[Cites 1, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Manoj Wadekar And Associates Thr Its ... vs Nigel Shaughnessy on 26 February, 2026
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2026:BHC-AS:9908
19-WP-13807-24-Final.doc
Sayali
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
SAYALI CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
DEEPAK
UPASANI
Digitally signed by
WRIT PETITION NO. 13807 OF 2024
SAYALI DEEPAK
UPASANI
Date: 2026.02.26
18:18:32 +0530 Manoj Wadekar and Associates and
Others ... Petitioners
V/s.
Nigel Shaughnessy ... Respondent
Mr. Kiran Bapat, Senior Advocate i/b Aumkar Joshi,
for Petitioners.
Mr. Jitendra M. Pathade with Ms. Priyanka R. Singh,
for Respondents.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
DATED : FEBRUARY 26, 2026
ORAL JUDGMENT:
1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith.
2. The present petition calls in question the order dated 29
July 2024 passed by the 2nd Labour Court, Pune, whereby the
applications below Exhibits U-6 and U-10 preferred by the
respondent came to be allowed, resulting in impleadment of Mr.
Manoj Wadekar, Lex-Eye Services Pvt. Ltd., and Mrs. Asmita M.
Wadekar as First Party Nos. 2 and 3 in the pending reference. The
petitioners assail the said order primarily on the ground that the
direction to implead additional parties travels beyond the scope
of Section 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
19-WP-13807-24-Final.doc
3. Mr. Kiran Bapat, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
petitioners, invited attention to the order of reference dated 04
September 2020 and submitted that the terms of reference
framed by the Commissioner specifically designate Manoj
Wadekar and Associates as the employer. According to him, the
reference is confined to adjudication of the legality and validity
of the order of termination dated 18 October 2019, and the
Labour Court is required to restrict itself strictly to the dispute so
referred. Placing reliance on Section 10(4) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Labour
Court derives jurisdiction only from the terms of reference and
cannot enlarge the scope of adjudication by introducing parties
not contemplated therein. It was therefore contended that the
impugned direction amounts to exceeding the statutory limits of
jurisdiction and could not have been lawfully issued.
4. Per contra, Mr. Jitendra Pathade learned Advocate
appearing for the contesting respondent, drawing attention to the
pleadings and application filed before the Labour Court,
submitted that the respondent had specifically asserted that the
employees working under Mr. Manoj Wadekar, Lex-Eye Services
Pvt. Ltd., and Mrs. Asmita M. Wadekar function in close
coordination and operational integration. It was pointed out that
salary preparation and disbursement, sanction of leave, and
human resource management were common to both concerns. It
was further urged that administrative and effective control over
the affairs of both entities was interlinked, and that labour
19-WP-13807-24-Final.doc
welfare enactments, including the Payment of Gratuity Act and
the Maharashtra Shops and Establishments Act, were uniformly
applicable. According to the respondent, the membership and
management structure of both entities substantially overlapped,
and on certain occasions salary payments had in fact been made
to the petitioner by the entity sought to be impleaded. On this
basis, it was submitted that the Labour Court rightly exercised its
discretion to ensure complete and effective adjudication of the
reference and to advance substantial justice between the parties.
It was therefore contended that no interference is warranted in
exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
5. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for the
parties and upon perusal of the record, it becomes necessary, for
the purpose of adjudicating the grievance raised by the petitioner,
to reproduce the precise terms of reference made by the
Commissioner, which read as under:
Jh- fuxsy 'kkS?usLlh] ,&4] 1yk etyk] vk;-lh-b- (fl-
ft-,l-Vh-) dkWyuh] 41&,] llqu jksM] iq.kZ & 411 001
;k dkexkjkph] R;kP;k es- eukst okMsdj vW.M
vlksfl,V~l 101] rst dszLV vikVZesaV] 1 yk etyk] IykaV
ua- 1204@2026] vkWQ ts-,e-jksM] iqjna js jksM]
f'kokthuxj] iq.ks & 411 004 ;k fu;ksD;kus fn-
18@10@2019 iklqu dsyy
s h lssoklekIrh (Termination)
gh dk;ns'khj (legal/valid) o leFkZfu; (justified) vkgs
fdaok dls ?
19-WP-13807-24-Final.doc
6. The terms of reference framed by the Commissioner require
the Labour Court to examine two specific questions. The first
question is whether the termination of the respondent by the
employer, namely Mr. Manoj Wadekar and Associates, is legal,
valid and justified in law. The second question concerns the
consequential reliefs that may follow if the termination is found
to be illegal, namely whether reinstatement, back wages and
other ancillary monetary benefits are liable to be granted. The
scope of adjudication is therefore clearly structured. The identity
of the employer and the legality of the termination form the
foundation of the dispute, while the issue of monetary and
service benefits is consequential and dependent upon the finding
on the primary issue.
7. A perusal of the complaint filed by the respondent shows
that the reliefs are specifically claimed against Mr. Manoj
Wadekar and Associates, described as a proprietary concern. The
prayer clause seeks reinstatement with continuity of service and
full back wages against that entity alone. Both the complaint and
the order of reference proceed on the consistent premise that the
proprietary firm is the employer. What is sought through the
applications before the Labour Court is, in substance, a
substitution or enlargement of the employer by introducing a
company which is a separate legal entity in the eye of law. The
fact that salary may have been disbursed on certain occasions by
the proposed entity, or that the two concerns may function in
close coordination, cannot by itself alter the legal character of the
19-WP-13807-24-Final.doc
reference. Such circumstances may have evidentiary value on
questions of control or management, but they do not
automatically permit a change in the foundational structure of
the dispute referred for adjudication. The jurisdiction of the
Labour Court is controlled by the statutory scheme. Section 10(4)
of the Industrial Disputes Act makes it clear that the adjudicatory
authority must confine itself to the dispute referred and matters
incidental thereto. The provision reads thus:
"Section 10(4): Where in an order referring an industrial
dispute to [a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal]
under this section or in a subsequent order, the
appropriate Government has specified the points of
dispute for adjudication, [the Labour Court or the
Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be],
shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters
incidental thereto."
8. The language of Section 10(4) leaves little scope for
ambiguity. Once the appropriate Government frames the points of
dispute and makes a reference, the adjudicatory authority is
required to remain within those boundaries. The statutory
command is clear. The Labour Court cannot travel beyond the
dispute referred, nor can it reshape the controversy in a manner
not contemplated by the referring authority. The purpose of the
provision is to maintain certainty in industrial adjudication, so
that parties know the exact dispute they are required to meet and
lead evidence upon.
9. The reasoning reflected in the impugned order shows that
the Labour Court considered the impleadment of additional
19-WP-13807-24-Final.doc
parties necessary for doing complete justice. The approach
appears to rest on equitable considerations and on the perceived
practical relationship between the entities involved. However, the
Industrial Disputes Act does not confer an unrestricted equitable
jurisdiction. The Labour Court functions as a statutory tribunal.
Its powers flow from the reference and not from general notions
of fairness alone. Equity may guide interpretation within the
statutory scheme, but it cannot enlarge jurisdiction where the
statute itself imposes limits.
10. Section 10(4) permits adjudication of the specified points
and matters incidental thereto. The expression "incidental" has a
limited meaning in law. It refers to matters that arise naturally
and necessarily while deciding the dispute already referred. Such
matters aid the adjudication of the original controversy but do
not alter its foundation. An incidental issue may clarify, support,
or facilitate determination of the referred question. It cannot
introduce a new dispute or change the identity of the principal
parties.
11. In the present case, the respondent's own pleadings and the
order of reference proceed on the basis that Manoj Wadekar and
Associates was the employer responsible for the termination. The
dispute referred for adjudication was framed on that footing. The
subsequent attempt to add another entity as employer does not
merely assist adjudication of the existing dispute. It changes the
very premise on which the reference rests. The enquiry then
19-WP-13807-24-Final.doc
shifts from examining the legality of termination by the named
employer to determining who the real employer is among
multiple entities. This amounts to expansion of the reference and
not clarification of an incidental issue.
12. If such a course were permitted, the Labour Court would in
effect assume the power to recast the terms of reference, a
function which the statute reserves exclusively for the
appropriate Government. The discipline imposed by Section
10(4) would then lose its meaning. Therefore, though the
objective of doing substantial justice may be understandable, the
method adopted cannot be sustained in law, since it enlarges the
scope of adjudication beyond what was originally referred.
13. In view of the statutory limitations governing the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court, the impugned order permitting
impleadment of additional employers could not have been passed
in law.
14. For the same reasons, the conclusion is inescapable that the
Labour Court exceeded the permissible limits of adjudication
while allowing the applications for impleadment.
15. The impugned order is therefore liable to be set aside.
16. The Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause 'a'.
17. No order as to costs.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
