Sachin Dhondiram Chavan vs Trupti Sachin Chavan
2025 Latest Caselaw 3482 Bom

Bombay High Court

Sachin Dhondiram Chavan vs Trupti Sachin Chavan on 26 March, 2025

Author: Madhav J. Jamdar

Bench: Madhav J. Jamdar

2025:BHC-AS:14713
                                                                                 911-WP-3747-2025(1).doc


                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                      WRIT PETITION NO.3747 OF 2025
                    Sachin Dhondiram Chavan                          ...Petitioner
                          Versus
                    Trupti Sachin Chavan                             ...Respondent
                    _______________________________________________________________
                    Mr. Shyamrishi Pathak, Mr. Satyavijay Yadav, Ms. Gayatri Pinkyar, for
                    the Petitioner.
                    Mr. Abhijit Adagule a/w Ms. Ketaki Patil, for the Respondent.
                    _______________________________________________________________
                                                            CORAM: MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J.
                                                            DATED: 26 MARCH 2025
                    JUDGMENT:

1. Heard Mr. Pathak, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner

and Mr. Adagule, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent.

2. By the present Writ Petition filed under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India, the challenge is to the legality and validity of the

Order dated 7th December 2024 passed by the learned Judge, Family

Court, Kolhapur below Exhibit-12 in Petition No. A-205 of 2024. By the

impugned order the learned Judge, Family Court, Kolhapur has rejected

the Application filed by the Petitioner-husband seeking withdrawal of

the consent given for passing the decree by mutual consent under

Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ("H.M.A.").

3. It is the submission of Mr. Pathak, learned Counsel appearing for

the Petitioner that the consent terms were executed as the relatives of

the Respondent have brought pressure on the Petitioner. He submits

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that the Petitioner's wish is to save the marriage.

4. On the other hand, it is the submission of Mr. Adagule, learned

Counsel appearing for the Respondent that in this case initially the

Petition before the Family Court has not been filed under Section 13-B

of the H.M.A. and the same has been filed seeking divorce on the

ground of cruelty by the Respondent-wife under Section 13(i-a) of the

H.M.A. and thereafter converted into a Petition filed under Section 13-B

of the H.M.A. The Petitioner has taken benefit of the consent terms and

after the Respondent complied with the consent terms the application

seeking withdrawal of the consent terms has been filed which is not

permissible. He relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this

Court in Prakash Alumal Kalandari v. Jahnani Prakash Kalandari 1 and

also on the decision of a learned Single Judge in the case of Rajesh

Pratap Sainani v. Bhavna Rajesh Sainani 2.

5. Before considering the rival contentions, it is necessary to set out

the factual position:

i. The marriage between the Petitioner and the Respondent took

place on 5th June 2010.

ii. Son is born on 13th October 2012.

iii. As there are serious disputes between both of them, they started

staying separate since 16th December 2019. The Respondent-

1 2011 ( 4) Mh.L.J. 187 2 2008 (6) Mh.L.J 853

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wife along with son started staying with her parents.

iv. The Respondent filed Application under the provisions of the

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 ("DV

Act") in the Court of the learned JMFC, Kolhapur bearing PWDV

Application No.114 of 2023.

v. The Petitioner filed Petition-A No.53 of 2023 in the Court of

Family Court, Kolhapur under Section 9 of the H.M.A.

vi. The Respondent-wife filed on 10th June 2024, Petition No. A-205

of 2024 seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section

13(1) (ia) of the H.M.A.

vii. As the parties decided to get the divorce by mutual consent,

amendment Application has been filed jointly by both the parties

under Order VI Rule 17 on 12th August 2024 for converting the

said Petition being Petition No. A-205 of 2024 under Section

13(1)(ia) of the H.M.A. to Petition seeking decree by mutual

consent under Section 13-B of the H.M.A. and the same has

been allowed by the learned Judge, Family Court by the

impugned Order dated 12th August 2024.

viii. The agreed terms between the parties have also been brought on

record by said amendment. The relevant terms are to be found

in Paragraph Nos.6, 7, 8 and 9, which read as under:-

ß6- ;krhy vtZnkj ua-2 ;kauh vtZnkj ua-1 ;kauk fookgle;h ?kkrysys lksU;kps xaB.k o NksVs eaxGlq= gs vtZnkj ua-1 ;kauh vtZnku ua-2 ;kauk

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ijr dj.ksps vkgs- rlsp vtZnkj ua-1 ;kaps vkbZ ofMykauk vtZnkj ua- 2 ;kauk lk[kjiqM;ke/;s ?kkrysyh vaxBh o dsnkj ;kaps fookgkr tko;kpk eku Eg.kqu ?kkrysyh vaxBh vtZnkj ua-2 ;kauh vtZnkj ua- 1 ;kuk ijr dj.ksph vkgs- rlsp vtZnkj ua-1 o 2 ;kauh ¶yWV ua-

903] , foax lkbZ osykWlhVh Qst &1 lOgsZ ua- 68@6 ikSM cko/ku cqnzqd] rk- eqG'kh- ft- iq.ks gh ¶yWV feGdr ,d=kr uksan.kh--r [ksjsnh dj.kslkBh jftLVj djkji= >kysys vkgs- rjh lnj djkji=ks vtZnkj ua-1 fgyk izkIr >kysys gDd o vf/kdkj vtZnkj ua-1 fgus foukgjdr vtZnkj ya-2 ;kaps gDdkr lksMwu ns.ksps vkgsr- R;kdfjrk djkO;k ykx.kk&;k uksan.kh--r nLrkl mifLFkr jkgwu lgh laerh ns.ksps vkgs- lnjph ckc ;krhy vtZnku ua-1 o 2 ;kauk ekU; o dcqy vkgs-

7- ;krhy vtZnku ua-1 ;k LoPNsus ?kVLQksV ?ks.ksl r;kj vlysus R;kauh vtZnkj ua- 2 ;kapsdMwu iksVxhpk dk;eLo:ih gDd lksMwu fnysyk vkgs- vtZnkj ua-1;kauh vtZnkj ua-2 ;kapsdMwu dk;eLo:ih iksVxkhpk gDd lksMwu fnysus R;kauh vtZnkj ua-2 o R;kaps dqVfaq c;kaps fo:/n ;kiq,s dks.kR;kgh dksVkZr iksVxh vFkok R;kaps Lfkkoj o taxe ekyeRrsckcr gDdklkBh dks.krkgh nkok] iksVxh vtZ] vihy dks.kR;kgh dksVkZr nk[ky dj.ksps ukgh- rlsp vtZnkj ua-1 ;kauh vtZnkj ua-2 ;kaP;k Lfkkoj o taxe feGdrhe/khy laiq.kZ gDd dk;ei.ks lksMwu fnysyk vkgs- 8- vtZnkj ua-1 o 2 ;kapk eqyxk fp- v.kZo pOgk.k ;kpk dk;eLo:ih rkck vtZnkj ua-1 ;kapsdMs jkg.kspk vlqu R;kps ikyu &iks"k.k] f'k{k.k] laxksiu gs loZ vtZnkj ua-1 ;kauhp dj.ksps vkgs lnjph ckc vtZnkj ua- 1 o 2 ;kauk ekU; o dcqy vkgs- rlsp vtZnkj ua-2 gs fp- v.kZo ;kps tud ofMy vlysus vtZnkj ua-2 gs fp- v.kZo ;kyk nksu efgU;krq ,dnk dksYgkiwj ;sFkhy dkSVqafcd U;k;ky;kr vxj R;kauk ;ksX; okVsy ;k fBdk.kh HksVrhy rlsp vtZnkj ua-2 ;kauk fp- v.kZo ;kyk HksVoLrq ns.ksph eqHkk jkghy ljnph ckc ;krhy vtZnkj ua-1 o 2 ;kauk ekU; o dcqy vkgs- vtZnkj ua-2 ;kauh fp- v.kZo ;kl HksV.ksdjhrm ;s.ksiqohZ fdeku vkB fnol vxksnj Hkzeu/ouh˜kjs vtZnkj ua- 1 ;kauk iwoZdYiuk ns.ksph vlwu mHk;arkps lks;huqlkj HksV.ksph osG o fnol rlsp fBdk.k Bjfo.ksps vkgs- rlsp fp- v.kZo ;kps 'kkGsph lqVVhps dkyko/khe/;s fp- v.kZo ;kl R;kaps ?kjh vktjk ;sFks ?ksowu tk.ksl vtZnkj ua-1 fgus vuqerh n'kZfoysyh vkgs- rFkkfi vtZnkj ua- 2 ;kaps cjkscj R;kaps ?kjh tk;ps dh ukgh gs loZLoh fp- v.kZo ;kps bPNsoj voyacwu vlsy- rFkkfi fp- v.kZo ;kl vtZnkj ua-2 ;kaps ?kjh vkB fnol jkg.kslkBh tk.ksl vtZnkj ua-1 ;kauh izksRlkfgr dj.ksps vkgs- 9- vtZnkj ua- 1 o 2 ;kauh Hkfo";kr ,desadkps fo:/n fnok.kh rlsp QkStnkjh [kVys] fQ;kZn vFkok R;kizek.ks dks.krsgh vtZ dks.kR;kgh dksVkZr nk[ky dj.ksps ukghr- vtZnkj ua-1 o 2 ;kauh lnjpk ?kVLQksVkpk vtZ nk[ky dsysuarj rlsp ?kVLQksV eatqj >kysura j ,desd a kps oS;fDrd vkiq";kr <oGk<oG dj.ksps ukgh vls lkeksipkjkus ekU; o dcqy dsysys vkgs-Þ

(Emphasis added)

The main terms of the said agreed consent terms are as

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follows:

(a) The Respondent wife has agreed to transfer

her right, title and interest in Flat No.903, "A" Wing,

Sai Velocity, Phase-I, Survey No.68/6, Bavdhan,

Budruk, Taluka-Mulshi, District-Pune in favour of the

Petitioner-husband.

(b) Both the parties agreed to return back the

ornaments to each other.

(c) The Respondent-wife has given up her right to

seek maintenance.

(d) The Respondent-wife has agreed not to claim

any right, title or interest with respect to any of the

properties of the Petitioner.

(e) The son is to remain with the Respondent and

it is her complete responsibility to maintain the son.

(f) Both the parties agreed not to institute any

proceedings in any Court. Thus, in effect what is

agreed is that all the pending proceedings between the

parties would also be withdrawn.

ix. The said consent terms are dated 12th August 2024.

x. In compliance with the said consent terms on 27 th August 2024

the Respondent wife has executed registered document

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transferring the said flat in favour of the Petitioner-husband.

xi. As per Clause No.9 of the said consent terms parties have to

withdraw various cases filed against each other. In compliance

with said Clause No.9, on 3rd October 2024, DV proceedings

filed by the wife has been withdrawn.

xii. After taking entire benefit of the consent terms and after getting

transfer all the right, title and interest with respect to said flat in

his favour and after withdrawal of the said DV case filed by the

Respondent-wife against the Petitioner-husband, immediately

within a period of 4 days i.e. on 7th October 2024, the Petitioner-

husband has filed Application for withdrawal of the consent

terms. It is absolutely clear that the Application which has been

filed by the husband for withdrawal of the consent is malafide.

xiii. In the above background, it is very important to consider the

reasons given by the Petitioner for withdrawal of the consent in

Application bearing Exhibit-12 filed in Petition No. A-205 of

2024, which reads as under:-

";krhy vtZnkj ua-2 ;kaps vtZnkj ua-1 iRuh o eqyxk v.kZo ;kpsojrh [kqi izse] yGk] ek;k vlY;kus vtZnkj ua-2 ;kauk vtZnkj ua-1 o v.kZo ;kapscjkscj jkgwu lalkj dj.kspk vkgs-

;krhy vtZnkj ua-2 gs vktgh vtZnkj ua-1 ;kauk ukanko;kl r;kj vkgsr rjh izLrqr leksipkjkus fookg foPNsnu vtkZl vtZnkj ua-2 ;kaukh fnysyh lgerh dk<qu ?ksr vkgsr- ;krhy vtZnkj ua-2 ;kauk izLrqrpk vtZ pkyfo.kspk ukgh- rjh izLrqrpk vtZ dk<qu Vkd.ksr ;kok gh uez fouarh vkgs-"

(Emphasis added)

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xiv. The said contention raised is malafide can be seen from the

following factual position:

(a) On 12th August 2024 Consent Terms arrived at.

(b) On 27th August 2024 the Respondent-wife transferred

the flat in favour of the Petitioner.

(c) On 3rd October 2024, DV proceedings filed by the

Respondent-wife against the Petitioner-husband is

withdrawn.

(d) On 7th October 2024 i.e. within a period of four days

after getting entire benefit out of the said Consent Terms, the

application is filed by the Petitioner-husband seeking leave to

withdraw the consent.

Thus, it is clear that the reasons given by the Petitioner-husband are

totally false and in any case the Application filed is for malafide

purpose.

6. In view of above factual position, it is necessary to see Section 13-

B of the H.M.A. which is regarding divorce by mutual consent, which

reads as under:

"13B. Divorce by mutual consent.--

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnised before or after the commencement of the

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Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.

(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnised and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree."

(Emphasis added)

Thus, Sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B provides that on the motion of

both the parties made not earlier then six months after the date of

presentation of the Petition referred in Sub-Section (1) and not later

than 18 months after the said date, if the Petition is not withdrawn, in

the meantime, the Court shall on being satisfied after hearing the

parties and after making such enquiry as it thinks fit that a marriage has

been solemnized and that the averments in the Petition are true, pass a

decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect

from the date of the decree. Thus, relevant provision is that not earlier

than six months after the date of the presentation of the Petition the

decree of divorce cannot be granted. It means the consent which is

given can be withdrawn within said period of six months or even till

passing of the decree. Even in the Petition presented under Section 13-B

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of the H.M.A. as per the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of

Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur 3 it has been held that even said

period of six months can be waived.

7. A Division Bench of this Court in the decision of Prakash (supra)

was considering the similar situation as in the present case. The

relevant Paragraph Nos.16 to 19 reads as under :-

"16. As aforesaid, if the Petition is filed "simplicitor under section 13B of the Act" for divorce by mutual consent, the Court must satisfy itself that the consent given by the parties continues till the date of granting decree of divorce. Even if one party unilaterally withdraws his/her consent, the Court does not get jurisdiction to grant decree of divorce by mutual consent in view of the mandate of section 13B of the Act. However, the situation would be different if the parties in the first instance resort to Petition for relief under section 9 or 13 of the Act and during the pendency of such Petition, they decide to invite decree for divorce by mutual consent. On the basis of agreed arrangement, if the parties were to execute Consent Terms and then file a formal Petition/Application to convert the pending Petition to be treated as having been filed under section 13B of the Act to grant decree of divorce by mutual consent, then, in the latter proceedings, before the decree is passed, one party cannot be allowed to unilaterally withdraw the consent if the other party has already acted upon the Consent Terms either wholly or in part to his/her detriment. In other words, the Court will have to be satisfied that: (i) there is sufficient, good and just cause for allowing the party to withdraw his consent, lest, it results in permitting the party to approbate and reprobate; (ii) that the other party would not suffer prejudice which is irreversible, due to withdrawal of the consent. If this twin requirement is not satisfied, the Court should be loath to entertain the prayer to allow the party to unilaterally withdraw his/her consent.

3 (2017) 8 SCC 746

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17. Reverting to the facts of the present case, we are in agreement with the finding recorded by the trial Court that the sole reason or justification given by the appellant husband for withdrawing his consent already given (that he was denied access of the children), is not substantiated by him. Whereas, the material on record would indicate that the real reason was the inability of the appellant husband to meet the children as he was in jail in connection with criminal cases and also because the children were unwilling to meet the appellant. Thus, it was not a case of respondent coming in the way of providing access of the children to the appellant. In other words, there was no sufficient or just cause established by the appellant for permitting him to withdraw his consent. Further, it has come on record that the respondent acted upon the Consent Terms dated 6th October, 2008 and performed her obligations and committed herself to waive the claim of maintenance for herself and also streedhan including to withdraw civil and criminal actions initiated by her against the appellant. Even for this reason, the appellant cannot be permitted to withdraw his consent as it would result in bestowing premium on the appellant in spite of his unjust and inequitable request to allow him to of unilaterally withdraw the consent. We are in agreement with the said conclusion reached by the Family Court.

18. In this view of the matter, the rejection of the application preferred by the appellant for withdrawal of his consent was inevitable; and at the same time, the Court was duty bound to dissolve the marriage between the parties and pass a decree of divorce by mutual consent on the basis of the Consent Terms already filed on record accompanied by a formal application/Petition filed by the parties to grant such decree. The Family Court has also adverted to Rule 31 of the Family Courts (Maharashtra) Rules, 1987. The same reads thus:

"31. Settlement before Counsellor: When the parties arrive at a settlement before the Counsellor relating to the dispute or any part thereof, such settlement shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the parties and countersigned by the Counsellor. The Court shall

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pronounce a decree or order in terms thereof unless the Court considers the terms of the settlement unconscionable or unlawful or contrary to public policy."

19. Notably, these Rules have been framed by the High Court in exercise of power bestowed in section 21 of the Family Courts Act. 1984. In terms of section 21(2) (c) of the Act, Rules can be framed to deal with the subject of efforts to be made by the Family Court and the procedure to be followed for assisting and persuading parties to arrive at a settlement. Rule 31. inter-alia deals with that subject. In terms of this Rule, therefore, the Court may pronounce a decree on the basis of the consent terms reduced into writing and signed by the parties, unless it were to be of the opinion that the terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties are unconscionable or unlawful or contrary to the public policy. None of these issues have been raised by the appellant. We, however, make it clear that Rule 31 will be of no avail to pass a decree on the basis of petition such as for relief under section 13 of the Act of 1955, as those petitions cannot be decreed merely because it is not defended or that parties have consented for passing decree on the ground pleaded therein. We have already alluded to this aspect hitherto."

(Emphasis added) [

Thus, the Division Bench of this Court has made distinction between

Petition which is originally filed under Section 13-B of the H.M.A. and a

Petition which has been filed seeking divorce under Section 13 of

H.M.A. or under Section 9 of the H.M.A. seeking restitution of the

conjugal rights and the same has been subsequently converted into

Petition seeking decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B

of the H.M.A. What is held is that if the Petition is filed under Section

13-B of the divorce by mutual consent, the Court must satisfy itself that

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the consent given by the parties continues till the date of granting

decree of divorce and that even if one party unilaterally withdraws the

consent, the Court does not get jurisdiction to grant decree of divorce

by mutual consent in view of the mandate of Section 13-B of H.M.A.

However, the situation would be different if the parties in the first

instance resort to the Petition for relief under Section 9 or Section 13 of

the H.M.A. and during pendency of such Petition they decide to invite

decree by mutual consent. The Division Bench has held that in such a

case one party cannot be allowed to unilaterally withdraw the consent if

the other party has already acted upon the Consent Terms either wholly

or in part to his/her detriment. In other words the Court will have to be

satisfied that: (i) there is sufficient, good and just cause for allowing the

party to withdraw his consent; (ii) that the other party would not suffer

prejudice which is irreversible, due to withdrawal of the consent. If

these twin requirements are not satisfied, the Court should not entertain

the prayer to allow the party to unilaterally withdraw his/her consent.

8. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent has also relied on

the decision of a learned Single Judge in Rajesh (supra). In that case,

although the Petition is filed under Section 13-B of the H.M.A., the

consent was withdrawn after a period of 7 months after getting all the

benefits of the Consent Terms. In the said factual position, the learned

Single Judge considered whether a party can be estopped from

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withdrawing consent and discussed the same in Paragraph Nos.29 to

31, which read as under :-

"29. The Apex Court in the case of B. L. Sreedhar vs. K. M. Munireddy AIR 2003 SC 578 held as under:

"The essential factors giving rise to estoppel are, I think

(a) A representation or conduct amounting to representation intended to induce a course of conduct on the part of the person to whom the representation was made.

(b) An act or omission resulting from representation whether actual or by conduct, by the person to whom the representation was made.

(c) Detriment to such person as a consequence of the act or omission where silence cannot amount to a representation, but where there is a duty to disclose, deliberate silence may become significant and amount to a representation. The existence of a duty on the part of a customer of a bank to disclose to the bank his knowledge of such a forgery as the one in question was rightly admitted."

30. In the case of Maddanappa (deceased) after him by his legal representatives vs. Chandramma and anr.. AIR 1965 SC 1812 the Supreme Court relying upon the judgment of Privy Council in the case of Saratchunder Dey vs. Gopal Chunder Laha 19 Ind App 203 (PC) explained the ingredients of the doctrine of estoppel and went on to hold that a person who sets up an estoppel against the other must show that his position was altered by reason of the representation or conduct of the latter and unless he does that, even the general principle of estoppel cannot be invoked by him.

31. The general principle of estoppel is stated thus by the Lord Chancellor in Cairncross vs. Lorimer (1860) 3 H.L.C. 829: "The doctrine will apply, which is to be found, I believe, in the laws of all civilized nations that if a man either by words or conduct has intimated that he consents to an act which is to be done and that he will offer no opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully done without his

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consent, and he thereby induces others to do that from which they otherwise might have abstained, he cannot question the legality of the act he has so sanctioned, to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct...I am of the opinion that generally speaking, if a party having an interest to prevent an act to be done has full notice of its being done, and acquiesces in it, so as to induce a reasonable belief that he consents to it, and the position of others is altered by their giving credit to his sincerity, he has no more right to challenge the act to their prejudice than he would have had if it had been done by his previous licence.

32. Having examined the aforesaid legal position, it is clear that the estoppel is a rule of equity flowing out of fairness striking on behaviour deficient in good faith. It operates as a check on spurious conduct by preventing the inducer from taking advantage and assailing forfeiture already accomplished. It is invoked and applied to aid the law in administration of justice "

(Emphasis added)

9. The learned Single Judge in the decision of Rajesh (supra)

applied the above principles to the facts of that case and discussed the

factual position in Paragraph Nos.33 and 34, which reads as under :-

"33. With the above understanding of law, if one turns to the facts of the case in hand, at the cost of repetition, I must observe that the Petitioner, by making representation that he was agreeable for divorce by mutual consent provided respondent-wife withdraws her criminal complaint, returns his ornaments given to her in the marriage and takes care and custody of the minor child with limited access to him. The said representation made by the husband was accepted and acted upon by the respondent- wife to her prejudice. She withdrew criminal complaint filed against the husband and his family members. She returned ornaments received by her in the marriage. She agreed to have a custody of the minor son and on the top of it waived present and future right to claim maintenance for herself as well as for minor son. Thus, it is clear like a day light that the respondent- wife acted to her prejudice by accepting terms of

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compromise favourable to the petitioner-husband. The husband is, thus, estopped from withdrawing his consent.

34. The Family Court cannot be helpless spectator and duplicity of the petitioner-husband to induce the hapless wife, the respondent to waive maintenance claim for not only herself and her son, also compelled her to withdraw the criminal complaint in the hope of starting her life afresh. The husband by his conduct has caused the wife huge disadvantage. No spouse can unilaterally, wilfully be allowed to withdraw consent even on the grounds; such as fraud, undue force, representation unless grounds are proved satisfactorily. In the present case, if the withdrawal of consent by the petitioner-husband is upheld, it will cause anamoulous situation and serious prejudice to the respondent-wife, who is law abiding person. She will be left high and dry without recourse to any remedy and saddled with dead marriage. The respondent-husband has resorted to fraud and misrepresenttion which cannot be permitted by the Courts of Law and equity."

(Emphasis added)

10. On the analysis of the above decisions, the following principles

emerge :-

A) If the Petition is filed under Section 13B of the H.M.A. for

divorce by mutual consent, the Court must satisfy itself that

the consent given by the parties continues till the date of

granting decree of divorce. Even if one party unilaterally

withdraws his/her consent, the Court does not get

jurisdiction to grant decree of divorce by mutual consent in

view of the mandate of section 13B of the H.M.A.

B) Even in case of Petition filed under Section 13-B seeking

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decree of divorce on the ground of mutual consent no spouse

can unilaterally, wilfully be allowed to withdraw consent if

other spouse has acted on the said Consent Terms

prejudicially affecting the position of said spouse even on the

grounds such as fraud, undue force, representation unless

grounds are proved satisfactorily.

C) If the parties in the first instance resort to Petition for relief

under Section 9 or 13 of the H.M.A. and during the pendency

of such Petition, they decide to invite decree for divorce by

mutual consent, one party cannot be allowed to unilaterally

withdraw the consent if the other party has already acted

upon the Consent Terms, either wholly or in part to his/her

detriment.

D) In the case covered by clause (C), the Court will have to

record satisfaction that:

(i) There is sufficient, good and just cause for allowing the

party to withdraw his consent.

(ii) That the other party would not suffer prejudice which is

irreversible, due to withdrawal of the consent.

If these twin requirements are not satisfied, the Court should

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not entertain the prayer to allow the party to unilaterally

withdraw his/her consent.

11. The factual position in this case is required to be considered on

the touchstone of the above principles. In the present case Respondent

wife has filed Petition under Section 13(1)(ia) of the H.M.A. seeking

divorce. The Petition was filed on 10th June 2024. Thereafter, parties

agreed to get converted the said Petition under Section 13-B of the

H.M.A. on 12th August 2024 and accordingly the said conversion is

allowed by Order dated 12th August 2024. Thereafter, the Respondent -

wife has performed her part of the said Consent Terms prejudicially and

adversely affecting her interest :-

(a) On 27th August 2024 the Respondent-wife transferred the flat

in favour of the Petitioner.

(b) On 3rd October 2024, DV proceedings filed by the Respondent-

wife against the Petitioner-husband is withdrawn.

12. Thereafter, the Application for withdrawal of the consent has

been filed on 7th October 2024 i.e. within a period of 4 days after

withdrawal of the DV proceedings. As noted herein above, the said

Application for withdrawal of the consent has been filed by the

Petitioner after getting the benefit of the consent terms i.e. a valuable

flat has been transferred by the Respondent in favour of the Petitioner

and DV proceedings filed against the Petitioner by the Respondent has

911-WP-3747-2025(1).doc

been withdrawn by the Respondent.

13. The factual position in this case is required to be considered in

view of the above position of law. The observations in the case of

Prakash (supra) and Rajesh (supra) are also applicable to the present

case. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the Petitioner-husband

is estoppel from withdrawing his consent.

14. Although, it is the case of the Petitioner that consent has been

given as the relatives of the wife has brought pressure on him, however,

the position on record shows that on 12th August 2024 the consent

terms were executed, on 27th August 2024 the flat has been transferred

by the wife in favour of the husband, on 3rd October 2024 DV

proceedings have been withdrawn by the wife. Thus, from 12 th August

2024 till 3rd October 2024 during which the flat has been transferred

and the DV proceedings have been withdrawn in terms of the consent

terms at no point of time, it is the contention of the husband that

although the consent terms are being implemented the consent terms

have been arrived at as the relatives of the wife had brought pressure

on him and immediately after getting the benefit out of the consent

terms thereafter the application for withdrawal of the consent has been

filed within a period of four days i.e. on 7th October 2024.

15. Thus, it is clear that not only the conduct of the Petitioner is

malafide but the same amounts to interference in the administration of

911-WP-3747-2025(1).doc

justice as it is represented to the Court that the Petitioner would abide

by the consent terms and after getting benefit of the consent terms

including getting title to the valuable flat and withdraw of the DV case,

thereafter, the consent has been withdrawn. However, as the Petitioner

has filed affidavit dated 26th March 2025 tendering unconditional

apology no further action is required to be taken. In the said affidavit it

is vaguely indicated that the Petitioner is withdrawing the present

Petition, however, in view of the conduct of the Petitioner the Writ

Petition is decided on merits.

16. Thus, in the light of law laid down by the Division Bench of this

Court in the case of Prakash (supra) and Rajesh (supra) it is clear that

there is no illegality committed by the learned Family Court, Kolhapur

in rejecting the said Application bearing Exhibit-12 seeking withdrawal

of the consent terms.

17. At this stage, it is required to note that in the case of Prakash

(supra) wherein, the Court has observed that although the Family Court

in that matter has rejected the Application preferred by the husband for

withdrawal of his consent, however, the Court has not passed the decree

of dissolving marriage. In that context, the Division Bench has held that

at the same time the Court was duty bound to dissolve the marriage and

pass the decree by mutual consent on the basis of the consent terms

already filed on record.

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18. Both the learned Counsel state that the matter is before the

learned Judge, Family Court, Kolhapur on 1st April 2025. The learned

Judge, Family Court, Kolhapur is requested to pass decree of divorce in

terms of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the

case of Prakash (supra) immediately on 1st April 2025.

19. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed, however, subject to

above clarification and as the conduct of the Petitioner-husband is

malafide and amounts to interference in the administration of justice,

the Writ Petition is dismissed with cost of Rs.50,000/-.

[MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J.]