Bombay High Court
Jalal H. Agha vs Airport Authority Of India Thr. Mr. ... on 18 February, 2025
2025:BHC-AS:8040
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 952 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 35568 OF 2024
Kishor J. Dhoke ]
Age 64 years, Occp. - Air India Service, ]
Flat No. Building No. R-463, ]
Air India Colony, Kalina, ]
Santacruz East, Mumbai - 29. ] ...Appellant.
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL ]
/Adani Group Terminal 1B ]
1st Floor, CSMIA Mumbai 99. ] ...Respondents.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 973 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 35633 OF 2024
Mr. Sudhir Shrikant Rawat, ]
Age = 41 years, Occp. - Air India Service, ]
Flat No. 23, Building No. 6A, ]
Indian Airlines Colomy, Kalina, ]
Santacruz East, Mumbai. ]
Eviction Case No. 282 of 2023 ]
Email - [email protected] ]
Mumbai-29. ] ...Appellant.
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Patil-SR (ch) 1 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL ]
/Adani Group Terminal 1B ]
1st Floor, CSMIA Mumbai 99. ] ...Respondents.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 970 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 35650 OF 2024
Jalal H. Agha ]
Age 48 years, Occp. - Air India Service, ]
Flat No. Building No. 19/7A ]
Ol Air India Colony, Kalina, ]
Santacruz East, Mumbai - 29. ] ...Appellant.
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL ]
/Adani Group Terminal 1B ]
1st Floor, CSMIA Mumbai 99. ] ...Respondents.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 977 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 35656 OF 2024
Mr. Gyaneshwar Chandrakant Waghe ]
Age 54 years Occp- Air India Service ]
Flat No. 6, building No. 17B Indian Air Lines ]
Colony Kalina Santacruz (East) ]
Eviction case No. 180 of 2023 ]
Mob No. 9819827304 ]
Email- [email protected] ]
Mumbai-29. ] ...Appellant.
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
Patil-SR (ch) 2 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL ]
/Adani Group Terminal 1B ]
1st Floor, CSMIA Mumbai 99. ] ...Respondents.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 976 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 35640 OF 2024
Mr. Sanjay C. Mohile ]
Age 65 Years Occp- Air India Service ]
Flat No.356/B Building No. H ]
Indian Airlines Colomy Kalina, ]
Eviction Case No. 285 of 2023 ]
Mob No. 9869147745 ]
[email protected] ]
Mumbai - 29. ] ...Appellant.
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL /Adani Group Terminal ]
1B 1st Floor, CSMIA Mumbai 99. ] ...Respondents.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 954 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 35652 OF 2024
Mr. Bhagwan S. Padvi ]
Age 54 Years Occp- Air India Service ]
Flat No.13 Building No.7 ]
Indian Airlines Colomy, Kalina, ]
Eviction Case No. 271 of 2023 ]
Mob No. 9321140639 ]
Email- [email protected] ]
Mumbai - 29. ] ...Appellant.
Patil-SR (ch) 3 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL/Adani Group ]
Terminal 1B 1st Floor, CSMIA ]
Mumbai-99. ] ...Respondents.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 947 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 35658 OF 2024
Mr. Raju Saibu Anna Reddy ]
Age 56 Years Occp- Air India Service ]
Flat No. 10 Building No.2 ]
Air India Colony, Kalina, ]
Santacruz (East), ]
Eviction Case No. 90 of 2023 ]
Mob No. 7506191643 ]
Email- [email protected] ]
Mumbai - 29. ] ...Appellant.
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL ]
/Adani Group Terminal 1B ]
1st Floor, CSMIA Mumbai 99. ] ...Respondents.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 963 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 35874 OF 2024
Mr. Pravin Powar ]
Age-57 Years Adult Occp- Air India Service ]
Patil-SR (ch) 4 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
Flat No.11 Building No.6A ]
Indian Air Line colony, Kalina, ]
Santacruz (East), ]
Eviction Case No. 289 of 2023 ]
Mob No. 8779406616 ]
Email- [email protected] ]
Mumbai - 29. ] ...Appellant.
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL ]
/Adani Group Terminal 1B ]
1st Floor, CSMIA Mumbai 99. ] ...Respondents.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 967 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 35802 OF 2024
Mr. Anna Manaji Parkhe ]
Age-55 Years Occp- Air India Service ]
Flat No. 7/A 3rd floor Building No.4 ]
Indian Airlines Colomy, Kalina, ]
Eviction Case No. 271 of 2023 ]
Mob No. ]
Email- ]
Mumbai - 29. ] ...Appellant.
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL ]
/Adani Group Terminal 1B ]
1st Floor, CSMIA Mumbai 99. ] ...Respondents.
Patil-SR (ch) 5 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 945 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 35872 OF 2024
Mr. Vinod S. Naik ]
Age-56 Years Occp- Air India Service ]
Flat No. 1 Building No.18 ]
Air India Colony, Kalina,. Santacruze (East) ]
Eviction Case No. 40 of 2023 ]
Mob No. 9869133291 ]
Email- [email protected] ]
Mumbai - 29. ] ...Appellant.
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL ]
/Adani Group Terminal 1B ]
1st Floor, CSMIA Mumbai 99. ] ...Respondents.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 969 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 36134 OF 2024
Mr. Sanjay B. More ]
Age-54 Years Occp- Air India Service ]
Flat No. 11/B 1st Floor Building No.17 ]
Indian Airlines Colomy, Kalina,. ]
Eviction Case No. 167 of 2023 ]
Mob No. . ]
Email- ]
Mumbai - 29. ] ...Appellant.
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
Patil-SR (ch) 6 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL ]
/Adani Group Terminal 1B ]
1st Floor, CSMIA Mumbai 99. ] ...Respondents.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 950 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 36139 OF 2024
Mr. Rajendra Vitthal Bhalerao ]
Age-57 Years Occp- Air India Service ]
Flat No. 31 Building No.16/31 ]
Indian Airlines Colomy, Kalina,. ]
Eviction Case No. 290 of 2023 ]
Mob No. 9372186716 ]
Email- [email protected] ]
Mumbai - 29. ] ...Appellant.
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL ]
/Adani Group Terminal 1B ]
1st Floor, CSMIA Mumbai 99. ] ...Respondents.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 974 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 36128 OF 2024
Mr. M.S. Hariharan ]
Age-60 Years Occp- Air India Service ]
Flat No. 4B 1st Housing floor Building No.26 ]
Indian Airlines Colomy, Kalina,. ]
Eviction Case No. 276 of 2023 ]
Mob No. . ]
Email- ]
Mumbai - 29. ] ...Appellant.
Patil-SR (ch) 7 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
Versus
1) Airport Authority of India, ]
Through - Mr. Radhakrishna ]
Eviction Officer Western Regional Office ]
New Airport Colony Andheri ]
Sahar Road Mumbai - 99. ]
2) Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. ]
Through - Mr. Jeetendra Prakash Sali ]
Representative MIAL ]
/Adani Group Terminal 1B ]
1st Floor, CSMIA Mumbai 99. ] ...Respondents.
------------
Mr. K. J. Dhoke, Mr. Rachit Singh i/b Mr. Nitin Satpute for the Appellant.
Ms. Shilpa Kapil and Mr. Chidanand Kapil for the Respondent No.1.
Mr. Vikram Nankani, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Chirag Kamdar, Ms.
Shama Maitra, Ms. Samruddhi Mali i/b Wadia Gandhy & co., for the
Respondent No. 2.
------------
Coram : Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.
Reserved on : February 12., 2025.
Pronounced on : February 18, 2025.
Judgment :
1. This group of First Appeals filed under Section 28-K of Airports
Authority of India Act, 1994 [for short "AAI Act"] challenges the
eviction order of the Eviction Officer appointed under Section 28-B of
AAI Act, ordering the Appellants to hand over vacant and peaceful
possession of subject airport premises within a period of 15 days from
the date of order.
2. The Interim Applications in the First Appeals seek condonation of
delay in filing of Appeals setting out identical explanation for the
Patil-SR (ch) 8 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
delay. With consent of parties, Interim Application No.952 of 2025
filed in First Appeal (st.) No.35569 of 2024 was taken as lead Interim
Application and pleadings of the said application are referred during
the hearing. Common submissions were advanced and the Interim
Applications are being disposed of by this common judgment.
3. The group of Interim Applications seek condonation of delay for
varied period. Mr. Nankani, learned Senior Advocate appearing for
Respondent No.2 has tendered a chart giving details of the name of
occupant and the date of filing of Appeal. The said chart is not
disputed by Mr. Dhoke, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants.
In the chart produced by Mr. Nankani, an additional column has been
added by this Court giving the number of days of delay as mentioned in
the Interim Application. For ease of reference the chart is reproduced
hereinbelow:
Sr. Name of Occupant Date of filing First Appeal Interim Number
No. appeal (st) No. Application of days
No. delay as
per IA.
1. Kishor Dhoke 7th December 2024 35568 of 2024 952 of 2025 19
th
2. Sudhir Rawat 9 December 2024 35633 of 2024 973 of 2025 21
th
3. Jalal Agha 9 December 2024 35650 of 2024 970 of 2025 21
th
4. Gyaneshwar Waghe 9 December 2024 35656 of 2024 977 of 2025 21
5. Sanjay Mohile 9th December 2024 35640 of 2024 976 of 2025 21
th
6. Bhagwan Padvi 9 December 2024 35652 of 2024 954 of 2025 21
th
7. Raju Reddy 9 December 2024 35658 of 2024 947 of 2025 21
th
8. Pravin Powar 10 December 2024 35874 of 2024 963 of 2025 19
th
9. Anna Parkhe 10 December 2024 35802 of 2024 967 of 2025 21
th
10. Vinod Naik 10 December 2024 35872 of 2024 945 of 2025 21
Patil-SR (ch) 9 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
11. Sanjay More 12th December 2024 36134 of 2024 969 of 2025 24
th
12. R V Bhalerao 12 December 2024 36139 of 2024 950 of 2025 24
13. M S Hariharan 12th December 2024 36128 of 2024 974 of 2025 24
PLEADINGS :
4. The Interim Application avers about the litigation instituted by
the Applicants against the Respondents i.e. (1) Criminal Writ Petition
No. 5134 of 2022 against the alleged disinvestment of Airport Mumbai
(2) Criminal complaints by Association before Special Court under
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989 and the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 i.e. Criminal
Miscellaneous Application No.1091 of 2023 and Criminal Miscellaneous
Application No.379 of 2024 and (3) Contempt Petition in pending
proceedings before the Special Court as eviction orders were passed
pending the proceedings.
5. It is further pleaded that the Respondents have not cancelled
the allotment orders of residence of the Appellant till date and have
initiated eviction proceedings in different manners, i.e., departmental
order for recovery of Rs.10 lakh to Rs.15 lakh from salaries, under PPE
Act, 1971 and AAI Act. It is pleaded that essential services have been
discontinued therefore police complaints were filed. The eviction
orders have been produced before the Special Court which has
directed the Respondents to produce authenticated copies of
Patil-SR (ch) 10 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
agreements, maps and development plans. Despite thereof, the
Respondent No.2 issued 48 hours notice for eviction of the Appellants
and hence the Appellant filed Appeal through their Association on 5 th
November 2024. In view of the objection taken to the filing of Appeal
through the Association, separate appeals by individual aggrieved
person came to be filed on 6th December 2024 and hence there is delay.
SUBMISSIONS :
6. Mr. Dhoke, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant has
tendered his written arguments. Though the written arguments
contain gist of arguments for the First Appeal and the arguments on
the other litigation pending between the parties, what is relevant for
our purpose is the submissions on the aspect of condonation of delay
which is set out in Exhibit "B" to the written arguments. Perusal of the
said Exhibit "B" discloses that the submission is that on 29 th September,
2021 eviction proceedings were initiated by the Respondents and Writ
Petition(L) No 19001 of 2022 was filed by Air Corporation of SC and ST
employees Association, which came to be disposed of vide order dated
24th September, 2022 granting liberty to file separate Petitions. It is
submitted that pending the various criminal petitions filed against the
Respondents, final eviction orders were issued on 26 th April, 2024, 4th
October, 2024, 18th October, 2024 and 4th November, 2024.
7. It is submitted that the order dated 13 th March, 2023 passed in
Patil-SR (ch) 11 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
Writ petition No 34307 of 2022 in matter of disinvestment, the High
Court had restrained the Respondent from recovering penal rent or
damages. It is submitted that the Association had filed Appeal No 1798
of 2024 before this Court on 5th November, 2024 against the 48 hours
eviction notice dated 4th November, 2024 and upon objection separate
appeals were filed by 57 employees and therefore there is delay. It is
further submitted that as per direction of Apex Court the time period
for eviction should be 30 days and hence time period mentioned in
Section 28K of AAI Act is not applicable.
8. A chart is annexed to the written arguments which sets out that
the eviction orders in these group of applications have been passed on
18th October, 2024, as per the order of Apex Court period of 30 days
expired on 18th November 2024 and date of filing of Appeals are 7 th
December, 2024 , 9th December, 2024, 10th December, 2024 and 12th
December, 2024. The period of delay varies between 19 days to 24
days as per the Applicant's calculation.
9. Mr. Nankani, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
Respondent No.2 would submit that the Appellants were well aware of
the impending eviction proceedings in view of the orders passed in
previous petitions before this Court which inter alia sought to
challenge the communication addressed to the individual employees
asking them to give undertaking for vacating allotted accommodation
Patil-SR (ch) 12 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
where they are residing. He submits that despite eviction orders
having been passed, appeals are not filed within prescribed period of
limitation of 30 days. He would submit that under provisions of Section
28-K(1) of the AAI Act, the limitation is 15 days for preferring an Appeal
against the order of eviction which can be extended to a period of 30
days and not beyond that as per the proviso to Section 28-K(1) of the
AAI Act. He submits that in view of the proviso to Section 28-K(1) of
the AAI Act, provisions of Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 stand excluded and therefore there is no power to condone
the delay beyond the period of 30 days. He submits that the order of
Apex Court dated 16th February, 2024 clarified that even if orders of
eviction are passed, the same shall not be implemented for period of
one month from date on which copies of relevant orders are served to
enable them to prefer statutory appeals. He submits that the order of
Apex Court is in consonance with the period of limitation of Appeal and
could not be read as extending the prescribed period of limitation.
10. He would further submit that the provisions of Section 14 of
Limitation Act, 1963, is inapplicable as the conditions are not satisfied.
He submits that although it is sought to be contended that Appeal was
filed by the Association, the Appeal by Association did not list the
members on whose behalf the Appeal was filed and annexed only
evictions orders of Ms. Kashmiri Gogoi, Ms. Mamta Iswary and Kishor
Patil-SR (ch) 13 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
Dhoke. He submits that for application of Section 14 of Limitation Act,
the proceedings must be between the same parties, must be filed for
seeking the same relief, the earlier proceeding must have failed owing
to defect of jurisdiction and the earlier proceeding must have been
prosecuted in good faith. He submits that all these conditions are not
satisfied in the present case. In support, he relies upon following
decisions :
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Anusaya Sitaram
Devrukhkar1
HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd vs Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad 2
REASONS AND ANALYSIS :
11. The issues arising for consideration is firstly whether upon
reading of the proviso to Section 28-K of AAI Act, there is express
exclusion of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 by reason of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, resulting in no discretion left in the
Appellate Court to condone the delay beyond period of 30 days from
date of eviction order and secondly whether benefit of Section 14 of
Limitation Act, 1963 is available to the Applicants.
12. Section 28-K of the AAI Act, which provides for appeal to the
High Court will have to considered, which reads as under:
1 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 36.
2 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3190.
Patil-SR (ch) 14 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
"28-K Appeals to Tribunal. - (1) Any person aggrieved by an
order of the eviction officer under the Chapter, may, within
fifteen days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal to
the High Court.
Provided that the High Court may entertain any appeal
after the expiry of the said period of fifteen days, but not
after the period of thirty days from the date aforesaid, if it is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause
from filing the appeal in time."
13. Section 28-K prescribes a different period of limitation, which is
fifteen days from date of the eviction order extendable by further
period of 15 days upon sufficient cause being shown i.e. in total a
period of 30 days. The extendable period of 15 days after the expiry of
initial period of 15 days from date of eviction order requires sufficiency
of cause being shown and it is this delay of 15 days which can be
condoned.
14. "Prescribed Period" has been defined in Section 2(j) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 as period of limitation computed in accordance
with the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 and "Period of
Limitation" means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit,
Appeal or Application by the Schedule. By reason of the special period
of limitation prescribed by Section 28-K of AAI Act, the provisions of
Section 3 of Limitation Act, 1963 will have to be read in context of the
period of limitation prescribed by Section 28-K of AAI Act.
15. The prescribed period of limitation would thus be 15 days
Patil-SR (ch) 15 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
extendable by further period of 15 days. As the applications seek
condonation of delay beyond period of 30 days from date of eviction
order, the applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 to the
Appeals filed under Section 28-K will have to be considered. In this
context Section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1963 is relevant which reads
thus:
"29. Savings.-- (1) ..........
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,
appeal or application a period of limitation different from the
period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3
shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the
Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any
special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to
which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local
law.
(3).....
(4)....."
16. Section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1963 can be read in two parts,
the first part deals with the determination of period of limitation in
case of special or local law for purpose of Section 3 of Limitation Act
and the second part deals with the computation of period of limitation
by considering the applicability of Section 4 to 24 of Limitation Act,
1963 if not expressly excluded by the special law.
17. The eviction orders were passed on 18 th October, 2024 and First
Appeal (St.) No.1798 of 2024 came to be filed by the Air Corporation of
Patil-SR (ch) 16 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Employees Association
Through-Reporting Trustee on 5th November, 2024. Upon objection
being raised to the challenge through the Association, the Appeal
came to be withdrawn and individual Appeals were filed on 5 th
December, 2024. The period of 30 days provided under Section 28-K
of the AAI Act expired on 18th November, 2024.
18. The days of delay are calculated by the Applicants by considering
the period from expiry of period of limitation, i.e. 18th November, 2024
to 7th December, 2024. In event the period during which the Appeal
filed by the Association was being prosecuted is to be excluded, the
Appeal would be within time. In other words, the applicability of
Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963 will have to be considered which
reads thus:
"14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court
without jurisdiction. - (1) In computing the period of
limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has
been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding,
whether in a court of first instance or of the appeal or revision,
against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding
relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good
faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause
of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any
application, the time during which the applicant has been
prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding,
whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision,
against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded,
where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith which, from
defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable
to entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order
Patil-SR (ch) 17 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the provisions of
sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted
on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order,
where such permission is granted on the ground that the first
suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the
Court or other cause of a like nature.
Explanation- For the purpose of this section,-
(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil
proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding
was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be
counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be
deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be
deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of
jurisdiction."
19. It is only upon satisfaction of the conditions laid down in Section
14 of Limitation Act, 1963 that the benefit of exclusion of period of
limitation will be available to the Applicants. The earlier Appeal (St) No
1798 of 2024 was filed by the Air Corporation of Schedule Castes and
Scheduled Tribes Employees Association seeking blanket prayer of
setting aside the eviction orders dated 26 th August, 2024, 4th October,
2024, 18th October, 2024 and 48 hours notice dated 4 th November, 2024
without any reference to the individual employee who had suffered
the eviction order. Paragraph 6 of the Appeal referred to and annexed
three eviction orders issued to Kashmiri Gogoi dated 26 th August, 2024,
Mamta Iswary dated 4th October, 2024 and Kishor Dhoke dated 18 th
October, 2024. There is no pleading in the Appeal that the present
Patil-SR (ch) 18 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
Applicants are members of the Association. An Interim Application
came to be filed in the Appeal on 26th November, 2024, i.e. beyond the
period of limitation for adding individual parties to the Appeal, which
Application was not moved and the Appeal came to be withdrawn.
20. Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 mandates that the
earlier and subsequent proceedings to be (a) against the same party,
(b) for the same relief, (c) to be prosecuted in good faith, and (d) earlier
proceeding fails for the defect of jurisdiction. The earlier Appeal was
filed by the Association whereas the subsequent Appeals are filed by
the individual employees, who were not party to the earlier Appeal.
Secondly, the relief claimed in the present Appeal is not the same relief
as in the earlier proceedings. There was blanket challenge to the
eviction orders whereas in present proceedings specific individual
eviction orders are challenged and thirdly, the earlier proceeding did
not fail owing to defect of jurisdiction. The non satisfaction of the
essential conditions of Section 14(2) of Limitation Act, 1963 deprives
the Applicants of the benefit of the same.
21. Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963 deals with exclusion of period
while computing the period of limitation and the provisions of AAI Act
are not shown to specifically exclude the applicability of Section 14 of
Limitation Act, 1963. However, in facts of present case, the benefit of
Patil-SR (ch) 19 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963 is not available to the Applicants.
22. On the other hand, Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 deals with
extension of period of limitation and provides for extension of the
prescribed period of limitation enabling the admission of any Appeal or
application beyond the prescribed period upon sufficient cause being
shown. Section 28-K of the AAI Act is similar to Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 which provides for extension of period of
limitation beyond 15 days, the differentiating factor being that
whereas Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not place any outer
limit on the period of delay which can be extended, Section 28-K of the
AAI Act provides that Appeal cannot be entertained beyond the period
of 30 days from eviction order.
23. The proviso to Section 28-K of AAI uses the expression "but not
after the period of thirty days" which has the effect of placing an outer
limit on the period of delay which can be condoned and results in
express exclusion of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. By exclusion of
Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, there is no discretion vested in the
Appellate Court to condone the delay beyond the period of 30 days
from date of eviction order.
24. In MCGM v. Anusaya Sitaram Devrukhkar (supra), the Division
Bench of this Court was considering Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
1963 in the context of Section 74(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation
Patil-SR (ch) 20 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013, which provided for limitation of 60 days with further
extension of 60 days by using the expression "not exceeding sixty
days". The Division Bench applied the ratio of decision of the Apex
Court in Union of India v. Popular Construction Company3 which held
as under :
"4. Before us, the appellant has not disputed the position that
if the Limitation Act, 1963 and in particular Section 5, did not
apply to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, then its objection to the
award was time-barred and the appeal would have to be
dismissed. The submission, however, is that Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act makes the provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act applicable to special laws like the 1996 Act since
the 1996 Act itself did not expressly exclude its applicability
and that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the
application under Section 34. Counsel for the respondent, on
the other hand, has submitted that the language of Section 34
plainly read, expressly excluded the operation of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act and that there was as such no scope for
assessing the sufficiency of the cause for the delay beyond the
period prescribed in the proviso to Section 34.
5. The issue will have to be resolved with reference to the
language used in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and
Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Section 29(2) provides that:
"29. (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any
suit, appeal or application a period of limitation
different from the period prescribed by the Schedule,
the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period
were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the
purpose of determining any period of limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any
special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections
4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the
extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law."
6. On an analysis of the section, it is clear that the provisions
of Sections 4 to 24 will apply when:
(i) there is a special or local law which prescribes a different
3 (2001) 8 SCC 470.
Patil-SR (ch) 21 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application; and
(ii) the special or local law does not expressly exclude those
sections.
7. There is no dispute that the 1996 Act is a "special law" and
that Section 34 provides for a period of limitation different
from that prescribed under the Limitation Act. The question
then is -- is such exclusion expressed in Section 34 of the 1996
Act ? The relevant extract of Section 34 reads:
"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-- (1)-
(2)***
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made
after three months have elapsed from the date on
which the party making that application had received
the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under
Section 33, from the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal:
Provided that if the court is satisfied that the
applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from
making the application within the said period of
three months it may entertain the application within
a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter."
8. Had the proviso to Section 34 merely provided for a period
within which the court could exercise its discretion, that would
not have been sufficient to exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act because "mere provision of a period of
limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is
not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5" [Mangu
Ram v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi, (1976) 1 SCC 392 at p. 397,
para 7 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 10].
9. That was precisely why in construing Section 116-A of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Constitution
Bench in Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel [AIR 1964 SC
1099] rejected the argument that Section 5 of the Limitation
Act had been excluded : (AIR p. 1112, para 27)
"27. It was then said that Section 116-A of the Act
provided an exhaustive and exclusive code of limitation
for the purpose of appeals against orders of tribunals and
reliance is placed on the proviso to sub-section (3) of that
section, which reads:
'Every appeal under this Chapter shall be preferred
within a period of thirty days from the date of the
order of the Tribunal under Section 98 or Section 99.
Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal
after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is
satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for
not preferring the appeal within such period.'
Patil-SR (ch) 22 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
The contention is that sub-section (3) of Section 116-A of
the Act not only provides a period of limitation for such
an appeal, but also the circumstances under which the
delay can be excused, indicating thereby that the general
provisions of the Limitation Act are excluded. There are
two answers to this argument. Firstly, Section 29(2)(a) of
the Limitation Act speaks of express exclusion but there is
no express exclusion in sub-section (3) of Section 116-A of
the Act; secondly, the proviso from which an implied
exclusion is sought to be drawn does not lead to any such
necessary implication."
10. This decision recognises that it is not essential for the
special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the
Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of the
language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention
to exclude can be necessarily implied. As has been said in
Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [(1974) 2 SCC 133]
: (SCC p. 146, para 17)
"If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear
that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be
called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act."
11. Thus, where the legislature prescribed a special limitation
for the purpose of the appeal and the period of limitation of
60 days was to be computed after taking the aid of Sections 4,
5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, the specific inclusion of these
sections meant that to that extent only the provisions of the
Limitation Act stood extended and the applicability of the
other provisions, by necessary implication stood excluded
[Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai, [(1992) 4
SCC 264].
12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
concerned, the crucial words are "but not thereafter" used in
the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would
amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the
application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to
go further. To hold that the court could entertain an
application to set aside the award beyond the extended period
under the proviso, would render the phrase "but not
thereafter" wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would
justify such a result."
Patil-SR (ch) 23 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
25. The Division Bench concluded in paragraph 32 as under:
"In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an
appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the
period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and
its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act
which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act
read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the
legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal
against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section
125 will become nugatory."
26. The ratio of decision in MCGM vs Anusuya Sitaram Devrukhkar
(supra) is squarely applicable to the present case. In the present case,
the proviso to Section 28-K of AAI Act uses the language "but not after
the period of thirty days" which makes it evident that the legislative
intent is to provide special period of limitation and exclude application
of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963.
27. The inevitable conclusion is that the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of
Section 28-K of the AAI Act expressly excludes the application of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and resultantly, there is no power
vested in the Appeal Court to condone delay beyond the maximum
period of 30 days. As the conditions of Section 14 of Limitation Act,
1963 are not satisfied and the applicability of Section 5 of Limitation
Act, 1963 is excluded, the Appeals having been filed beyond the period
of 30 days from the date of eviction orders are liable to be dismissed. It
is not necessary to go into the sufficiency of the cause shown for
condonation of delay beyond 30 days in light of the discussion above.
Patil-SR (ch) 24 of 25
IA 952-2025 & Group.doc
28. As regards the reliance placed on the order of Apex Court dated
16th February, 2024, the Special Leave Petitions arose out of judgment
passed by this Court in Petitions challenging the order declining to
make reference to CGIT, the charging of penal rent and damages and
withholding of Performance Linked Incentive. The order of Apex Court
would not have the effect of extending the period of limitation of 30
days and in fact the Apex Court has directed that in event the eviction
orders are passed, the same not to be implemented for period of 30
days, which is in accordance with the prescribed period of limitation.
29. As regards the contention about the overriding effect of Section
20 of SC/ST Act, the same applies in event there is conflict between the
said enactment and other statutes. The present issue is about
condonation of delay and Section 20 of SC/ST Act has no applicability.
30. In the light of above discussion, the Interim Applications stand
dismissed.
31. In view of dismissal of the Interim Applications, First Appeals do
not survive for consideration and stand dismissed.
[Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.]
Patil-SR (ch) 25 of 25
Signed by: Sachin R. Patil
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 18/02/2025 20:25:47
