Bombay High Court
Surabhi Keshav Sahu vs State Of Maharashtra And 2 Ors on 28 March, 2025
Author: A.S. Chandurkar
Bench: A.S. Chandurkar
2025:BHC-OS:5330-DB
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 29423 OF 2022
SURABHI KESHAV SAHU ..PETITIONER
VS.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. ..RESPONDENTS
------------
Mr. Anil V. Anturkar, Senior Advocate i/b. Adv. Abhijit Desai for the
petitioner.
Adv. Manish Upadhye, AGP for respondent nos. 1 and 2 - State.
Mr. Kiran S. Bapat, Senior Advocate i/b. Adv. Aumkar Joshi for
respondent no.3.
------------
CORAM : A.S. CHANDURKAR & RAJESH S. PATIL, JJ.
Date on which the arguments were heard : 12th December 2024.
Date on which the judgment is pronounced : 28th March 2025
JUDGMENT (PER : RAJESH S. PATIL, J.) :
1. This Writ Petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, by the petitioner which challenges an order
dated 14th January 2022, passed by the Law and Judiciary
Department of the Government of Maharashtra, on the
recommendation of the respondent no. 2 (High Court on its
Administrative side) thereby dismissing, the petitioner from the
Maharashtra State Judicial Services.
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith.
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
FACTS:-
2. On the petitioner clearing the Maharashtra Public Service
Commission examination (for short 'MPSC exam'), for the post of the
Civil Judge Junior Division and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, in the
year 2006, she was appointed to the said post on 28 th May 2006. The
petitioner during the course of service was transferred from time to
time to different districts. The petitioner was posted as the Civil
Judge Senior Division and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dadra and
Nagar Haveli, from 24th May 2016 to 30th January 2018.
3. By an order dated 30th January 2018, the petitioner was
transferred from Dadra and Nagar Haveli to District Dhule,
Maharashtra. The petitioner was then posted as a Civil Judge Senior
Division, Dhule. Shortly thereafter, a suspension order dated 17 th
February 2018 was issued to the petitioner and a departmental
enquiry was proposed against the petitioner. A departmental enquiry
was initiated against the petitioner due to certain incidents which
occured while the petitioner was serving at Dadra and Nagar Haveli.
Eleven charges were framed in the charge-sheet. The petitioner was
called upon to submit her response to the suspension order and
charge-sheet dated 20th April 2018. The petitioner filed her written
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
statement dated 14th June 2018. The petitioner though admitted the
sequence of the incidents, but the allegations made against the
petitioner were disputed. On 14 th June 2019, the then Principal
District and Sessions Judge, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Silvassa, Mr. D.
P. Surana was appointed as an Enquiry Officer. So also, Mr. Y. S.
Paithankar, the then Civil Judge Senior Division and Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Silvassa, was appointed as the
Presenting Officer. Thereafter, in all twenty-nine witnesses were
examined. After completing the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer
submitted his report dated 30th January 2020, thereby concluding
that the charge Nos.1 to 7 and 9 were "proved", charge No.8 was
"partly proved", charge No.10 was "apparently established" and
charge no.11 as "probably against the delinquent officer".
4. The records of the enquiry including the report of the Enquiry
Officer was thereafter placed before the Disciplinary
Authority/Committee on 12th October 2020 for taking an
appropriate decision. Upon considering the same, the Disciplinary
Authority/Committee directed that the copy of the Enquiry Report be
supplied to the Charged Officer and asked her to submit her reply
within a period of fifteen days of the receipt of the reply. A letter
dated 29th October 2020 was served upon the petitioner, directing her
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
to file a reply to the enquiry report. The petitioner, accordingly, filed
her reply on 14th January 2021.
5. The respondent no.1 and 2 in the name of the Hon'ble
Governor of Maharashtra, were pleased to exercise power under Rule
5 (1) (ix) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1979 (for short, the Rules of 1979) and directed that the
petitioner should be dismissed from service from the date of the
receipt of the order. Accordingly, by an order dated 14 th January
2022, the petitioner was held guilty of charge No.1 to 7 and 9 out of
the total eleven charges and was dismissed from services. Being
aggrieved by the impugned order dated 14 th January 2022, the
petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition.
SUBMISSIONS:-
6. Mr. Anil Anturkar, the learned Senior Advocate and Mr.
Abhijeet Desai, learned counsel appeared on behalf of the petitioner
and made their submissions:-
(i) As regards Charge No.2, the official residence of the petitioner
at the relevant time was at Daman and she used to travel to Silvassa
for judicial work and as there was no official residence for judicial
officers at Silvassa, therefore, the petitioner had no option but to use
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
the official vehicle to travel between Daman to Silvassa.
As regards the allegations about visit to Maharashtra Judicial
Academy, Uttan, the same was for official purpose, hence, the official
vehicle was used. The petitioner had shown willingness to pay the
charges for making use of the official vehicle. The same was not
considered by the Enquiry Officer. The official vehicle belonged to the
"Government of Union Territory". The said fact was not at all
considered by the Enquiry Officer.
(ii) As regards Charge No.3 the petitioner had applied for leave on
'medical grounds' and hence, she could not have waited till the leave
application was formally granted, she had to proceed on leave in
anticipation of sanction of leave. The said fact was not considered by
the Enquiry Officer.
Shri Kulkarni, peon never deposed that the petitioner had asked
him to bring the books in absence of the librarian or without his
permission. The said fact was not considered by the Enquiry Officer.
The books were needed in the Court hall for judicial work. Even this
part is not considered by the Enquiry Officer.
(iii) As regards Charge No.5 the Notification of the Bombay High
Court was issued. The Enquiry Officer has not considered it.
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
Sections 10 and 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not
been considered by the Enquiry Officer.
The Regulation related to the Civil Court cannot be applied to
criminal Courts. The point was raised by the petitioner but the same
was not considered by the Enquiry Officer.
(iv) As regards Charge No.6 the orders which were passed by the
petitioner were not in real sense transfer orders. The petitioner had
authority to pass the said orders under Section 585, Chapter XXXI of
Civil Manual. All the orders passed by the petitioner were relating to
the assignment of work amongst staff at the disposal of the petitioner
at the relevant time. The petitioner was fully justified in doing so as
per the provisions of the Civil Manual Section 585. The petitioner
was not given any opportunity to point out the said fact to the
Enquiry Officer. The directions given under Article 235 of the
Constitution of India, no reliance can be placed on Regulation 5(3)
and Regulation 9 of the Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu
Civil Courts and Miscellaneous Provisions Regulations, 1963.
At the place of duty of the petitioner there were two Courts,
and since the Presiding Officer of the other Court namely the C.J.J.D
and J.M.F.C. was not available, therefore, the charge of that Court
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
was not given and hence, the entire staff even under that Court was
also available to the petitioner. Only for the purpose of completing
pending work, the said staff was moved. The said arrangement was
temporary and it could not be termed as "transfer of an employee".
(v) As regards Charge No.9 the petitioner could not have presided
over the Juvenile Justice Board, in light of the directions of the
Hon'ble Chief Justice of Bombay High Court. The said fact has not
been considered by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner could not
have presided over the Juvenile Justice Board in the light of the
Notification issued by the administration of Union Territory of Dadra
Nagar Haveli.
(vi) As regards Charge No.7, the District Legal Services Authority
did not exist. The said fact is not considered by the Enquiry Officer.
(vii) As regards Charge No.3, the petitioner used the official vehicle
for the purpose of official work and even for going to Maharashtra
Judicial Academy at Uttan, which was part of her official work. If the
petitioner had waited to receive the official order authorising her to
do so, she was always ready to pay the charges for making use of
such vehicle.
(viii) As regards Charge No.9, the petitioner pointed out that the
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
Notification issued by the Dadra Nagar Haveli dated 2 nd September
2016, was clearly contrary to the High Court's letter dated 19 th
September 2016 and therefore, the petitioner was justified in
following the High Court Rules rather than Dadra and Nagar Haveli
and Daman and Diu Civil Courts and Miscellaneous Provisions
Regulations, 1963 which were not applicable because they were in
respect of "civil Court" and for purpose of controlling "criminal
matter" which is subject matter of Charge No.5. Therefore, no
reliance could have been placed on those Regulations. As per Section
15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner was a
subordinate to the Sessions Court and she could not be given charge
of the higher Judicial Officer, as then any order passed by her would
be without jurisdiction. There was a Bombay High Court Notification
which provided as to whom the charge was to be given when the
District Judge is not available, but under no circumstances it could be
given to the subordinate Judicial Officer. There was a conflict
between the High Court Notification and the direction dated 11 th
June 2014, by the Sessions Judge for the assignment of the remand
work and statutory provisions of Section 15 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The petitioner had not option but to follow the High
Court Notification. "The Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
Civil Courts and Miscellaneous Provisions Regulations, 1963" was in
respect of the Civil Court and the same did not apply and would not
apply when there are statutory provisions and High Court
Notification under Article 235 of the Constitution of India.
(ix) As regards Charge No.4, the petitioner could have explained if
an opportunity was granted that there is no reference to any
disobedience towards the District Judge. There is no statement in the
charge that the petitioner had asked Mr. Kulkarni, peon, to bring the
books in the absence of librarian or without his permission. As the
books which were allotted to the petitioner were at her residence and
she officially needed the books in the Court hall. The Judicial Officer
from whom the books in the bag of the Librarian was meant, was not
available in the Court premises, the petitioner had made use of those
books, for which by no imagination it could be called as "ill-motive"
or "misconduct".
(x) As regards ground of waiver is concerned, the petitioner relied
upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Motilal
Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others 1.
The affidavit filed by the High Court dated 17 th August 2023 was
totally silent on the point of waiver. Such a plea of waiver which was
1 (1979) 2 SCC 409
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
essentially factual in nature, therefore, could not be argued across the
bar without there being any foundation laid down in the affidavit.
The specific averments were made by the petitioner as regards non-
compliance of the provisions of Rule 8, Clause 20 of the Rules of
1979.
7. On behalf of the petitioner following judgments were referred:-
(a) State of Maharashtra & ors. vs. Wasudeo Madhukarrao Pande2;
(b) Masuood Alam Khan-Pathan vs. State of Maharashtra & ors.3;
(c) Vijay s/o. Shamrao Bhale vs. Godavari Garments Ltd. & anr.4;
(d) Raj Kumar vs. State (NCT of Delhi)5;
(e) Naresh Kumar vs. State of Delhi 6;
(f) Delhi Transport Corporation vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma7;
(g) State Bank of India & ors. vs. Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty &
anr.8;
(h) Yoginath D. Bagde vs. State of Maharashtra & anr.9;
(i) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ram Ratan 10.
8. Mr. Kiran Bapat, the learned Senior Advocate appeared on
behalf of the High Court and made his submissions:-
(i) As regards Charge No.1 he submitted that the petitioner
2 2021(5) Mh.L.J. 364
3 2009(5) Mh.L.J. 68
4 2011(2) Mh.L.J.983
5 2023 SCC OnLine SC 609
6 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1641
7 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1871
8 (2018) 12 SCC 807
9 (1999) 7 SCC 739
10 1980 Supp SCC 198
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
mentioned that she was hospitalized in Lilavati Hospital, Mumbai
from 9th July 2017 to 13th July 2017. She claimed that on returning
home she found that gold ornaments which were in dressing table
cupboard were missing and therefore, she lodged a First Information
Report (FIR). She further pressurized the police machinery to illegally
search residence of her maid servant before filing the FIR and also
further interfered in the investigation process. She further purchased
the gold jewellery and asked the jeweller to prepare receipt in the
name of police personnel.
(ii) As regards Charge No.2, the petitioner misused the official
vehicle for travelling from Daman to Silvassa and Silvassa to Daman
without obtaining permission of the High Court.
(iii) As regards Charge No.3, the petitioner was kept in charge of
Shri Rane, the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division and JMFC, Silvassa
from 21st October 2016 to 24th October 2016. In spite of that, the
petitioner filed application for grant of 4 days casual leave from 24 th
October 2016 to 27th October 2016, with permission to leave
Headquarters. The Principal District Judge rejected the petitioner's
request to leave headquarters from 21 st October 2016 to 24th October
2016 and granted casual leave on 26th October 2016 and 27th October
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
2016. Despite rejection of her request, the petitioner left the
headquarters. Similarly, on 10th September 2016, the petitioner left
the headquarters without prior permission of the Principal District
Judge.
(iv) As regards Charge No.4, the petitioner directed the peon to
bring the bag of undistributed 28 books kept in District Court Library
in spite of petitioner having received books for her use.
(v) As regards Charge No.5, on 28th October 2016, the Principal
District Judge was holding a sitting at Daman, the concerned Bench
Clerk placed remand extension papers of the accused before the
petitioner. However, the petitioner refused to extend the remand on
the ground that the order has no recognition of the High Court.
(vi) As regards Charge No.6, the petitioner had issued orders dated
13th January 2017 and transferred some staff members. The Principal
District Judge vide his administrative order dated 16th January 2017
cancelled the said order passed by the petitioner dated 13 th January
2017. The Principal District Judge also directed the staff to forthwith
resume their original Court duty. However, the petitioner did not
relieve them, thereby disobeying the order of the Principal District
Judge.
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
(vii) As regards Charge No.7, Lokadalat was arranged on 9 th July
2016 at Silvassa and the petitioner was appointed as a Secretary of
DLSA. The Principal District Judge had also informed the petitioner
about non-availability of another Judicial Officer at the station due to
death of his mother. Hence, the application of the petitioner for grant
of permission to remain absent for the said Lokadalat was rejected.
The petitioner however chose to remain absent.
(viii) The petitioner also refused to hold a Legal Awareness Camp.
On 28th September 2016, the Principal District Judge had arranged a
Legal Aid Program after office hours, the petitioner on purpose did
not relieve the staff members to attend the said program.
(ix) As regards Charge No.8, the petitioner had shown favour
towards her own staff especially while arranging staff for remand
work, thereby not maintaining the judicial discipline which was
expected by the petitioner.
(x) As regards Charge No.9, the Principal District Judge directed
the petitioner to forward Notification dated 2nd September 2016 to
High Court for further directions and also directed the petitioner to
continue work of the Juvenile Justice Board. The petitioner disobeyed
the order thereby causing great inconvenience to the litigants and
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
lawyers.
(xi) As regards Charge No.10, on 17th April 2017, the petitioner
called Mr. Rane in her Chamber and scolded him on the point of his
staff members and also threatened the staff members thereby not
maintaining the judicial discipline.
(xii) As regards Charge No.11, the petitioner refused to record the
statement of the victim in Crime No.205/2017 which was registered
at Silvassa under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code read with
Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. She
stated that she has no power to record that statement.
(xiii) The findings of the Enquiry Officer were based on the evidence
recorded of the witnesses and there was no perversity in the
reasoning. Hence, this Court ought not to interfere with the well
reasoned order passed and the writ petition be dismissed.
The learned Senior Advocate relied upon the following judgments to
buttress his submissions.
(a) Shobhit Chamar & anr. vs. State of Bihar11;
(b) Pradeep Hiraman Kale vs. State of Maharashtra through Law
and Judiciary Department & anr.12;
(c) Janak Yadav & ors. vs. State of Bihar13.
11 (1998) 3 SCC 455
12 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1214
13 (1999) 9 SCC 125
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
(d) State Bank of Patiala and others vs. S. K. Sharma14
(e) Union of India and others vs. Dilip Paul15
ANALYSIS
9. This Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India cannot act as an appellate authority to reassess
the material taken into consideration by the Review Committee. Once
it is shown that there was material on record which prompted the
Review Committee to recommend non-continuation of the
petitioner's service in public interest, the scope for interference would
be rather limited. As observed in Ram Murti Yadav (supra), the
standards of probity, conduct and integrity that may be relevant for
discharge of duties by a careerist in another job cannot be the same
for a judicial officer. The petitioner has not alleged any malafides
while assailing the recommendation of the Review Committee or
ultimate decision taken to dismiss her from service.
10. At the outset, we wish to state that the scope of judicial
review in matters relating to termination of judicial service is now
confirmed to very limited extent, where there is violation of
principles of natural justice or infirmity in decision making process or
patent illegality. We propose to refer to some of the decisions on this
14 (1996) 3 SCC 364
15 (2023) INSC 975
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
issue. The disciplinary proceedings are not a criminal trial and in
spite of the fact that same are quasi judicial and quasi criminal,
doctrine of proof beyond reasonable doubt, does not apply in such
case. The principle of preponderance of probabilities would apply.
The Court has to see whether there is some evidence on record to
reach the conclusion that the delinquent had committed a
misconduct. However, the said conclusion should be reached on the
basis of tests of what a prudent person would have done and the said
decision has to be applied keeping in mind the position and the
nature of job the delinquent is occupying and keeping in mind the
larger public interest.
11. The Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at
Bombay Through its Registrar vs. Shashikant S. Patil and Another 16
considered the scope available for Courts while exercising jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while considering a
challenge to an order passed by the Disciplinary Authority of the High
Court. In paragraph 16 it observed as under:-
"16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached
the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the
administrative/ disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference
with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such
authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural
16 (2000) 1 SCC 416
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of
such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by
considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if
the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly
arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at
such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot
overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary
Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the
inquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if
there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then
adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for
canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article
226 of the Constitution."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. The Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at
Bombay v. Udaysingh s/o. Ganpatrao Naik Umbalkar17 law laid down
on this subject and observed in Paragraph No.7 as under :-
"7. Having regard to the respective contentions, the question that arises a
for consideration is whether the view taken by the Division Bench is
sustainable in law. As regards the nature of the judicial review, it is not
necessary to trace the entire case-law. A Bench of three Judges of this
Court has considered its scope in its recent judgment in B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India in which the entire case-law was summed up in paragraphs
12, 14 and 15 thus: (SCC pp. 759-60)
"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the
manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant
to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure
that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in
the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of
misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to
determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent office or
whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings
or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with
the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a
finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some
evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact
or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the
authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support
therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power
17 (1997) 5 SCC 129
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the
evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence.
The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the
proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the
mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the
disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding
be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the
Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and
mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
14. In Union of India v. S.L. Abbas when the order of transfer was
interfered with by the Tribunal, this Court held that the Tribunal was not
an appellate authority which could substitute its own judgment to that
bona fide order of transfer. The Tribunal could not, in such circumstances,
interfere with orders of transfer of a government servant.
In Administrator of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. H.P. Vora³ it was held that
the Administrative Tribunal was not an appellate authority and it could
not substitute the role of authorities to clear the efficiency bar of a public
servant. Recently in State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow a
Bench of this Court of which two of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy and B.L.
Hansaria, JJ.) were members, considered the order of the Tribunal, which
quashed the charges as based on no evidence, went in detail into the
question as to whether the Tribunal had power to appreciate the evidence
while exercising power of judicial review and held that a tribunal could
not appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion to that of
the disciplinary authority. It would, therefore, be clear that the Tribunal
cannot embark upon appreciation of evidence to substitute its own
findings of fact to that of a disciplinary/appellate authority."
13. It is also relevant to note the observations of the Supreme
Court in the case of Ram Murti Yadav v. State of U.P. 18 wherein it is
observed as under:-
"14. A person entering the judicial service no doubt has career
aspirations including promotions. An order of compulsory
retirement undoubtedly affects the career aspirations. Having said
so, we must also sound a caution that judicial service is not like any
18(2020) 1 SCC 801
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
other service. A person discharging judicial duties acts on behalf of
the State in discharge of its sovereign functions. Dispensation of
justice is not only an onerous duty but has been considered as akin
to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, is a very serious matter.
The standards of probity, conduct, integrity that may be relevant for
discharge of duties by a careerist in another job cannot be the same
for a judicial officer. A Judge holds the office of a public trust.
Impeccable integrity, unimpeachable independence with moral
values embodied to the core are absolute imperatives which brooks
no compromise. A Judge is the pillar of the entire justice system and
the public has a right to demand virtually irreproachable conduct
from anyone performing a judicial function. Judges must strive for
the highest standards of integrity in both their professional and
personal lives."
14. In the light of the aforesaid legal position, it is clear that while
examining a challenge to an order passed by the Disciplinary
Authority pursuant to the departmental inquiry, the inquiry report
furnished would be required to be examined. While doing so, this
Court would not act as an Appellate Court so as to re-appreciate the
material on record and arrive at it own findings. It is only if it is
found that the inquiry proceedings have been held in a manner
inconsistent with the principles of natural justice or in violation of
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
statutory rules or where the conclusion or finding recorded by the
Disciplinary Authority is based on no evidence that the Court may
consider interfering with such order. As held in Dilip Paul (supra), in
a disciplinary proceeding the standard of proof is preponderance of
probabilities and the courts must only interfere where the findings
are either perverse or based on no evidence at all.
15. We have perused the report of the Inquiry Officer dated 30 th
January 2020. It is seen that on behalf of the Presenting Officer
about 29 witnesses were examined to substantiate eleven charges
that were framed against the petitioner. The opportunity of cross-
examination was availed by the petitioner. We may now briefly
consider the Inquiry Report:-
(a) Charge No.1 pertains to the conduct of the petitioner in going
to the residence of the maid servant, Smt. Parvati for conducting a
search with regard to the gold ornaments which were stated to have
been stolen from the residence of the petitioner. This search was
stated to have been taken place on 17 th July 2017 prior to the
registration of the First Information Report No.114 of 2017 on 18 th
July 2017. The evidence on record indicates that the petitioner
alongwith police officials visited the house of the maid servant on
17th July 2017 despite being told that such search could not be
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
undertaken without registration of the crime of theft. The Inquiry
Officer after referring to the testimony of witness nos. 2 to 4, 6 and 8
held that the petitioner did visit the house of maid servant for taking
search thereof. The stand taken by the petitioner that she was under
the impression that the First Information Report was already
registered was not accepted as she had been apprised of the same by
the police officials. The further charge is that the petitioner visited
M/s Saraswati Jewellers so as to purchase ornaments similar to those
that had been stolen and then required the Police Department to foot
the bill. P.W. 9, the Manager of M/s Saraswati Jewellers as well as
the concerned police officials were examined. Reference was made
to the relevant footage of the Close Circuit Television installed at M/s
Saraswati Jewellers dated 4th August 2017. On the basis of the
material on record and on the principle of preponderance of
probability, Charge No.1 as framed amounting to serious judicial
impropriety as well as of conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer
was held to be proved.
(b) Charge No.2 pertains to use of the official vehicle from 24 th
May 2016 to 9th July 2016 by the petitioner for travelling from
Daman to Silvassa without obtaining prior permission from the High
Court. Similar travel was undertaken by the petitioner to attend
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
training at Maharashtra Judicial Academy, Uttan by using the official
vehicle on 5th March 2017. The said vehicle was detained for a period
of two days with its driver without any prior permission. In this
regard, it is seen that the Inquiry Officer has found that though the
petitioner moved an application seeking permission to use the official
vehicle, as rejection of the said application was not communicated to
her, she was under the impression that the same was granted. In this
regard, the learned Principal District Judge at the relevant point of
time was examined who denied grant of any such permission to use
the official vehicle. Similarly, the request made by the petitioner for
grant of permission to attend the workshop at Uttan on 5 th March
2017 came to be rejected. Despite aforesaid, the official vehicle was
used for attending the training programme. Again the learned
Principal District Judge discharging duties at the relevant period was
examined to prove this aspect. On this basis, the Inquiry Officer has
held this charge to be proved.
(c) Charge No.3 indicates that the petitioner had sought casual
leave from 24th October 2016 to 27th October 2016 with permission
to leave the Head Quarters. Her request was partly allowed and she
was granted casual leave for 24 th October 2016 to 27th October 2016.
Despite rejection of her request for the earlier period, it is stated that
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
the petitioner left the Head Quarters. She therefore filed an
application on 5th-7th November 2016 for grant of commuted leave
from 24th October 2016 to 27th October 2016. The learned Principal
District Judge treated her period of absence from 24 th October 2016
and 25th October 2016 leave without pay. Against the aforesaid
order, she filed an application on 28th February 2017 using harsh
language against the superior authority. On 10th September 2016
also the petitioner left the Head Quarters without prior permission of
the Principal District Judge. The Inquiry Officer has found that this
charge was proved from the official record coupled with deposition of
the clerical staff on duly at the relevant time as well as the deposition
of the Principal District Judge. It was also found that no permission
was sought for leaving the Head Quarters on 10 th September 2016 as
a result of which urgent remand work was required to be undertaken
by another judicial officer. The said other judicial officer was already
engaged in the workshop of Lok Adalat. It had been held on the basis
of material on record that such conduct of the petitioner had caused
an obstruction in the smooth functioning of the administration and
also amounted to insubordination.
(d) Charge No.4 pertains to directions given by the petitioner to
the concerned peon to bring back the undistributed books that were
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
kept in District Court Library to her chamber. In the absence of the
Library in-charge, said books were kept in the petitioner's Chamber.
The Inquiry Officer noted that the concerned clerk who acted on the
instructions of the petitioner as well as the Library in-charge were
examined to prove the charge. It was found that the said twenty
eight books were not part of the District Court Library but had
remained undistributed to a judicial officer who had been transferred
in the meanwhile. Without seeking permission of the Principal
District Judge and without having an access to the same, such books
were brought by the petitioner through witness no.17 in her chamber.
This conduct was also found to be unbecoming of a judicial officer.
(e) As regards Charge No.5, it is stated that the petitioner failed to
pass orders for remand extension on the ground that the direction
issued by the Principal District Judge in that regard was not
recognized by the High Court. The Inquiry Officer after considering
the evidence on record has found that such act on the part of the
petitioner amounted to insubordination. Under the Office Order
dated 11th June 2014, the matters were placed before the petitioner
as Chief Judicial Magistrate. Despite the same, the petitioner refused
to to pass remand orders. Such conduct has been held to be
improper and lacking devotion to duty.
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
(f) Charge No.6 pertains to the petitioner issuing transfer orders
dated 11th January 2017 to staff members without any authority. It
is stated that the petitioner passed two orders dated 13 th January
2017 and 18th January 2017 transferring clerical staff from one court
to another without having any authority to do so. These orders were
cancelled by the Principal District Judge on 16th January 2017 and
20th January 2017 respectively. Despite aforesaid, the petitioner on
18th January 2017 issued letter to the learned Principal District Judge
seeking to justify the transfer orders. The tenor of the letter was
found to be harsh containing unwarranted words. These acts were
found to be in breach of judicial discipline amounting to misconduct,
thus unbecoming of an judicial officer.
(g) As regards Charge No.7, same pertains to making necessary
arrangement for conduct of Lok Adalat on 9 th July 2016. The
petitioner was appointed as Secretary of the District Legal Services
Authority and despite directions to attend the Lok Adalat, she sought
permission to remain absent. Though the petitioner was informed of
the non-availability of another judicial officer, the petitioner failed to
remain present at the Lok Adalat on 9 th July 2016. It has been found
that on various occasions, the petitioner failed to attend various legal
aid programmes and also was reluctant to permit her staff to attend
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
such programmes. After considering the material on record the
Inquiry Officer found that such conduct indicated indiscipline and
was unbecoming of a judicial officer.
(h) Charge No.8 has been found to be partly established and hence
same is not required to be gone into in detail.
(i) Charge No.9 pertains to work as member of the Juvenile
Justice Board. It is stated that the petitioner disobeyed the directions
issued by the Principal District Judge to preside over the Juvenile
Justice Board thus causing inconvenience to the litigants and lawyers.
On the basis of the evidence on record, the Inquiry Officer found that
despite directions the petitioner failed to preside over the Juvenile
Justice Board. The directions issued by the High Court and the
Principal District Judge in that regard were not followed. The
Inquiry Officer held that such conduct amounted to breach of judicial
discipline and lack of devotion towards work.
(j) Charge No.10 is stated to have been apparently established and
hence is not required to be gone into in detail. Similarly, insofar as
Charge No.11 is concerned, it is stated by the Inquiry Officer that the
same was probablised.
16. On the basis of the aforesaid material on record, the Inquiry
Officer held that Charge Nos. 1 to 7 and 9 to be duly proved. This
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
was after considering the relevant material on record. We find that
there is sufficient material on record in support of findings recorded
against such charges. We are satisfied that the aforesaid evidence on
record is sufficient to sustain the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer
that the aforesaid charges were duly proved and that the conduct of
the petitioner was unbecoming of a judicial officer. Charge nos.1 and
2 especially are found to be of a serious nature and definitely
unbecoming of a judicial officer. As noted earlier, the sufficiency or
otherwise of the evidence on record is not required to be gone into.
Presence of some legal evidence for supporting the conclusion of the
Enquiry Officer would be sufficient. Moreover, the Disciplinary
Authority has found this evidence sufficient for imposing a major
penalty on the petitioner. We therefore do not find any reason to
interfere with the report of the Enquiry Officer.
17. As regards the conduct of the departmental enquiry, it can be
seen that the Presenting Officer examined 29 witnesses who were
also cross-examined by the petitioner. Its evidence was closed on 30 th
January 2019. The petitioner was granted time to submit her
statement in accordance with Rule 8(18) of the Rules of 1979. The
proceedings were thereafter adjourned from time to time on 6 th
December 2019, 7th December 2019, 9th December 2019 , 13th
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
December 2019 and 19th December 2019. The petitioner however
failed to remain present on these dates for submitting her statement
of defence as per Rule 8(18). Hence the Enquiry Officer proceeded
ex-parte against the petitioner in the departmental enquiry. The
petitioner thereafter appeared on 30th December 2019 and prayed for
setting aside the ex-parte order. The said request was accepted and
her statement of defence was taken on record. An opportunity was
granted to the petitioner to lead evidence. The petitioner again failed
to attain the proceedings on 2nd January 2020 and issued an e-mail
communication stating therein that she did not intend to either
examine herself or any other witness. The enquiry proceedings were
thereafter kept on 9th January 2020, 10th January 2020, 16th January
2020 and 17th January 2020 but the petitioner failed to remain
present. The petitioner however filed her written note of arguments.
It is thereafter that the report of the Enquiry Officer was submitted
on 30th January 2020.
The aforesaid manner in which the enquiry was conducted
indicates that sufficient opportunity was granted to the petitioner to
submit her statement of defence. Though she was proceeded ex-
parte, that order was recalled and further opportunity was granted to
her. The petitioner however did not lead any evidence in support of
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
her defence. It can thus be seen that the enquiry was conducted in a
fair manner after affording sufficient opportunity to the petitioner. No
fault whatsoever can be found in this regard.
18. Coming to the contention raised by the petitioner as regards
breach of the provisions of Rule 8 (20) of the Rules of 1979 is
concerned, it is urged that since the circumstances appearing against
the petitioner were not put to her so as to grant her an opportunity to
explain such circumstances appearing against her, the enquiry
proceedings were vitiated. Reliance has been placed on the decisions
in Wasudeo Madhukarrao Pande, Masuood Alam Khan-Pathan and
Vijay s/o. Shamrao Bhale (supra). On the other hand, according to
the respondents, the plea with regard to violation of the provisions of
Rule 8 (20) was not raised by the petitioner any time earlier. It is
further stated that the petitioner has failed to show any prejudice
caused to her because of the alleged infraction of Rule 8(20). The
petitioner in fact had waived her right in this regard.
It is to be noted that the petitioner had cross-examined all
witnesses who had been examined by the Presenting Officer. She was
aware of the evidence on record against her. She however chose not
to examine herself or any other witness in her defence. Moreover,
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
after the petitioner stated that she did not intend to lead any
evidence on 2nd January 2020, the enquiry proceedings were fixed on
four subsequent occasions when too the petitioner failed to remain
present before the Enquiry Officer. Instead, the petitioner filed
written note of arguments on 16 th January 2020 without making a
request before the enquiry Officer to ensure compliance with the
provisions of Rule 8 (20) of the Rules of 1979. In these facts and
especially the manner in which the petitioner conducted herself
during the enquiry proceedings and remain absent and further in the
absence of any prejudice being shown, we do not find that absence of
an opportunity as contemplated by Rule 8 (20) can result in vitiating
the entire departmental proceedings. As held in State Bank of Patiala
(supra), the test to be applied is "all things taken together whether
the delinquent officer/employee had or did not have a fair hearing".
Recently, in Dilip Paul (supra) it was reiterated that to determine if
prejudice had been caused by the violation of a procedural rule or
facet of natural justice, it must be shown that the violation had some
bearing upon the outcome or that the result would have been
different. On the basis of the material before the Enquiry Officer, we
do not find that the ultimate result would have been different. Thus,
even if the aspect of waiver is ignored as it had not been specifically
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
raised in the affidavit in reply of the respondent no.2, considering the
fact that no evidence was led by the petitioner nor was any plea
raised by the petitioner in this regard in her written note of
arguments, the petitioner cannot get over the findings of the Enquiry
Officer. The said contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted.
19. On the aspect of lack of opportunity of hearing being granted
to the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority, we find that the Rules
of 1979 especially Rule 9(4) thereof do not contemplate grant of any
opportunity of hearing to the delinquent. Rule 9(4) of the Rules of
1979 reads as under: -
"(4) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings
on all or any of the articles of charge and on the basis of the
evidence adduced during the inquiry, is of the opinion that any
of the penalties specified in [clauses (v) to (ix) of sub-rule (1)
of rule 5] should be imposed on the Government servant, it
shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be
necessary to give the Government servant any opportunity of
making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed :
Provided that, in every case where it is necessary to
consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry shall be
forwarded by the disciplinary authority to the Commission for
its advice, and such advice shall be taken into consideration
before making an order imposing any such penalty on the
Government servant.]"
The written submissions of the petitioner in response to the enquiry
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
report were placed before the Disciplinary Authority which after
considering the enquiry report and the written statement of defence
proposed imposing a major penalty on the petitioner. In these facts
therefore the ratio of the decisions in Delhi Transport Corporation,
Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty & anr. and Ram Ratan (supra), cannot be
made applicable to the case in hand. Moreover, Rule 9 of the Rules of
1979 as considered in Yoginath D. Bagde now stands amended and
hence ratio laid down therein cannot be made applicable to the case
in hand.
20. In Pradeep Hiraman Kale (supra), the Division Bench to which
one of us (A.S. Chandurkar, J.) was part of the Bench has held as
under:-
"22. The stature of a judge in the society is also worth
noting. It is a universally accepted norm that Judges and
Judicial Officers must act with dignity and must not
indulge in a conduct or behaviour which is likely to
affect the image of judiciary or which unbecoming of a
Judicial Officer. If the Members of the judiciary indulge
in a behaviour which is blameworthy or which is
unbecoming of a Judicial Officer, the Writ Courts are not
expected to intervene and grant relief to such a Judicial
Officer. Ordinarily, an order terminating services of a
Judicial Officer by passing an order of dismissal from
service or other on the recommendation of the High
Court as contemplated under Article 235 of Constitution
of India would be liable to be interfered with broadly on
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
proof of breach of a constitutional provision, principles
of natural justice or the applicable service rules."
21. In Janak Yadav (supra) the Supreme Court held that question
of prejudice to the accused, in case of defective examination, is
different than no examination at all. The Court held that Appellate
Court may either examine the accused itself or direct re-trial of case
confined to the stage of recording the statement of the accused.
Direction for re-trial of the entire case by framing de-novo charges
was held to be improper. In the present proceedings, according to us,
enough opportunity was granted to the petitioner before the Enquiry
Officer.
22. Thus after carefully considering the ratio of the decisions relied
upon by the learned counsel for the parties and the submissions made
before us, we do not find that any exceptional case has been made
out for this Court to interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. The conduct of the petitioner has
been found to be unbecoming of a judicial officer. In the judgment of
the High Court of Judicature of Patna Through Registrar General vs.
Shyam Deo Singh and Others19, the Supreme Court has held that in
the formation of opinion for the purposes of continuation in service,
19 (2014) 4 SCC 773
Diksha Rane WPL 29423-22.doc
limited judicial review is permissible. The charges proved against the
petitioners are quite serious in nature. The material on record in the
present case is found to be sufficient to sustain the recommendation
of the Review Committee and acceptance of that recommendation by
the Hon'ble Governor. In that view of the matter, the writ petition
stands dismissed. No costs.
[ RAJESH S. PATIL, J. ] [ A.S. CHANDURKAR, J. ]
Signed by: Diksha Rane
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 29/03/2025 16:06:09
