Bombay High Court
Sardar Manjeet Singh Jagan Singh And ... vs The State Of Maharashtra Through Its ... on 6 October, 2025
Author: R.G. Avachat
Bench: R.G. Avachat
2025:BHC-AUG:27978-DB
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
W.P. No.4665/2024
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO.10553 OF 2022 WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.9419 OF 2025
1) Sardar Paramjot Singh s/o Arjun
Singh Chahel, Age 67 years,
Occu. Legal Practitioner (Retired Judge &
Former Ex-Member/ Secretary of
The Nanded Gurudwara Board),
R/o 'Vasundhara', CHS, Sector-8,
Flat No.101, Kharghar,
Navi Mumbai - 410 210
2) S. Bhupindar Singh Ji Manhas
Ex-President, Gurudwara Sachkhand
Board Takhat Sachkhand Sri Huzur
Abchalnagar Sahib Nanded,
Age 73 years, Occu. Business,
R/o 10-A, Vinay Hawaya Complex,
159/A C.S.T. Road, Kalin,
Sabtakruz (E), Mumbai - 8
(Petitioner No.2 deleted as per Court's
order dated 14/3/2024)
3) S. Gurinder Singh Ji Bawa,
Ex-Vice President - Gurudwara
Sachkhand Board Takhat
Sachkhand Sri Hazur Abchalnagar
Sahib, Nanded, Age 75 years,
Occu. Business, R/o Guru Angad Niwas,
Bungalow No.22Rd. B-1, Housing Society
Vittal Nagar Co-operative J.N.P.D. Scheme,
Mumbai - 98
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4) S. Ravinder Singh Ji Aasa Singh Ji
Bungai, Ex-Secretary- Gurudwara
Sachkhand Board Takhat Sachkhand
Sri Hazur Abchalnagar Sahib, Nanded
Age 52 years, Occu. Business,
R/o Aasha-Jeet Niwas, Opp. Kalidhar
English School, Shahidpura,
Nanded ( M.S. )
5) S. Manpreet Singhji Gobind Singh Ji
Kunjniwale, Ex-Member - Gurudwara
Sachkhand Board Takhat Sachkhand
Sri Hazur Abchalnagar Sahib, Nanded
Age 35 years, Occ. Business,
R/o Gurudwara Gate No.2, Near Gurudwara
Mahakal Saheb , Nanded 431601
6) S. Gurmeet Singh Mahajan,
Ex-Member- Gurudwara Sachkhand
Board Takhat Sachkhand Sri Hazur
Abchalnagar Sahib Nanded,
Age 38 years, Occ. Business,
R/o Hari Niwas, H.No.3-6-180,
Badpura, Nanded 431601
7) S. Gobind S. Singhji Longowal,
Ex-Member- Gurudwara Sachkhand
Board Takhat Sachkhand Sri Hazur
Abchalnagar Sahib, Nanded
Age 72 years, Occu. Business,
R/o Teja SinghSamundri Hall,
SGPC Opffice, Amritsar 143 006
8) S. Raghujit Singh Ji Virk
Ex- Member, Gurudwara Sachkhand Board
Takhat Sachkhand Sri Hazur Abchalnagar
Sahib, Nanded, Age 58 years,
Occu. Business. R/o Virk House,
Meera Ghati GT Road, Karnal- 132001
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9) S. Harpal Singh Bhatia
Ex-Member- Gurudwara Sachkhand Board
Takhat Sachkhand Sri Hazur Abchalnagar
Sahib Nanded, Age 29 years,
Occu. Business, R/o 9/A, Prem Nagar,
Indore, (M.P.)
... PETITIONERS
VERSUS
1) The State of Maharashtra
through the Principal Secretary,
Department of Revenue & Forests,
M.S., Mantralaya, Mumbai
2) The Hon'ble Chief Minister
Government of Maharashtra
M.S., Mantralaya, Mumbai
3) The Hon'ble Deputy Chief Minister,
Government of Maharashtra,
M.S., Mantralaya, Mumbai
4) The Hon'ble Minister
Department of Revenue & Forest,
M.S., Mantralaya, Mumbai
5) The Collector, Nanded
6) The Superintendent,
The Takht Sachkhand Shri Hazur
Apchalnagar Sahib Board, Nanded,
Taluka and District Nanded
7) Dr. Parvinder Singh Paschricha,
I.P.S. (Retired), Age 55 years,
Occ. Pensioner, R/o as above.
(Notices to the Respondents No.1 to 5
to be served through the Government
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Pleader, High Court of Bombay,
Bench at Aurangabad) ... RESPONDENTS
.......
Mr. R.S. Deshmukh, Senior Counsel with
Mr. Kunal Kale & Ms Ashwini Deshmukh, i/b
Mr. Devang Deshmukh, Advocate for petitioners
Dr. Mr. Biren Saraf, Advocate General with
Mr. A.B. Girase, Government Pleader for R.No.1, 4 & 5
Mr. G.A. Gadhe, Advocate for R.No.6
Mr. P.R. Katneshwarkar, Senior Counsel i/b
Mr. Anuj Fulpagar, Advocate for R.No.7
Mr. S.A. Nagarsoge, Advocate for applicant/ intervener in
Civil Application No.9419/2025
.......
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.4665 OF 2024 WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.6292 OF 2024
1) Sardar Manjeet Singh Jagan Singh
Aged about: 60 years, Occ. Business
Address : House No.3-6-219, Badpura,
Nanded - 431 601
2) Jagjeevan Singh Trilok Singh Ramgadiya,
Aged about: 45 years, Occ. Business,
Address : House No.3-6-489,
Satnam Niwas, Gurudwara Chourasta,
Nanded - 431 601
3) Tahel Singh Gurmukh Singh Nirmale
Aged about: 75 years, Occ. Business,
Address: House No.4-2-3, Shaheed
Bhagat Singh Road, Near Govindbagh,
Nanded - 431 601
4) Sardar Bishan Singh Beeran Singh,
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Aged about : 56 years, Occ. Business,
Address: House No.2-3-263, New Sikhwadi,
Karimnagar (Telangana) 505001
5) Sardar Triloksingh Kartar Singh,
Aged about : 50 years, Occ. Business,
Address: House No.2-6-59/1, Sikhwadi,
Karimnagar (Telangana) 505001
6) Gulab Singh Chanda Singh Khandarwale
Aged about: 75 years, Occ. Business,
Address: Block No.1, Khalsa Colony,
Gawalipura, Station Road,
Nanded - 431 601
7) Darshansingh Charansingh Motorwale,
Aged about: 85 years, Occ. Business,
Address: House No.3-6-190,
Gurudwara Gate No.3, Badpura,
Nanded - 431 601
8) Sardar Parvinder Singh Amar Singh,
Aged about: 57 years, Occ. Business,
Address: House No.2-5-22, Sikhwadi,
Karimnagar (Telangana) 505001
9) Narendra Singh Gangan Singh
Asarjanwale, Aged about : 48 years,
Occ. Business, Address: House
No.3-4-100, Near Tara Singh Market,
Guru Gobindsingh Road,
Nanded 431 601
10) Amarjeet Singh Khem Singh Shiledar,
Aged about : 55 years, Occ. Business,
Address : Paras Ghar No.3, Sector No.4,
Govindbagh, Abchalnagar,
Nanded - 431601
11) Sardar Santok Singh s/o Johar Singh
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Aged about: 50 years, Occ.
R/o H. No.6-3-266,
Fateh Garh Gurudwara, Sahib Subhash
Nagar, Nizamabad (Telangana State)
12) Sardar Surjit Singh s/o Jivan Singh
Girnewale, Age: 72 years, Occ. Business,
R/o Gate No.3, Gurudwara, Nanded
Tq. & Dist. Nanded
13) Avtar Singh s/o Ratan Singh
Age: 65 years, Occ.
R/o Vishnupuri, Nanded
Tq. & Dist. Nanded
14) Sardar Ajit Singh s/o Khanna Singh,
Age: 50 years, Occ.
R/o H. No.4-2-267,
Hanuman Tekadi, Bodhan, Block No.2,
Ward 4, Dist. Nizamabad
(Telangana State)
15) Raja Singh s/o Gurubachan Singh,
Age: 56 years, Occ.
R/o Badapura, Nanded
16) Sardar Manindersingh s/o Inder Singh,
Age: 38 years, Occ. Business,
R/o H.No.12-10-125/19, Gajulpeth,
Near Post Office, Nizamabad ... PETITIONERS
VERSUS
1) The State of Maharashtra
through its Secretary of the
Revenue & Forest Department,
Mantralaya, Mumbai - 32
(copy to be served for Resp. No.1
on Govt. Pleader, in the office of
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
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High Court of Judicature of Bombay,
Bench at Aurangabad)
2) Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Apchalnagar,
Nanded, through its Superintendent,
Nanded, Tq. & Dist. Nanded
3) Dr. Vijay Satbir Singh
Administrator of Nanded Sikh
Gurudwara, Apchalnagar, Nanded,
through its Superintendent, Nanded,
Tq. & Dist. Nanded ... RESPONDENTS
.......
Mr. S.G. Karlekar, Advocate holding for
Mr. J.V. Patil, Advocate for petitioners
Dr. Mr. Biren Saraf, Advocate General with
Mr. A.B. Girase, Government Pleader for R.No.1
Mr. P.P. Mandlik, Advocate for R.No.2 & 3
.......
CORAM : R.G. AVACHAT AND
ABASAHEB D. SHINDE, JJ.
Date of reserving judgment : 18th September, 2025
Date of pronouncing judgment : 6th October, 2025
JUDGMENT (PER : R.G. AVACHAT, J.) :
Both these Writ Petitions are taken up together
since common questions of facts and law arise therein. For
the sake of convenience, papers in Writ Petition
No.10553/2022 would be referred.
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
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2. This Writ Petition has been filed for the following
main relief :
(C) Rule may kindly be made absolute by allowing the Writ
Petition, thereby quashing and setting aside the impugned
Notification dated 29/06/2022 (Annexure 'D') issued
from the Department of Revenue and Forest, M.S.,
Mantralaya, Mumbai, whereby the Nanded Sikh
Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib
Board, Nanded came to be dissolved or superseded and
further the respondent No.7/ Dr. P.S. Pasricha- I.P.S.
(Retired) came to be appointed for performing and
exercising all the duties and powers on behalf of the
Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur
Apchalnagar Sahib Board, Nanded.
(C-1) Rule may kindly be made absolute by allowing the Writ
Petition, thereby reinstating forthwith the Nanded Sikh
Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib
Board, which came to be dissolved or superseded vide
impugned notification, dated 29/06/2022 (Annexure "D")
till the formation of the new Nanded Sikh Gurudwara
Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Board, Nanded.
FACTS:
3. The petition was originally preferred by only one of
the members of the Board. After the respondent State pointed
out certain shortcomings in the Writ Petition, other members of
the Board have joined in as petitioners with some amendment
in the pleadings.
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4. The then Hyderabad State passed the Act, "The
Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Apchalnagar Sahib
Act, 1956 ("the Act" for short). The Act was passed for the
proper administration of the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara. The
petitioners were the members of the Board, nominated by the
State Government. Number of complaints were received
regarding functioning of the Board. The State Government
appointed a Committee to enquire into the complaints
received. The Committee submitted its report to the State
Government, which in turn, issued the notification dated
29/6/2022, superseding the Board by nominating one of the
retired I.P.S. officers to manage the affairs of the Nanded
Gurudwara. The said notification is sought to be annulled/ set
aside in these Writ Petitions with the consequential prayer for
reinstatement of the Board.
5. The challenge is mainly on the following grounds :
(i) The then Government acted in undue haste to
topple the Board. The decision was taken on the
last day of the Maha Vikas Aghadi's rule.
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(ii) Malafides are thus attributed to the then
Government in Power.
(iii) No notice under Section 53 of the Act was served
upon all the members of the Board. The same
constituted breach of principles of natural justice.
(iv) None of the grounds of complaint alleged to have
been proved has a potential to dislodge the Board
or any of its members.
6. The petition has been countered with filing
affidavits-in-reply. Learned Advocate General (A.G.)
represented the State of Maharashtra and its instrumentalities.
It was first submitted by the learned A.G. that the notice under
Section 53 of the Act was served on the Board. An admission
to that effect pleaded in para 24 of the Writ Petition was
adverted to. According to the learned A.G., number of
complaints were received inviting the Government's attention
towards the mismanagement of the Gurudwara affairs. A
Committee was, therefore, constituted to enquire into the
complaints. The Superintendent of the Gurudwara was very
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
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much present during the enquiry. All the record including the
Books of Accounts were inspected by the Enquiry Committee.
The Enquiry Committee was fair enough to conclude that only
4 of number of allegations made in the complaints were found
to have been proved. He then adverted our attention to certain
provisions of the Act to submit that, holding of meeting of the
Board at least once in four months was mandatory. No such
meetings were held during the relevant period. No audit
reports were placed within the time-frame. Moreover, the
estimate/ budget of each and every year had also not been
placed for approval on or before 31 st of March each year. In
spite of there being Government orders preventing movements
or assembly of persons so as to prevent spread of Corona
pandemic, the petitioners, in violation of those orders, took out
a procession. They confronted with the authorities deputed for
maintenance of law and order. Those authorities were
manhandled. Crimes were, therefore, registered against the
petitioners and others. In one of the communications made by
one of the petitioners, he admitted that most of the members of
the Board/ petitioners were absconding during the relevant
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time. The learned A.G. meant to say that, there was no
coordination among the members of the Board. Even if the
President was not keeping well and unable to convene a
meeting of the Board, our attention was adverted to Section 15
of the Act, whereunder the members of the Board were
authorized to convene a meeting. The same has not been
done. According to learned A.G., the petition is silent to deny
or traverse the enquiry report. The same suggests the
petitioners to have impliedly admitted the report of the Enquiry
Committee. Giving a notice as a part of principles of natural
justice, although not a formality, when the matter comes to the
Court of law, the person claiming violation of principles of
natural justice need to make out a case of prejudice. For want
of pleadings in the petition, it could safely be observed that the
petitioners did not suffer any prejudice by non-receipt of a
show-cause-notice, if any. According to the learned A.G.,
although after having pointed out certain shortcomings, other
members of the Board joined in the petition as petitioners, no
fresh pleadings have been introduced. As such, the report of
the enquiry went unchallenged. According to him, the Enquiry
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Committee completed the enquiry before the time-frame and,
therefore, the report was submitted two days in advance. No
fault, therefore, could be found therewith. More so, when the
petitioners themselves referred to the enquiry report. He
would further submit that, the tenure of the petitioners has long
been over. This Court, in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can refuse to
grant the relief of reinstatement. According to him, the grounds
for toppling the Board, given in Section 53 of the Act, have all
been made out. It was not necessary for supersession of the
Board that the Board Members should indulge in financial
mismanagement. In support of his submissions, the learned
A.G. has relied on the following three authorities :
(1) State of Assam & anr. Vs. Gauhati Municipal Board,
Gauhati [ AIR 1967 SC 1398]
(2) Dharampal Satyapal Limited Vs. Deputy Commissioner
of Central Excise, Gau & ors. [ (2015) 8 SCC 519]
(3) State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Sudhir Kumar Singh & ors.
(2021) 19 SCC 706
7. We need not detain ourselves with the submissions
advanced by the learned Advocates for the respective parties.
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Those are very much on our mind. Let us, therefore, turn to
appreciate the same in the light of the factual and legal matrix.
8. As stated above, the Hyderabad State passed the
Act for better management of Nanded Gurudwara affairs. A
glance at the relevant provisions of the Act is a must. We,
therefore, reproduce certain provisions thereof.
Section 2 of the Act defines certain terms. Sub-
clause (8) defines the term 'Board' to mean the Board
constituted under the provisions of Chapter II.
Chapter II of the Act speaks of control of the
Gurudwara. By virtue of Section 5 of the Act, the Board shall
be recognized by name of "The Nanded Sikh Gurudwara
Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Board". The Board
is a body corporate having a perpetual succession and a
common seal with power to acquire and hold property and
transfer the same subject to such conditions and restrictions as
may be prescribed. Section 6 speaks of constitution of the
Board. It is a 17 member Board, 12 of whom to be nominated
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
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by the State Government. Section 7 speaks of a
disqualification of an independent member to hold the office as
a member or an office bearer in a capacity as a member.
Section 8 reads thus :
"8. The members of the Board shall hold office for
three years from the date of its constitution or until
constitution of a new Board, whichever is later."
Section 9 (2) reads thus :
"9. (2) If any person having been nominated or
elected member of the Board absents himself without
sufficient cause from three consecutive meetings of the
Board, his name may be removed from membership of
the Board, provided that if he applies to the Board
within one month of the removal of his name to be
restored to membership, the Board may at the meeting
next following the date of receipt of such application
restore him to office, provided further that no members
shall be restored more than three times.
Section 13 reads thus :
"Meeting of the Board, other than the first meeting,
shall be held as often as necessary at Nanded or at such
other place as the President may determine, but at least
one meeting shall be held in every four months."
Section 15 reads thus :
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"15. Not less than one fourth of the whole number of
members may by application in writing made to the
President demand that a meeting of the Board be held
and if notwithstanding such demand, notice of a
meeting is not given within fifteen days of the date on
which the application was received by the President,
the applicants may themselves call a meeting to be
held at the Office of the Board by ten days notice
served in the manner described in Section 14."
9. The Scheme of the Act indicates that, there shall
be a Superintendent to look after the day-to-day affairs of the
Gurudwara. A Committee is there to control the day-to-day
affairs and the Apex body is in the nature of the Board.
Section 53 reads thus :
"53.1) If the Government is of opinion that the
Board is unable to perform, or has persistently
made default in the duty imposed on it by or under
this Act or has exceeded or abused its powers, the
Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, supersede the Board for such period as
may be specified in the notification.
Provided that before issuing a notification
under this sub-section the Government shall give a
reasonable time to the Board to show cause why it
should not be superseded and shall consider the
explanation and objections, if any, of the Board.
2) Upon the publication of a notification under
sub-section (1), superseding the Board -
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a) all the members of the Board and the
Committee shall, as from the date of
supersession, vacate their offices as such
members;
b) all the powers and duties which may, by or
under the provisions of this Act, be
exercised or performed by or on behalf of
the Board or the Committee shall, during the
period of supersession be exercised and
performed by such person or persons as the
Government may direct, and;
c) all property vested in the Board shall, during
the period of supersession, vest in the
Government.
3) On the expiration of the period of
supersession specified in the notification
issued under sub-section (1), Government
may -
a) extend the period of supersession for such
period as it may consider necessary, or
b) reconstitute the Board and the Committee in
the manner provided in Chapter II."
10. A look at the aforesaid provisions and the Scheme
of the Act, one will have no difficulty to conclude that the Board
means and includes its members, both nominated by the State
Government and elected as per the Scheme under Section 6
of the Act. As such, the members of the Board constitute the
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
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Board itself. It is also true that, the Board has been recognized
as a separate entity, which can, on its own sue or be sued in
its own name.
11. Admittedly, the Board was reconstituted in 2019.
The tenure of the Board was for three years. In the
meanwhile, number of complaints were said to have been
received against the Members of the Board. A three member
Committee was, therefore, constituted to look/ enquire into the
allegations in the complaint. The record indicates that the
Committee enquired into the complaints and found substance
in four of the complaints. The nature of those complaints said
to have been proved is :-
(1) The Board did not convene/ hold requisite number of
meetings.
(2) No annual budget was placed for approval on or before
31st March each year.
(3) No accounts were audited within a time-frame.
(4) The Board/ petitioners took out a procession in breach of
directions issued with a view to contain or prevent
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spread of Corona pandemic.
12. True, the Superintendent of the Board was present
before the enquiry committee all along. It is also true that, the
enquiry committee did not find substance in rest of the
complaints including fiscal mismanagement or
misappropriation.
13. As seen above, under Section 53(1) of the Act, the
State Government has power to supersede the Board for such
period as may be specified in the notification. The grounds for
supersession are :
(1) Inability of the Board to perform,
(2) Persistent default in discharge of duty imposed on the
Board by or under the Act.
(3) The Board has exceeded or abused its powers.
14. The proviso to sub-section (1) mandates the State
Government to give the Board a reasonable time to show
cause why it should not be superseded. The State
Government is under obligation to consider the explanation
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and objections, if any, the Board has offered.
15. The phraseology of Section 53(1) suggests that,
the notice should be given to the Board. Under the Act, the
term 'Board' has been defined to mean a Board constituted in
terms of Section 6 of the Act. In our view, the notice provided
under the proviso should be given to each and every member
of the Board. A look at Section 7 of the Act indicates that, an
individual member of the Board could be disqualified to hold
the office as a member of the Board in certain circumstances.
It has been stated time and again by the Apex Court that, when
certain things to be done in a certain manner prescribed by the
Statute, the same has to be done in that manner alone or not
at all. Let us, therefore, advert to the record as to whether the
State Government had in fact issued the notice to the Board
(each and every member thereof). The show-cause-notice is
dated 30/5/2022. It has been addressed to the President,
Gurudwara Board, Nanded. It has been averred in the notice
that, some complaints have been received and the State
Government was prima facie of the view that the Board
members have defaulted in their duty and abused their
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powers. It, therefore, called upon the President of the Board to
show cause within a period of seven days as to why the Board
shall not be superseded.
16. In our view, the notice is bad for more than one
reason. First, it has been addressed to the President of the
Board alone and not to the individual members of the Board.
One could have understood if the notice is addressed to the
Gurudwara Board and was served on it by delivering it to either
the Superintendent or President of the Board. Furthermore,
the notice has been issued on the strength of the allegations
which were not enquired into while the notice was issued.
Meaning thereby, when the notice was issued, the State
Government did not have any material before it about the
substance in the allegations or the complaints to have been
proved on enquiry. It is, therefore, just difficult to imagine as to
how the State Government, without there being any findings
about the allegations made in the complaint, could issue notice
under Section 53(1) of the Act, and call upon the President of
the Board to show cause. Along with the show-cause-notice,
copies of the complaints were said to have been served on the
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President of the Board. It has been specifically averred in the
petition, after amendment, that, no notice was individually
served on the Board members. The report of enquiry had
never been served to any of the Board members (petitioners).
The petitioners, therefore, required to obtain the enquiry report,
under the Right to Information Act.
17. Admittedly, the Committee, appointed to make
enquiry into the allegations did its job in June 2022. In our
view, after the receipt of the enquiry report, the State
Government ought to have served the same along with the
show-cause-notice to each and every member of the Board.
The same has admittedly not been done in this case. True, in
para 24 of the Writ Petition, it has been averred that the
Gurudwara Board was served with the show-cause-notice
dated 30/5/2022. Those were the pleadings when the petition
was filed by the then sole petitioner No.1. It is true that, after
joining of the other members of the Board as co-petitioners,
the pleadings have not been substantially amended. The said
admission remained as it is. Law as regards admission is
crystal clear. Admissions are not conclusive proof. It may,
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however, estop. Admission can be explained, proved to be
wrong or successfully be withdrawn. The admission appearing
in para 24 of the petition was that of the sole petitioner No.1.
The same would not bind the co-petitioners. Moreover, the
record itself indicate the said admission was not factually
correct.
18. Giving of a notice to show cause is in the nature of
principles of natural justice introduced by a statutory provision.
19. In case of State Orissa Vs. Binapani Dei (AIR
1967 SC 1269), it has been observed :-
"Even administrative orders which involved civil
consequences have to be passed consistently with the
rules of principles of natural justice."
20. In the case in hand, we are not concerned with the
general principles of natural justice under the Administrative
Law. The proviso to Section 53(1) introduced the statutory
mandate of issuance of a show-cause-notice. A three Judge
Bench of the Apex Court, in case of City Corner Vs. Personal
Asstt. To Collector and Addl. District Magistrate, Nellore (AIR
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
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1976 SC 143), observed :
5. But the main ground of attack against the order of
cancellation is that in making it the District Magistrate
had failed to observe the principles of natural justice.
The order that the District Magistrate passed is a quasi-
judicial order and therefore the appellant is right in
contending that the principles of natural justice should
have been followed before that order was passed. It is
now well established by decisions of this Court that such
is the requirement of law even where the statute in
question itself does not so provide. It is also well
established that the principles of natural justice do not
necessarily conform to a fixed formula, nor is it a
procrustean bed into which all proceedings must be
fitted. The principles of natural justice will always
depend upon the facts of each case. The learned Judges
of the High Court examined the various documents the
copies of which had been asked for by the appellant and
came to the conclusion that the show cause notice issued
to him contained a summary of all those documents
which was sufficient to enable the appellant to make his
representation. We cannot say that this conclusion is
wrong. It is not always necessary that the documents
asked for should itself be furnished provided the
substance of those documents is furnished, always
provided, however, that the summary is not misleading.
Such is not the case here. But when the appellant asked
for original documents he could at least have been told
that he had already been given a summary of the
documents which was sufficient to enable him to make
his representation and he could make his fuller
representation as he had promised in his earlier so called
interim reply. The District Magistrate's characterisation
of the interim reply of the appellant as a routine one is
not correct. After all the opinion of the Village
Panchayat which is a representative body of all the
villagers is entitled to great if not greater weight than that
of the Mitramandali and the Town Yuvajanasangham,
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 25 ::
the composition of which or the strength of which we do
not know. The Village Panchayat was also competent on
a consideration of all the facts to form its own opinion.
The opinions of representative bodies should not be
lightly brushed aside unless of course there is reason to
think that they have acted out of considerations other
than relevant. We are of opinion that the order passed by
the District Magistrate post-haste immediately he
received the appellant's reply without either giving him
the copies asked for or at least telling him that the
material already furnished was sufficient to enable him
to make his representation and if he had any further
representation to make he could do so offends the
principles of natural justice. We are aware that we are
dealing with an appeal questioning the proceedings
initiated under Article 226 of the Constitution where the
power of the Court is a limited one, that is to say, limited
to cases where there is any error of law apparent on the
face of the record. But the observance of the principles of
natural justice is fundamental to the discharge of any
quasi-judicial function. We therefore allow the appeal
and set aside the order of the District Magistrate."
21. In case of Southern Painters Vs. Fertilizers and
Chemicals Travancore Ltd. & anr. [1994 Supp (2) SCC 699],
it has been observed :
10. Again, in Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar
(1989) 1 SCC 229, this Court observed: (SCC p. 230,
para 4) -
4) "Indisputably, no notice had been given to the
appellant of the proposal of blacklisting the appellant. It
was contended on behalf of the State Government that
there was no requirement in the rule of giving any prior
notice before blacklisting any person. Insofar as the
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 26 ::
contention that there is no requirement specifically of
giving any notice is concerned, the respondent is right.
But it is an implied principle of the rule of law that any
order having civil consequence should be passed only
after following the principles of natural justice. It has to
be realised that blacklisting any person in respect of
business ventures has civil consequence for the future
business of the person concerned in any event. Even if
the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle
of natural justice that parties affected by any order
should have right of being heard and making
representations against the order."
While in case of Krishna Lal Vs. State of Jammu
& Kashmir (1994) 4 SCC 422, it has been held :
"Whether the violation of the mandatory provision
under Section 17(5) of the J & K Act regarding
furnishing of copy of proceedings of the enquiry to the
delinquent would render the order of dismissal a nullity
would depend upon whether the requirement under
Section 17(5) is one which is for the benefit of the
individual concerned or serves a public purpose. If it
be former, the same can be waived; if it be latter, it
cannot be. The requirement is for the benefit of the
person concerned which is to enable him to know as to
what had taken place during the course of the
proceedings so that he is better situated to show his
cause as to why the proposed penalty should not be
imposed. Such a requirement cannot be said to be
relatable to public policy or one concerned with public
interest, or to serve a public purpose. Thus the
requirement mentioned in Section 17(5) of the Act
despite being mandatory is one which can be waived.
If, however, the requirement has not been waived any
act or action in violation of the same would be a nullity.
In the present case as the appellant had far from
waiving the benefit, asked for the copy of the
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 27 ::
proceeding despite which the same was not made
available, it has to be held that the order of dismissal
was invalid in law. This, however, is not suficient to
demand setting aside of the dismisal order in this
proceeding itself because what has been stated in ECIL
case in this context would nonetheless apply. This is
for the reason that violation of natural justice which
was dealt with in that case, also renders an order invalid
despite which the Constitution Bench did not concede
that the order of dismissal passed without furnishing
copy of the inquiry officer's report would be enough to
set aside the order. Instead, it directed the matter to be
examined as stated in paragraph 31."
22. The facts in the case of Gauhati Municipal Board
(supra) indicate that the notice was served on the Board. The
tenure of all the members of the Board had come to an end by
July 6, 1966. From reading of the said judgment, we could not
gather the format of the notice besides title thereof. We have
already observed here that, the notice in question was issued
in the name of the President of the Board alone and not the
Board or the members thereof individually.
23. There can be no two views over what has been
observed in case of Dharampal and Sudhir (supra). We
propose to reproduce the relevant observations from both the
authorities relied on by the learned A.G. In case of Dharampal,
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 28 ::
the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :
"38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the
law on the principle of audi alteram partem has
progressed in the manner mentioned above, at the
same time, the Courts have also repeatedly remarked
that the principles of natural justice are very flexible
principles. They cannot be applied in any straight-
jacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of
functions performed and to the extent to which a
person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain
exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been
invoked under certain circumstances. For example, the
Courts have held that it would be sufficient to allow a
person to make a representation and oral hearing may
not be necessary in all cases, though in some matters,
depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-
fledged oral hearing but even cross-examination of
witnesses is treated as necessary concomitant of the
principles of natural justice. Likewise, in service
matters relating to major punishment by way of
disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict and
full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the
statutory rules as well. On the other hand, in those
cases where there is an admission of charge, even
when no such formal inquiry is held, the punishment
based on such admission is upheld. It is for this
reason, in certain circumstances, even post-decisional
hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the Courts
have held that under certain circumstances principles
of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of
diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended
danger and so on.
39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the
present case as the issue relates to giving of notice
before taking action. While emphasizing that the
principles of natural justice cannot be applied in
straight-jacket formula, the aforesaid instances are
given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 29 ::
adhering to the principles of natural justice which are
grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness,
accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals,
etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for
some reason - perhaps because the evidence against
the individual is thought to be utterly compelling - it
is felt that a fair hearing 'would make no difference' -
meaning that a hearing would not change the ultimate
conclusion reached by the decision-maker - then no
legal duty to supply a hearing arises. Such an approach
was endorsed by Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v.
Aberdeen Corporation [(1971) 2 All ER 1578], who
said that :
"... A 'breach of procedure...cannot give (rise to) a
remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is
something of substance which has been lost by the
failure. The court dos not act in vain'.
Relying on these comments, Brandon LJ opined in
Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority[(1980) 1
WLR 582] that 'no one can complain of not being
given an opportunity to make representations if such
an opportunity would have availed him nothing'. In
such situations, fair procedures appear to serve no
purpose since 'right' result can be secured without
according such treatment to the individual.
40. In this behalf, we need to notice one other
exception which has been carved out to the aforesaid
principle by the Courts. Even if it is found by the
Court that there is a violation of principles of natural
justice, the Courts have held that it may not be
necessary to strike down the action and refer the
matter back to the authorities to take fresh decision
after complying with the procedural requirement in
those cases where non-grant of hearing has not caused
any prejudice to the person against whom the action is
taken. Therefore, every violation of a facet of natural
justice may not lead to the conclusion that order
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 30 ::
passed is always null and void. The validity of the
order has to be decided on the touchstone of
'prejudice'. The ultimate test is always the same, viz.,
the test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing.
41. In ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727, the
majority opinion, penned down by Sawant, J., while
summing up the discussion and answering the various
questions posed, had to say as under qua the prejudice
principle:
"30. Hence the incidental questions raised above may
be answered as follows:
xx xx xx
(v) The next question to be answered is what is the
effect on the order of punishment when the report of
the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee
and what relief should be granted to him in such cases.
The answer to this question has to be relative to the
punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed
or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside
because the report is not furnished to him, in some
cases the non-furnishing of the report may have
prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may
have made no difference to the ultimate punishment
awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the
employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the
rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of
reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural
justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law
and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights.
They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be
performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in
fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not
on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be
considered on the facts and circumstances of each
case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the
report, no different consequence would have followed,
it would be a perversion of justice to permit the
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 31 ::
employee to resume duty and to get all the
consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the
dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the
concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits.
It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural
justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice."
42. So far so good. However, an important
question posed by Mr. Sorabjee is as to whether it is
open to the authority, which has to take a decision, to
dispense with the requirement of the principles of
natural justice on the ground that affording such an
opportunity will not make any difference? To put it
otherwise, can the administrative authority dispense
with the requirement of issuing notice by itself
deciding that no prejudice will be caused to the person
against whom the action is contemplated? Answer has
to be in the negative. It is not permissible for the
authority to jump over the compliance of the
principles of natural justice on the ground that even if
hearing had been provided it would have served no
useful purpose. The opportunity of hearing will serve
the purpose or not has to be considered at a later stage
and such things cannot be presumed by the authority.
This was so held by the English Court way back in the
year 1943 in the case of General Medical Council v.
Spackman[1943 AC 627]. This Court also spoke in
the same language in the case of The Board of High
School and Intermediate Education, U.P. & Ors. v.
Kumari Chittra Srivastava & Ors.[(1970) 1 SCC 121],
as is apparent from the following words:
"7. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. C.B.
Aggarwal, contends that the facts are not in dispute
and it is further clear that no useful purpose would
have been served if the Board had served a show cause
notice on the petitioner. He says that in view of these
circumstances it was not necessary for the Board to
have issued a show cause notice. We are unable to
accept this contention. Whether a duty arises in a
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 32 ::
particular case to issue a show cause notice before
inflicting a penalty does not depend on the authority's
satisfaction that the person to be penalised has no
defence but on the nature of the order proposed to be
passed."
43. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, Mr.
Sorabjee may also be right in his submission that it
was not open for the authority to dispense with the
requirement of principles of natural justice on the
presumption that no prejudice is going to be caused to
the appellant since judgment in R.C. Tobacco P. Ltd.
V. Union of India (2005) 7 SCC 725 had closed all the
windows for the appellant.
44. At the same time, it cannot be denied that as far
as Courts are concerned, they are empowered to
consider as to whether any purpose would be served in
remanding the case keeping in mind whether any
prejudice is caused to the person against whom the
action is taken. This was so clarified in the case of
ECIL v. B. Karunkar (1993) 4 SCC 727 itself in the
following words:
31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's
report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in
the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals
should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to
the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it
before coming to the Court/ Tribunal and given the
employee an opportunity to show how his or her case
was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the
report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal
comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the
report would have made no difference to the ultimate
findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal
should not interfere with the order of punishment. The
Court/ Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the
order of punishment on the ground that the report was
not furnished as it regrettably being done at present.
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 33 ::
The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since
it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their
judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for
setting aside or not setting aside the order of
punishment, (and not any internal appellate or
revisional authority), there would be neither a breach
of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the
reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal
finds that the furnishing of the report would have
made a difference to the result in the case that it
should set aside the order of punishment."
45. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles
in mind, even when we find that there is an infraction
of principles of natural justice, we have to address a
further question as to whether any purpose would be
served in remitting the case to the authority to make
fresh demand of amount recoverable, only after
issuing notice to show cause to the appellant. In the
facts of the present case, we find that such an exercise
would be totally futile having regard to the law laid
down by this Court in R.C. Tobacco (supra)."
In case of Sudhir, it has been observed :
"42. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus
reveals:
(1) Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of
the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy
injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule
cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion
that prejudice is thereby caused.
(2) Where procedural and/or substantive provisions
of law embody the principles of natural justice, their
infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 34 ::
orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to
the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision
of law which is conceived not only in individual
interest, but also in public interest.
(3)No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of
the breach of natural justice where such person does not
dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by
reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of
non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in
cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real
prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to
the person complaining of the breach of natural
justice."
24. In case of Isolators and Isolators through its
Proprietor Sandhya Mishra Vs. Madhya Pradesh Madhya
Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Company Limited & anr. [2023 AIR (SC)
2058], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, referred to the case of
UMC Technologies Private Limited Vs. Food Corporation of
India & anr. [2021 SCC (2) 551], paragraph No.13 of which
reads as under :
"13. At the outset, it must be noted that it is the first
principle of civilised jurisprudence that a person against
whom any action is sought to be taken or whose right
or interests are being affected should be given a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The basic
principle of natural justice is that before adjudication
starts, the authority concerned should give to the
affected party a notice of the case against him so that he
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 35 ::
can defend himself. Such notice should be adequate
and the grounds necessitating action and the penalty/
action proposed should be mentioned specifically and
unambiguously. An order travelling beyond the bounds
of notice is impermissible and without jurisdiction to
that extent. This Court in Nasir Ahmed v. Custodian
General, Evacuee Property, (1980) 3 SCC 1 has held
that it is essential for the notice to specify the particular
grounds on the basis of which an action is proposed to
be taken so as to enable the noticee to answer the case
against him. If these conditions are not satisfied, the
person cannot be said to have been granted any
reasonable opportunity of being heard."
25. It is true that, in the petition, the enquiry report
has not been substantially traversed. That, however, does not
mean the petitioners to have admitted the conclusions arrived
at by the enquiry committee. As seen above, the Scheme of
the Act suggests that most of the members of the Board were
nominated by the Government. An individual member of the
Board could be held to be disqualified if he was found to have
indulged in some unwanted activities. In terms of Section
53(1) of the Act, the Board could be superseded only after the
show-cause-notice is issued to the Board (according to us,
each and every member of the Board) and that too after finding
the explanation or objection offered by the members of the
Board to be not satisfactory. It is reiterated that, in the case in
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 36 ::
hand, no show-cause-notice along with the enquiry report was
served on the petitioners individually. The show-cause-notice
was served on the President alone, that too long before the
enquiry committee was even constituted. In our view, that is
the non-compliance of the mandate of Section 53(1) of the Act,
the breach whereof goes to the root of the matter. If we accept
the submission of the learned A.G. that the petitioners have
failed to make out a case of what prejudice has been caused
to them by non-service of notice to show cause, in our view,
the petitioners were condemned unheard. They were being
unseated of the post of members of the Board. It has
necessarily a civil consequence. Without affording the
petitioners opportunity of hearing, they are held to have been
guilty of the grounds in Section 53 of the Act, which authorizes
the State Government to supersede the Board for a certain
duration.
26. In our view, when the action of the State
Government in superseding the Board is held to be illegal, the
legal consequence thereof is to restore the status-quo ante. It
is true that, the term of the petitioners (Board members) has
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 37 ::
already been over. Section 8 of the Act, however, specifies
that the members of the Board shall continue officiating until
the constitution of a new Board, even after the expiry of their
three-year term by efflux of time. It is true that, in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India, this
Court may even refuse to grant the relief since it is
discretionary in nature. Needless to mention, discretion is to
be exercised rationally/ judicially. The nature of complaints do
not have potential to dictate our conscious not to grant the
discretionary relief of restoring the status-quo ante.
27. It is true that, the petitioners, vide prayer clause
(C), only seek setting aside the notification with a further
direction to appoint a new Board. In our view, the said prayer
clause remained in the petition as it is on account of the
negligence of the petitioners. This prayer clause was there
since beginning i.e. when the petition was filed by the sole
petitioner. Thereafter the petition was amended, introducing
the prayer for restoration of the Board. As we have already
observed that the ground on which the Board has been toppled
no longer sustained, the consequential relief of status quo ante
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 38 ::
deserves to be granted.
28. In our view it was negligence on the part of the
petitioners to withdraw from such prayer when on amendment
of the petition, they came with a prayer for reinstatement of the
Board. It cannot be taken that, the petitioners still continued
with the said prayers. Even it is assumed the said prayers to
have been still alive, the legal corollary of the decision in
setting aside the impugned notification would be to restore the
status-quo ante.
29. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find the action of
the State Government in issuing notification superseding the
Board of the Gurudwara to be illegal and therefore, required to
be set aside. The petition, therefore, succeeds in terms of the
following order :
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition No.10553/2022 is allowed.
(ii) The notification dated 29/06/2022 is hereby set aside.
(iii) The respondent- State is hereby directed to restore
Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur
W.P. No.10553/2022 with
:: 39 ::
Apchalnagar Sahib Board to its original state i.e. its
status immediately before issuance of notification dated
29/06/2022, within two months from the date of this order.
(iv) In view of the above order, Writ Petition No.4665/2024
(second petition) stands disposed of.
(v) Consequently, Civil Applications are disposed of.
(ABASAHEB D. SHINDE, J.) (R.G. AVACHAT, J.)
FMPathan/-
