[Cites 21, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Meena A. Rizvi vs The State Of Maharashtra And Ors. on 4 February, 2026
2026:BHC-OS:3317
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 1365 OF 2012
Meena A. Rizvi ]
the Sole Proprietress ]
M/s. Meena Constructions having address ]
at Rizvi House, 1st Floor, Hill Road, ]
Bandra (W), Mumbai - 400050 ]...Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra ]
through the Principal Secretary ]
to the Revenue Department ]
having office at Mantralaya ]
Nariman Point, Mumbai- 400020 ]
2. The Deputy Director of Land Records ]
Konkan Division, New Administrative ]
Bldg., Bandra [E], Mumbai- 400051 ]
3. The Superintendent of Land Records ]
Mumbai Suburban District, 10th Floor, ]
New Administrative Bldg., Bandra (E), ]
Mumbai- 400051 ]
4. The City Survey Officer, Bandra ]
Municipal Motor Garage Compound, ]
Opp. BEST Depot, S.V. Road, ]
Santacruz (W), Mumbai- 400054 ]
5. Bendict Soares, Adult of Mumbai ]
Inhabitant residing at Lily's Cottage ]
106 D Hill Road, Bandra (W), ]
Mumbai- 400050 ]...Respondents
__________________________________________________
Mr. Drupad Patil for Petitioner
Ms. Gauri Sawant, AGP for Respondent No. 1 to 4
Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar for Respondent No. 5
__________________________________________________
CORAM : KAMAL KHATA, J.
RESERVED ON : 14TH JANUARY 2026
PRONOUNCED ON: 4TH FEBRUARY 2026.
Digitally
signed by
SUMEDH
SUMEDH NAMDEO
NAMDEO SONAWANE
SONAWANE Date:
1
2026.02.04
15:53:17
+0530
::: Uploaded on - 04/02/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 04/02/2026 20:50:40 :::
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JUDGMENT:
1) Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, by Consent of the
parties.
2) By the present Petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the Petitioner challenges the legality, validity
and correctness of the orders dated 14th May 2009 passed by
Respondent No.3 - Superintendent of Land Records, 29th March
2010 passed by Respondent No.2 - Deputy Director of Land
Records, and 30th November 2011 ("the impugned order") passed
by Respondent No.1 - State of Maharashtra, (collectively referred
to as the "impugned orders"). By the said orders, the mutation
entry effected in the Property Register Card in respect of land
bearing Survey No.236, Hissa No.2, CTS No. B/1061, admeasuring
about 1067.7 square metres, situate at Hill Road, Bandra (West),
Mumbai- 400 050 ("the subject property"), in favour of the
Petitioner came to be deleted, and the Petitioner's application for
mutation of her name as owner was finally rejected by the
Respondent No.1, despite the Petitioner's claim of title founded on
a Consent Decree passed by this Court.
FACTUAL BACKDROP
3) One Mr. John Alexander Dias was the original owner of
several immovable properties, including the subject property.
Upon his demise on 20th January 1966, the subject property
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devolved upon his widow, Mrs. Lidwina Mary Dias, who, according
to the Petitioner, became the absolute owner thereof.
4) Mrs. Lidwina Mary Dias expired on 12th September 1966,
leaving behind her two sisters and one brother, namely Mrs. Mona
Oliver, Mrs. Collette Oliver and Mr. George Oliver, who, according to
the Petitioner, succeeded to the subject property as her legal heirs
and legatees under a Will executed by Mrs. Lidwina Mary Dias.
5) Mrs. Collette Oliver applied for Letters of Administration
in respect of Wills of John and Lidwina vide Petitions Nos.394 and
395 of 1970 before this Court. However, due to default, Petition
No.395 of 1970 came to be dismissed.
6) On 17th November 1979, the Petitioner entered into an
Agreement for Sale with the said Mrs. Mona Oliver, Mrs. Collette
Oliver and Mr. George Oliver, whereby the subject property was
agreed to be sold to the Petitioner for a total consideration of
₹1,70,000/-. The Petitioner states that pursuant thereto, a part
consideration of Rs.17,000/- was paid, with the balance being
payable upon execution of the Deed of Conveyance.
7) As the vendors had failed to perform their obligations
under the Agreement for Sale, the Petitioner instituted a Suit
No.2465 of 1985 before this Court seeking specific performance of
the Agreement for Sale dated 17th November 1979.
8) During the pendency of the said Suit, the disputes
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between the Petitioner and the vendors were amicably resolved
and Consent Terms dated 5th November 1985 were executed.
Pursuant thereto, a Consent Decree was passed by this Court
directing conveyance of the subject property in favour of the
Petitioner.
9) The Petitioner states that although the Consent Decree
was passed in the year 1985, it was lodged for registration only on
14th December 1986. However, the issue of payment of stamp duty
in respect of the Consent Decree remained pending and was finally
resolved in July 2007, whereafter the Consent Decree came to be
registered- nearly 22 years after it was passed.
10) Upon registration of the Consent Decree, the Petitioner
made an application dated 18th August 2007 to Respondent No.4
under the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code,
1966, seeking mutation of her name in the Property Register Card
of the subject property on the basis of the said Consent Decree.
11) Respondent No.5, claiming to be a lessee in respect of a
portion of the subject property and alleging long-standing
occupation thereof by his family, filed objections to the proposed
mutation. Respondent No.5 contended, inter alia, that prohibitory
and restraint orders dated 17th November 1973 and 24th June
1974 passed by the Collector of Bombay, restraining transfer or
creation of any charge in respect of the subject property, were still
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subsisting; that the Petitioner's vendors had no authority to
convey title; and that no probate or letters of administration had
been obtained in respect of the Wills relied upon by the Petitioner.
12) Notwithstanding the said objections, Respondent No.4, by
an order dated 7th March 2008, rejected the objections raised by
Respondent No.5 and allowed the Petitioner's application for
mutation, pursuant to which the Petitioner's name came to be
entered in the Property Register Card of the subject property.
13) Aggrieved by the said order of mutation, Respondent No.5
preferred an appeal under Section 247 of the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code, 1966 before Respondent No.3.
14) By an order dated 14th May 2009, Respondent No.3
allowed the Appeal filed by Respondent No.5, set aside the
mutation entry made in favour of the Petitioner, and held that in
the absence of probate or Letters of Administration in respect of
the said Wills forming basis of the Petitioner's title, the Petitioner
was not entitled to have her name mutated in the Property
Register Card.
15) The Petitioner thereafter preferred an Appeal before
Respondent No.2, challenging the order dated 14th May 2009.
However, by an order dated 29th March 2010, Respondent No.2
dismissed the Appeal and affirmed the findings recorded by
Respondent No.3.
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16) Still aggrieved, the Petitioner invoked the revisional
jurisdiction of Respondent No.1, contending that the revenue
authorities had exceeded their jurisdiction, failed to give due effect
to the binding Consent Decree passed by this Court, and
impermissibly adjudicated issues relating to title.
17) By an order dated 30th November 2011, Respondent No.1
dismissed the revision application and confirmed the concurrent
orders passed by Respondent Nos.2 and 3, thereby deleting the
mutation entry standing in the name of the Petitioner.
18) The Petitioner claims that the impugned orders suffer
from patent illegality, are contrary to settled principles governing
mutation proceedings, and constitute an impermissible
adjudication of title by revenue authorities, resulting in grave
prejudice to the Petitioner. Hence, the present Petition challenging
the impugned order.
RIVAL SUBMISSIONS
19) Mr. Drupad Patil, learned Advocate for the Petitioner,
assailed the impugned orders by submitting that the revenue
authorities have acted wholly without jurisdiction in deleting the
mutation entry standing in favour of the Petitioner, despite the fact
that the Petitioner derives title under a duly registered Consent
Decree passed by this Court.
20) Learned counsel submitted that Respondent No.5 had no
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locus whatsoever to challenge Mutation Entry No.2248. It was
pointed out that Respondent No.5 failed to produce any lease deed
or documentary material evidencing a legally subsisting right, title
or interest in the subject property. Mere possession or a bald
assertion of tenancy, unsupported by proof, could not clothe
Respondent No.5 with the status of a "person interested" so as to
maintain an Appeal under Section 247 of the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code, 1966.
21) It was further submitted that once the Consent Decree
dated 5th November 1985 was registered in July 2007, the
mandate of Sections 149 and 150 of the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code, 1966 stood attracted, rendering it obligatory upon
the revenue authorities to record the Petitioner's name in the
Property Register Card. The refusal to do so, despite a registered
Decree passed by a competent civil Court, was ex facie illegal,
arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
22) Learned counsel emphasized that the Consent Decree has
attained finality, has never been challenged by any party, and
binds not only the parties thereto but also all authorities
subordinate to this Court. The revenue authorities, therefore, could
not sit in appeal over a judicial Decree by questioning the
Petitioner's title or the competence of the vendors to convey the
subject property.
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23) It was contended that the findings recorded by
Respondent Nos.2 and 3, requiring the Petitioner to once again
approach the civil court, are wholly perverse. The Civil Court had
already adjudicated the matter and passed a Consent Decree, and
no further adjudication of title was either permissible or
warranted.
24) Learned counsel further submitted that the title of Mrs.
Lidwina Mary Dias was never in dispute and was not questioned by
Respondent No.5 at any stage. Upon her demise, succession opened
in favour of her sisters and brother, namely Mrs. Mona Oliver, Mrs.
Collette Oliver and Mr. George Oliver, who were the only surviving
heirs. In the absence of rival claimants to the estate of Mrs.
Lidwina Mary Dias, the revenue authorities clearly acted beyond
their jurisdiction in casting doubts on succession and title.
25) In support of these submissions, learned counsel placed
reliance upon judgments of this Court in Shrikant R. Sankanwar &
Ors. Vs Krishna Balu Naukudkar 1 & Ramesh Shantilal Modi & Anr.
Vs State of Maharashtra2, and submitted that mutation
proceedings are fiscal and administrative in nature and neither
confer or extinguish title. It was urged that revenue authorities are
bound to give effect to a registered Decree and cannot embark
upon an adjudication of title, unless such Decree is set aside by a
2003 Scc Online Bom 46
2018 Scc Online Bom 1330
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competent Court.
26) On these grounds, it was submitted that the impugned
orders deserve to be quashed and set aside, and the mutation entry
in favour of the Petitioner be restored.
27) Per contra, the learned AGP appearing for Respondent
Nos.1 to 4 submitted that the impugned orders do not warrant
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the
revenue authorities have acted strictly in accordance with the
statutory scheme governing mutation and maintenance of revenue
records.
28) The learned AGP submitted that late John Alexander Dias
had executed a Will during his lifetime bequeathing the subject
property exclusively in favour of his wife, Mrs. Lidwina Mary Dias.
Upon the death of Mr. John Vincent Dias on 20th January 1966,
testamentary succession opened, however, in the absence of a
grant of probate or letters of administration, the estate did not vest
in Mrs. Lidwina Mary Dias.
29) It was submitted that Mrs. Lidwina Mary Dias herself
expired on 6th September 1967 during the pendency of
testamentary proceedings relating to the estate of Mr. John
Vincent Dias. Consequently, at no point of time did Mrs. Lidwina
Mary Dias acquire representative title or legal authority in law to
deal with, alienate or otherwise dispose of the estate of Mr. John
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Vincent Dias.
30) The learned AGP submitted that prior to her demise,
Lidwina Mary Dias executed a Will purporting to bequeath the
property to her sister and brother. However, such testamentary
disposition was legally ineffective, as a legatee cannot bequeath
property which has not vested in her in law. In the absence of
probate or letters of administration, the estate never devolved
upon her absolutely.
31) It was submitted that testamentary proceedings bearing
Testamentary Petition Nos. 394 and 395 of 1970 seeking Letters of
Administration with Will annexed in respect of the estates of Mr.
John Vincent Dias and Mrs. Lidwina Mary Dias remained pending
and were never culminated in any grant. In such circumstances,
none of the persons claiming under the alleged Wills, including
Mrs. Mona Oliver, Mrs. Collette Oliver and Mr. George Oliver,
acquired any authority to deal with or alienate the subject
property.
32) Despite the absence of representative title, the said
persons entered into an Agreement for Sale dated 17th November
1979 with the Petitioner. The learned AGP emphasized that the
Agreement itself expressly records that prior permission of the
competent Court was required before any transfer could take
effect, which, is a clear acknowledgment of lack of authority and
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absence of marketable title. Admittedly, no such permission was
ever obtained.
33) The learned AGP submitted that the Consent Terms dated
5th November 1985 and the Consent Decree passed in Suit
No.2465 of 1985 were founded entirely on the said Agreement for
Sale. Since the Agreement itself was void and unenforceable for
want of authority and representative title, the Consent Decree
arising therefrom was vitiated at its very root and incapable of
conferring any legal right, title or interest.
34) It was further submitted that under the Indian Succession
Act, only an executor or administrator appointed by a competent
Court can represent the estate of a deceased person. In the absence
of such appointment, any agreement or conveyance executed by
heirs or legatees is void in law and cannot be validated even by
Consent of parties.
35) The learned AGP specifically addressed the Petitioner's
reliance on the 2002 amendment to the Indian Succession Act
dispensing with the requirement of probate for Christians, and
submitted that the amendment does not operate retrospectively so
as to validate agreements and Decrees executed decades earlier
when testamentary proceedings were admittedly pending.
36) The learned AGP further submitted that the Consent
Decree bears the seal of the Civil Court dated 14th February 1986
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and became executable and registrable from that date. Under the
Registration Act, 1908, limitation for registration commenced
from the date of execution of the Decree, and there is no provision
in law for postponement or suspension of limitation.
37) It was submitted that although the Decree was lodged for
registration in the year 1986, it was not registered within the
statutory period. The registration ultimately effected in July 2007,
after a lapse of more than 21 years, was ex facie illegal and beyond
the jurisdiction of the registering authority.
38) The learned AGP contended that adjudication of stamp
duty under the Maharashtra Stamp Act does not arrest limitation
under the Registration Act, nor does it revive a document which
has already become time-barred. Payment of stamp duty, even
pursuant to adjudication, cannot validate an instrument that has
become incapable of registration by operation of law.
39) It was further submitted that the Consent Decree also
suffered from serious infirmities under the Stamp Act, as stamp
duty was neither paid nor registration completed within the
mandatory statutory framework applicable as on 14th February
1986.
40) The learned AGP submitted that when the revenue
authorities noticed that the mutation was sought to be effected on
the basis of a document which was void, unenforceable, improperly
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stamped and illegally registered, they were duty-bound to refuse
mutation. Such refusal, it was contended, does not amount to
adjudication of title but is a legitimate administrative act to
prevent perpetuation of illegality in public records.
41) The learned AGP submitted that the concurrent findings
recorded by Respondent Nos.1 to 3 are based on statutory
provisions, settled legal principles and material on record, and do
not suffer from perversity or jurisdictional error warranting
interference under Article 226.
42) On these grounds, the learned AGP urged that the Writ
Petition be dismissed and the impugned orders be upheld.
43) Mr. Khandeparkar, learned Advocate appearing for
Respondent No.5, submitted at the outset that Section 150(2) of
the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 read with Rules 14 and
24 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Record of Rights and
Registers (Preparation and Maintenance) Rules, 1971 mandates
issuance of notice to all persons interested in the land before
certifying any mutation entry. The expression "person interested"
is of wide amplitude and is not confined to absolute owners alone.
He supplements the aforesaid submission by relying upon the
judgment of this Court in Ramchandra vs SDO, Chandrapur3.
44) Relying upon the judgment in Dossibai Nanabhoy
2008 SCC Online Bom 809
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Jeejeebhoy v. P.M. Bharucha4, learned counsel submitted that a
person need not have perfected title to qualify as a "person
interested". Any person having a subsisting right to remain in
occupation, or whose civil rights are likely to be affected by
alteration of revenue records, squarely falls within the ambit of
that expression.
45) It was submitted that Respondent No.5 is a lessee in
respect of the subject property, which is evident from the Letter
dated 15th November 1955 and the Intimation of Disapproval
dated 16th July 1957 issued by the Municipal Corporation of
Greater Bombay, and that his status as lessee is also reflected in
the Property Register Card. Consequently, Respondent No.5's
rights stood directly affected by the proposed mutation in favour of
the Petitioner.
46) Learned counsel contended that the submission of the
Petitioner that Respondent No.5 lacked locus is legally untenable,
as mutation proceedings are not inter se disputes between rival
owners alone, but are statutory proceedings intended to maintain
accurate and lawful revenue records after giving notice to all
affected persons.
47) On merits, Mr. Khandeparkar submitted that the mutation
claimed by the Petitioner was fundamentally unsustainable, as the
Petitioner's alleged title itself was under a serious cloud. He
1958 SCC Online Bom 90
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submitted that the Petitioner traces her claim through Mrs. Mona
Oliver, Mrs. Collette Oliver and Mr. George Oliver, who purportedly
derived title from late Mrs. Lidwina Mary Dias under a Will dated
12th May 1966.
48) Learned counsel pointed out that no probate or Letters of
Administration in respect of the said will have ever been granted.
Testamentary Petition No.395 of 1970 filed for letters of
administration was dismissed by an order dated 24th October
1975 due to discrepancies, and though a restoration application
was filed in 1979, no final orders were ever passed. Consequently,
the alleged testamentary title never crystallized in law.
49) Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in
Jitendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 5, learned counsel
submitted that where mutation is sought on the basis of a Will, and
the Will itself is disputed or unproved, revenue authorities are
duty-bound to refuse mutation and direct the claimant to first
establish rights before a competent civil Court.
50) Mr. Khandeparkar further invited attention to the
prohibitory orders dated 17th November 1973 and 24th June 1974
passed by the Collector of Bombay under Section 46(2) of the
Income Tax Act, 1922 read with Order XXI Rule 54 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, restraining transfer or creation of any charge in
respect of the subject property on account of arrears of estate duty.
2021 SCC Online SC 802
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51) Learned counsel submitted that these prohibitory orders
were duly reflected in the Property Register Card by mutation
entries made on 14th February 1974 and 22nd July 1974, and that
admittedly, these orders have never been challenged, set aside,
vacated or lifted till date.
52) Relying upon the judgment in Keshrimal Jivji Shah v.
State of Maharashtra6, learned Counsel submitted that any
transfer effected in violation of a subsisting prohibitory or
attachment order passed by a competent authority is void, illegal
and incapable of conferring any right, title or interest. He
contended that in the present case, prohibitory orders dated 17th
November 1973 and 24th June 1974 restraining transfer or
creation of any charge in respect of the subject property were
admittedly in force and duly reflected in the Property Register
Card. Despite the said restraint, the Agreement for Sale dated 17th
November 1979, the Consent Terms dated 5th November 1985
and the Consent Decree founded thereon were brought into
existence. He contended that such transactions, being in the teeth
of statutory prohibitions, are non est in law and cannot be
recognised by revenue authorities for the purpose of mutation, and
that the impugned orders refusing to act upon such documents are
therefore legally justified and call for no interference under Article
226 of the Constitution of India
2004 SCC Online Bom 368
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53) In this regard, learned counsel relied upon State of Punjab
v. Amar Singh7, to submit that parties cannot, by private
arrangement or compromise Decree, confer upon themselves
rights which they were otherwise legally prohibited from creating,
nor can such Decrees bind statutory or revenue authorities to act
contrary to law.
54) Mr. Khandeparkar further submitted that the
extraordinary delay of nearly twenty-two years in securing
registration of the Consent Decree, coupled with suppression of
material facts relating to prohibitory orders and pending
testamentary proceedings, disentitles the Petitioner to any
discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
55) Learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of this
Court in Sushanku Builders Limited v. Apex Grievance Redressal
Committee8, to contend that where concurrent findings of fact are
recorded by multiple statutory authorities, and no perversity or
jurisdictional error is demonstrated, this Court ought not to
interfere in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction.
56) In conclusion, Mr. Khandeparkar submitted that the
Petition is an attempt to bypass mandatory civil remedies, to
legitimize an otherwise defective title through mutation
proceedings, and to erase the lawful rights of Respondent No.5
(1974) 2 SCC 70
2025 SCC Online Bom 727
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without due process. Reliance was also placed on Ajay Singh v.
Khacheru9 to submit that writ jurisdiction is discretionary and is
not intended to correct every alleged error. Where the authority
has acted within jurisdiction and followed settled law, the Court
should refrain from substituting its own view.
57) On these grounds, learned counsel urged that the Petition
deserves to be dismissed with costs.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
58) I have given anxious consideration to the rival
submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner, Respondent
Nos.1 to 4 and Respondent No.5, and have carefully perused the
material placed on record as well as the impugned orders passed
by the revenue authorities. The central issue which arises for
consideration is whether the revenue authorities were justified in
deleting the mutation entry made in favour of the Petitioner,
notwithstanding the existence of a registered Consent Decree
passed by this Court.
59) At the outset, the legal position that mutation entries in
revenue records are maintained primarily for fiscal and
administrative purposes is well settled. The position of law
governing the scope and ambit of powers of revenue officers under
Sections 149 and 150 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code,
(2025) 3 SCC 266
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1966 is no longer res integra and stands conclusively settled by
this Court in Shrikant R. Sankanwar v. Krishna Balu Naukudkar
(supra). This Court in the case of Shrikant R. Sankanwar held as
under:
"9. Bare reading of sections 149 and 150 of the said Code and
the said Rules would therefore disclose that the powers which
are to be exercised by the Revenue Officers in relation to the
mutation of entries in the revenue records pertaining to the
immovable properties in the villages are for the purpose of
updating such revenue records in respect of rights acquired by
the parties in different modes specified under the said section
149. Such right might have been acquired by way of any
document executed by the parties and duly registered or on
account of pronouncement of decision by the Courts or
authorities competent to deal with the matters pertaining to
the rights and interests of the parties in relation to the
immovable properties. Neither section 149 nor section 150
empowers the revenue authorities acting thereunder and
according to the procedure prescribed under the said Rules to
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties or their title to the
immovable properties. The said provisions of law only deal
with the revenue records being updated in relation to the
immovable properties for the purpose of assessment of
revenue and collection thereof.
11. Undoubtedly in case of difficulty in ascertaining the right
of the parties based on the document produced or on account
of failure to produce documents, the revenue officers acting
under section 150 of the said Code can certainly decide about
the issue of possession of the property and modify the entries
accordingly in the register of mutations. However, in cases
where the person discloses the title better than the other, from
the documents produced by him, certainly such person will
have edge over the other in relation to the decision pertaining
to the possession of property. Every such decision would be
also final subject to the adjudication about the same by the
civil court. Nevertheless, while considering the issue of actual
possession, the revenue authorities under section 150 of the
said Code cannot decide about title to the property or other
right to the property of the parties to such dispute. In fact,
Rule 17 of the said Rules deals with and clearly speak of
certification of entries in the register of mutation and deciding
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disputes relating to the mutation in the entries, and not of
decision relating to the rights of the parties in or to the
properties. It further speaks of fixing the matter for hearing
consequent to the objections raised to the entries, in order to
decide the dispute for the purpose of certifying the entries and
not to decide the rights of parties to the properties. Only other
issue which can be dealt with by the revenue authorities
under the said provisions of law is the issue of actual
possession of the properties. In that respect also, the Revenue
Officer acting under sections 149 and 150 of the said Code
while deciding the issue of possession has to give due credence
to the documentary evidence and the person having
documentary proof of title to the property either in the form of
valid and lawful registered deed or a Decree of the court, then
such person shall be held to be in actual possession. This
conclusion is inevitable in view of the provisions of law
contained in part D of the said rules and particularly Rule 17
thereof which provides that "The certifying officer shall then
hold a summary enquiry and decide each dispute entered in
the register of disputed cases on the basis of possession" and
further "if a person actually holds properties under a claim of
title, he shall be recorded as occupant" and then that "if there
is a doubt as to the actual possession, the persons with the
strongest title shall be so recorded."
10. The sub-section (3) of section 150 of the said Code clearly
speaks of "any objection to any entry made under sub-section
(1) in the register of mutations." Sub-section (6) thereof deals
with the powers of the revenue authorities to test "Entries in
the register of mutations" and "if found correct or after
correction" the same to "be certified ................ in such manner
as may be prescribed". Thus, the objections which are to be
entertained and to be dealt with under section 150 of the said
Code by such Revenue officers are in relation to the entries
proposed to be made pursuant to acquisition of rights by the
parties intimated under the report made by the parties or by
the registering authorities to the Talathi and not in relation to
the right itself of the parties in or to the immovable
properties. The enquiry pursuant to such reports to the
Revenue Officers, has to be restricted to the matters
pertaining to the mutation of the entries in the revenue
records. Such enquiry cannot travel beyond the power given
to the authorities under the said provision of law. Such power
being restricted to ascertain the veracity of the proposed
entry, based on the document produced by the parties, the
authorities cannot adjudicate upon the rights acquired by the
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parties to such properties in respect of which the mutation of
entry is requested for. In other words the Authorities in such
enquiry will have to ascertain as to whether documents
produced before such authorities apparently disclose
acquisition of right in favour of the applicant in a manner and
of the nature claimed by him or her and not whether the
applicant is in fact entitled to claim such right in or to the
property. The power to adjudicate regarding such issue
pertaining to right of the parties to the immovable properties
vests in the Courts and the Authorities duly empowered to
enquire and adjudicate about the same and not with the
revenue officers acting under sections 149 and 150 of the Code
and the provisions of the said Rules. In brief, therefore, the
enquiry contemplated under section 150 in relation to
application for mutation of entries is to ascertain whether the
document produced reveal acquisition of right stated to have
been acquired in the land in respect of which mutation of
entry is sought for, and does not empower such Authorities to
adjudicate upon the title and rights of the parties to the
immovable proprieties. In fact the entire proceedings
prescribed under sections 149 and 150 of the said Code and
the procedure prescribed for the same under the said Rules
relate to the dispute pertaining to the mutation and
certification of entries in the register depending upon the
documents which are produced by the parties and not to
decide about the rights of the parties to such properties.
13. It is well settled law that the entries in the revenue records
are basically for revenue purposes and do not by themselves
constitute title to the property in favour of any person. Such
entries can, undoubtedly, be corroborative piece of evidence to
establish the certain rights of the parties in relation to
property but they themselves cannot create any title in favour
of any person in relation to any immovable property."
(Emphasis Supplied)
The ratio laid down in the case of Shrikant (supra) has been duly
followed by the Division Bench of this Court in Sidram Ramdas
Darnulwar Vs State of Maharashtra and Others10.
60) It is equally settled that revenue authorities functioning
under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 are not vested
2025 SCC Online Bom 982
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with jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of title, validity of
conveyances, testamentary succession or enforceability of civil
Court Decrees. Any such adjudication lies exclusively within the
domain of competent civil Courts. This Court, while reiterating the
ratio laid down in Srikhant (supra) in its judgment in Ramesh
Shantilal Modi v. State of Maharashtra (supra) has held as under:
"27. This Court in the case of Shrikant R.
Sankanwar v. Krishna Balu Naukudkar (supra) has held that
objections which are to be entertained and to be dealt with
under section 150 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code by
the revenue officers are in relation to the entries proposed to be
made pursuant to the acquisition of rights by parties and not in
relation to the right itself of the parties in or to immovable
properties. The enquiry pursuant to such reports of acquisition
of rights to the revenue officers has to be restricted to the
matters pertaining to the mutation of the entries. Such enquiry
cannot travel beyond the power given to the authorities under
the said provision of law. Such power being restricted to
ascertain the veracity of proposed entry, based on document
produced by the parties cannot adjudicate upon the rights
acquired by the parties to such properties in respect of which
the mutation of entry is requested for. Such power to adjudicate
right of parties to immovable properties vests in Courts and
duly empowered authorities and not with the revenue officers
acting under sections 149 and 150 of the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code and Rules.
28. The Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Budhiya Vesta
Patel v. Nirmala Jayprakash Tiwari (supra) has held that a
registered document under section 74 of the Evidence Act,
1872 has a lot of sanctity attached to it and this sanctity
cannot be allowed to be lost without following the proper
procedure. In my view, the revenue authority is not empowered
to directly or indirectly set aside the registered documents. The
development agreement as well as the two power of attorneys
which were duly registered had not been set aside by the
competent Court till date. The respective suits filed by the
parties in respect of the suit land are still pending."
(Emphasis added)
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61) In the present case, it is not in dispute that the Petitioner
claims mutation on the basis of a Consent Decree dated 5th
November 1985 passed by this Court, which Decree came to be
registered in July 2007. It is also not in dispute that the said
Consent Decree has not been challenged or set aside by any
competent Court and continues to subsist as on date.
62) Once a Decree of a civil Court attains finality and is
registered in accordance with law, the revenue authorities are
duty bound to take cognizance of it for the limited purpose of
mutation. They cannot sit in appeal over such Decree, re-examine
its legality, or test the merits of the underlying transaction by
questioning the correctness of the findings recorded therein .
63) The impugned orders, however, reveal that the revenue
authorities have travelled far beyond their limited jurisdiction by
entering into an elaborate examination of the Petitioner's title, the
validity of testamentary succession, the authority of the vendors,
the effect of alleged prohibitory orders, and the legality of
registration of the Consent Decree. Such an exercise is plainly
impermissible in mutation proceedings. It is sitting in appeal and
reversing the Court's Decree.
64) It is true that the objection proceedings were triggered at
the instance of the Respondent No.5 resulting in the Revenue
authorities rejecting the request of the Petitioner. The Petitioner
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has questioned the locus of Respondent No.5 before the Revenue
authorities as well as in the present Petition. In turn, Respondent
No.5 has relied upon Ramchandra v. Sub-Divisional Officer,
Chandrapur and Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M. Bharucha,
to contend that he falls within the expression "person interested"
under Section 150 (2) of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code.
65) The reliance placed by Respondent No.5 on Ramchandra
v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Chandrapur is wholly misplaced in the
facts of the present case. In Ramchandra, the Court was concerned
with deletion of a mutation entry pertaining to land reserved for a
'public purpose' effected without hearing the affected villagers. The
decision turned on violation of principles of natural justice and
statutory protection accorded to 'public land'. The said judgement
neither deals with mutation entries sought on the basis of a
registered Decree of a civil Court nor does it sanction any
adjudication of title by revenue authorities. On the contrary,
Ramchandra itself reiterates the settled position that mutation
entries do not create or extinguish title and that questions of title
cannot be determined in revenue or writ proceedings. Far from
supporting Respondent No.5, the decision reinforces the limited,
fiscal nature of mutation proceedings and is clearly distinguishable
on facts.
66) The judgment in Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M.
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Bharucha, relied upon to contend that Respondent No.5, as a lessee
or occupier, is a "person interested" is clearly inapposite. While the
general proposition that a person in possession under an
agreement may have a protectable interest is unexceptionable, the
said decision arose in the context of apportionment of
compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and application of
the doctrine of part-performance under Section 53A of the
Transfer of Property Act. The controversy therein was neither
concerned with mutation proceedings under Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code, 1966, nor with the power of revenue authorities to
refuse mutation sought on the basis of a subsisting civil Decree.
67) Though Respondent No.5 seeks to assert locus by claiming
to be a "person interested" within the meaning of the Maharashtra
Land Revenue Code, 1966, a bare assertion of such status is
insufficient in law. Save and except a bald claim of long-standing
possession as a lessee, Respondent No.5 has failed to place on
record any document such as a registered lease deed or other
cogent material demonstrating a subsisting legal right in respect of
the subject property. The expression "person interested" cannot be
so expansively construed as to permit any individual to merely
assert an interest, without foundational proof, and thereby
obstruct mutation proceedings.
68) If Respondent No.5 claims an independent or superior
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right as a lessee or otherwise, the burden squarely lies upon him to
establish such right before a competent civil Court in appropriate
proceedings. Until such rights are adjudicated and declared,
Respondent No.5 cannot, on the basis of unsubstantiated claims,
insist upon the denial of mutation sought on the strength of a
registered civil Court Decree. To permit such an approach would
render mutation proceedings vulnerable to frivolous objections
and defeat their limited fiscal and administrative purpose.
69) Much emphasis was placed by the learned AGP and
Respondent No.5 on the absence of probate or Letters of
Administration in respect of the Wills of Mr. John Vincent Dias and
Mrs. Lidwina Mary Dias. Such issues may be germane in
appropriate civil proceedings. They cannot, however, be
determinative in mutation proceedings where the claimant relies
on a subsisting Decree of a civil Court recognising the Petitioner's
rights.
70) The revenue authorities were not called upon to decide
whether the vendors had valid title in law, nor whether probate
ought to have been obtained. Those questions which stood
concluded, at least inter partes, by a Consent Decree passed by this
Court, cannot be reopened in mutation proceedings. Until such
Decree is set aside in accordance with law, the revenue authorities
were bound to act upon it for fiscal purposes.
oswp-1365-2012-J.doc
71) The reliance placed on the decision of the Supreme Court
in Jitendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh is wholly misplaced
when the factual backdrop of that case is carefully examined. In
Jitendra Singh, mutation was claimed solely on the basis of a Will
which had neither been proved nor acted upon through any
adjudication by a competent civil Court; significantly, the dispute
had arisen even prior to the death of the testatrix. The Supreme
Court was thus confronted with a situation where the very
foundation of the claim, namely the Will, was uncertain and
disputed. It was in that context, that the Court held that the
revenue authorities could not effect mutation unless rights under
the Will were first crystallised by a competent civil Court.
72) In stark contrast, the present case does not rest on an
unproved Will or a mere assertion of testamentary succession. The
Petitioner's claim for mutation is founded upon a registered
Consent Decree passed by this Court in a suit for specific
performance. The existence of a such Decree fundamentally alters
the factual and legal position in the present case and renders the
reliance on Jitendra Sign wholly inapposite.
73) The judgment in Keshrimal Jivji Shah v. State of
Maharashtra was cited to contend that any transaction entered
into in violation of a prohibitory or attachment order is void. While
the legal principle enunciated therein is not in dispute, the factual
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context in which it was rendered is materially distinct. In
Keshrimal Jivji Shah, the validity of the transaction itself was
directly under challenge before a competent forum, and the Court
was called upon to determine the legal consequences of acts done
in breach of an attachment or restraint order.
74) In the present case, however, the validity of the
Agreement for Sale or the Consent Decree has not been directly
assailed in any civil proceedings, nor has any Court declared them
to be void or unenforceable. The issue before the revenue
authorities was not to adjudicate upon the legality or enforceability
of the transaction, but merely give effect to and reflect a subsisting
and registered civil Court Decree in the revenue records. To invoke
Keshrimal Jivji Shah in such circumstances would amount to
conferring upon revenue authorities a jurisdiction they do not
possess.
75) Similarly, the contention that the Consent Decree is
vitiated because it arises out of an Agreement for Sale executed by
persons lacking representative title cannot be examined by
revenue authorities. Whether the Decree is valid, void or voidable
is a matter for a competent civil courts; Revenue authorities
cannot declare a civil Court Decree to be ineffective or non est.
76) Considerable emphasis was also placed on the delay of
nearly twenty-two years in registration of the Consent Decree and
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the alleged illegality under the Registration Act and Stamp Act.
These aspects also fall outside the limited scope of mutation
proceedings. The Decree stands registered; so long as such
registration remains undisturbed, revenue authorities cannot
refuse to act upon it on the ground that it ought not to have been
registered.
77) The submission that adjudication and payment of stamp
duty does not arrest limitation under the Registration Act may
have relevance in appropriate proceedings. However, it cannot
empower revenue authorities to disregard a registered instrument
while effecting mutation.
78) Once the Petitioner produced a registered Consent Decree,
the revenue authorities were obliged to give effect to it in the
Revenue records, subject always to the settled principle that
mutation entries are fiscal and do not confer title. They could not
have deleted the entry by embarking upon an adjudication of title.
79) The reliance on Sushanku Builders Limited v. Apex
Grievance Redressal Committee is equally misplaced. The said
decision arose out of proceedings under the slum rehabilitation
regime, wherein specialised statutory authorities were exercising
powers expressly conferred upon them to examine compliance
with statutory conditions, eligibility criteria, and the conduct of
the developer. In that context, the Court declined to interfere with
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concurrent findings recorded by authorities acting squarely within
their jurisdiction.
80) The present case stands on an entirely different footing.
The revenue authorities under the Maharashtra Land Revenue
Code do not possess jurisdiction to adjudicate title or to examine
the validity or effect of civil Court Decrees. Where concurrent
findings are recorded by authorities acting beyond limits of their
statutory competence, the principle of judicial restraint invoked in
Sushanku Builders has no application.
81) The judgment in Ajay Singh v. Khacheru has been relied
upon to contend that this Court ought not interfere with
concurrent findings of fact in writ jurisdiction. The said decision
was rendered in the context of service and administrative matters,
where the Supreme Court cautioned against re-appreciation of
evidence or substitution of views in writ proceedings. However,
even in Ajay Singh, the Supreme Court unequivocally recognised
that interference is warranted where authorities act without
jurisdiction or in excess of the jurisdiction vested in them.
82) In the present case, the impugned orders are not vitiated
by mere errors of appreciation of facts. They suffer from a
fundamental jurisdictional infirmity, inasmuch as the revenue
authorities have ventured into adjudicating issues of title,
succession, and the validity of a civil Court Decree, matters wholly
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beyond their statutory competence. Such an error goes to the root
of the matter and squarely attracts the well-recognised exception
noted in Ajay Singh.
83) The reliance placed by Respondent No.5 on State of Punjab
v. Amar Singh is clearly misconceived when examined in the
factual context of the present case. In Amar Singh, the Supreme
Court was concerned with a situation where a compromise or
Consent arrangement was sought to be enforced in direct
contravention of an express statutory prohibition. The issue before
the Court was whether such a compromise could bind the State or
defeat a statutory mandate. The controversy thus arose in
substantive proceedings in which the legality and enforceability of
the compromise itself was directly in issue.
84) In the present case, however, the Consent Decree passed
by this Court has not been challenged in any substantive civil
proceedings, nor has any competent court declared it to be void or
unenforceable on the ground of statutory violation. The issue
before the revenue authorities was not whether the Consent
Decree could override statutory prohibitions, but whether a
subsisting and registered civil Court Decree could be ignored for
the limited purpose of effecting mutation. Until the Consent Decree
is set aside in appropriate proceedings, it continues to operate in
law and is required to be reflected in revenue records for fiscal and
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administrative purposes.
85) The submission that the Petitioner ought to be relegated to
a civil suit is also misconceived. The Petitioner has already
approached a civil Court and obtained a Decree. To require her to
re-litigate the same issues would be contrary to settled principles
of law. Respondent No.5 who claims to be a lessee on the subject
property cannot under the garb of being a "person interested"
prevent a Decree holder from having his name into the Revenue
records. Respondent No. 5, even assuming has a subsisting
interest, is not remediless; it is open to him to adopt appropriate
civil remedies in accordance with law.
86) In the present case, there is occasion to consider Section
264 of the MLRC, as the superior holder of the land is present and
it is only in his absence that the person actually in possession
would be liable for dues under the land revenue.
87) The contention founded on the prohibition / restraint
orders dated 17th November 1973 and 24th June 1974 may raise
issues between the concerned statutory authorities and the parties
affected. However, the existence, operation and legal consequences
of such orders cannot be examined by revenue authorities to
declare a civil Court Decree ineffective for the purpose of mutation.
The plea of suppression of prohibitory orders dated 17 th November
1973 and 24th June 1974 also cannot, in the present factual
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setting, furnish a basis of refusing mutation on the strength of a
subsisting registered Decree. Questions of knowledge, suppression,
and their legal consequences are matters for adjudication in
properly constituted proceedings.
88) Merely because probate was not obtained at the relevant
time cannot, by itself, justify deletion of mutation in proceedings of
this nature, particularly where no rival claimant to the estate of
Mrs. Lidwina Mary Dias or predecessor in title has come forward
and where the Petitioner rests her claim on a civil Court Decree.
89) This Court is mindful of the limited scope of interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, where
statutory authorities act beyond jurisdiction and ignore the
binding effect of a civil Court Decree, interference becomes
necessary to prevent manifest injustice.
90) In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court holds that
the impugned orders dated 14th May 2009, 29th March 2010 and
30th November 2011 are vitiated by jurisdictional error, suffer
from patent illegality, and cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the
said impugned orders dated 14th May 2009, 29th March 2010 and
30th November 2011 are quashed and set aside.
91) The Petition, accordingly succeeds, with the clarification
that restoration of mutation entry is purely for fiscal and revenue
purposes and shall not confer, declare or extinguish title nor
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prejudice the rights of any party to seek appropriate relief before a
competent civil Court.
92) Mutation Entry No.2248 effected in the Property Register
Card in respect of land bearing Survey No.236, Hissa No.2, CTS No.
B/1061, admeasuring about 1067.7 square metres, situated at Hill
Road, Bandra (West), Mumbai in favour of the Petitioner shall
stand restored, subject to the clarification.
93) Respondent No.4 - City Survey Officer, Bandra, shall carry
out the necessary entries in the Property Register Card in terms of
this order within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of
an authenticated copy of this Judgment.
94) Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms.
95) There shall be no order as to costs.
(KAMAL KHATA, J.)
List of Judgments Relied upon:
1. Shrikant R. Sankanwar & Ors. Vs Krishna Balu Naukudkar [2003 Scc Online Bom
46]
2. Ramesh Shantilal Modi & Anr. Vs State of Maharashtra [2018 Scc Online Bom
1330]
3. Ramchandra vs SDO, Chandrapur [2008 SCC Online Bom 809]
4. Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M. Bharucha [1958 SCC Online Bom 90]
5. Jitendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2021 SCC Online SC 802]
6. Keshrimal Jivji Shah v. State of Maharashtra [2004 SCC Online Bom 368]
7. State of Punjab v. Amar Singh [(1974) 2 SCC 70]
8. Sushanku Builders Limited v. Apex Grievance Redressal Committee [2025 SCC
Online Bom 727]
9. Ajay Singh v. Khacheru [(2025) 3 SCC 266]
10. Sidram Ramdas Darnulwar Vs State of Maharashtra and Others [2025 SCC Online
Bom 982]
