Bombay High Court
Arun Hastimal Firodia vs The State Of Maharashtra And Another on 27 March, 2025
2025:BHC-AUG:9103
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 64 OF 2023
Arun s/o Hastimal Firodiya ... Petitioner
Age: 77 years, Occu: Business (Ori. Accused
R/o Kinetic Engineering Ltd., No.3)
D-1 Block, Plot No. 18/2
MIDC, Chinchwad, Pune 411 019
VERSUS
1. The State of Maharashtra
2. Ramrao Hanumantrao Kandekar ... Respondents
Age 77 years, Occu: Agri. (R-2/employee)
R/o Nepti,Tq. & Dist. Ahmednagar
Mr. Rajendrraa Deshmukkh, Senior Advocate a/w Ms. Rakshanda Rajan
Jaiswal i/by Mr. Arun Firodia, Advocate for the Petitioner,
Mr. S. M. Ganachari, APP for Respondent No.1 State
Mr. V. P. Golewar, Advocate for Respondent No.2
CORAM : Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J.
RESERVED ON : 10.03.2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 27.03.2025
JUDGMENT:
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1. At the outset it is to be mentioned that, on 06.02.2025, during
the course of argument, Mr. Rajendrraa Deshmukkh, the learned senior
counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Mr. V. P. Golewar, learned counsel
for respondent No.2 jointly made the statement about amicable settlement
of dispute between the parties. In pursuance of said statement, the
Petitioner/Chairman of the Industrial Establishment and employer of
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Respondent i.e. Kinetic Engineering Ltd., tendered offer at Exh. 'X'. The
Respondent No.2/ Employee tendered his offer at Exh. 'Y'. As per offer
Exh. 'X' submitted by the petitioner, the respondent No.2 employee is
entitled for monetary benefits arising out of his service to Rs.10,30,000/-,
whereas, the respondent No.2/ employee submitted his offer Exh. 'Y' and
claimed that, he is entitled for monetary benefits of Rs.29,81,686/-. On
enquiry, both the parties declined to negotiate the offers and fairly stated
that they do not wish to settle the dispute. As such, matter is heard on
merit.
2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and by consent of the
parties, heard both sides finally at the admission stage.
3. By the present Petition, the Petitioner takes exception to the
order dated 17.11.2022 passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court,
Ahmednagar, in Revision (ULP) No.5 of 2022, thereby upheld the order of
issuance of process passed by the learned Judge, Labour Court,
Ahmednagar, on 06.08.2022, in Criminal Complaint (ULP) No. 9 of 2020
for non implementation of Judgment dated 29.11.2019 passed by the
learned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998.
4. In nutshell, facts giving rise to present petition are that,
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respondent No.2/complainant was in service of Kinetic Engineering Ltd.,
(for short, hereinafter it would be referred to as "Industrial
Establishment") as Machinist. The Respondent No.2 was served with
charge sheet on 30.01.1997 for his alleged misconduct. After domestic
enquiry, the respondent No.2 was dismissed from service vide order dated
08.05.1998. Being aggrieved by order of dismissal, respondent No.2 filed
Complaint (ULP) No. 57/1998 before the learned Labour Court,
Ahmednagar. On 29.11.2019, the learned Judge, Labour Court passed the
Judgment in Complaint (ULP) No. 57/1998 and allowed said complaint
declaring that, the order of dismissal passed on 08.05.1998 by the
employer amounts to unfair labour practice contemplated under Item
1(a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and (g) of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices
Act, 1971 ( for short, the MRTU & PULP Act).
5. Being aggrieved by said Judgment, the employer/Industrial
establishment had filed Revision Petition (ULP) No. 4 of 2020 before the
Industrial Court. On 14.12.2021, the learned Member, Industrial Court,
passed the Judgment in Revision petition (ULP) No. 4 of 2020 and upheld
Judgment dated 29.11.2019 passed by the learned Labour Court in
Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998. Being aggrieved by both the Judgments,
the Employer/Industrial Establishment filed Writ Petition No.11899 of
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2022 before this Court. On 12.01.2022, this Court passed an order in
Writ Petition No.11899 of 2022 and issued "Rule". However, this Court
declined to grant interim stay to the effect and operation of Judgment
dated 14.12.2021 passed by the learned Industrial Court. The said petition
is pending for final decision. Thereafter, the respondent No.2 filed the
Criminal Complaint (ULP) No. 9 of 2020 under section 48(1) of the MRTU
& PULP Act and prayed for taking criminal action against the Respondents
for non implementation of Judgment passed by the learned Labour Court.
6. The Respondent no. 2 alleged that, his employer/Industrial
Establishment failed to comply with Judgment dated 29.11.2019 passed
by the learned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 57/1998 despite no
stay is in operation for implementing judgment dated 29.11.2019 and
issued notice on 06.01.2020 calling upon the accused i.e. General
Manager/Manager/Vice President/Managing Director/President for
complying with Judgment passed by the learned Labour Court. The
Accused No.1 General Manager, the Industrial Establishment served with
the notice but failed to comply with notice. The Notice of Accused No.2
Vice President/Managing Director and Accused No. 3 President returned
back with postal endorsement 'unclaimed'. Therefore, the Accused No.2
and Accused No.3 are deemed to be served within the meaning of Sec. 27
of the General Clauses Act,1897.
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7. On 11.02.2021, the learned Judge, Labour Court recorded
verification and testified contents of the complainant under Section 48(1)
of the MRTU & PULP Act. On 06.08.2022, the learned Labour Court
passed the order and issued process against Accused No.1 Dattatray
Marutrao Nawale, the General Manager, Accused No.2 Mr. Ajinkya Arun
Firodiya, the Vice President/Managing Director and Accused No.3 Mr. Arun
Hastimal Firodiya, the Chairman /President (present petitioner) for the
offence under Section 48(1) of the MRTU & PULP Act.
8. Being aggrieved by order of issuance of process, the
Petitioner/accused No.3 filed Revision (ULP) No. 5 of 2022 questioning
order of issuance of process. On 17.11.2022, the learned Member,
Industrial Court, Ahmednagar, passed the impugned judgment and
dismissed said Revision. Being aggrieved by said judgment, the
Petitioner/Accused No.3 Arun Hastimal Firodiya, the President of
Industrial Establishment has instituted the present petition and set out
following grounds:
(i) The learned Member, Industrial Court could have held that there
is nothing on record to show the present petitioner is responsible
for a compliance of the order dated 29.11.2019 passed by the
learned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP)No.57/ 1998.
(ii) The learned Member Industrial Court could have observed that
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since 1998 till institution of the petition, several proceedings were
initiated by the respective parties against each other and to none
of the petition or proceeding, the present petitioner is party also,
nothing has been brought on record to show the bonafide
intention of respondent No.2 to implead the petitioner as an
accused.
(iii) The learned Member Industrial Court could have observed that
respondent No.2 also lodged complaint against the Managing
Director of the Industrial Establishment therefore, it ought to have
held that as per provisions of Section 2(n) of the Factories Act,
1948, the occupier is responsible for day to day affairs of the
Industrial Establishment. Therefore, the order for issuance of
process against the Chairman of the Industrial establishment is
not legal and proper.
(iv) There is no averment in the complaint that the present petitioner
is responsible for the compliance of the order passed by the
learned Labour Court, which is essential ingredient for issuance of
process under section 48(1) of the MRTU & PULP Act. However,
the learned Courts below have failed to consider the legal
prepositions of law.
(v) The learned Member, Industrial Court ought to have observed that
the Industrial Establishment had filed Writ Petition No.
11899/2022 challenging the judgment and order dated
14.12.2021 passed in Revision petition (ULP) No. 4 of 2020
arising out of judgment and order dated 29.11.2019 passed in
Complaint (ULP) No. 57/1998 and the fact of pendency of the
said petition is well within the knowledge of respondent No.2,
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however, respondent No.2 employee has filed criminal
proceedings under Section 48 (1) of the MRTU & PULP Act, just
to harass the Petitioner/accused No.3 President of the Industrial
Establishment who is old aged person and suffering from various
ailments.
9. Mr. Rajendrraa Deshmukkh, the learned Senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner canvassed that, the petitioner was not party
before the learned labour Court in complaint (ULP) No. No. 57/1998,
however, the Accused no. 2 is the occupier of Industrial Establishment
within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the Factories Act, 1948, therefore,
he is responsible for day to day affairs of the Industrial Establishment.
Therefore, order for issuance of process against the petitioner/accused
Chairman of the Industrial establishment is not legal and proper.
10. In support of these submissions, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Petitioner relied on the following case laws:
(I) Judgment dated 29.10.2021 passed in SLP (Cri.)
No.3913/2020, Dyale Desouza Vs. Government of India, wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a company being a juristic person
cannot be imprisoned and it can be subjected to a fine which, in itself is a
punishment. Every punishment has an adverse consequence and therefore,
the prosecution of the Company is mandatory. The exception would
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possibly be when the company has itself been ceased to exist or cannot be
prosecuted due to a statutory bar. However, such exceptions are of no
relevance in the present case. Thus, the present prosecution must fail for
this reason as well.
(II). Madhav Ramkrishna Chitniss Vs. State of Maharashtra LAWS
(BOM) 1998-9-100, wherein issue was under consideration that, whether
the accused Nos. 1 to 14 therein could be attributed with knowledge of
the interim order when they were not parties to the first complaint? Under
these circumstances, this Court observed in paragraph Nos. 17, 25 and 32
as under:
"(17.) UNLESS, therefore, it can be established that Accused Nos. 1
to 14 are to be held liable because they are the Directors of the
Company of that the orders were against them, in my opinion, there
cannot be any question of being held responsible criminally.
(25) IN this background, so far as the petitioners are concerned,
except for the fact that they happened to be the Directors of the
company, there is no question of they having the knowledge of the
order passed by way of interim relief in the first compliant and,
therefore, the act on their part can not be related to the so called
knowledge when it was sought to be imputed only on the strength of
they being Directors. Certainly this can not be accepted.
(32) THE net result is, therefore, that the complaint of breach can be
filed against the person to whom the order is served. Unless it is
shown that the persons, who were allegedly committed breach of an
order, were served with the order or whether they are made aware of
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the order and, therefore, are said to be made answerable for the
wilful disobedience thereof, there can not be a compliant on the basis
of deeming fictions which is sought to be raised on the basis of they
being directors."
(III) Indian Tourism Development Corporation & others Vs.
Presiding Officer, 9th Labour Court, Mumbai and another,2009(5) Mh.L.J.
493, wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court held that, unless interim
orders are served personally, no action for contempt can be initiated
against persons concerned. So, the order for issuance of process has to be
passed after proper application of mind as laid down in case of State of
Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 and
M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and
others, 1998 (1) Mh. L.J (SC) 599.
(IV) S. S. Industries and Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Rajendra N. Gurav,
Mumbai, wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court considered Rule
96(a) of the Labour Courts (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 1975 and
Section 39 of the MRTU and PULP Act and observed as under:
"(6) Section 39 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and
Prevention of Unfair labour Practices Act, 1971 provides three
categories of persons who are competent to file criminal complaint
against the persons who commit offence under section 48(1) of the
said Act. The person affected would be category No. 1. The person
means a body of individual, also unrecognised union can be
complainant under the cover of body of individual and as said, it has a
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right to institute a criminal complaint taking recourse to section 39 of
the said Act. In the present proceedings, the respondent No. 2, by
virtue of application made by 16 employees under Order I, Rule 8 of
C.P.C. has made an application to the Industrial Court. The
complainant did not satisfy his role in the matter nor he figured in
those employees, complaint could not have been attended to without
other employees being informed or specific leave of the Court is
obtained. Explanation in complaint by respondent No. 1 is without
legal base. Personal execution can only be taken by party on record.
(7) In the criminal complaint by respondent No. 1 in paragraph 1
he refers of Noel Monteiro, being authorised person to file the
proceedings in representative capacity. In paragraph 9, it is informed
that the petitioners stopped appearing in complaint (ULP) No. 741 of
2000 and did not file written statement and consequently, the order
dated 20th October, 2007 was recorded by the Industrial Court. The
learned Judge had examined various facts but he was not informed
deliberately of restoration and the complainant therein (respondent
No. 1) was not a party to the original proceedings. Taking survey of
the above facts, the order of process issued by the learned Judge,
Labour Court dated 6th January, 2009 is set aside. Petition is allowed
in the above terms."
(V) United Helichapters Pvt. Ltd. and others Vs. S. P. Apsingekar,
LAWS (BOM)- 2014-2-360, wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court
dealt with the order of issuance of process against the petitioners therein
by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate for the offence punishable under
Clause 13(1)(c) of the Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment
and Welfare) Scheme 2022 read with section 3(3) of the Maharashtra
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Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act,
1981. Petitioner No.2 therein was Chairman-cum-Managing Director and
Petitioner No.2 was the Head of HR Department of the company. Under
the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment in the case of ICICI
Bank Ltd. & others Vs. State of Maharashtra and another , 2011-II-LLJ-46
(Bom) was relied on, wherein it is observed as under:
"8. While dealing with a similar issue in Writ Petition No.
1773/2009 Tops Security Ltd. and Another Vs. S.P. Aspingekar,
Inspector, Security Guard Board for Greater Mumbai & Thane
District and Another relying on the judgment of the Apex Court
in the case of S.K. Alagh Vs. State of Uttar Pradsh and Others
(2008) 5 SCC 662: (2008) 1 MLJ (Cri) 1360, I have held that
unless a statute specifically provides for vicarious liability of a
director or any other employee for an offence committed by the
emplo"8. While dealing with a similar issue in Writ Petition No.
1773/2009 Tops Security Ltd. and Another Vs. S.P. Aspingekar,
Inspector, Security Guard Board for Greater Mumbai & Thane
District and Another relying on the judgment of the Apex Court
in the case of S.K. Alagh Vs. State of Uttar Pradsh and Others
(2008) 5 SCC 662: (2008) 1 MLJ (Cri) 1360, I have held that
unless a statute specifically provides for vicarious liability of a
director or any other employee for an offence committed by the
employer such a director or employee cannot be vicariously held
liable. While considering the provisions of the Act along with
provisions of 2002 Scheme, specifically Clause 42(2) of the said
Scheme, I have held that unless the conditions specified in sub
clause 2 of Clause 42 are satisfied, a director or an officer of an
employee cannot be made liable for offences committed by an
employer."yer such a director or employee cannot be vicariously
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held liable. While considering the provisions of the Act along
with provisions of 2002 Scheme, specifically Clause 42(2) of the
said Scheme, I have held that unless the conditions specified in
sub clause 2 of Clause 42 are satisfied, a director or an officer of
an employee cannot be made liable for offences committed by an
employer."
11. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for Respondent
No.2 employee canvassed that, on 29.11.2019, the learned Labour Court
passed judgment in Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998 and set aside order
of dismissal passed on 08.05.1998 holding that the Employer of the
Respondent no. 2 indulged into unfair labour practice contemplated under
Item 1 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act,1971 and the Respondent
no. 2 employer is deemed to be in service w.e.f. 08.05.1998 and he is
entitled for full back wages with consequential benefits till date of his
superannuation. Further, on 14.12.2022, the learned Member, Industrial
Court passed the Judgment in Revision (ULP) No.4 of 2020 and affirmed
the Judgment passed by the learned Labour Court. Though the Employer
Industrial Establishment filed Writ Petition No. 11899 of 2022 before this
Court, however, on 12.01.2023, this Court issued Rule and declined to
grant stay to the operation of the judgment and order dated 14.12.2021
passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court, in Revision (ULP) No. 4
of 2020. Therefore, it is obligatory on the part of the Industrial
Establishment, its General Manager, Chairman/President/Vice President,
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Managing Director to comply with said Judgment, however, the Petitioner
and other Accused failed to comply the same.
12. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.2 further
canvassed that, on 06.01.2020, Respondent No.2 issued notice with both
the Judgments and had called upon the accused persons to comply with
the Judgments, however, notice of present Petitioner returned back with
postal endorsement "unclaimed". Respondent No.2 has specifically made
averment in complaint that, present Petitioner/accused No. 3 is President/
Chairman of the Industrial Establishment and he is responsible for day to
day affairs of the Industrial Establishment. Not only this, but the General
Manager of the Industrial Establishment was duly served with the notice
and fact of passing of the Judgment by learned Labour Court is within
knowledge of the present Petitioner/Accused No.3. Therefore, merely the
petitioner is old aged person and may be suffering from various ailments
cannot be the substantial ground for quashment of order of issuance
process passed by the learned Judge, Labour Court under Section 48(1) of
the MRTU & PULP Act, hence, prayed for dismissal of the Petition.
13. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.2 further
canvassed that, Mr. Arun Hastimal Firodia, the Chairman of the Industrial
Establishment had assailed order dated 06.08.2022 in Revision
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Petition(ULP) No. 5 of 2022 challenging order of issuance of process,
however, on 17.11.2022, the learned Member, Industrial Court passed the
impugned judgment and dismissed the Revision. Therefore, the accused
No.3/ the Chairman of the Industrial Establishment is responsible for the
day to day affairs of the Industrial Establishment and is under obligation
to comply with the Judgment passed by the Labour Court. However, the
petitioner failed to comply with said Judgment intentionally and
deliberately. Therefore, order of issuance of process under Section 48(1) of
the MRTU & PULP Act is just and proper, hence, prayed for dismissal of
the Petition.
14. In support of this submission, the learned counsel appearing
for Respondent No.2 relied on the following case laws as under:
(i) Sonu Gopta Vs. Deepak Gupta and others, (2015) 3 Supreme
Corut Cases 424, wherein it is held that at the stage of cognizance and
summoning, the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind only with
a view to take cognizance of offence or in other words, to find out
whether prima facie case has been made out for summoning the accused
person. At this stage, the Magistrate is not required to consider the
defence version or material or argument nor he required to evaluate the
merits of the material or evidence of the complainant, because the
Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to find out at this stage
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whether these materials will lead to conviction or not.
(ii) Satish J. Mehta and others Vs. The State of Maharashtra and
others, 1991 II CLR 547, wherein, it is held that Section 48 of the Act is
wide enough to cover the persons who are not parties to the complaint
provided they were bound to comply the order of the Industrial Court and
failed to comply the same. Therefore, the blanket proposition that in
each and every case, company is must in the array of the accused need not
be accepted.
(iii) Judgment dated 11th April,2016 passed by this Court in
Criminal Writ Petition No. 586 of 2014, Gulabrao Bhadu Pawar Vs.
Ajinkya Arun Firodya, Managing Director, Kinetic Engineering Ltd., and
observed in Paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 as under:
"6. In the present case, what is noticed is, the Industrial Court has
accepted the statement of accused person made in the application
which was without any legal foundation but for pleadings, and has
discharged the accused Ajinkya Firodiya. The least that was expected
of the Industrial Court was to consider the pleadings of the petitioner-
complainant in an application under Section 48(1) of M.R.T.U. &
P.U.L.P. Act, showing the respondent to be accused person in the same,
and proceeded after ascertaining liability and responsibility in
managing affairs of the Company, particularly in the matter of
compliance of the Judicial verdicts given by the learned Court in
favour of the petitioner to which respondent was party.
7. The order which is impugned in the present petition prima facie
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could be inferred as the one passed by the learned Industrial Court
without considering above referred parameters and hence not in tune
with the provisions of Section 48(1) of the Act. As a consequence of
above, even if original accused No. 1 Hemant Dike is convicted under
Section 48(1) of the Act, still in my opinion, the order of issuance of
process and the discharge order would not merged with the final
order passed against other accused Hemant. The role of the present
respondent Ajinkya has to be analysed. so as to find out whether he is
entitled for discharge."
(iv) Vijay Laxmanrao Vahadne Vs. Ajinkya Arun Firodiya, 218 All
M.R. (Cri) 499, wherein, the proceeding was initiated against the General
Manager who was convicted but the complainant did not get execution of
the order of reinstatement. Therefore, the Board of Directors and
Managing Director were expected to execute the orders of the Court.
(v) Judgment dated 20.04.2021 passed by this Court in Criminal
Writ Petition No. 1893 of 2019, Dilip Bhikaji Londhe Vs. Ajinkya Arun
Firodiya & another, wherein this court considered various case laws cited
therein as well scope of Section 48(1) of the MRTU & PULP Act and held
that, the offences made punishable thereunder would be continuous act of
a person of failing to comply with the order of the Industrial or Labour
Courts. There is no question of any double jeopardy. The order directing
the petitioner to be reinstated has reached finality and it is the obligation
of the company and the person managing its affairs to obey it. Therefore,
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so long as the order is not implemented/obeyed, it would always be open
for the person like the petitioner to seek to proceed against the persons
who according to him are responsible for execution and to obey the order
but have failed to do so. In para 13, this Court further observed that,
whether and if he would be able to establish the charge is a matter which
cannot be gone into at this stage. By sending a letter by Registered Post
AD and calling upon the respondents to obey the order of the Industrial
Court but fail to comply the same, would be entitled to insist for
implementation of the order which has been reached finality.
15. In the case in hand it is not in dispute that, the respondent
No. 2 filed Criminal Complaint (ULP) No. 9 of 2020 and specifically
alleged that, on 29.11.2019, the learned Labour Court passed judgment in
Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998 and set aside the order of his dismissal
dated 08.05.1998. So also, on 14.12.2021, the learned Member Industrial
Court passed the judgment and order in Revision Petition (ULP) No 4 of
2020 and affirmed the judgment dated 29.11.2019 passed by the learned
Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998.
16. It is a matter of record that, the Industrial Establishment filed
Writ Petition No. 11899 of 2022 challenging the judgment and order dated
14.12.2021 passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court in Revision
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(ULP) NO. 4 of 2020 arising out of judgment dated 29.11.2019 passed by
the learned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998. However,
on 12.01.2023, this Court simply issued Rule but declined to grant interim
relief.
17. No doubt, the Writ Petition No. 11899 of 2022 filed by the
Employer of Respondent NO.2 is subjudice before this Court. However,
merely the Petition is admitted without granting stay to the effect and
operation of the judgment and order dated 14.12.2021 passed by the
learned Member, Industrial Court in Revision Petition (ULP) No. 4 of 2020
arising out of judgment dated 29.11.2019 passed by the learned Labour
Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998, said judgment does not
automatically loose it's operation. Therefore, the Respondent No.2/
Employee has every right to get implemented the judgment and order
dated 29.11.2019 passed by the learned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP)
No. 57 of 1998.
18. Needless to say that, on 29.11.2019, the learned Labour Court
passed the judgment and order declaring that, the act of employer while
issuing order of dismissal of the Respondent's service on 08.05.1998
amounts to unfair labour practice under item 1(a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and
(g) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. It is further declared that,
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the order of dismissal of service of respondent is illegal, improper and bad
in law, hence, quashed and set aside the same. It is further held that, the
complainant superannuated during pendency of the complaint, therefore,
he is deemed to be in the service w.e.f. 08.05.1998 till the date of his
superannuation and he would be entitled for continuity in service with
full back wages and all consequential benefits.
19. The present petitioner is the Chairman of the Industrial
Establishment in which the respondent No.2 was employed. Therefore, the
petitioner/accused No.3 is responsible for day to day affairs of the
Industrial Establishment. It is not the case of the Petitioner/accused No.3
that, he was not having knowledge of passing judgment dated 29.11.2019
passed by the learned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998
and upheld by the learned Member, Industrial Court in Revision Petition
(ULP) No. 4 of 2020 on 14.02.2021. No doubt, the Industrial
Establishment filed Writ Petition No.11899 of 2022 before this Court
challenging Judgment dated 14.02.2021 passed in Revision Petition (ULP)
No. 4 of 2020. On 12.01.2023, this Court issued Rule in said Petition and
declined to stay to the judgment passed by the learned Industrial Court in
Revision Petition (ULP) No. 4 of 2020.
20. The Petitioner has not denied about issuance of notice dated
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06.01.2020 by the Respondent no. 2 alongwith Judgments passed by the
learned Revision and Labour Court calling for compliance of said
judgments, however, the envelope containing notice of petitioner returned
back with postal endorsement 'unclaimed'. Therefore, it is deemed to be
served within the meaning of Sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act.
21. Since this Court passed an order on 12.01.2023 in Writ
Petition No.11899 of 2022 and issued Rule but declined to stay effect and
operation of Judgment passed by the learned Labour Court in Complaint
(ULP) No. 57/1998, therefore, it is obligatory on part of the petitioner
accused to comply with said Judgment, which is upheld by the learned
Industrial Court. The petitioner/accused has not brought any
circumstances to show about making effort for compliance of said
Judgment. Therefore, considering the averments made in the complaint as
well verification statement, the learned Labour Court satisfied that, the
Respondent No.2 has made out case for issuance of process under Sec.
48(1)of the MRTU & PULP Act, which is upheld by the learned Member,
Industrial Court, on 17.11.2022.
22. The Petitioner/accused No.3 being the Chairman of the
Industrial Establishment having control and supervision over affairs and
day to day transaction of the said establishment, therefore, he is
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responsible to obey the judgment passed the Labour Court but inspite of
service of notice with judgment, the petitioner failed to implement the
judgment passed by the competent Court. Therefore, considering the
scope of Section 48(1) of the MRTU & PULP Act as well as law laid down
in the above cited cases, I am of view that, the findings recorded by both
the Courts below are just and proper, hence, no interference is called at
the hands of this Court.
23. In view of the above discussion, this Petition is dismissed. Rule is
discharged.
( Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J. )
At this stage, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks
extension of interim order granted on 27.02.2023, however, no substantial
ground is found to extend the same. Hence the prayer is hereby rejected.
( Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J. )
JPChavan
