Shyamrao Champatrao Dhamankar (In ... vs State Of Maharashtra Thr. Police ...
2026 Latest Caselaw 3482 Bom

Bombay High Court

Shyamrao Champatrao Dhamankar (In ... vs State Of Maharashtra Thr. Police ... on 7 April, 2026

2026:BHC-NAG:5433

                                               1                REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt




                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR

                        CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 196 OF 2017

                        Shyamrao Champatrao Dhamankar,
                        Aged about 74 years, Occ: Nil,
                        R/o. Rahatgaon, Tq. & Dist. Amravati.          APPLICANT
                          Versus

                        State of Maharashtra,
                        Thr. Police Station Officer, Nandgaon
                        Peth, Tq. Nandgaon Peth,
                        Dist. Amravati.                       NON-APPLICANT

                                             WITH

                        CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 197 OF 2017

                     1. Anil s/o Vishwanath Agarkar,
                        Aged about 52 years, Occ: Labour,

                     2. Dadarao s/o Shankarrao Dhamankar,
                        Aged about 64 years, Occ: Labour,
                        Both R/o. Rahatgaon, Tq. &
                        Dist. Amravati.                               APPLICANTS

                          Versus

                        State of Maharashtra,
                        Thr. Police Station Officer, Nandgaon
                        Peth, Tq. Nandgaon Peth,
                        Dist. Amravati.                       NON-APPLICANT
                    -----------------------------------------------
                    Mr. P.R. Agrawal, Advocate for the Applicants.
                    Mrs. M.A. Barabde, APP for the Non-applicant/State.
                    -----------------------------------------------
                               2            REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt




        CORAM                 :   URMILA JOSHI PHALKE, J.

        RESERVED ON           :   26th MARCH, 2026.

         PRONOUNCED ON :          07th APRIL, 2026.


ORAL JUDGMENT :-

1. Heard.

2. ADMIT. Heard finally by the consent of learned

Counsel for the respective parties.

3. In both the Revision Applications, the judgment and

order of sentence in R.C.C. No. 1306/2007 passed by the

Judicial Magistrate First Class Court No.11, Amravati dated

28.04.2010 convicting the Applicants and confirmed by the

Additional Sessions Judge-3, Amravati, in Criminal Appeal

Nos. 72/2010 and 77/2010 dated 14.11.2017 is under

challenge.

4. By the impugned judgment the accused No.1 Anil

Vishwanath Agarkar and accused No.2/Shyamrao Champatrao

Dhamankar are convicted of the offence punishable under

Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer 3 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

rigorous imprisonment for two years and fine of Rs. 2,000/-

each, in default of payment of fine to suffer simple

imprisonment for six months. Accused No.1 Anil Vishwanath

Agarkar, accused No.2/Shyamrao Champatrao Dhamankar and

accused No.4/Dadarao Shankarrao Dhamankar are convicted of

the offence punishable under Section 468 read with Section 34

of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous

imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 1,000/- each, in

default of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for six

months.

5. Brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of

the present Revisions are as under:

5(i). Informant Bebibai Agarkar who is the daughter of

Annapurna Dhamankar who died in the year 2000 and the

father of the Informant i.e. Ramchandra Suryabhan Dhamankar

died on 14.03.1985. After the death of the parents, the

Informant and her sister Kalavati Agarkar are the original legal

heirs. Accused No.1 Anil Agarkar is the son of her sister Kalavati

Agarkar. It is alleged by her that, accused Anil Agarkar,

Shyamrao Dhamankar, Kisanrao Mahulkar, Dadarao Dhamankar 4 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

and Shivanand Gosavi had fabricated the sale deed in respect of

field Survey No. 202 admeasuring 14 Acres 1R, situated at

Rahatgaon for Rs. 60,000/-. Accused No.1/Anil Agarkar and

accused No.4/Dadarao Dhamankar posed themselves as

Ramchandra Dhamankar and Shankarrao Dhamankar and

executed the said sale deed to accused No.5/Shivanand Gosavi

on 05.04.2007. Accused Shyamrao Dhamankar who was the

co-owner was also present at the time of the execution of the

sale deed and he also shared the common intention and made

their signatures before the Sub Registrar. Thus, they have

committed an offence of forgery. On the basis of the said report

Police have registered the crime against the present Applicants

and other co-accused. After registration of the crime the

Investigating Officer has recorded the relevant statements of

witnesses, collected the original sale deed and seized the same

and after completion of the investigation submitted the

charge-sheet against the present Applicants.

5(ii). Learned Magistrate has framed the charge vide

Exh. 29 and the contents of the charge were read over and

explained to the accused which they pleaded not guilty.

5 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

5(iii). To substantiate the allegations, the prosecution has

examined in all six witnesses i.e. PW-1/Ekanath Kisanrao

Mahurkar vide Exh. 34, PW-2/Smt. Bebibai Kashinathrao

Agarkar vide Exh. 43, PW-3/Eknath Bankaji Agarkar vide

Exh.55, PW-4/Dilip Kodbuji Gedam vide Exh. 57,

PW-5/Rajendra Ajabrao Kale vide Exh. 61 and PW-6/Udhav

Govindraoji Deshmukh vide Exh.63.

5(iv). Besides oral evidence, the prosecution has placed

reliance on report-Exh. 47, FIR-Exh.64, Sale deed Exh.44, Death

certificate of Kisanrao Raghoji Mahulkar-Exh.26, Death

certificate of Ramchandra Suryabhan Dhamankar-Exh.45.

5(v). On the basis of the above said oral as well as

documentary evidence, the learned Magistrate held that the

present Applicants posed themselves as Ramchandra

Dhamankar and Shankarrao Dhamankar who are already dead

long back and the accused No.4/Dadarao Dhamankar was

knowing the fact, has not disclosed the same and signed the

said sale deed by sharing the common intention with the other

Applicants and thereby committed an offence punishable under 6 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

Sections 420 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code (for short

"IPC").

5(vi). Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the same, the

Appeals were preferred by the present Applicants bearing

Appeal Nos. 72/2010 and 77/2010 and both the Appeals were

decided by common judgment by the Additional Sessions

Judge-3, Amravati and held that the evidence of PW-2/Bebibai

Agarkar, sale deed Exh.44 and the evidence of PW-5/Rajendra

Kale Sub Registrar proves that the Applicants namely Anil

Agarkar and Dadarao Dhamankar posed themselves as

Ramchandra Dhamankar and Shankarrao Dhamankar and

executed sale deed in favour of accused No.5/Shivanand Gosavi

by forging the signatures of the dead persons and dismissed the

Appeals. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the same the

present Revision Applications are preferred by the Applicants.

6. Before entering into the merits of the case it is

necessary to consider the considerations for exercising the

revisional powers. While exercising the revisional powers

cardinal principles to be kept in mind is that the scope of the 7 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

revision is very limited only to see as to the correctness, legality

or propriety of any finding, and sentence or order.

7. In view of Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure (for short "Cr.P.C."), this Court or the

Sessions Court is empowered to call for and examine record of

any proceeding before any inferior criminal court situate within

its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or

himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any

finding. Sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the

regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may,

when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any

sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in

confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond

pending the examination of the record.

8. In the decision of Bindeshwari Prasad Singh @ B.P.

Singh & Ors., Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and another

(2002) 6 SCC 650, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that

the High Court was not justified in reappreciating the evidence

on record and coming to the different conclusion in a revision

preferred by the informant under Section 401 of the Code of 8 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms

provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to

authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one

of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a

limitation on the powers of the revisional court, prohibiting it

from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is

itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power

conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If

the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one

of conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the

method of ordering a retrial. It is well settled by a catena of

decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not

interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in

exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires

interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the

prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will

not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely

because the trial court has taken a wrong view of the law or has

erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor

advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which

exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions 9 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of

revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal

by a private party.

9. In the case of State of Kerala Vs. Puttumanaillath

Jathavedan Namboodiri with Managing Director, Western India

Plywoods Vs. Puthumanaillath Jathavedan Namboodiri (1999)

2 SCC 452, wherein also it is held that in its revisional

jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record

of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the

correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or

order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory

Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting

miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be

equated with the power of an appellate court nor it be treated

even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it

would not be appropriate for the High Court to be re-appreciate

the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when

the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as

well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature 10 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

is brought to the notice of the High Court which would

otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.

10. In the case of Ashish Chadha Vs. Asha Kumari &

Anr., (2012) 1 SCC 680, wherein also the Hon'ble Apex Court

observed that the High Court has in its revisional jurisdiction

appraised the evidence which it could not have done. It is the

trial court which has to decide whether evidence on record is

sufficient to make out a prima facie case against the accused so

as to frame charge against him. Pertinently, even the trial court

cannot conduct roving and fishing inquiry into the evidence. It

has only to consider whether evidence collected by the

prosecution discloses prima facie case against the accused or

not.

11. In the light of the above well settled principles, the

present Revision Applications are to be decided.

12. Learned Counsel for the Applicants, vehemently

submitted that, as far as Shyamrao Dhamankar is concerned,

who is the only co-owner and no other role is attributed to him,

and therefore, the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC 11 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

is not made out against him. He submitted that, there is no

reason for him to know regarding the status of the other

Applicants, and therefore, the question of sharing common

intention also does not arise. He further submitted that, there

was a property dispute between the Informant and the

Applicant No.1, out of that the said FIR came to be lodged.

Except the evidence of PW-2/Bebibai there is absolutely no

material to connect the present Applicants with the alleged

offence. The aspect of forgery is also not proved by the

prosecution. To attract the offence punishable under Section

420 of IPC, the intention since inception is required, and

therefore, on that ground also, the Applications deserve to be

allowed.

13. He has taken me through the entire evidence and

submitted that, the evidence of the Informant is to the extent

that the present Applicant Anil Agarkar posed himself as

Ramchandra Dhamankar. Her cross-examination shows that, her

mother has executed the Will in favour of said Anil Agarkar. In

view of said Will, he became the owner of the said property, and

therefore, the sale deed executed by him is not illegal and there 12 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

is no forgery as such, and therefore, the Revision Applications

deserve to be allowed.

14. Per contra, learned APP strongly opposed the said

contention and submitted that, the sale deed which is on record

sufficiently shows that the Applicant Anil Agarkar has not

executed the sale deed as the owner of the property but he

posed himself as Ramchandra Dhamankar and signed on the

sale deed as Ramchandra Dhamankar, however, the photographs

which is alongwith the sale deed is not of Ramchandra

Dhamankar but it is the present Applicant No.1/Anil Agarkar.

Similarly, accused No.2/Shyamrao Dhamankar posed himself as

Shankarrao Dhamankar, who died long back and the

photograph which is on record is of said Shyamrao Dhamankar,

and Dadarao Dhamankar despite his knowledge, has not

disclosed the said fact that the other Applicants are not the

owner of the property and they have posed themselves as

Ramchandra Dhamankar and Shankarrao Dhamankar only to

show that they were sharing common intention. Therefore, both

the judgments were delivered by considering the said fact. In

view of that, the Revision Applications are being devoid of 13 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

merits and considering the scope of this Court, the Revision

Applications deserve to be dismissed.

15. On perusal of the entire evidence on record, though

prosecution has placed reliance on the evidence of Eknath

Kisanrao Mahurkar but he has not supported the prosecution

case and turned hostile. PW-3/Eknath Agarkar is also examined

but his evidence is also not much helpful to the prosecution.

Therefore, only evidence remains is of PW-2/Bebibai and

PW-5/Rajendra Kale.

16. The evidence of PW-2/Bebibai shows that, the

deceased Ramchandra Suryabhan Dhamankar is her father who

died in the year 1980. The death certificate which is produced

on record is at Exh. 45 issued by the Amravati Municipal

Corporation, Amravati shows that, he died on 14.03.1985 and it

was registered on 27.03.1985. Her evidence further shows that,

prior to his death he was living at Rahatgaon and was illiterate

and unable to sign. Her mother Annapurna Ramchandra

Dhamankar also not alive. Her father owns agricultural field

and the house at Rahatgaon. After the death of her parents she

alongwith her sister who are the only legal heirs to inherit the 14 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

property. Accused No.1/Anil Agarkar is the son of her younger

sister. Survey No.202 was owned by her father which was in her

name but accused No.1/Anil Agarkar posed himself as

Ramchandra Dhamankar and sold the said field to accused

No.5/Shivanand Gosavi. He has also signed the document i.e.

sale deed as Ramchandra Dhamankar. Similarly, Shankarrao

Dhamankar belongs to her community and she knows him. He

was died prior to the death of her father. Dadaram Dhamankar

shown himself as Shankarrao Dhamankar and this fact was

within the knowledge of Shyamrao Dhamankar but he has not

disclosed it and thereby shared the common intention. She

further testified that, the photograph filed by her below the list

of document Exh.42, is of her father and the photograph which

is on the sale deed is of accused No.1/Anil Agarkar. Thus, she

testified that, both Dadarao Dhamankar and Anil Agarkar have

forged the signatures of Ramchandra Dhamankar and

Shankarrao Dhamankar. As far as the death of Shankar Punjaji

Dhamankar is concerned, which reveals from the certified copy

of the summons which is at Exh. 46. The Bailiff report on

Exh.46 shows that, Shankar Punjaji Dhamankar died long back

but the Bailiff report shows that, when he had been to serve the 15 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

summons to Shankar Punjaji Dhamankar as the Informant has

filed the suit against him, it was informed by the family

members that, said Shankar Punjaji Dhamankar who is the

original defendant No.3 in the said suit died 10 years prior of

01.10.2008. Thus, from the Court document itself it is

established that said Shankar Punjaji Dhamankar was also not

alive on the date of execution of the sale deed.

17. During her cross-examination it came on record

that, accused No.1/Anil Agarkar is her nephew, accused

No.2/Shyamrao is her uncle and accused No.4/Dadaram

Dhamankar is her cousin brother. She further admits that, her

mother Annapurnabai died in the year 2001. She further admits

that, in order to get the Will cancelled she had filed complaint

case at Tahsil Office, Amravati and one civil suit at Amravati

Court.

18. Her cross-examination further shows that, Ramrao

Champatrao Dhamankar, Shyamrao Champatrao Dhamankar,

Deorao Champatrao Dhamankar, Kisanrao Raghoji Dhamankar

and Shankar Punjaji Dhamankar were the owners of Survey

No.202 of Mouza Rahatgaon admeasuring 15R. Accused No.5 16 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

had purchased 12.5R out of 15R. She further admitted that,

accused No.5 is not residing either at Rahatgaon or Shirkhed.

She further admits that, she has no idea whether the accused

No.5 is in service and on which post he was working. Thus, her

cross-examination shows that, all the three Applicants herein

are her relatives. Her evidence further shows that, her father

died in the year 1985 i.e. on 14.03.1985 and Shankar Punjaji

Dhamankar also died prior to 10 years of execution of sale deed.

19. To corroborate her version, prosecution has

examined PW-3/Eknath Agarkar vide Exh.55 but his evidence is

not helpful to the prosecution as his evidence is only on the

basis of information given by the Informant. PW-4/Dilip Gedam

who is the witness on the said sale deed, who stated that,

accused No.5/Shivanand Gosavi asked him to come as a

witness, and therefore, he went in the Registrar's Office and put

his signature on the said sale deed.

20. The another material witness is PW-5/Rajendra Kale

who was serving as Sub Registrar. His evidence shows that, the

document Exh.44 bears signature of vendor and vendee. One

Ramchandra Dhamankar has signed on the said document. He 17 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

further stated that, the person who is in the said photograph

signed before him as Ramchandra Suryabhan Dhamankar and

Shankar Punjaji Dhamankar. Despite the lengthy

cross-examination nothing elicited from his cross-examination

and his evidence remain intact. Thus, the evidence shows that,

the Applicants Anil Agarkar and Dadarao Dhamankar are the

persons who put the signatures as Ramchandra Dhamankar and

Shankarrao Dhamankar and accused Shyamrao Dhamankar also

put his signature despite he was knowing the said fact.

21. PW-6/Udhav Deshmukh is the Investigating Officer

who has narrated about the investigation carried out by him.

22. On appreciation of the evidence which shows that,

the sale deed was executed on 05.04.2007. The sale deed

Exh. 44 shows that, the said sale deed was executed between

Shivanand Gosavai who was accused No.5 and Ramchandra

Suryabhan Dhamankar, Shyamrao Champatrao Dhamankar,

Kisanrao Raghoji Mahulkar and Shankar Punjaji Dhamankar.

Exh. 45 is the death certificate shows that, Ramchandra

Suryabhan Dhamankar died much prior to the execution of the

sale deed on 14.03.1985. Exh.46 which is the certified copy of 18 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

the summons issued to Shankar Punjaji Dhamankar in Civil Suit

No. 246/2003 filed by the Informant against the said Shankar

Punjaji Dhamankar. The Bailiff report shows that, it was

informed that said Shankar Punjaji Dhamankar died long back

of issuance of the summons. Thus, from these documents which

corroborates the evidence of PW-2/Bebibai that at the time of

execution of the sale deed neither Ramchandra Dhamankar nor

Shankarrao Dhamankar were alive. One of the defence taken by

Anil Agarkar is that, the Will is already executed in his favour,

and therefore, the Informant has no concerned with the suit

property. Even accepting the said contention, the sale deed

which is on record sufficiently shows that Ramchandra

Dhamankar and Shankarrao Dhamankar were not alive at the

time of execution of the sale deed. Accused No.1/Anil Agarkar

and accused No.4/Dadarao Dhamankar posed themselves as

Ramchandra Dhamankar and Shankarrao Dhamankar and put

the signatures of the said dead persons on the said sale deed.

23. Section 416 of IPC deals with Cheating by

personation, which reads as under:

19 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

"416. Cheating by personation.- A person is said to "cheat by personation" if he cheats by pretending to be some other person, or by knowingly substituting one person for or another, or representing that he or any other person is a person other than he or such other person really is.

Explanation.-The offence is committed whether the individual personated is a real or imaginary person.

Illustrations

(a) A cheats by pretending to be a certain rich banker of the same name. A cheats by personation.

(b) A cheats by pretending to be B, a person who is deceased. A cheats by personation."

24. The present case covers under the illustration (b).

Thus, after going through the entire evidence on record it

clearly brings out the involvement of the present Applicants in

the cheating by personation. From the evidence adduced by the

prosecution, the only conclusion which must arise is that

accused No.1/Anil Agarkar posed himself as Ramchandra

Dhamankar and accused No.4/Dadarao Dhamankar posed

himself as Shankarrao Dhamankar and Shyamrao Dhamankar

who was knowing the said fact has not disclosed the same and

executed the said sale deed in favour of co-accused Shivnanad

Gosavi for a consideration. Admittedly, the Informant was one

of the owner of the said property and due to the act of the

present Applicants she suffered a loss. The intention of the 20 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

present Applicants also reveals since inception which is the

requirement of law and thereby the prosecution has proved that

the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC is made out

against the present Applicants. The evidence on record further

discloses that, they have put their signatures as Ramchandra

Dhamankar and Shankarrao Dhamankar.

25. The definition of forgery is given under Section 463

of IPC, which is reproduced as under:

"463. Forgery.- Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery."

26. Section 468 of IPC, deals with forgery for purpose of

cheating, which is reproduced as under:

"468. Forgery for purpose of cheating. Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document or electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."

27. To attract the offence punishable under Section 468

of IPC, the essential ingredients are (i) commission of forgery 21 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

(ii) that such commission of forgery must by in relation to the

document or electronic record which purporting for the purpose

of cheating. The act of the present Applicants especially

Applicants Anil Agarkar and Shyamrao Dhamankar sufficiently

shows that with intent to cheat they have prepared the forged

documents and executed the sale deed. The learned Trial Court

as well as Sessions Court rightly appreciated the evidence that it

was the accused No.1/Anil Agarkar and accused

No.2/Shyamrao Dhamankar have committed an offence of

forgery by forging the signatures of the dead persons namely

Ramchandra Dhamankar and Shankarrao Dhamankar and

cheated the Informant by personation.

28. Learned Counsel for the Applicants, submitted that

considering the alleged act was committed in the year 2007,

there are no previous criminal antecedents against them, and

therefore, they be given the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation

of the Offenders Act.

29. Section 360 of Cr.P.C., deals with order to release on

probation of good conduct or after admonition, which is

reproduced as under:

22 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

"360. Order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition.-

(1) When any person not under twenty-one years of age is convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, or when any person under twenty-one years of age or any woman is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and no previous conviction is proved against the offender, if it appears to the Court before which he is convicted, regard being had to the age, character or antecedents of the offender, and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period (not exceeding three years) as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:

Provided that where any first offender is convicted by a Magistrate of the second class not specially empowered by the High Court, and the Magistrate is of opinion that the powers conferred by this section should be exercised, he shall record his opinion to that effect, and submit the proceedings to a Magistrate of the first class, forwarding the accused to, or taking bail for his appearance before, such Magistrate, who shall dispose of the case in the manner provided by sub-section (2).

(2) Where proceedings are submitted to a Magistrate of the first class as provided by sub-section (1), such Magistrate may thereupon pass such sentence or make such order as he might have passed or made if the case had originally been heard by him, and, if he thinks further inquiry or additional evidence on any point to be necessary, he may make such inquiry or take such evidence himself or direct such inquiry or evidence to be made or taken.

(3) In any case in which a person is convicted of theft, theft in a building, dishonest misappropriation, cheating or any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), punishable with not more than two years, imprisonment or any offence punishable with fine only and no previous conviction is proved against him, the Court before which 23 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

he is so convicted may, if it thinks fit, having regard to the age, character, antecedents or physical or mental condition of the offender and to the trivial nature of the offence or any extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed, instead of sentencing him to any punishment, release him after due admonition.

(4) An order under this section may be made by any Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session when exercising its powers of revision.

(5) When an order has been made under this section in respect of any offender, the High Court or Court of Session may, on appeal when there is a right of appeal to such Court, or when exercising its powers of revision, set aside such order, and in lieu thereof pass sentence on such offender according to law:

Provided that the High Court or Court of Session shall not under this sub-section inflict a greater punishment than might have been inflicted by the Court by which the offender was convicted.

(6) The provisions of sections 121, 124 and 373 shall, so far as may be, apply in the case of sureties offered in pursuance of the provisions of this section.

(7) The Court, before directing the release of an offender under sub-section (1), shall be satisfied that an offender or his surety (if any) has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place for which the Court acts or in which the offender is likely to live during the period named for the observance of the conditions.

(8) If the Court which convicted the offender, or a Court which could have dealt with the offender in respect of his original offence, is satisfied that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of his recognizance, it may issue a warrant for his apprehension.

(9) An offender, when apprehended on any such warrant, shall be brought forthwith before the Court issuing the warrant, and such Court may either remand him in custody until the case is heard or admit him to bail with a sufficient surety conditioned on his appearing for sentence and such Court may, after hearing the case, pass sentence.

24 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

(10) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), or the Children Act, 1960 (60 of 1960) or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders."

30. Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

(for short "P.O. Act") empowers the Court to release a convicted

person on his entering into a bond with or without sureties on

probation when he is found guilty of committing of any offence

not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Relevant

portion of Section 4 of the P.O. Act, reads thus:

"Section 4 - Power of Court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct - (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period not exceeding three years, as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour."

31. For exercising the power which is discretionary, the

Court has to consider circumstances of the case, the nature of

the offence and the character of the offender. While considering

the nature of the offence, the Court must take a realistic view of 25 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

the gravity of the offence, the impact which the offence had on

the victim. The benefit available to the accused under Section 4

of the Probation of Offenders Act is subject to the limitation

embodied in the provisions and the word "may" clearly indicates

that the discretion vests with the Court whether to release the

offender in exercise of the powers under Section 3 or 4 of the

Probation of Offenders Act, having regard to the nature of the

offence and the character of the offender and overall

circumstances of the case. The powers under Section 4 of the

Probation of Offenders Act vest with the Court when any person

is found guilty of the offence committed, not punishable with

death or imprisonment for life. This power can be exercised by

the Courts while finding the person guilty and if the Court

thinks that having regard to the circumstances of the case,

including the nature of the offence and the character of the

offender, benefit should be extended to the accused, the power

can be exercised by the Court even at the appellate or revisional

stage.

32. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dalbir Singh

Vs State Of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 1677, held that, the 26 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

conditions for applying Section 4 of the P.O. Act have been

delineated in the commencing portion of the provision in the

following words :

"When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct........"

33. It is further observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

that, Parliament made it clear that only if the court forms the

opinion that it is expedient to release him on probation for his

good conduct regard being had to the circumstances of the case.

One of the circumstances which cannot be sidelined in forming

the said opinion is "the nature of the offence." Thus Parliament

has left it to the court to decide when and how the court should

form such opinion. It provided sufficient indication that

releasing the convicted person on probation of good conduct

must appear to the court to be expedient. The word "expedient"

had been thoughtfully employed by the Parliament in the

section so as to mean it as "apt and suitable to the end in view".

In Block's Law Dictionary the word "expedient" is defined as 27 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

"suitable and appropriate for accomplishment of a specified

object" besides the other meaning referred to earlier.

34. In State of Gujarat Vs. Jamnadas G. Pabri & Ors.,

AIR 1974 SC 2233, a three Judge Bench of this Court has

considered the word "expedient". Learned Judges have observed

in paragraph 21 thus :

"Again, the word 'expedient' used in this provisions, has several shades of meaning. In one dictionary sense, 'expedient' (adj.) means 'apt and suitable to the end in view', 'practical and efficient,' 'politic,' 'profitable,' 'advisable', 'fit, proper and suitable to the circumstances of the case'. In another shade, it means a device 'characterised by mere utility rather than principle conducive to special advantage rather than to what is universally right' (see Webster's New International Dictionary)."

35. It was then held that the court must construe the

said word in keeping with the context and object of the

provision in its widest amplitude. Here the word "expedient" is

used in Section 4 of the P.O. Act in the context of casting a duty

on the court to take into account "the circumstances of the case

including the nature of the offence....". This means Section 4

can be resorted to when the court considers the circumstances

of the case, particularly the nature of the offence, and the court

forms its opinion that it is suitable and appropriate for 28 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

accomplishing a specified object that the offender can be

released on probation of good conduct.

36. Bearing in mind the observations of the Hon'ble

Apex Court, in the present case also, the Applicants are involved

in causing the loss to the other legal heir by forging the

signatures of the dead persons and the intention of the present

Applicants is apparent while committing the such act.

Therefore, considering the expression used by the Hon'ble Apex

Court that if the Court forms the opinion that it is expedient to

release him on probation for his good conduct and another

important circumstance the nature of the offence. Admittedly,

the nature of the offence is serious one as the Informant was

deprived from getting her right in the property due to the act of

the present Applicant not only that she has suffered a loss and

she has to face the consequences and due to the act of the

present Applicants she compelled to knock the door of the Court

and to incur the expenses towards the litigation costs. Moreover,

the act of the present Applicants that they have represented the

persons who are already dead. Thus, bearing in mind the

circumstances under which the offence is committed by the 29 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

present Applicants, admittedly, nothing is on record to show

that it is expedient to release them on probation of good

conduct. In view of that, the submission of the learned Counsel

for the Applicants regarding the benefit of Section 4 of the P.O.

Act, is not sustainable.

37. In the above circumstances and considering the

scope of the revision I am of the view that no case is made out

by the Applicants to interfere in the judgment and order passed

by the learned Trial Court as well as learned Appellate Court. In

view of scope of revision reappreciation of the evidence is not

permissible, the only thing this Court has to see whether any

illegality or error is committed by the Court while convicting the

present Applicants and while dismissing the Appeals. After

considering the record, the view taken by the learned Trial

Court as well as learned Appellate Court on the basis of the

evidence is reasonable and it is not the case that there was no

evidence at all or the evidence was wrongly appreciated by the

learned Trial Court or the learned Appellate Court. In view of

that, both the Revision Applications being devoid of merits are 30 REVN.196-2017 & ANR.JUDGMENT.odt

liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the

following order.

ORDER

i. Criminal Revision Application Nos. 196/2017 and 197/2017 are dismissed.

ii. All the Applicants shall surrender before the Superintendent, Central Prison, Amravati to undergo the sentence on 15.04.2026.

iii. R & P be sent to the Trial Court.

38. Pending application/s, if any, shall stand disposed of

accordingly.

(URMILA JOSHI PHALKE, J.)

S.D.Bhimte

Signed by: Mr.S.D.Bhimte Designation: PA To Honourable Judge Date: 07/04/2026 16:45:45