[Cites 12, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Tmi Staffing Services Private Limited ... vs Sharad Ashok Dhangar And Ors on 9 April, 2026
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2026:BHC-AS:16847
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AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.3293 OF 2025
TMI Staffing Services Private Limited,
ASV Adarsh Towers, No.719, 3rd Floor,
Pathari Road, Chennai 600 002
through its authorized representative
Mr. Ashwin Sundar, Age 36 years,
Occupation : Driver
Office at ASV Adarsh Towers, No.719,
3rd Floor, Pathari Road,
ATUL Chennai 600 002
GANESH ... Petitioners
KULKARNI
Digitally signed
by ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI
Vs.
Date: 2026.04.09
11:40:42 +0530
1. Sharad Ashok Dhangar,
Age 32 years, Occupation Service,
R/at A/p. Sukwat, Tal. Shindkheda,
District Dhule
2. Patil Pankaj Walaji,
Age 31 years, Occupation service,
R/at Sumatahane, Tal. Parola
Vikasnagari-2, District Jalgaon
3. Rahul Rajendra Khairnar,
Age 32 years, Occupation Service,
Rat A/P. Samathane, Taluka Parola,
District Jalgaon
4. Avinash Shivaji Jadhav,
Age 32 years, Occupation Service,
R/at Hanuman Mandhir Gauthan,
Pohregaon, Latur
5. Santosh Minde Nathu,
Age 43 years, Occupation Service,
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R/at At Shinde, Post Vasuli,
Taluka Khed, District Pune
6. Sainath Watekar Genbhau,
Age 37 years, Occupation Service,
R/at Watekarwadi, Post Kalus,
Taluka Khed, District Pune
7. Santosh Vitthal Yergude,
Age 34 years, Occupation Service,
R/at Khalumbre, Taluka Khed,
District Pune
8. Balasaheb Dhondiram Adhangale,
Age 44 years, Occupation Service,
R/at post Khalumbre, Taluka Khed,
District Pune
9. Amol Uddhav Mali,
Age 30 years, Occupation Service,
R/at Bhaolegon, Post Shirur,
Anandpal, Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune
10. Dipeen Jalilndar Morve,
Age 37 years, Occupation Service,
R/at A/P Walgaon, Taluka Khed,
District Pune 410 505 ... Respondent
Mr. J.P. Cama, Senior Advocate with Mr. Chetan A. Alai,
Mr. Varun Joshi, Ms. Rama Somani and Mr. Rishabh
Chaurasia i/by Mr. Chetan A. Alai for the petitioner.
Mr. G.S. Telangre for respondent Nos.1 to 10.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : APRIL 2, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : APRIL 9, 2026
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JUDGMENT:
1. By the present writ petition instituted under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner assails the order
dated 23 September 2024 passed by the Industrial Court at Pune
in Complaint (ULP) No. 7 of 2024, whereby the application
seeking interim relief came to be allowed and the operation of the
transfer order dated 23 January 2024 has been stayed pending
final adjudication of the complaint.
2. The factual matrix giving rise to the present writ petition, as
set out by the petitioner, is as follows. The petitioner is a company
duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act,
1956, and is an existing company within the meaning of Section 2
of the Companies Act, 2013, having its registered office at
Chennai. The petitioner is, inter alia, engaged in the business of
providing manpower supply services to various establishments.
The respondents are stated to fall within the definition of
"workman" under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, and "employee" within the meaning of Section 3(5) of the
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971. The respondents were appointed in the
capacities of operator, picker packer, and assembly operator. Their
appointments were co-terminus with the subsistence of the
contractual arrangement entered into between the petitioner and
Kubota Agricultural Machinery India Private Limited.
3. The petitioner had been engaged in supplying manpower to
Kubota for its manufacturing facility situated at Pune, pursuant to
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a service agreement which came into effect from 1 April 2014. It is
the case of the petitioner that, on account of its inability to
continue business operations with Kubota, the client service
agreement dated 11 March 2014 came to be terminated in
accordance with the governing commercial terms. In that regard, a
notice of 60 days was duly issued to Kubota.
4. During the interregnum, the respondents approached the
Industrial Court by instituting Complaint (ULP) No. 129 of 2023
alleging unfair labour practices. In the said proceedings, the
Industrial Court passed a direction restraining the petitioner from
terminating the services of the respondents. It is the case of the
petitioner that, in view of the absence of any other clients at Pune
with whom the respondents could be deployed, the petitioner
issued transfer orders dated 23 January 2024 transferring the
services of the respondents. Being aggrieved by the said transfer
orders, the respondents once again approached the Industrial
Court at Pune by filing Complaint (ULP) No. 7 of 2024, impugning
the said action of transfer.
5. The Industrial Court, Pune, by an ad-interim ex parte order
dated 29 January 2024, stayed the operation and implementation
of the transfer orders. The petitioner thereafter filed its detailed
written statement opposing the grant of interim relief and
contending that the transfer orders were legal, valid, and in
consonance with the applicable provisions of law. Upon hearing
the parties, the Industrial Court proceeded to pass the impugned
order dated 23 September 2024 confirming the interim relief.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction
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of this Court. It is further stated that the respondents have
subsequently initiated reference proceedings before the Industrial
Court seeking a declaration of permanency with Kubota
Agricultural Machinery India Private Limited, contending that the
contractual arrangement between the petitioner and Kubota is
sham, bogus, and merely a paper arrangement devised to deprive
the respondents of their legitimate claim to permanency.
6. Mr. Cama, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of
the petitioner, submitted that there has been no alteration in the
service conditions of the respondents. It was contended that the
petitioner is willing to provide employment to the respondents at
Chennai and that their services shall not be terminated without
following due process of law. He further submitted that the
complaint does not contain any specific pleadings alleging mala
fides, nor has any individual been impleaded in a personal capacity
to substantiate such allegations. Inviting attention to the
appointment orders, it was submitted that the terms clearly
stipulate that the respondents were engaged pursuant to the
agreement with Kubota, and that their appointments were co-
terminus with the subsisting agreement with Kubota, unless
terminated earlier or upon cessation of the petitioner's project with
the said client.
7. Inviting attention to clause (c) of the appointment orders,
learned Senior Counsel submitted that although the clause is
captioned as deputation or transfer, sub-clause (1) expressly
provides that the respondents may be deputed to the petitioner's
client as per the terms of the deputation letter or to any of the
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client's locations from time to time. He further submitted that sub-
clause (2) clarifies that during the period of deputation, the
respondents shall continue to remain in the employment of the
petitioner. It was also pointed out that, by communication dated
29 November 2023, the petitioner terminated its contract with
Kubota with effect from 31 January 2024.
8. It was further submitted that the respondents had earlier
approached the Industrial Court by filing Complaint (ULP) No. 129
of 2023, wherein an ad-interim order was passed restraining the
petitioner from terminating their services without following due
process of law. Referring to the pleadings in the said complaint,
learned Senior Counsel submitted that paragraph 3 thereof makes
reference to clause (c) of the appointment orders, wherein the
respondents have themselves averred that the petitioner does not
have the right to transfer employees to its own establishment and
that the employment is client-based. On that basis, it was
contended that the respondents have, by necessary implication,
acknowledged the existence of a power of transfer. It was further
submitted that there was no material before the Industrial Court to
conclude that work was available in Maharashtra. According to the
petitioner, once the respondents report to the head office at
Chennai, they would be deployed as and when work becomes
available, and until such time, their services would not be
terminated without due process and wages would continue to be
paid.
9. Inviting attention to the transfer orders, it was submitted
that the same disclose specific reasons, namely that the contract
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with Kubota was coming to an end on 31 January 2024 and that,
in view of the restraint order passed by the Industrial Court against
termination without due process, coupled with the absence of
further operations at Pune, the respondents were transferred to the
petitioner's office at Chennai in terms of clause (C1) of the
appointment orders.
10. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decisions in
Rajendra Roy vs. Union of India & Another, AIR 1993 SC 1236;
Management of Addisons Paints and Chemicals Ltd. vs. Workmen,
represented by the Secretary (A, P, and C) Assistants' Association &
Another, 2001 I CLR 587; State of U.P. & Others vs. Gobardhan Lal,
(2004) 11 SCC 402; Pearlite Liners (P) Limited vs. Manorama
Sirsi, (2004) 3 SCC 172; and Rajneesh Khajuria vs. Wockhardt
Limited & Another, (2020) 3 SCC 86.
11. Per contra, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents
supported the impugned order and submitted that the same is well
reasoned and based on a detailed consideration of the entire
material on record. It was contended that the Industrial Court has
rightly recorded a finding that the transfer order dated 23 January
2024 is vitiated by mala fides and has been issued for a collateral
purpose with an oblique motive. It was submitted that the
petitioner was fully aware that no work suitable to the respondents
was available at its head office at Chennai, particularly when the
respondents are skilled workers engaged in operational duties and
the said location does not have any manufacturing facility. It was
further contended that the conditions of service do not
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contemplate transfer to a place where no work is available.
Emphasis was laid on the fact that the transfer orders were issued
within a short span of approximately 40 days from the passing of
the ad-interim order restraining termination. It was also submitted
that the respondents are conversant only with the Marathi
language and that their children are pursuing education in
Maharashtra, where Marathi is the medium of instruction, which is
not available in Tamil Nadu. It was further contended that the
petitioner, being engaged in providing services to the engineering
industry, could have secured alternative contracts within
Maharashtra, thereby enabling the respondents to continue their
employment within the State, instead of effecting their transfer to
Chennai. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned
Advocate for the respondents placed reliance upon the judgment
of this Court in Hindoostan Spinning & Weaving Mills Limited,
Mumbai vs. Sharad G. Shanolkar & Others, 2002 (1) Mh LJ 559.
REASONS AND ANALYSIS:
12. The case of the petitioner is that there is no removal of the
respondents from service at all. The petitioner is repeatedly saying
that the employment relationship is continuing and only the place
of work is changed. According to the petitioner the situation arose
because the contract with Kubota at Pune came to an end. Because
of this the work which earlier existed at Pune was no longer
available. The petitioner contends that in such a situation it cannot
be forced to keep the respondents idle at Pune when there is no
client and no assignment. It is further pointed out that the
appointment letters themselves clearly mention that the
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employment was connected with the client project. The condition
is that the employment will run along with that project, and when
the project stops, naturally the work at that place also stops. The
petitioner is relying strongly on clause (c) of the appointment
terms. It says that this clause allows deputation or transfer to any
client location from time to time. According to the petitioner, this
clause is not a small or casual term, but a main condition of
employment. The respondents accepted this condition at the time
of joining. Therefore, when the petitioner says that it has shifted
them to Chennai, it is only acting within that agreed condition.
The petitioner also explains that since there was no work left at
Pune after the Kubota contract ended, the only practical step
available was to call the respondents to its head office at Chennai,
from where further deployment could be arranged.
13. On the question of intention, the petitioner strongly denies
any wrongdoing. It says that there is no bad faith or hidden motive
behind the transfer. It is also pointed out that in the complaint
filed by the respondents, there is no clear and specific allegation of
mala fide. No particular officer is named, and no details are given
as to who acted wrongly and how. According to the petitioner, such
vague allegations cannot be accepted to doubt a management
decision. The petitioner further gives an assurance that the
respondents will not be thrown out of employment. It says that
their services will continue, wages will be paid, and as and when
work becomes available, they will be assigned duties. In this way,
the petitioner is trying to show that the action is protective of
employment, not destructive of it.
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14. It cannot be said that an employer has no control at all over
where its employees should work. Especially in a business of
manpower supply, the very nature of work is that employees are
placed at different sites depending on client needs. If the
appointment terms themselves say that the work is client based
and that transfer or deputation can take place, then such a
condition cannot be ignored later. The respondents at the time of
joining agreed to such a structure of employment. So it is not
possible to say that any movement from one place to another is
automatically illegal. The appointment terms also indicate that the
employment was not of a permanent and fixed location kind. It
was tied to a particular project. This means that when the project
comes to an end, the employer has to take some decision. Either
the employee is shifted somewhere else, or the employment itself
may come to an end, subject to law. Here the petitioner has chosen
not to terminate but to continue the employment by shifting the
place. This aspect cannot be lightly ignored. Once the Kubota
contract ended the petitioner was justified in saying that there was
no work left at Pune under that arrangement.
15. In normal understanding also a transfer cannot be treated as
punishment by itself. It does not reduce salary. It does not break
service. It only changes the place where the work is to be done.
Similarly it is also not a termination. The employee continues in
service. Therefore, merely because the respondents do not want to
go to Chennai that by itself may not make the transfer illegal. In
industries where work depends on projects and clients some
amount of flexibility must be given to the employer. Otherwise, the
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business itself cannot function. Thus, from this angle the petitioner
is showing that its action is within the contract, within business
need, and without any wrongful intention. This part of the case
cannot be rejected outright. It needs careful balancing with the
other side before reaching any final conclusion.
16. Even so the matter does not end at that stage. The Court
cannot stop only by reading one clause of the appointment letter
and deciding the issue. The Court has to see the full situation as it
actually happened. Here an important fact is that the respondents
had already gone before the Industrial Court earlier by filing
Complaint (ULP) No. 129 of 2023. In that complaint the Industrial
Court had passed an ad-interim order. By that order the petitioner
was restrained from terminating the services of the respondents
without following due process of law.
17. Now what is to be seen is what happened next. Within a
short time, roughly about fifty days from that order, the petitioner
issued the transfer order. This timing becomes very important.
When an employer is stopped from doing one thing by a Court and
immediately after that takes another step affecting the same
employees the Court is required to look at such conduct more
carefully. In many cases intention is gathered from circumstances.
The sequence of events, the timing, and the surrounding situation
together help the Court to understand the real nature of the
action. Here the Industrial Court has done exactly that. It has
looked at the earlier restraint order, then the quick issuance of the
transfer order and then formed a view that the transfer may not be
a simple administrative decision. It has taken a view that the
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transfer could be connected with the earlier order of protection
and may have been issued when the petitioner was not able to
terminate the services directly. This is a matter of inference drawn
from facts. Such an inference when based on record and sequence
cannot be said to be without basis. The Court must give due
weight to such reasoning especially at the interim stage.
18. The respondents have also raised another aspect. They say
that even at Chennai there was no real work available for them.
According to them, they are skilled workers doing operational
duties like operator, picker packer, and assembly work. Such work
usually requires a production unit. It is their case that the Chennai
location is only a head office and not a place where such
operational work is actually carried out. If that is so then sending
them to such a place becomes questionable. On this point the
material placed by the petitioner is also important. The petitioner
has not shown before the Industrial Court any clear document or
record to establish that work was actually available at Chennai for
these respondents at the time of transfer. There is no specific
posting, no identified assignment, no clear requirement shown.
The stand of the petitioner is only that if and when work becomes
available the respondents will be given work. This statement
though sounding reasonable at first does not fully answer the
issue. There is a difference between saying that work may arise in
future and showing that work was available at the time when the
transfer order was issued.
19. When a transfer is made normally it is expected that the
employee is being shifted to a place where there is existing work
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or immediate requirement. If a worker is sent to a place where
there is no present work and only a possibility of future work is
spoken of then such transfer can appear doubtful. It may look less
like a genuine deployment and more like an arrangement to deal
with the situation created by the earlier Court order. That is why
the Industrial Court has considered this aspect seriously.
20. Thus, when these facts are put together the earlier protection
order, the short gap of time, the absence of clear work at the
transferred place, a reasonable doubt arises about the real purpose
of the transfer. At this stage the Court is not finally deciding the
rights, but it must see whether the respondents have shown
enough to justify interim protection. The Industrial Court has
found that they have and such a view based on these
circumstances cannot be said to be without support from the
record.
21. The respondents have also placed before the Court the
question of hardship and this part also needs careful attention.
They say that they are Marathi-speaking workers. Their families
are living in Maharashtra. Their children are studying here. There
day-to-day life, their social connections, their language, all are
connected with this State. According to them shifting to Chennai is
not a small change. It affects their family life, education of
children, and their ability to adjust in a different language and
environment. They say that they are not in a position to suddenly
move and settle in another State where the language and
conditions are different.
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22. Now, it is true that in service matters hardship alone cannot
stop every transfer. Many employees are transferred from one
place to another and some inconvenience is always there. Law
does not say that a transfer becomes illegal only because it causes
difficulty. So this argument of hardship, by itself, may not be
enough to set aside the transfer. But the position changes when the
Court is already examining whether the transfer is genuine or not.
In such a situation hardship becomes an important supporting
factor. It helps the Court to see whether the action is reasonable or
whether it is being used to pressurize the employees. Here, the
Industrial Court has not treated hardship as the only ground. It has
looked at it along with other facts. It has considered that these
respondents are not ordinary transferable staff in a large national
setup with regular postings everywhere. They are workers doing
specific operational jobs and their placement depends on
availability of work at particular sites. In such a case shifting them
to a place where not only work is doubtful but also where they will
face serious personal difficulty becomes a relevant circumstance. It
adds weight to the doubt already arising from the timing and
nature of the transfer.
23. Thus, when hardship is seen together with the other
circumstances, the earlier restraint order, the quick timing of
transfer, and the lack of clear work at Chennai, the overall picture
becomes more doubtful. The hardship does not stand alone but it
strengthens the inference. It gives support to the view that the
transfer may not be purely for business need but could be carrying
some collateral purpose. That is why the Industrial Court has
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considered this aspect and such consideration cannot be said to be
misplaced.
24. The petitioner has argued that the complaint should be
rejected at the threshold because the respondents have not named
any particular officer as the person who acted with mala fide
intention. This submission is mainly based on the law explained in
Rajneesh Khajuria. Therefore, it becomes necessary to see what
exactly that judgment lays down and how far it applies to the
present facts. In that judgment, the Supreme Court has clearly said
that allegation of mala fides is a serious matter. It cannot be made
in a casual way. It must be supported by proper facts and material.
The Court has also said that when such allegation is made against
a person, that person should be made a party, so that he can
answer the charge. Otherwise, it would not be fair to hold that
such person acted with bad intention. At the same time, the
Supreme Court has also explained that mala fides is not always
proved by direct evidence. It can be gathered from surrounding
circumstances. The Court can look at the sequence of events, the
timing, and the effect of the action, and then see whether there is
something improper in it. But such conclusion must come from
clear facts, not from vague or empty allegations.
25. Now applying this to the present case, the submission of the
petitioner cannot be accepted in a absolute manner. Here the
respondents are not making a case that a particular named officer
had personal enmity or grudge against them. They are not
pointing to any one individual and saying that he acted with bias.
They are saying that the action of transfer itself is not genuine
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because it came immediately after a protection order, because
there was no clear work at Chennai, and because it causes serious
difficulty to them. So the allegation here is not of personal mala
fide against an individual but of improper exercise of power by the
employer. In such a situation it is not always necessary that a
particular officer must be named. The Court is required to see
whether the action appears to be bona fide or not. This can be
examined from the surrounding facts. Further in the present
matter the Industrial Court has not given any final finding that any
particular person acted with mala fide. It has only formed a prima
facie view at the interim stage. It has looked at the timing of the
transfer, the earlier restraint order and the absence of clear
material showing work at Chennai. Based on these factors it has
found that the respondents have made out a case for interim
protection. This is a limited finding not a final conclusion of guilt
against any officer.
26. The judgment in Rajneesh Khajuria will apply fully when the
Court is recording a final finding of mala fides against a specific
person. In such a case that person must be before the Court. But at
the stage of examining whether the action appears doubtful or
requires interim protection the Court can look at the overall facts
even without naming an individual. Therefore, the submission of
the petitioner that the complaint must be rejected only because no
officer is named cannot be accepted. The complaint does contain
factual basis. It refers to the sequence of events and the
surrounding circumstances. That is sufficient at least at this stage
to allow the Court to examine the issue. The objection raised by
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the petitioner does not defeat the complaint.
27. The petitioner has placed strong reliance on the appointment
clause and also on various judgments which say that transfer is
part of managerial power. According to the petitioner once the
appointment letter allows transfer the Court should not interfere.
This argument on first look appears correct because in service law
it is well accepted that the employer has the right to decide where
an employee should work. Especially in a setup where work
depends on clients and projects such power becomes necessary. If
such power is completely taken away then the employer will not
be able to manage its business properly. So this part of the
submission of the petitioner cannot be ignored. It has some legal
basis.
28. At the same time the position in law is not so simple that
once there is a transfer clause the Court has no role at all. The law
always puts some limits on the exercise of power. Even if a power
exists it must be used in a proper way and for a proper purpose. If
the power is used in a wrong manner then the Court can step in.
So it is not correct to say that the existence of a transfer clause
ends the matter completely. The Court still has to see how that
power is used in the facts of the case. It is true that generally
Courts do not interfere in transfer matters. Courts do not act like
an appellate authority to check whether one place is better than
another or whether the employer could have taken a different
decision. That is not the function of the Court. The Court does not
sit to re-arrange postings. It only checks whether the action is legal
and fair. So in normal situations transfer orders are allowed to
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operate, and the employee is expected to comply.
29. But this general rule has clear exceptions. If the transfer is in
the nature of punishment, meaning it is done to harm or penalize
the employee without following proper procedure then the Court
can interfere. Similarly, if the transfer is not really for work but for
some indirect reason like to force the employee, to harass him, or
to defeat some legal protection already granted, then also the
Court can step in. Another important situation is where the
transfer is used to frustrate pending proceedings. If an employee
has already gone to Court and obtained some protection, and then
a step is taken which practically defeats that protection, the Court
cannot remain silent.
30. The judgments relied upon by the petitioner also say that
transfer should not be examined like an appeal on facts. That
means the Court should not go into minute details to decide
whether the employer's decision was the best possible one. But at
the same time, those very judgments do not say that a transfer
passed for an improper purpose must be protected. They do not
give a free hand to the employer to act in any manner. The
protection given to the employer is only when the action is bona
fide and within legal limits.
31. In the present case, the Industrial Court has not taken an
extreme view. It has not said that every transfer is bad or that the
petitioner has no power to transfer. It has only looked at the
specific facts of this case. It has seen the earlier order protecting
the respondents, the quick timing of the transfer, the absence of
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clear work at Chennai, and the hardship caused. After considering
all this, it has formed a view that this particular transfer appears
doubtful at this stage. The Industrial Court has only granted
interim protection. It has not finally decided the issue. It has only
said that till the complaint is fully heard and decided, the transfer
should not be given effect. If later it is found that the transfer was
proper the employer can still act. But if the transfer is allowed now
and later found to be improper the damage may not be easy to
undo. Thus, when the matter is seen in this way the reliance
placed by the petitioner on the general principle of transfer does
not completely answer the case. That principle applies in normal
situations. But where there are surrounding circumstances creating
doubt about the purpose of the transfer, the Court is justified in
taking a closer look. The Industrial Court has done exactly that
and therefore its approach cannot be said to be incorrect.
32. This Court while using its writ powers is not sitting like an
appeal court over every interim order passed by the Industrial
Court. It is not the duty of this Court to re-check each fact and
come to a fresh conclusion just because another view is possible.
Interference is only done in limited situations. For example, if the
order is completely unreasonable, or if it is passed without giving
any reasons, or if important facts are ignored, then only this Court
can step in. Otherwise, normally the order is allowed to stand.
33. In the present case, the Industrial Court has looked into all
the necessary aspects. It has considered the appointment
conditions, the earlier complaint filed by the respondents, the
order which had already protected them from termination, the
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short timing within which the transfer was issued, the contention
that there was no proper work at Chennai, and also the hardship
which may be caused to the respondents. The reasons given by the
Industrial Court may not be very long or detailed, but they are not
without basis. They show that the Court has applied its mind to
the facts placed before it. Once such a reasonable view is taken on
the material available, this Court cannot replace it with another
possible view just because it may think differently.
34. Looking at the matter as a whole, I am satisfied that the
respondents have shown a prima facie case for grant of interim
protection. At this stage the Court is not deciding finally who is
right or wrong. It is only seeing whether protection is needed till
the case is fully heard. In this situation the balance of convenience
also supports the respondents. If the transfer is allowed to take
effect now, and later it is found to be improper, the harm caused to
the respondents will be difficult to correct. They may suffer loss
which cannot be easily reversed. On the other hand the petitioner
is not facing any serious harm because of this interim order. The
petitioner can still continue its business. It can engage workers,
pay wages, and take all steps as permitted by law. It is also free to
present its full case before the Industrial Court when the complaint
is finally heard. So, it cannot be said that the petitioner is suffering
any irreparable loss due to continuation of the interim relief.
35. For all these reasons, I do not find any ground to interfere
with the order dated 23 September 2024. The Industrial Court has
taken a reasonable and possible view based on the material before
it.
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36. Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.
37. At this stage, learned Advocate for the petitioner prayed for
continuation of ad-interim relief. However, in view of the reasons
recorded in the judgment, the request for continuation of ad-
interim relief stands rejected.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
