Bombay High Court
Bhayyasaheb S/O Pundlikrao Band And ... vs Amarsingh S/O Krushnarao Deshmukh on 15 October, 2025
2025:BHC-NAG:11261
Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO.5151 OF 2024
PETITIONERS 1) Bhayyasahed S/o. Pundlikrao Band,
Aged about 70 years, Occu. :
Agriculturist, R/o. At. Kharwadi, Post,
Kharala Tq. Chandur Bazar, Distt.
Amravati
2) Ashok S/o. Kashirao Band, aged about
60 years, Occu: Agriculturist, R/o. At.
Kharwadi, Post. Kharala Tq. Chandur
Bazar, Distt. Amravati
Dnyaneshwar Ruprao Band, (Since
Dead through its legal heirs)
3-a) Sulochana W/o. Dnyaneshwar Band,
aged about years, Occu: Agricultur-
ist, R/o. Rahatgaon, Tq. And Distt.
Amravati
3-b) Rajendra S/o. Dnyaneshwar Band,
aged about 52 years, Occu:
Agriculturist R/o. Amravati, Tq. And
Distt. Amravati.
4) Manohar S/o. Ruprao Band, aged
about 70 years, Occu: Agriculturist,
R/o. Amravati, Tq. and Distt.
Amravati.
5) Vijay S/o. Ruprao Band, aged about
65 years, Occu: Agriculturist, R/o. At.
Kharwadi, Post. Kharala, Tq. Chandur
Bazar, Distt. Amravati.
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
2
6) Vinod Ruprao Band, (Since Dead
through his legal heirs)
6-a) Smt. Vina Wd/o. Vinod Band, aged
about years, Occu: Agriculturist,
R/o. At. Kharwadi, Post. Kharala, Tq.
Chandur Bazar, Distt. Amravati.
6-b) Rohit S/o. Vinod Band, aged about
years, Occu: Agriculturist, R/o. At.
Kharwadi, Post. Kharala, Tq. Chandur
Bazar, Distt. Amravati.
6-c) Sau. Shneha W/o. Ranjit Dhake, aged
about years, Occu: Agriculturist
R/o. At. Kharwadi, Post. Kharala, Tq.
Chandur Bazar, Distt. Amravati
(Ori. Applicants) (ON RA)
...VERSUS...
RESPONDENT Amarsingh S/o Krushnarao Desh-
mukh, aged about 68 years, Occ.:
Agriculturist & Advocate, R/o. Post
Talvel, Tq. Chandur Bazar, Dist. Amra-
vati
At Present residing at Deshmukh Bun-
glow, Camp Road, Amravati, Tq. and
Dist. Amravati
(Ori. Non-Applicant) (ON RA)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. J.B. Kasat, Advocate for Petitioners.
Mr. , Advocate for Respondent.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CORAM : SIDDHESHWAR S. THOMBRE, J.
DATE : 15/10/2025
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
3
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. The petition
is heard finally with the consent of the learned Counsel for the
respective parties at the stage of admission.
2. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioners are
challenging the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal,
Nagpur, whereby the revision filed by the present respondent came to
be allowed and the same is being assailed by the petitioners. The
present petitioners had filed an application before the Agricultural lands
Tribunal, Chandurbazar, under Section 48 read with Section 46 of the
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958
(for short "the Act") on 27.05.2004 wherein it was stated that
Pundlikrao Gulabrao Band and Kashirao Gulabrao Band were real
Brothers and Ruprao Champatrao Band was their cousin brother. The
Hindu Joint Family had taken a lease of Suit land in the name of Ruprao
Champatrao Band and Pundlikrao Gulabrao Band as members of Hindu
Joint Family. Ruprao Champatrao Band has expired on 22.01.1988,
Pundlikrao Gulabrao Band expired on 07.07.1998 and Kashirao has
expired on 14.02.2000, therefore as per Section 54 of the Act the
coparceners inherited the property and thereby became the tenants of
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
the suit land being the coparceners in the family. After the death of
Ruprao Champatrao Band, Pundlikrao and his brother Kashirao
Gulabrao Band, the applicants herein cultivating the suit land as heir. It
was contended in the application that the non applicant being a minor
on vesting date of 01.04.1961, the ownership could not be transferred
in the name under deceased protected lessee, tenant - Ruprao and
Pundlikrao Band as per section 46 of the Act. It was further averred in
the application that it was the duty of the tribunal to start suo motu
proceeding for the compulsory transfer of ownership in favour of the
tenant as soon as the disability ceased, but no such suo motu
proceedings were started after attaining the majority by the
non-applicant. After attaining the majority, the non applicant himself
did not take any action to get the suit land for personal cultivation
within a period of one year after the disability ceased. It was further
contended that as per the land revenue the price came to Rs.3,120/-,
therefore, by way of an application the present petitioner prayed before
the Tribunal that price be fixed and the sale certificate be granted.
3. After receipt of the said application the learned Tribunal
issued notices to the other side and the same were replied by the
respondent herein. Respondent specifically denied in the written
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statement that Hindu Joint Family had taken the suit land on lease.
Further it was disputed that the suit land was inherited by the
coparceners and they have become the tenants of suit land. The
respondent have specifically raised issue of delay as the application was
filed by the petitioner on 27.05.2004, whereas he became major on
17.07.1977 itself. It was specifically denied that the suit land was given
to the applicants as tenants and further it was averred that there was no
question of the applicants becoming tenants as there was no record to
that effect placed before the authority. Despite of delay in filing the
application after attaining majority and lack of record indicating that
applicants were tenants, the application was registered. Therefore, he
had prayed to dismiss the application.
4. The learned Tahsildar, Chandurbazar, by order dated
30.12.2017, allowed the application filed by the petitioners herein and
fixed the price for the suit land and further issued a sale certificate in
favour of the present petitioners. This order was assailed by the present
respondent by filing appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Achalpur,
which has confirmed the order passed by the Tahsildar.
5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent
herein filed an appeal before the Member (Judicial), Maharashtra
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Revenue Tribunal vide its Tenancy Revision No.
REV/TNC/AMR-15/2020, which was allowed and the orders passed by
the Tahsildar and Sub-Divisional Officer were set-aside.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners, submit that as the
petitioners are already declared as protected tenant and the only
question of fixing the price and issuance of sale certificate was remained
to be considered. The respondent became major in the year 1977 and
for filing an application under Section 48 r/w. Section 46 of the Act,
there is no limitation prescribed. When there is no specific time limit
prescribed, the application can be filed at any time. Learned Counsel for
the petitioner further submits that it was the Tribunal who was
supposed to take suo motu action under section 46 of the Act.
Therefore, the application filed by the petitioners in the year 2004 is
perfectly maintainable and the Tahsildar as well as the Sub Divisional
Officer have rightly passed orders thereby fixing the price and directing
to issue sale certificate. In support of his contention the learned counsel
for the petitioners has relied upon the following judgments : -
1. Uttam Namdev Mahale Vs. Vithal Deo and Ors. Re-
ported in (1997) 6 SCC Case No.73, decided on
07.05.1997.
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"4. Mr. Bhasme, learned counsel for the appellant,
contends that in the absence of fixation of the rule of
limitation, the power can be exercised within a rea-
sonable time and in the absence of such prescription
of limitation, the power to enforce the order is viti-
ated by error of law. He places reliance on the deci-
sions in State of Gujara v. Patil Raghav Natha 2; Ram
chand v. Union of India3 and Mohd. Kavi Mohamad
Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim4. We find no force in the
contention. It is seen that the order of ejectment
against the applicant has become final. Section 21 of
the Mamlatdar's Court Act does not prescribe any lim-
itation within which the order needs to be executed.
In the absence of any specific limitation provided
thereunder, necessary implication is that the general
law of limitation provided in the Limitation Act (Act 2
of 1963) stands excluded. The Division Bench, there-
fore, has rightly held that no limitation has been pre-
scribed and it can be executed at any time, especially
when the law of limitation for the purpose of this ap-
peal is not there. Where there is statutory rule operat-
ing in the field, the implied power of exercise of the
right within reasonable limitation does not arise. The
cited decisions deal with that area and bear no rele-
vance to the facts."
2. L. J. Kriplani since deceased by his legal heirs Vs.
Manik Aditwar Patil & Ors. Reported in (2000) SCC OnLine
Bom 354, Decided On 17.06.2000.
"4. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid decision
of the Tribunal in this petition. Ld. Counsel for the peti-
tioner mainly argued two points before this Court. Ac-
cording to him the tenant ought to have reasonable time,
thought's initiated 32-G proceedings within a limitation
has been provided therefor. The second point which was
pressed into service was that the Appellate Court and the
Tribunal committed an error holding, that the respon-
dents were tenants merely on the basis of mutation en-
tries, that tod when the said entries have been certified
without notice to the petitioner. The Ld. Counsel appear-
ing for the respondents on the other hand contended that
the first point is covered by the decision of the Apex Court
in the case of (Uttam Namdeo Mahale v. Vithal Deo)¹,
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1998 (1) Bom. C.R. (S.C.) 786: (1997) 6 SCC 73: 1997
(5) Supreme 578. In so far as the second point is con-
cerned it is contended on behalf of the respondents that
whether the respondents were tenants or not is a pure
question of fact and the same has been rightly concluded
by the Appellate Court as well as the Tribunal, which con-
clusion does not warrant any interference in exercise of
writ jurisdiction.
5. Having considered the rival contentions I have no hesi-
tation in accepting the submission on behalf of the re-
spondents that merely because the respondents initiated
proceedings in the year 1981 that would not enure to the
benefit of the petitioner in any manner. The Ld. Counsel
for the respondents is right in contending that having re-
gard to the principle enunciated in the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Uttam Namdeo Mahale (supra),
it is not open for the petitioners to contend to the con-
trary. On a bare reading of section 32-G of the Act, it
makes it clear that the duty to initiate the said proceed-
ings is primarily cast on the authorities. Therefore, merely
because the tenant initiates the proceedings belatedly it
cannot rob him of the right which is crystalised in his
favour on the tiller's day of having become a deemed pur-
chaser of the lands. The provisions under section 32-G are
merely for determining the purchase price in respect of
lands which have been deemed to have been purchased
by the tenant on the tiller's day. I, therefore, rejected the
argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that be-
cause of delay in initiating the proceedings by the tenants,
as late as in the year 1981, they have disentitled them of
any relief."
3. Keshav Ganesh Bedekar, since deceased through his le-
gal heirs Vs. Gopinath Krishna Salunke, since deceased
through his legal heirs Reported in (2002) SCC OnLine
Bom 961, Decided On 01.10.2002.
"8. Mr. Sargule the learned Counsel for the petitioner sub-
mitted that in the first place the respondent was not enti-
tled to apply under section 32-G in view of the fact that
the respondent had surrendered his tenancy on 1-6-1956
and order had been passed on 25-8-1956 holding that the
surrender is voluntary and that possession has already
been mutually taken over by the landlord. According to
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the learned Counsel for the petitioners an application for
determination of purchase price made under section 32-G
is not tenable in the year 1982. This point has been raised
and already considered by a learned Single Judge of this
Court in (L.J. Kriplani since deceased by his legal heirs v.
Manik Aditwar Patil)¹, reported in 2000 (4) Bom. C.R.
366: 2000 (3) All. M.R.. 281 relying on the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of (Uttam Namdeo Mahale
v. Vithal Deo)2, reported in 1998 (1) Bom. C.R. (S.C.)
786: (1997) 6 SCC 73. Learned Single Judge has con-
cluded that section 32-G of the Tenancy Act casts a duty
on the authority to initiate proceedings for determination
of purchase price. The status of deemed purchaser is con-
ferred on a tenant with effect from 1-4-1957 itself and
therefore, the landlord cannot raise the plea of limitation.
I am in agreement with the view of the learned Single
Judge."
4. Limbaji Shankar Munde (deceased through L.Rs.) Vs.
Bhaurao Baliram Munde (deceased through L.Rs.) and oth-
ers Reported in 2010 (3) Mh.L.J. 138, Decided on
16.12.2009.
"5. I have perused the orders passed by all the three ten-
ancy authorities and heard arguments advanced by
learned counsel for the respective parties. Learned coun-
sel for the petitioner raised twofold objections to the im-
pugned order passed by the trial Court. According to the
petitioner, application tendered by respondent No. 1 be-
fore the Tahsildar is not entertainable under section 38-
E(1) explanation of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricul-
tural Lands Act, 1950 and the remedy available to the dis-
possessed tenant is by way of presenting application un-
der section 98 of the Act. The another objection raised by
the petitioner is in respect of bar of limitation. According
to him, the application which is tendered by the tenant af-
ter more than 30 years of his alleged dispossession is not
entertainable even under the provisions of section 38-E(1)
explanation of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that wherever the relevant provision is silent in
respect of limitation, remedy is required to be availed
within reasonable period. According to learned counsel
for the petitioner, the applicant has approached the ten-
ancy authority after 30 years of alleged dispossession and
as such it cannot be contended that the tenant has
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knocked the doors of the authority within reasonable pe-
riod. Learned counsel for the petitioner therefore con-
tends that the tenancy authority ought not to have enter-
tained the application tendered by the dispossessed tenant
after about 30 years of his alleged dispossession.
7. It is true that section 38-E(1) explanation does not
provide for any limitation for presenting an application by
a tenant who is declared as owner seeking recovery of
possession. Mr. Nagargoje, learned counsel for the peti-
tioner vehemently contends that where a Statute is silent
in respect of limitation for availing the remedy, the liti-
gant concerned has to approach the Court or the appro-
priate forum within reasonable time. According to him,
the tenant has approached the tenancy authority after 30
years of his dispossession and the period of 30 years can-
not be construed as a reasonable period. Reliance is
placed on a judgment in the matter of Mohan Pandurang
Kashid and others vs. Anusayabai Rajaram Mane and oth-
ers, reported in 2000(2) Mh.L.J. 532. The matter arose
before the Court in pursuance to application tendered by
owner of the land under section 29(2) read with section
33(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act
for restoration of possession. The owner had obtained cer-
tificate under section 88-C of the Act prior to presentation
of application in question. Application was tendered after
18 years of accrual of cause of action in the reported mat-
ter. The learned Single Judge of this Court considering the
question of delay in approaching the Court has recorded
in paragraph No. 13 and 16 of the judgment that where
no limitation is prescribed, steps must be taken within
reasonable time. Reliance is placed by the learned Single
Judge on the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of
Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim, re-
ported in (1997) 6 SCC 71. The matter before the Divi-
sion Bench was under the provisions of Bombay Preven-
tion of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act
in respect of variation of the scheme. While dealing with
the matter, the Division Bench has recorded thus:
Though there is no time limit prescribed under:-
"Section 32(1) for the Settlement Commissioner to
vary the scheme which has come into force, but ob-
viously even in the absence of any period pre-
scribed under section 32, the said power can only
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be exercised within reasonable period in any case.
What would be the reasonable period for exercise
of power under section 32(1) by the Settlement
Commissioner may depend on facts and circum-
stances of each case. Ordinarily exercise of such
power after three years of finalisation of scheme
under section 22 may not be justified. In the facts
and circumstances of the present case, the exercise
of power by Settlement Commissioner for variation
of scheme which had come into force in the year
1973, by initiating proceedings in the year 1988
cannot be said to be within reasonable time."
8. In order to controvert the contentions raised by the
petitioner, it is urged by learned counsel for the respon-
dent that where the Statute does not prescribe period of
limitation, the remedy available to the litigant cannot be
taken away by reading something which is not there in
the Statute. It is contended that the Legislation has con-
ferred benefits on certain class of agriculturists i.e. ten-
ants and the Legislature in its wisdom has intentionally
not provided limitation for securing relief by the class of
persons i.e. tenants. The concerned provision is a part of
beneficial legislation for advancement of the cause of
tenants and as such the remedy bestowed upon the class
of tenants cannot be taken away by prescribing bar of
limitation which in fact is not provided in the Statute. It
is contended that the authority relied upon by the peti-
tioner are not applicable to the instant case and that pro-
visions of the Tenancy Act are required to be interpreted
differently. Reliance can be placed on reported judgment
of the Apex Court in the matter of Uttam Namdeo Ma-
hale vs. Vithal Deo and others, reported in (1997) 6 SCC
73. Objection was raised in the proceeding initiated for
execution of the order passed under the Mamlatdar
Courts Act on the ground that the remedy is unavailed
after lapse of unreasonable period. Section 21 of the
Mamlatdar Courts Act has not prescribed any limitation
for execution of orders. It was contended before the
Apex Court that the power can be exercised within rea-
sonable period and in the absence of such prescription of
limitation, the power to enforce the order is vitiated by
error of law. Reliance was also placed on the earlier judg-
ment of the Apex Court in the matter of Ram Chand vs.
Union of India, reported in (1994) 1 SCC 44. However,
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the Apex Court turned down the contention holding
thus:
"In the absence of any specific limitation provided
thereunder, necessary implication is that the gen-
eral law of limitation provided in the Limitation
Act (Act 2 of 1963) stands excluded. The Division
Bench, therefore, has rightly held that no limita-
tion has been prescribed and it can be executed at
any time, especially when the law of limitation for
the purpose of this appeal is not there. Where
there is statutory rule operating in the field, the
implied power of exercise of the right within rea-
sonable limitation does not arise. The cited deci-
sions deal with that area and bear no relevance to
the facts."
9. While dealing with the provisions of section
32(1-B) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands
Act, 1948. The learned Single Judge has adopted a simi-
lar view. Provisions of section 32(1-B) of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act is in substance strik-
ingly similar with the provision of section 38-E(1) expla-
nation of the Act. Section 32(1-B) of the Act is quoted as
below:
"32. Tenants deemed to have purchased land on
tillers' day:
[(1-B) Where a tenant who was in possession on
the appointed day and who on account of his be-
ing dispossessed before the 1st day of April 1957
otherwise than in the manner and by an order of
the Tahsildar as provided in section 29, is not in
possession of the land on the said date and the
land is in the possession of the landlord or his suc-
cessor-in-interest on the 31st day of July, 1969
and the land is not put to a non-agricultural use
on or before the last mentioned date, then, the
Tahsildar shall, notwithstanding anything con-
tained in the said section 29, either suo motu or
on the application of the tenant, hold an inquiry
and direct that such land shall be taken from the
possession of the landlord or, as the case may be,
his successor-in-interest, and shall be restored to
the tenant; and therefore, the provisions of this
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section and sections 32-A to 32-R (both inclusive)
shall, insofar as they may be applicable, apply
thereto, subject to the modification that the tenant
shall be deemed to have purchased the land on
the date on which the land is restored to him;
Provided that, the tenant shall be entitled to
restoration of the land under this sub-section only
if he undertakes to cultivate the land personally
and of so much thereof as together with the other
land held by him as owner or tenant shall not ex-
ceed the ceiling area.
Explanation In this sub-section, 'successor-in-
interest' means a person who acquires the interest
by testamentary disposition or devolution on
death."]
It was argued before the learned Single Judge that al-
though the provision of section 32(1-B) does not pro-
vide for any limitation, the remedy has to be exhausted
within reasonable time. The learned Single Judge of
this Court while dealing with the matter of Shankar M.
Pawar vs. Anusayabai @ Ambabai w/o Punja Avhad, re-
ported in 2002(5) Mh.L.J. 328 considering the benefi-
cial rights conferred in favour of the class of tenants has
2002(1) BCJ 231 while turned down similar objection
and recorded in paragraph No. 11 of the judgment
"11. Section 32(1-B) deals with the beneficial
rights in favour of the tenants and provides rem-
edy for enforcement of such rights. The legisla-
ture in its wisdom, has introduced the said provi-
sion in the statute with the object to give neces-
sary protection to the weaker section of the soci-
ety. It cannot be forgotten that the law of limita-
tion merely bars the remedy but, it does not de-
stroy the right. At the same time, it is to be borne
in mind that the Courts cannot act on principle
that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited
unless it is expressly provided but should proceed
on the converse principles that every procedure is
understood to be permissible till it is prohibited
by law. In other words, unless remedy provided
for enforcement of right is circumscribed by the
period of limitation, it is not permissible to import
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the boundaries upon such remedial measures by
way of interpreting the provisions of law as it
would amount to legislate upon the statutory pro-
vision by the Court which, in fact, is the exclusive
jurisdiction of the legislature. Even while inter-
preting the provisions under the Limitation Act it-
self, the scope of Limitation Act cannot be ex-
tended by implication, and party's right to ap-
proach the Court cannot be throttled unless the
Limitation Act expressly provides that the right is
barred. Any decision in that regard, if required,
one can safely refer to the decision of the Division
Bench of this Court in the matter of Mad-
havprasad Kalkaprasad Nagam vs. S.G. Chan-
davarkar. Certainly it is no part of the duties of
the Court to deprive a litigant of the benefit of
any exemption from the period of limitation for
enforcement of right by importing the words of
limitation not found in the statute. It is to be
noted that the section 32(1-B) was introduced in
the statute in the year 1969 and the legislature
being fully conscious about the limitation pro-
vided under section 29(1) and yet, after expiry of
period of 12 years, the right of restoration of the
land was still guaranteed to the tenant under the
said provision of law. This clearly discloses the in-
tention of the legislature to ensure the benefit un-
der the said Act to the aggrieved tenants and who
were not vigilant in exercising their rights. In
other words, while considering the provisions of
section 32(1-B), the principle that law comes to
the assistance of the vigilant, not to the sleepy has
to be ignored."
Ratio laid down in the reported judgment
squarely applies to the case in hand. Moreover, the in-
terpretation put to provisions of section 32(1)(b) of the
Act also can be adopted while interpreting the provi-
sions of section 38-E(1) explanation as both provisions
are in substance strikingly similar.
10. Similar question arose as to whether there is
any limitation provided for tendering application under
section 84 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1948 and the same was considered by the
Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ghanshyam-
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prasad Natwarlal Bhatt vs. Gendalsingh Vakhatsing and
others in Special Civil Application No. 764/1955. The
Division Bench has observed thus:
"You cannot apply limitation by analogy. Limita-
tion either bars a remedy or extinguishes a right
of a party and it is unthinkable that any Court
would bar a remedy or extinguish a right when
the Legislature has not done so by importing the
principles of some other statute and drawing
analogy from some other provision of law. If
there is no limitation provided by the legislature
then the only thing that the Tribunal has to do is
to permit the application to be made irrespective
of passage of time."
11. In view of the reasons set out above, it can be
said that the Tahsildar who decided the application
was justified in entertaining the application presented
under section 38-E(1) explanation of the Act by the
tenant and directing delivery of possession of land in
question in favour of the tenant. The bar of limitation
as contended by the petitioner herein cannot be im-
ported and read in the provisions of section 38-E(1)
explanation which in fact is not provided by the legis-
lature purposefully. In the absence of any specific pro-
vision debarring the remedy after lapse of certain pe-
riod, the only alternative available to the tenancy au-
thority was to entertain the application and pass ap-
propriate orders in consonance with law. I do not find
that tenancy authorities have committed any error in
entertaining application and passing orders directing
delivery of possession of tenanted property in favour
of respondent / tenant. Writ petition is devoid of
merit and does not call for any interference. Writ peti-
tion therefore stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. In
the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be
no order as to costs."
5. Laxman s/o Shankar Bandgar (D) through Lrs. And
others Vs. Venkat s/o Rama Bandgar (D) through Lrs. And
others Reported in 2015 (1) Mh.L.J. 408, Decided on
28.04.2014.
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
"10. His further objection is that if the deceased
Venkat was claiming to be a tenant and allegedly dis-
possessed in 1973-74, it took him twenty years to re-
alize this aspect. The said issue could not have been
dug up after a passage of twenty years. Such applica-
tion could have been filed within three years of the
cause of action.
33. So far as the issue of limitation is concerned, the
petitioners have relied upon the reported judgments
in the cases of Ramchandra Balwantrao Dubal vs.
Dhondiram Tatoba Kadam (supra), Santosh Kumar
Shivgonda Patil and ors. vs. Balasaheb Tukaram She-
vale and ors. (supra), and Radhu Gokul Gawli died
through L.Rs. and ors. vs. Mohan Kishan Gawali died
through L.Rs. (supra).
39. In para No. 22 of the Mesaji s/o Laxman Ubare's
judgment (supra), this Court has held as under-
"In scheme of various sections noted above by
me, whenever Legislature thought it fit to pre-
scribe period of limitation, the said period has
been specifically mentioned. In section 98
only Collector has been enabled to summarily
evict a person in unauthorised occupation or
wrongful possession. It does not contemplate
filing of any application by any party to initi-
ate proceedings under section 98. Thus, it
only casts obligation on the Collector to evict
such unauthorised or wrongful occupant. The
faci of such wrongful or unauthorised occupa-
tion may come to knowledge of Collector be-
latedly through different sources and in vari-
ous situations. It is therefore obvious that Leg-
islature has only conferred the powers upon
the authority to act in furtherance of provi-
sions and for the purposes of 1950 Act to see
that its aims and objects are achieved and pre-
served. No period of limitation therefore has
been deliberately prescribed as such fact of
unauthorised occupation or wrongful posses-
sion may also be deliberately suppressed by
the parties from the Collector by adopting var-
ious means and measures. When the legisla-
ture has vested title in protected tenant on
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
tiller's day against the wishes of landholder, it
is obvious that its design to advance the said
cause, to protect or preserve that title from
unscrupulous influences whenever it comes
across such instances cannot be allowed to be
defeated by such technical pleas. I find the ab-
sence or non-prescription of any period of lim-
itation in section 98 is deliberate and in tune
with that object."
40. As such, I am in respectful agreement with the
above observations from the judgment of this Court
in the case of Mesaji Laxman Ubare (supra). In my
view when section 98 does not prescribe any limita-
tion and looking to the scheme of the Act of 1950,
the intent and object of the legislature is quite clear.
When an agriculturist has been wrongfully dispos-
sessed and a person is in unauthorised occupation or
wrongful possession of the said land, law has been
empowered to summarily evict such a person who is
in wrongful possession. I find that the legislature
does not intend to fetter the scope and ambit of pro-
ceedings under section 98 with any limitation. The
non-prescription of any limitation in section 98 is,
therefore, to be construed to mean a specific object
which the legislature intends to achieve. In these cir-
cumstances, I respectfully disagree with the view ex-
pressed in the case of Radhu Gokul Gawli died
through L.Rs. and ors. (supra) to the extent of 'rea-
sonable time'.
41. Similarly, this Court in the case of Limbaji
Shankar Munde (deceased through L.Rs.) considered
whether there was any limitation provided in tender-
ing an application under section 84 of the Bombay
Tenancy Act, 1948. Reliance was placed on the Divi-
sion Bench judgment of this Court in the case of
Ghanshyamprasad Natwarlal Bhatt vs. Gendalsingh
Vakhatsing and others in Special Civil Application
No. 764/1955. The observations of the Division
Bench are as follows:-
"You cannot apply limitation by analogy. Limi-
tation either bars a remedy or extinguishes a
right of a party and it is unthinkable that any
Court would bar a remedy or extinguish a right
Shubham
Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
when the Legislature has not done so by im-
porting the principles of some other statute
and drawing analogy from some other provi-
sion of law. If there is no limitation provided
by the legislature then the only thing that the
Tribunal has to do is to permit the application
to be made irrespective of passage of time."
Section 84 of the Act of 1948 is akin to section 98 of
the Act of 1950.
42. In view of the above observations of the Divi-
sion Bench of this Court in Ghanshyamprasad Nat-
warlal Bhatt (supra), Limbaji Shankar Munde
(supra) and Mesaji s/o Laxman Ubare, I find it ap-
propriate to follow the view taken in the aforesaid
three judgments and, therefore, conclude that sec-
tion 98 of the Act of 1950, cannot be fettered with
limitation. As such, I conclude that the application
preferred by the applicants under section 98 of the
Act of 1950 was maintainable and has been
correctly so held by the Deputy Collector, Land Re-
forms and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal,
Aurangabad."
6. Ganesh and Anr. Vs. Khushalrao and Ors. Reported in
(2023) SCC OnLine Bom, 2623, Decided on 05.12.2023.
"3. We are called upon to answer an issue referred
to us which is as follows:
"Whether any period of limitation is applica-
ble for preferring an application under Sec-
tion 98 of Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricul-
tural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred
to as Act)?"
23. We have already referred to the three judges
bench order of the Supreme Court in the matter of
Uttam Namdeo Mahale (supra) as well as Division
Bench judgment of our High Court in the matter of
Ghanshyamprasad Natwarlal Bhatt (supra). It is
impermissible to read anything in statute which is
not provided. While interpreting Section 98 literal
interpretation has to be adopted. The literal inter-
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
pretation does not permit us to read the reasonable
period into the provision. We may refer to judg-
ment rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter
of B Prem Anand v. Mohan Goykal, to demonstrate
the rules of literal or strict construction. The fol-
lowing paragraphs are relevant:
17. No doubt in some exceptional cases de-
parture can be made from the literal rule of
the interpretation, e.g. by adopting a purpo-
sive construction, Heydon's mischief rule,
etc. but that should only be done in very ex-
ceptional cases. Ordinarily, it is not proper
for the Court to depart from the literal rule
as that would really be amending the law in
the garb of interpretation, which is not per-
missible vide J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan
(2003) 5 SCC 134: AIR 2003 SC 1405, State
of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh. It is for the
legislature to amend the law and not the
Court (vide State of Jharkhand v. Govind
Singh).
19. In Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing So-
ciety v. Swaraj Developers (2003) 6 SCC 659
AIR 2003 SC 2434, this Court observed:
It is a well settled principle in law that
the Court cannot read anything into a
unambiguous. A statute is an edict of
the legislature. The language employed
in a statute is the determinative factor
of legislative intent.
24. The literal rule of interpretation really
means that there should be no interpreta-
tion. In other words, we should read the
statute as it is, without distorting or twisting
its language. We may mention here that the
literal rule of interpretation is not only fol-
lowed by Judges and lawyers, but it is also
followed by the lay man in his ordinary life.
To give an illustration, if a person says "this
is a pencil", then he means that it is a pencil;
and it is not that when he says that the ob-
ject is a pencil, he means that it is a horse,
donkey or an elephant. In other words, the
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
literal rule of interpretation simply means
that we mean what we say and we say what
we mean. If we do not follow the literal rule
of interpretation, social life will become im-
possible, and we will not understand each
other. If we say that a certain object is a
book, then we mean it is a book. If we say it
is a book, but we mean it is a horse, table or
an elephant, then we will not be able to
communicate with each other. Life will be-
come impossible. Hence, the meaning of the
literal rule of interpretation is simply that
we mean what we say and we say what we
mean.
24. Adopting literal and strict interpretation, we dis-
approve the proposition that even when no limita-
tion is provided in Section 98 of the Act, it is to be
construed as reasonable period and the reasonable
period would be three years. We approve the rea-
sons assigned by the learned Single Judge (Justice
B.P. Dharamadhikari J. as he then was) in the matter
of Mesaji Laxman Ubare (supra) from paragraph no.
22. Το avoid the repetition, we reiterate that it is a
sound reasoning."
7. Learned counsel for petitioners relying upon above
mentioned judgments, prayed to allow writ petition.
8. Per contra, the learned senior counsel for respondent
submits that in view of the fact that the respondent attained majority on
17.07.1977, the application ought to have been filed by the tenants
within a period of two years. Respondent denied that the petitioners
were declared as protected tenants and therefore, on the ground of
delay, and the respondent disputed the position that present petitioners
were tenants, therefore learned senior counsel for the respondent
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
prayed to dismiss the petition. Learned Senior Counsel for respondent
has relied upon the following judgments :-
1. Vidarbha Maharogi Seva Mandal Vs. The Member, Ma-
harashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur & Ors. Reported in
2016 (3) AIR BomR 615, Decided on 23.02.2016. Particu-
larly in para 30 to 33 it has been stated that-
"30. The entitlement of a tenant to purchase the land
from his landlord under Sub-section (1) of Section 41
and to obtain a certificate of purchase under Sub-sec-
tion (8) of Section 43 in Chapter III of the said Act. de-
pends upon the volition to exercise such right, which,
of course, remains subject to the provisions of Sections
42 to 44 therein. The right to purchase the land need
to be exercised by making an offer of purchase price
under Sub-section (1) of Section 43 and to apply for
determination of purchase price under Sub-section (2)
of Section 43, in case where the landlord refuses or
fails to accept such offer within a period of three
months. Merely because there is no time-limit pre-
scribed in the said Act for the tenant either for making
such an offer, or to apply to the Tribunal for determina-
tion of purchase price, it does not follow that the ten-
ant can make such offer or apply for determination of
purchase price at any time during the lifetime or after
an inordinate delay. In the absence of there being any
time-limit prescribed, the tenant will have to follow the
procedure of obtaining a certificate of purchase under
Sub-section (8) of Section 43 of the said Act, within a
reasonable time. What is the reasonable time, shall de-
pend upon the facts and circumstances of each case
and no straitjacket formula can be prescribed.
31. Sub-section (14A) of Section 43 and Sub-sections
(5) and (6) of Section 49A of the said Act provide for
the consequences of non-fulfilment of or failing to
comply with the procedure prescribed for retaining the
title or to make the title indefeasible. If the tenant fails
to obtain a certificate of purchase under Sub-section
(8) of Section 43 within a reasonable time, the sale be-
comes ineffective or defeasible and shall result in the
consequences deemed surrender of tenancy by the ten-
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
ant to the landlord under Section 20 of the said Act,
and the tenant will no longer continue to be the owner
of the land in his possession. If such view is not taken,
then the provision of Sub-section (14A) of Section 43
and Sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 49A of the said
Act would become redundant.
32. If the tenant in possession of the land loses his title
or his title gets defeated on account of failure to obtain
a certificate of purchase under Sub-section (8) of Sec-
tion 43 of the said Act, the provision of Section 120 re-
garding summary eviction under the said Act may get
attracted. The provision of Section 120 of the said Act
is, therefore, reproduced below:
"120. Summary eviction. Any person unauthorisedly
occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land,
(a) the transfer of which either by the act of parties or
by the operation of law is invalid under the provisions
of this Act,
(b) the management of which has been assumed under
the said provisions, or
(c) to the use and occupation of which he is not enti-
tled under the said provisions and the said provisions
do not provide for the eviction of such person, may be
summarily evicted by the Collector after such inquiry
as he deems fit."
Though by virtue of Sub-section (1) of Sec-
tion 46 of the said Act or by virtue of Sub-section (1)
of Section 49A of the said Act, the tenant becomes the
statutory owner of the land under his personal cultiva-
tion as on 1st of April, 1961 or 1st of April, 1963, as
the case may be, if such transfer becomes invalid on ac-
count of failure to obtain a certificate of purchase un-
der Sub-section (8) of Section 43, the provision of
clause (a) of Section 120, reproduced above, gets at-
tracted, and the possession of such tenant becomes
unauthorised and wrongful. If the management of such
land is assumed by the State Government in exercise of
its power under Section 21 of the said Act, the provi-
sion of clause (b) of Section 120 would get attracted,
and in both these eventualities, the tenant is liable to
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
be summarily evicted under clause (c) of Section 120
of the said Act.
33. In view of above, it follows that merely because the
tenant becomes statutory owner by virtue of Sub-sec-
tion (1) of Section 46 or Sub-section (1) of Section
49A, that by itself will not be sufficient to protect him
from eviction under Section 120 of the said Act, unless
his title becomes indefeasible by obtaining certificate of
purchase under Sub-section (8) of Section 43 of the
said Act. In order to get protection, the tenant or his
successor-in-interest must be armed with the weapon
in the form of such certificate. The undisputed factual
position in this case is that till this date, the tenant or
his legal heirs have not obtained the certificate of pur-
chase under Sub-section (8) of Section 43 of the said
Act, to perfect the title or to make it indefeasible.
Hence, they are not entitled to protection from eviction
under Section 120 of the said Act."
2. Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil And Others Vs. Balasa-
heb Tukaram Shevale And Others Reported In (2009) 9
SCC, 352, Decided On 02.09.2009. Particularly in para 10
it has been stated that-
"10. Recently, in State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District
Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd. while dealing with the
power of revision under Section 21 of the Punjab
General Sales Tax Act, 1948, it has been held: (SCC p.
367, paras 17-19)
"17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal
that although no period of limitation has been prescribed
therefor, the same would not mean that the suo motu
power can be exercised at any time.
18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been
prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its
jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however,
shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the
nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder
and other relevant factors.
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordi-
narily be exercised within a period of three years having
regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any
event, the same should not exceed the period of five
years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said
to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view
the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found out
from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore,
maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-
section
(6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years."
3. Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin Vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim
Reported in (1997) 6 Supreme Court Cases 71, Decided on
22.08.1996.
"2 .................. In this connection, on behalf of the ap-
pellant reliance was placed on a judgment of Justice
S.B. Majmudar (as he then was in the High Court of Gu-
jarat) in State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah¹
disposed of on 1-3-1990, where in connection with Sec-
tion 84-C itself it was said that the power under the
aforesaid section should be exercised within a reason-
able time. This Court in connection with other statutory
provisions, in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav
Natha and in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India³
has impressed that where no time-limit is prescribed for
exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean
that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to
be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied
that in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
the suo motu power under Section 84-C of the Act was
not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable
time. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned
orders are set aside. No costs."
4. Radhabai Balkrishna Deshpande And Another Vs. Babu
Dhondu Shewale deceased by L.Rs. Bhika Dhondu Shewale
And Others Reported in 2001(1) Mh.L.J., 629, Decided on
13.06.2000.
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
"15. Apart from the aforesaid, what is relevant to
note is that in the present case the transaction in
question took place in the year, 1964 and it is af-
ter lapse of about 15 years that the authority
chose to initiate suo motu proceedings under sec-
tion 84C of the Tenancy Act. Learned Counsel for
the petitioner is right in relying on the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Mohamad Kavi
Mahamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim, (1997) 6
SCC 71 (supra), which is squarely applicable to
the facts of the present case. The Apex Court has
held that although no limitation is provided to
initiate action under section 84C, yet the author-
ity should act within a reasonable period. The
Apex Court in the said decision was pleased to
hold that the proceedings initiated by the authori-
ties after a lapse of nine months was wholly be-
yond reasonable period and, therefore without
the authority of law. In the present case, the ac-
tion has been initiated after a lapse of 15 years,
which by no standards can be said to be a reason-
able period. Consequently, the petition should
succeed on this short ground that the proceedings
under section 84C of the Tenancy Act having been
initiated after an unreasonable period cannot be
sustained in law."
9. After going through the record and submissions of the
learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for respondent,
it is an admitted fact that there is a specific denial on the part of the re-
spondents that the petitioners were never declared as a protected tenant
and the petitioners only made submissions to that effect. But, no any
record was placed before the authority, and only on the presumptions,
the learned Tahsildar and the Sub-Divisional Officer has passed an or-
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
der, but the fact remains that record about the tenancy was not placed
before the authority and a mere contention in the application does not
confer the tenancy upon the respondent. In view of the fact that the
respondent has specifically denied the same, therefore, once the peti-
tioner had not proved about the tenancy then the question of fixing the
price and issuance of sale certificate does not arise at all.
10. Further, the application filed was only for fixing up price
and for issuance of sale certificate on 27.05.2004, whereas, the land
owner attains the majority on 17.07.1977 and therefore, application it-
self is hopelessly time barred and both the authorities have not consid-
ered the same. Therefore, learned Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal has
rightly set-aside the order passed by the Learned Sub-Divisional Officer.
11. It is an admitted fact that the application was filed by the
petitioner first time on 27.05.2004, when, the respondent had became
major on 17.07.1977 itself. Despite the admitted fact that application
was filed after a long period, the reason for not filing the application
was not explained, and despite the specific denial from respondent with
respect to tenancy, the Tahsildar entertained the application. Therefore
application filed by the petitioner on 27.05.2004 was not within reason-
able period. In view thereof, the order passed by the Maharashtra Rev-
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Judgment WP-5151-2024 J.odt
enue Tribunal doesn't require any interference and accordingly, the Writ
Petition stands dismissed. No order as to costs.
12. The learned counsel for petitioner seeks continuation of the
interim relief for a period of 6 weeks. Considering the fact that the in-
terim relief is in operation since 03.09.2024, in the interest of justice,
the interim relief is continued for a period of 6 weeks.
Rule is hereby discharged. There shall be no order as to
costs.
( SIDDHESHWAR S. THOMBRE, J.)
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