the nature of misconduct itself.
12. It was further submitted that after recording validity of
enquiry and proof of misconduct, the Labour Court committed an
error in granting reinstatement with full back wages and
wp3874-2006-J.doc
continuity of service.
13. The respondent supported the order of the Industrial Court
contending that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction it rightly
interfered on the ground of perversity and remanded the matter
limited to proportionality of punishment. It was also pointed out
that during pendency of the petition the company closed down in
the year 2010 and the original petitioner employee has expired
and his legal representatives are now on record.
Analysis.
14. A court exercising revisional powers performs a limited
supervisory role. Its task is to see whether the subordinate court
applied the law correctly, acted within its authority, and arrived at
findings that a reasonable tribunal could have reached. It is not
meant to conduct a second full hearing on facts. The revisional
court does not substitute its own appreciation of evidence merely
because another view is possible. That function belongs to an
appellate court.
15. When the court of first instance has analysed the material on
record, discussed the evidence, and given clear reasons for its
conclusions, those findings carry weight. Interference becomes
justified only when the reasons disclose a clear error of law, a
decision beyond jurisdiction, or conclusions that no sensible
tribunal could draw from the material available. The revisional
court must therefore identify a specific defect in the reasoning
process. A mere preference for a different interpretation of the
same evidence cannot form the basis of interference.
wp3874-2006-J.doc
16. Disagreement is not the same as perversity. Unless the order
shows illegality, lack of jurisdiction, or findings unsupported by
any evidence, the revisional court must refrain from unsettling a
reasoned decision.
17. The labour court went through the charges one by one. It
referred to the material placed during the enquiry and considered
what exactly was proved against the employee. It also took note of
the service record extending over many years. The record showed
steady service without previous punishment. This aspect was
specifically discussed. The court did not interfere with the
punishment on general sympathy. It first understood the nature of
the accusations. After reading the enquiry papers and the evidence
relied upon by the employer, the court found that the lapses were
minor in character and technical in nature. They did not involve
dishonesty, violence, loss to the employer, or conduct that would
destroy confidence in employment. Having reached that
conclusion, the court then compared the gravity of misconduct
with the extreme penalty of dismissal.
18. While doing so the court placed weight on the long clean
record of service. The court reasoned that a worker who had
worked for many years without complaint could not be removed
from service for such minor acts. On that basis the court held that
dismissal was too severe and out of proportion to the misconduct
proved. The reasoning therefore directly deals with the legal
question whether punishment matched the gravity of the charges.
It was not an abstract exercise but a conclusion drawn after
balancing the nature of misconduct with the past conduct of the
wp3874-2006-J.doc
employee.
19. The revisional court itself recorded that the domestic enquiry
was fair and that the findings were supported by evidence. Once
such a conclusion is reached, the dispute narrows considerably.
The legality of the disciplinary process stands accepted. The
question whether the workman committed the misconduct also
stands concluded so far as revisional scrutiny is concerned. What
then survives is only the limited question whether the punishment
imposed is justified in the circumstances.
20. The Labour Court had dealt with that very issue. It examined
the nature of the proved acts, compared them with the employee's
long service record and then reached a definite conclusion that
dismissal was excessive. The Court explained why the penalty was
disproportionate. Therefore the matter did not remain undecided
or partially examined. In such a situation a remand cannot be
ordered mechanically. A remand is justified only if the earlier
decision suffers from a clear legal error, or if the conclusion is so
unreasonable that no tribunal could have reached it. The revisional
order does not point out such a defect. It merely expresses
disagreement with the conclusion. That by itself does not justify
reopening the proceedings.
21. The employer argued that the Labour Court reassessed
evidence and exceeded its limits. The record does not support that
submission. The Labour Court did not reconsider whether
misconduct occurred. It accepted the findings and only examined
whether the penalty matched the misconduct. That is precisely the
wp3874-2006-J.doc
function entrusted to it under the law.
22. The Labour Court first confirmed validity of enquiry and
then assessed proportionality of punishment. This sequence
follows the statutory scheme. When findings are based on
reasoning and are not perverse, the revisional court cannot send
the matter back only because another view appears possible.
Revisional power is meant to correct errors, not to substitute
preference.
23. During the pendency of the proceedings two events have
taken place. The establishment has closed down and the workman
has expired. These developments do not erase the illegality found
in the dismissal, but they affect the form in which relief can now
be granted.
24. Reinstatement is normally the primary relief in cases of
wrongful termination. However reinstatement presupposes the
existence of a running establishment and a living employee who
can return to duty. Where the undertaking itself has ceased
operations, there is no post to which a person can be taken back.
Similarly, once the employee has died, actual restoration of service
becomes physically impossible. The Court cannot issue directions
which cannot be implemented in reality.
25. The consequence, however, does not mean the workman's
rights vanish. The finding that the termination was improper still
survives. What changes is only the method of enforcement. The
benefits attached to service, particularly wages that would have
been earned, form part of the estate of the employee. Such
wp3874-2006-J.doc
monetary claims legally pass to the legal representatives.
26. In these circumstances courts consistently substitute
reinstatement with monetary compensation. The compensation
represents what the employee lost because of the wrongful action.
Back wages therefore remain recoverable even though physical
reinstatement cannot take place. The liability binds the employer
and, if necessary, its remaining or successor assets.
27. The Labour Court had granted reinstatement with back
wages. Since reinstatement has become impracticable, the order
must operate in its monetary form. The back wages component
continues to be enforceable and shall be payable to the legal
representatives of the deceased employee.
28. In view of the foregoing discussion, the following order is
passed:
(i) The writ petition is allowed.
(ii) The judgment and order dated 3 January 2006 passed
by the Industrial Court in Revision (ULP) No.15 of 2005 is
quashed and set aside.
(iii) The judgment and order dated 16 February 2005
passed by the Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No.391 of
1992 is restored, subject to modification regarding the
nature of relief.
(iv) Since the respondent establishment has closed down
and the original employee has expired, the direction of
reinstatement shall stand substituted by monetary
wp3874-2006-J.doc
compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
(v) The respondent employer shall pay to the legal
representatives of the deceased employee the full back wages
together with continuity benefits as determined by the
Labour Court. The amount shall be calculated from the date
of termination till the date of closure of the establishment.
(vi) The aforesaid amount shall be paid within a period of
twelve weeks from the date of this order. In case of default,
the amount shall carry interest at the rate of eight percent
per annum from the date of this order till realization.
(vii) The Labour Court shall determine the exact amount on
application made by either party, limited only to
quantification within three months from the date of
appearance of the parties. Parties shall appear before Labour
Court on 9th march 2026.
29. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to
costs.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
