Bombay High Court
Pravin S/O. Prabhakar Wankhade vs State Of Mah. Thr. Pso, Ps, Murtizapur, ... on 19 November, 2025
2025:BHC-NAG:12460-DB
1 J APL-917-2023.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO.917 OF 2023
APPLICANT : Pravin S/o Prabhakar Wankhade,
Aged about 36 years, Occ.: Service, R/o
Gramsevak Colony, Naka No.7, Murtizapur,
Tq. Murtizapur, Dist. Akola.
..VERSUS..
NON-APPLICANTS : 1. State of Maharashtra,
Through Police Station Officer, Police
Station Murtizapur, Tq. Murtizapur,
Dist. Akola.
2. X. Y. Z. (Victim) Crime No.169/2023,
P.S.O., P.S. Murtizapur City, Tq. Murtizapur,
Dist. Akola.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr P. R. Agrawal, Advocate for Applicant.
Mrs S. Z. Haider, Addl. P. P. for Non-Applicant/State.
Mr S. S. Ali, Advocate for Non-Applicant No.2 (Appointed)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE AND
NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 7th NOVEMBER, 2025.
PRONOUNCED ON : 19th NOVEMBER, 2025.
JUDGMENT (PER : NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J.)
. Heard.
2. Admit. Heard finally with the consent of learned
Counsel for the parties.
2 J APL-917-2023.odt
3. The applicant has approached this Court by filing
the present application under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking to quash the First Information
Report dated 12.05.2023 registered as Crime No.0169 of 2023
with the non-applicant No.1 - Police Station Murtizapur for the
offence punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 313 and 323
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and has further prayed for
quashing of the charge-sheet/final report form dated 10.07.2023
pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Murtizapur.
4. As per the contents of the First Information Report
lodged by the non-applicant No.2, she is a widow having two
daughters and after the death of her husband, she and the present
applicant were in consensual relationship since the year 2006.
The relationship between them was continued from the said year.
The applicant was appointed as a constable in Police Department
and subsequently was posted at Gadchiroli. When, the applicant
was married to another woman in the year 2015, thereafter also,
the relationship of the applicant and non-applicant No.2
continued. It is further stated in the First Information Report that
3 J APL-917-2023.odt
during the year 2007, non-applicant No.2 became pregnant, but
the applicant asked her to terminate pregnancy by consuming
some pills for the said reason. Thereafter, also the relationship
continued and non-applicant No.2 again became pregnant in the
month of November-2022. It is further alleged in the First
Information Report that the applicant does not want a child and
asked non-applicant No.2 to terminate the pregnancy again.
However, this time non-applicant No.2 refused for the same,
which enraged the applicant and he abused non-applicant No.2
and hit her abdomen with his leg. According to non-applicant
No.2, this caused a miscarriage leading her to file the First
Information Report, which is impugned in the present
application.
5. We have heard Mr. P. R. Agrawal, learned counsel
for the applicant as well as Mrs. S. Z. Haider, learned Additional
Public Prosecutor for the non-applicant/State and Mr. S. S. Ali,
learned counsel for the non-applicant No.2.
6. Mr. P. R. Agrawal, learned counsel for the applicant
submits that the non-applicant No.2 is shown to be 39 years old
4 J APL-917-2023.odt
and applicant is of 36 years old. Thus, both are adult and major
and are able to understand the implications of their relationship.
Furthermore, the meaningful reading of the First Information
Report would reveal that the relationship was entirely consensual
and therefore, no offence is made out. He further states that as far
as the offence of causing miscarriage, the medical report indicates
otherwise. He submitted that continuation of the proceedings
would be abuse of the process of Court and prayed for quashing
of the First Information Report and the consequent charge-sheet
arising out of the same.
7. Per contra, Mrs. S. Z. Haider, learned Additional
Public Prosecutor while vehemently opposing the contentions
advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant states that the
applicant's actions were driven by a desire to satisfy his lust,
rather than any intention to marry or maintain a legitimate
relationship with non-applicant No.2. The learned counsel for
non-applicant No.2 supports the contentions advanced by the
learned Additional Public Prosecutor and states that the conduct
of applicant clearly shows that his intention was only to cheat
5 J APL-917-2023.odt
non-applicant No.2 and satisfy his lust. In nutshell, both these
counsels prayed for rejection of the application.
8. In the backdrop of these facts, we have perused the
application and the consequent charge-sheet filed on record. As
can be borne out from the record, the applicant and non-
applicant No.2 were adult and major being fully aware of the
results of initiation and continuance of such relationship between
them. Looking at the age of the parties and the length of
relationship, which dates back to the year 2006 till lodging of the
First Information Report in 2023 i.e. for more than 17 years, we
are of the considered view that the relationship is nothing but
consensual in nature. The non-applicant No.2 had expressly
consented for initiation and continuation of relationship for such
long period of time. The concept of "consent" has been
elaborated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pramod
Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra and another, reported
in (2019) 9 SCC 608, which reads as under :
"16. Where the promise to marry is false and the
intention of the maker at the time of making the promise
itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to
convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a
"misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's
6 J APL-917-2023.odt
"consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise
cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false
promise, the maker of the promise should have had no
intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it.
The "consent" of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated
on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where such
misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in
the said act."
9. In Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana, reported in
(2013) 7 SCC 675, this Court observed:
"21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach of a
promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court
must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a
false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the
consent involved was given after wholly understanding
the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There
may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation
made to her by the accused, or where an accused on
account of circumstances which he could not have
foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to
marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently.
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at the initial
stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of
keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of
course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various
unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise
made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to
reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available,
does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order
to come within the meaning of the term "misconception
of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance".
Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten
7 J APL-917-2023.odt
criminal liability on the other, "unless the court is assured
of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had
never really intended to marry her."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. In Uday vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2003)
4 SCC 46, the complainant was a college going student when the
accused promised to marry her. In the complainant's statement,
she admitted that she was aware that there would be significant
opposition from both the complainant's and accused's families to
the proposed marriage. She engaged in sexual intercourse with
the accused but nonetheless kept the relationship secret from her
family. The Court observed that in these circumstances the
accused's promise to marry the complainant was not of
immediate relevance to the complainant's decision to engage in
sexual intercourse with the accused, which was motivated by
other factors: (SCC P.58, Para 25)
"25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the
prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two
conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section
90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was
given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be
proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or
had reason to believe that the consent was given in
consequence of such misconception. We have serious
doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix
to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant.
8 J APL-917-2023.odt
She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage
with the appellant was difficult on account of caste
considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff
opposition from members of both families. There was
therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly
conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all
despite the promise of the appellant. The question still
remains whether even if it were so, the appellant knew, or
had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had consented
to having sexual intercourse with him only as a
consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they
will get married in due course. There is hardly any
evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary, the
circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion
that the appellant had reason to believe that the consent
given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love
for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in
love. They met often, and it does appear that the
prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, are
permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love.
It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix
stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at
12 o'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases,
when two young persons are madly in love, that they
promise to each other several times that come what may,
they will get married..."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. To summarize the legal position that emerges from
the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section
375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the
proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a
"misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two
propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must
9 J APL-917-2023.odt
have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no
intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false
promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct
nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.
12. As far as the offence under Section 313 is
concerned, the report submitted by doctor Yogesh Wankhede
clearly states that non-applicant No.2 was not pregnant while he
examined her and there was only a swelling on her appendix.
Thus, the offence of causing of marriage without the consent of a
woman is also not made out. In our view, therefore, the lodging
of First Information Report is nothing but an abuse of the process
of Court and the situation would squarely fall within the
following well laid down parameters of State of Harayana and
others vs Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, reported in 1992 AIR 604:
"1 ..........
2 ..........
3 ..........
4 ..........
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
10 J APL-917-2023.odt
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
6 ..........
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge."
13. Thus, the allegations in the First Information
Report are inherently improbable and not expected from a lady of
the applicant's age. It is, therefore, clear that the applicant cannot
be met to suffer the criminal prosecution. In that view of the
matter, we pass the following order.
ORDER
i) The criminal application is allowed.
ii) The First Information Report dated 12.05.2023
registered as Crime No.0169 of 2023 with the non-applicant
No.1 - Police Station Murtizapur for the offence punishable
under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 313 and 323 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 and consequent charge-sheet/final report form dated
10.07.2023 pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Murtizapur, are hereby quashed and set aside.
11 J APL-917-2023.odt
14. The application is disposed of in the above said
terms.
15. Fees of the appointed counsel should be calculated
and be paid as per the rules.
(NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J.) (URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.)
TAMBE.
Signed by: Mr. Ashish Tambe
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge
Date: 19/11/2025 19:50:45
