Friday, 15, May, 2026
 
 
 
Expand O P Jindal Global University
 
  
  
 
 
 

Vijay Madhukar Kesari vs Sagar Madhukar Gunjal
2025 Latest Caselaw 2616 Bom

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 2616 Bom
Judgement Date : 17 February, 2025

Bombay High Court

Vijay Madhukar Kesari vs Sagar Madhukar Gunjal on 17 February, 2025

2025:BHC-AUG:4523




                       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                  BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                              WRIT PETITION NO. 4198 OF 2024

           Vijay s/o Madhukar Kesari,
           Age : 64 years, Occu : Medical Practitioner,
           R/o 5603, Delhi Gate, Ahmednagar                 ...... PETITIONER
                                                               (Ori. Defendant)
           VERSUS

           Sagar s/o Madhukar Gunjal,
           Age : 53 years, Occu: Legal Practitioner,
           R/o House no. 19A, Janak, Shinde Mala,
           Savedi, Ahmednagar.                             ...... RESPONDENT
                                                              (Ori. Plaintiff)

           Mr. S. V. Dixit, Advocate for Petitioner
           Mr. A. M. Gholap, Advocate for Respondent

                                          CORAM                  : R. M. JOSHI, J.
                                          RESERVED ON            : 05th February,2025
                                          PRONOUNCED ON : 17th February, 2025

           JUDGMENT :

-

1. This petition takes exception to the impugned order passed

below Exhibit 65 by the Trial Court in Regular Civil Suit No. 296/2018

whereby the primary issue with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court to

entertain the suit came to be decided in affirmative. The

petitioner/original defendant being aggrieved by the said judgment has

preferred this petition.

2. For the sake of convenience parties are referred to as

"Plaintiff" and "Defendant".

WP4198-2024.odt 1 of 9

3. The facts which are necessary for the proper consideration of

the issue involved in this petition are narrated in brief as under :-

Plaintiff is an Advocate by profession. His father also was

pursuing legal profession. The suit premise was let out to him by the

defendant for the purpose of conducting his profession as an Advocate.

After death of father, plaintiff requested the defendant to accept him as a

tenant. Defendant did not accept plaintiff as a tenant. Plaintiff, therefore,

filed suit bearing Regular Civil Suit No. 296/2018 for declaration that the

tenant in respect of the suit property.

4. Defendant filed written statement. He raised preliminary

issue with regard to the maintainability of the suit. Trial Court framed

issue about the maintainability of the suit by order dated 15.09.2022

This order came to be challenged by plaintiff in Writ Petition

No.11212/2022 unsuccessfully. Pursuant thereto parties were permitted

to lead evidence before the Trial Court on the preliminary issue. By

impugned order, learned Trial Court accepted the contention of the

plaintiff about maintainability of the suit.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner-defendant submits that the

Trial Court has committed error in not considering the provisions of

Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (for short "the Act of 1999") in

proper perspective. It is his submission that after enactment of

WP4198-2024.odt 2 of 9 Maharashtra Rent Control Act, the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel

and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short "the Act of

1947") ceased to have application. It is his further submission that the

definition of premise has been modified considerably with a specific

intention that the promises let out for any profession is excluded. It is his

submission that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various judgments has

held that the profession of a Lawyer is not a business. It is his

submission that the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the

respondent/plaintiff on the judgment in case of S. Mohan Lal vs. R.

Kondiah 1979 AIR 1132 has no application to the present case as the

same has been passed in respect of a proceedings in Andhra Pradesh

Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. He placed

reliance on the judgment of Co-ordinate bench of this Court in case of

Savitribai Vishnupati Vaske and others Vs. Faruk Abdulrahim

Patel and others (2010) 5 Mah LJ 357 in order to submit that as per

Section 58 of the Act of 1999, the status of a tenant under the Act of

1947 comes to an end and as such there was no relationship of landlord

and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant therein. According to

him, this judgment is passed in the context of the issue in respect of an

open land. By relying upon bill VI of 1993, it is his submission that there

is conscious exclusion of premises let out to the Advocates/Legal

Professionals. It is his submission that deletion of Section 5(8A) from the

WP4198-2024.odt 3 of 9 Act of 1947, is sufficient to hold that one provision of the Act of 1999

would not apply to the present case.

6. Per contra learned counsel for the plaintiff supported the

impugned order by contending that at this stage the merit of the claim of

rival parties could not have been gone into by the Trial Court and it was

only to see as to whether the suit is maintainable. It is his submission

that the suit is filed for seeking declaration under Section 34 of the

Specific Relief Act and it is only the Civil Court which is competent to

issue any declaration. It is his submission that owing to Section 2 of the

Act of 1999, the premises which was covered by the Act of 1947

continues to have application of the provisions of the present act. It is

his submission that in view of the undisputed facts that the father of

plaintiff was a lawyer and was permitted to conduct his legal profession

from the suit premise and the plaintiff also being a Lawyer, is entitled to

succeed the said tenancy from his father. To support his submission that

the legal profession is a business in the context of the Rent Act, he

placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of S.

Monhan Lal (cited supra).

7. In the instant case, Trial Court framed and decided following

preliminary issue :-

"Whether this Court is having jurisdiction to try and entertain

WP4198-2024.odt 4 of 9 suit in present form.

8. The Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature

excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly

barred. There is no challenge to the territorial or subject matter

jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit for declaration. The

objection of the defendant is about right of plaintiff to get such

declaration in view of the provisions of the Act of 1999."

9. There is no dispute about the fact that plaintiff is an Advocate

and his father late Madhukar was also an Advocate by profession.

Defendant is the owner of the suit premise and the said premise was let

out to late Madhukar on rent of Rs. 50/- plus Electricity charges to

pursue profession as a Lawyer. Plaintiff claims to succeed the said

tenancy being legal heir and successor of deceased Madhukar. Since,

defendant did not acknowledge him as a tenant, suit came to be filed for

seeking declaration that plaintiff be declared as a tenant of the premise

in capacity of legal heir of original tenant in respect of the suit property.

The defendant filed written statement denying the contentions of the

plaintiff and also raised issue of non-joinder of other LR's of Madhukar. It

is denied that the plaintiff has any legal right to claim tenancy under the

provisions of Maharashtra Rent Control Act. On the basis of application

moved by the defendant vide Exhibit 65, learned Trial Court passed order

WP4198-2024.odt 5 of 9 dated 15.09.2022 framing preliminary issue with regard to the

maintainability of the suit. This order came to be upheld in Writ Petition

No. 11212/2022. The parties, therefore, agitated the said issue before

the Trial Court and the Trial Court decided the same in favour of plaintiff.

10. Though, defendant has sought to raise issue of

maintainability of the suit, nothing was brought on record to indicate that

the jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the suit is barred by law

expressly or even by implication. The question raised by the defendant is

that the plaintiff is not and cannot become a tenant of the suit property.

While appreciating the issue of maintainability raised, there has to be

drawn a distinction between these two issues i.e., about the

maintainability of the suit and entitlement of the plaintiff to seek such

relief. The issue of the entitlement of plaintiff cannot be decided at this

stage and which would be subject matter of the decision of the Trial

Court at the final decision. Suffice it to say that wherever there is no

expressed or implied bar created by any provisions of law prohibiting

Civil Court to give declaration as sought by the plaintiff, it has to be held

that the suit is maintainable.

11. In considered view of this Court, reference made to the

judgment in case of Savitribai (cited supra) is misplaced at this stage of

proceeding. Perusal of the said judgment shows that the issue before this

WP4198-2024.odt 6 of 9 Court was as to application of the provisions of the Act of 1999 to the

open land. In the instant case, the question before the Trial Court is as to

whether the plaintiff can be considered as a "tenant" in respect of the

suit property. Section 7(9) of the Act of 1999 defines "premises" which

means any building or part of a building let or given on license separately

(other than a farm building) including the gardens, grounds, garages and

out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building it

also indicates any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for

the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. There is no dispute about the

fact that suit premises is a building within the meaning of premises as

defined therein.

12. Section 7(15) defines "tenant" which means any person by

whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes

such a person who is a tenant, deemed tenant, sub-tenant permitted

under a contract or with permission/consent of the landlord or has

derived title under a tenant. Clause "d" of the said definition indicates

that :-

d) in relation to any premises, when the tenant dies, whether the death occurred before or after the commencement of this Act, any member or the tenant's family, who, -

                 i)    where they are let for residence, is residing,or
               ii)     where they are let for education, business,
                       trade or storage, is using the premises for any
                       such purpose,


WP4198-2024.odt                                                           7 of 9
          with the tenant at the time of his death, or, in the

absence of such member, any heir of deceased tenant.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner had relied upon definition

of "premises" under the Act of 1947 more particularly clause 8A thereof

in order to contain that in the provisions Act, the premises let included

for the purpose of practicing any profession or carrying on any

occupation therein. In the Act of 1999, definition of the premises does

not indicate the purpose of use thereof however definition of tenant in

clause "d" indicates that the tenancy is transferable after the death of

tenant where the premise is let out for education, business, trade or

storage. A bare perusal of these provisions, therefore, indicate that issue

which would fall for consideration before the Trial Court is as to whether

the term "business" as referred therein includes profession of a lawyer.

Needless to reiterate that this issue cannot be decided as preliminary

issue.

14. Though, this Court does not wish to go into the issue of the

merits sought to be raised by the parties, since the same is subjected to

the decision of Trial Court, suffice it to say that prima facie there is

judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court may be in respect of the Andhra

Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, however, it is

WP4198-2024.odt 8 of 9 held therein that the business is a word of wide import capable of variety

meaning and the practice of law is a business within the meaning of

expression in Section 10(3)(a)(iii). Thus, the issues sought to be

canvassed by both sides are required to be decided at the time of final

decisions of the suit.

15. In order to cause interference in the impugned order, the

petitioner was required to show perversity therein. For want of any

perversity, this Court finds no reason to cause any interference therein in

exercise of writ jurisdiction. Hence, petition is dismissed.

16. The observation made herein above are limited strictly to the

decision of this petition and the Trial Court is not bound by the same.

Trial Court to decide the suit in accordance with law, without getting

influenced by any observation made herein above.




                                                          (R. M. JOSHI, J.)



bsj




WP4198-2024.odt                                                       9 of 9
 

 
Download the LatestLaws.com Mobile App
 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter
 

Publish Your Article

 

Campus Ambassador

 

Media Partner

 

Campus Buzz

 

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent Apply Now!
 

LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026

 

LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!

 
 

LatestLaws Partner Event : IJJ

 

LatestLaws Partner Event : Smt. Nirmala Devi Bam Memorial International Moot Court Competition

 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter