[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Sharvi Tulsidas Sharma vs State Of Maharashtra on 11 February, 2026
Author: A. S. Gadkari
Bench: A. S. Gadkari
2026:BHC-AS:7089-DB
KSG APEAL-179-2025.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 179 OF 2025
Sharvi Tulsidas Sharma
Age : 35 yrs; Occ : Freelancer,
Residing at : D 502, Royal Classics,
Behind City Mall, Andheri (W),
Mumbai-400 053 ... Appellant
V/s.
The State of Maharashtra
(At the instance of Economic Offences
Wing, Mumbai) ... Respondent
_______________________________________
Ms. Sonal V. Parab a/w Mr. Jairaj D. Sawant for the Appellant.
Mr. Vinod Chate, A.P.P. for Respondent-State.
_______________________________________
CORAM : A. S. GADKARI AND
RANJITSINHA RAJA BHONSALE, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 29th SEPTEMBER, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 11th FEBRUARY, 2026
JUDGMENT (Per : A. S. GADKARI, J.) :
-
1) Appellant (Original Accused No.2) has preferred this Appeal
under Section 11 of Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in
Financial Establishment) Act, 1999 ('MPID Act'), impugning Order dated 16 th
December, 2024, passed below Exhibit-19 in MPID Special Case No.11 of
KSG APEAL-179-2025.doc
2017, rejecting her Application preferred under Section 227 of Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 ('Cr.P.C') for discharge from the offences punishable
under Sections 406, 420, 120-B, 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC')
and under Section 3 of the MPID Act.
2) Heard Ms.Parab, learned Advocate for the Appellant and
Mr.Chate, learned APP for the State. Perused record.
3) It is the prosecution case that, the principal accused i.e. mother
of Appellant namely Mrs. Sunita T. Sharma was working in the Finance and
Accounts department 'Dainik Bhaskar' group newspaper, Naman Centre, G
Block, Bandra Kurla Complex, Mumbai. Mrs. Sunita Sharma used to accept
deposits, invest it in forex trading and used to give good returns to the
investors from the deposits accepted by her. It is alleged that, brother of Mr.
Rishi Bhutani (first informant) gave him information about the said fact of
his investing funds with Mrs. Sunita Sharma. The first informant and other
investors therefore invested certain amounts in the investment scheme of
Mrs. Sunita Sharma. Ms. Sharma, who inturn assured them to give interest
on the invested amount at the rate of 15% per month. Mrs. Sunita Sharma,
initially paid the aggregate interest on the invested amount however after
May 2015, she stopped paying it. Mrs. Sunita Sharma with a view to gain
confidence of the investors and in particular the first informant gave him
post dated cheques. One of the cheque bearing No.154852 for an amount of
Rs.1,25,000/- was drawn from the account of Appellant. Subsequently,
KSG APEAL-179-2025.doc
investors realized that, their invested amounts have been defalcated and they
have been cheated by Mrs. Sunita Sharma, present crime is registered.
During the course of investigation, the role of Appellant is revealed in the
said crime. The investigation of the present crime has culminated into filing
of Final Report under Section 173(2) of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
('Cr.P.C.') which is numbered as MPID Special Case No.11 of 2017.
4) The Appellant thereafter filed an Application below Exhibit-19,
under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. for discharge from the said offences, which has
been rejected by the impugned Order dated 16th December, 2024.
5) Learned Advocate for the Appellant submitted that, merely
because the Appellant is the daughter of principal accused Mrs. Sharma, she
has been impleaded in the present crime. She submitted that, the Appellant
has no nexus in the crime alleged against her. That, the witnesses have
falsely implicated her in the present crime. She submitted that, though the
first informant and other witnesses have stated that, cheques were given
towards security from the account of the Appellant and the same were never
deposited and against the dishonor of cheques no proceedings thereof under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, was initiated against the
Appellant by the concerned witnesses. That, the Appellant was aged about
23 to 24 years when the alleged incident has taken place and therefore she
was not aware of the transactions between her mother and accused persons.
She submitted that, the trial Court has failed to take into consideration the
KSG APEAL-179-2025.doc
facts and has rejected her Application under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. for a
discharge by the impugned Order dated 16th December, 2024.
6) Per contra, Mr. Chate, learned APP opposed the Appeal. He
submitted that, Mr. J.V. Gadekar, Police Inspector attached to EOW Wing,
Unit-6, Mumbai has filed detailed Affidavit placing on record the material
available against the Appellant to frame charge in the present crime. He
submitted that, there is sufficient material available and annexed to the
charge-sheet to proceed to frame charge against the Appellant. He submitted
that, the trial Court has taken into consideration the relevant factors and has
rightly rejected the Application for discharge of the Appellant.
7) Perusal of record indicates that, it is the specific case against the
Appellant that, the amount received from two witnesses was deposited in her
bank account and the cheques under her signatures were also issued to four
depositors. That, a credit card of one witness Mr. Hitesh Chheda, was used by
the original accused No.1 and the Appellant for purchase of gold ornaments
from the establishment of M/s. Malabar Gold and Diamonds Shop at
Andheri. During the course of investigation it is revealed that, the Appellant
is the beneficiary of the amount received in investment by her mother. That,
an amount of Rs.4,00,000/- invested by two witnesses were transferred in
the bank account of the Appellant. As noted above, the cheques duly signed
by the Appellant were issued as a security to the depositors to win over their
confidence. It further appears from record that, both the accused with an
KSG APEAL-179-2025.doc
common intention have committed the aforesaid crime.
8) At this stage a useful reference can be made to the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar
Samal, reported in AIR 1979 SC 366. It is necessary to refer to paragraph 10
of the said judgment which reads as under :-
"10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned
above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing
the charges under section 227 of the Code has the undoubted
power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of
finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused has been made out:
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly
explained the Court will be, fully justified in framing a charge
and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally
depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down
a rule of universal application. By and large however if two
views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the
evidence produced before him while giving rise to some
suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be
fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under section 227 of the
Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and
experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post office or a
mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the
documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities
appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean
that the Judge should make a roaming enquiry into the pros and
cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial".
KSG APEAL-179-2025.doc
8.1) The Supreme Court in the case of R.S. Nayak vs. A.R. Antulay
and Anr. Reported in AIR 1986 SC 2045, while analysing provisions of
Sections 227, 239 and 245 of Cr.P.C., in unequivocable terms in Para 44 has
held as under:-
"The Code contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court
of Sessions under Section 227 in a case triable by it; cases
instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and
cases instituted otherwise than on police report are dealt with in
Section 245. The three sections contain some what different
provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. Under Section
227, the trial Judge is required to discharge the accused if he
'considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.' Obligation to discharge the accused under
Section 239 arises when "the Magistrate considers the charge
against the accused to be groundless." The power to discharge is
exercisable under Section 245(1) when "the Magistrate
considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the
accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant
his conviction...." It is a fact that Sections 227 and 239 provide
for discharge being ordered before the recording of evidence
and the consideration as to whether charge has to be framed or
not is required to be made on the basis of the record of the case,
including documents and oral hearing of the accused and the
prosecution or the police report, the documents sent along with
it and examination of the accused and after affording an
opportunity to the two parties to be heard. The stage for
discharge under Section 245, on the other hand, is reached only
after the evidence referred to in Section 244 has been taken.
Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope
for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to
consider the question of framing of charge under Section 245(1)
is a preliminary one and the test of "prima facie" case has to be
applied. In spite of the difference in the language of the three
sections, the legal position is that if the trial Court is satisfied
that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed."
KSG APEAL-179-2025.doc
8.2) A further reliance can also usefully be placed on the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Soma Nath Thapa
reported in (1996) 4 SCC 659 wherein, the Supreme Court has held that, if
there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, it
can be said that, a prima facie case has been made out against the accused.
It has been further held that even if the Court finds that the accused might
have committed an offence, it can frame charge. The Supreme Court has
further clarified in the said case that at the stage of framing of charge
probative value of the statements cannot be gone into.
8.3) The Supreme Court in the case of Palvinder Singh Vs. Balwinder
Singh and others reported in (2008) 14 SCC 504 while dealing with the
provisions of Section 227 of Cr.P.C., in para 13 has held that, the charges can
also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. That marshaling and
appreciation of evidence is not in the domain of the Court at that point of
time.
8.4) The Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Ashok
Kumar Kashyap (Criminal Appeal No.407 of 2021) dated 13 th April, 2021,
after considering its various decisions in the field has reiterated that, at the
stage of framing of the charge, it has to be seen whether or not a prima facie
case is made out and the defence of the accused is not to be considered.
That, at the stage of framing of charge and/or considering the discharge
application, a mini trial is not permissible. That, the defence on merits is not
KSG APEAL-179-2025.doc
to be considered at the stage of framing of the charge and/or at the stage of
discharge application.
9) It is thus settled position of law that, at the time of framing of
charge and/or considering the discharge Application of the accused, the
concerned Court has to take into consideration a prima facie case has made
out by the prosecution. That, the defence of accused cannot be considered at
the said stage.
10) After perusing the entire record, this Court is of the opinion that,
there is sufficient material available against the Appellant to proceed to
frame charge.
11) We are of the considered view that, the trial Court while passing
the impugned Order dated 16th December, 2024, has taken into consideration
material available on record and has not committed any error either on facts
or in law while passing it.
12) Appeal, is accordingly dismissed.
( RANJITSINHA RAJA BHONSALE, J. ) ( A.S. GADKARI, J. )
Digitally
signed by
KIRAN
SANJAY GHUGE
GHUGE Date:
2026.02.11
17:27:35
+0530
