[Cites 9, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Pravin S/O Shrirang Yelmule vs The State Of Maharashtra on 17 December, 2025
Author: Anil L. Pansare
Bench: Anil L. Pansare
2025:BHC-NAG:14339-DB
46-apeal-318-2021.odt 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 318 OF 2021
Pravin s/o Shrirang Yelmule,
aged about 30 years, Occ. Agriculturist,
R/o Lasanpur, Tah. - Samudrapur,
District - Wardha.
...APPELLANT
Versus
The State of Maharashtra,
through the Officer-in-Charge of
Police Station Samudrapur, Tah. - Samudrapur,
District - Wardha.
...RESPONDENT
Mr. P.H. Khobragade, Counsel for the appellant (appointed).
Mr. A.B. Badar, A.P.P. for the respondent/State.
.....
CORAM : ANIL L. PANSARE AND
RAJ D. WAKODE, JJ.
ARGUMENTS WERE HEARD ON : 8/12/2025
JUDGMENT IS PRONOUNCED ON : 17/12/2025
JUDGMENT (PER : ANIL L. PANSARE, J.) :
The appellant is aggrieved by judgment and order
dated 13/2/2020 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Hinganghat, District - Wardha, in Sessions Case No. 70/2017.
The Sessions Court convicted the appellant for the offence
punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(IPC).
2] Briefly stated, the facts are that on 21/4/2015, at
about 4:45 pm, at Mouza - Lasanpur, the appellant committed
murder of a boy, namely, Aryan Yelmule, aged around four
years, by assaulting on his head by means of an axe. The law
was set into motion by PW3 - Kishor saying that his uncle, i.e.,
the accused, has committed the offence. He stated that on
21/4/2015, at about 4:00 pm, he was playing cricket behind
bus stop with boys of the village. Prashant - brother of
appellant, was also with him. At about 4:45 pm, Prashant
received a phone call from someone, who informed that the
appellant assaulted Aryan - son of Subhash Yelmule, who is his
(PW3's) cousin. He was assaulted by means of an axe on his
head. PW3 and others rushed to the village. They saw Aryan's
father carrying his son on a motorcycle. PW3 saw that axe was
fixed in his forehead. He went to hospital to see Aryan, who
was later on removed to Sevagram Hospital, where he
succumbed to the injury. PW3 then lodged report with the
Police Station.
3] The Investigating Officer then carried on the
investigation. PW11 - Anil registered First Information Report
(FIR) and conducted preliminary investigation. PW13 -
Ranjitsingh was then handed over the investigation. He
collected evidence, recorded statements under Sections 161
and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and
filed chargesheet.
4] The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be
tried. The prosecution examined thirteen witnesses to bring
home guilt of the appellant. The defense of the appellant is of
mental illness (Schizophrenia) and, accordingly, pleaded
protection under Section 84 of the IPC. He has examined four
witnesses in support.
5] The learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence of
doctor and cross-examination of defence witnesses, found this
plea of insanity as inadmissible. The trial Court then
considered all attending circumstances, and held appellant
guilty of the offence. The said finding is challenged before us.
6] We have heard Mr. P.H. Khobragade, learned
Counsel for the appellant, and Mr. A.B. Badar, learned A.P.P. for
the respondent/State. We have gone through the impugned
judgment, evidence, documents and other material placed
before us. We will refer to the same to the extent necessary to
answer whether the appellant is responsible for homicidal
death of Aryan and if yes, whether he is entitled for protection
under Section 84 of the IPC.
7] The appellant has not disputed that Aryan suffered
homicidal death and, therefore, we need not discuss evidence
on this point. Suffice it to say that PW9 - Dr. Toshal, who has
conducted postmortem, found antemortem injuries on the
person of Aryan. The cause of death is 'hemorrhage and shock
as a result of head injury with cut fracture and destruction of
skull with axe seen fixed and penetrated deep in the head'.
Thus, homicidal death is obvious. Even otherwise, it is nobody's
case that Aryan suffered suicidal or accidental death.
8] On the point of involvement of appellant, the
testimony of PW2 - Rajendra, PW5 - Vanita and PW6 -
Ramesh, is important.
9] PW2 is an eye-witness. He had been to one
Pandhari Sabale for measuring wheat, as he cultivated his land.
Pandhari's house is situated near the house of appellant and
Subhash (PW4) - father of deceased. He and Pandhari were
measuring wheat in the courtyard. At about 4:30 to 4:45 pm,
Aryan was playing with tyre on cement road passing from in
front of house of Subhash and Pandhari. He (PW2) saw
appellant assaulting Aryan by means of an axe on his head. He
and Ramesh (PW6) rushed towards Aryan. The appellant ran
away. Aryan was lying unconscious, and blood was oozing from
his head and axe was fixed in his head. The appellant's mother
and Aryan's grandmother came there. PW2 called Aryan's
father (PW4) and informed him of the incident. PW4 came at
the spot, tied dupatta on the head of Aryan and removed him
to hospital at Samudrapur. From Samudrapur, Aryan was taken
to Sevagram Hospital, Wardha, where he succumbed to the
injury.
10] In cross-examination, except for suggestions,
nothing material is brought on record. All the suggestions have
been denied by the witness. The plea of insanity was taken to
which the witness showed ignorance. He said that he does not
know whether the appellant was undergoing treatment since
the year 2010.
11] PW4 is father of Aryan. The appellant is his cousin
uncle. He stated that daughter of police patil informed him
about the incident. He reached the spot after receiving
information, crowd had gathered, he saw axe fixed in forehead
of Aryan. People told him that appellant has committed the
offence. He tied dupatta on Aryan's forehead and removed him
to Government Hospital at Samudrapur. The Medical Officer
referred him to Sevagram Hospital, Wardha, where he
succumbed to the injury. His testimony also suggests motive
behind crime. It appears that one day prior to the incident, i.e.,
on 20/4/2015, when Aryan was playing with tyre, he went to
courtyard of appellant, and the tyre with which he was playing,
hit the appellant. The appellant got annoyed, which fact was
informed by Aryan to PW4 in the evening. Next day, the
incident occurred when Aryan was again playing with tyre.
12] In his cross-examination also, except for putting
suggestions, nothing material is brought on record. The
suggestions are denied by this witness. He denied that
appellant is mentally ill. He further denied that villagers and
police patil admitted appellant in hospital. He denied that
appellant is undergoing treatment. He, however, admitted that
for last 3-4 months, he was having strained relations with the
appellant. Further suggestion, however, that PW4 has falsely
implicated the appellant because of strained relations, is not
given. The cross-examination concluded by suggestion that he
is deposing false, which is denied by PW4.
13] PW5 is another villager. At the relevant time, she
was proceeding by road towards house of her niece situated
besides the house of PW4. She saw that PW4's son was playing
with tyre. The appellant came from his house holding axe in his
hand. He assaulted Aryan by throwing axe towards him. It hit
Aryan on his back near shoulder. Aryan fell down. At that time,
the appellant's mother came there. She caught hold of
appellant's hand, but he did not pay heed to her and again
assaulted Aryan by axe on his forehead. Thereafter, he fled
away. PW5 raised shout. Aryan was lying on road with an axe
fixed in his forehead. Blood was oozing from his head. His
father came after some time and took him to hospital. This
witness then identified the axe (Article - 3) and also the
appellant. In fact, all the witnesses have identified the
appellant as all of them were acquainted with appellant's
family and PW4's family.
14] In cross-examination, again, defence of mental
illness was put up, which is denied by this witness.
15] PW6 has a thrasher machine. He and one Raju had
been to the house of Pandhari Sabale for measuring wheat
towards remuneration of his machine. The house of PW4 is
nearby. He saw Aryan playing on the road. He heard noise and,
therefore, looked in that direction. He saw that Aryan was lying
on road, and an axe was fixed in his forehead. Blood was
oozing from his head. He then deposed that he saw appellant
assaulting Aryan. He rushed towards the place. The appellant
fled away. His mother was sitting there.
16] Thus, the testimony of these four witnesses, i.e.,
PW2, PW4, PW5 and PW6 if collectively analyzed, the
involvement of appellant in crime is writ large. PW5 has given
minute details of the incident. His version is supported by PW2
and PW6. Their evidence indicates that while Aryan was
playing with tyre, the appellant came out from his house with
an axe in his hand, and assaulted Aryan by throwing axe,
which hit his shoulder. Aryan fell down. At that time, the
appellant's mother intervened. He, however, did not pay heed
to his mother's intervention and went ahead. He again
assaulted the helpless minor child by assaulting on his
forehead. The impact or the force used during assault was such
that the axe pierced into the forehead and got fixed in the
forehead.
17] The reason for assault is spelt out in the testimony
of PW4, one day prior to the incident, i.e., on 20/4/2015, the
tyre by which Aryan was playing, hit the appellant. He got
annoyed. It appears that the appellant having seen Aryan again
playing with tyre on next day came out of his house with
determination of beating Aryan by axe. The end result is the
poor child suffered homicidal death for a petty reason. Thus,
there is overwhelming evidence of appellant's involvement.
18] In the circumstances, the evidence of other
witnesses need not be gone into in detail inasmuch as the
testimony of eye-witnesses is sufficient to prove appellant's
nexus with the crime.
19] We will, however, briefly narrate the role of other
witnesses. PW1 - Balkrushna is a panch witness to the spot,
which is not disputed. PW7 - Dr. Ashwin is the doctor, who has
given preliminary treatment at Rural Hospital. He found chop
wound on forehead of size 5 cm X 3 cm X 3 cm. He had seen
the axe fixed in the wound. He collected blood samples of the
appellant. PW8 - Ramesh Babarao Jamunkar is the one, who
accompanied PW4 on motorcycle. He also acted as panch to
inquest panchanama. PW9 is the doctor, who has conducted
postmortem of the deceased. His testimony is relevant to
decide nature of death, which we have found to be homicidal.
PW10 - Swapnil is the one who carried the article to Forensic
Science Laboratory (FSL). PW11 is the Police Inspector, who
has registered the FIR, visited the spot, prepared spot
panchanama, collected blood and soil samples at the spot, etc.
He did not enquire whether the appellant was mentally ill. He
arrested the appellant on 22/4/2015. PW12 - Rajesh carried
seized muddemal to C.A. office. PW13 is the Police Inspector,
who conducted further investigation and filed chargesheet.
20] On the point of plea of insanity, DW1 - Medina -
mother of appellant deposed that the appellant was mentally ill
since the year 2013, and that the villagers were aware of such
status. In cross-examination, she admitted that the appellant
works in fields regularly and behave normally. She admitted
that her son was feeling well because of treatment. She further
admitted that in June - 2014, she had taken her son to
hospital, and the doctor had reduced the doses of medicines,
and a single tablet was continued. She admitted that the
appellant was feeling good and started to go at work on field.
She admitted that after assaulting Aryan with axe, the
appellant bolted away from the spot.
21] Thus, the appellant's mother has, in a way,
admitted that the appellant was responsible for the incident. So
far as mental illness is concerned, her evidence indicates that
the illness was not such that he was incapable of knowing the
nature of act which he is doing or consequences thereof. In
fact, he was feeling well and started to go to the field in the
year 2014.
22] DW2 - Dr. Rameez is a Psychiatric. He deposed that
he treated the appellant in March - 2014, and also prior
thereto, i.e., in October - 2013. He found that appellant was a
patient of Schizophrenia. He described Schizophrenia to be a
chronic and serious mental disorder. He further deposed that
Schizophrenia requires lifelong treatment. He stated that the
patient of Schizophrenia can be dangerous to his own life as
well as life of others. He further said that such type of patient
may commit suicide or beat others or even may chase other
person, and such patient can sustain attack of aggressive
nature despite medication. He then deposed that such type of
patient can also behave with normal behaviour. He admitted
that even if such type of patient is having treatment and
behaves normally, it cannot be said that he is fully recovered.
23] In cross-examination, he admitted that when
appellant was discharged, he was oriented to time, place and
person. He further admitted that patient of Schizophrenia is
stable and under treatment even then he knows what is right
and what is wrong. He further admitted that he even knows
consequences of the act. He admitted that during treatment,
the appellant was not found dangerous to his own life and life
of others. He then admitted that on 16/5/2014, the patient
was referred to hospital, and it was noted that he was taking
medicines regularly, and was doing better and having no fresh
complaints. On 24/7/2014, he was further referred to hospital,
where it was found that he was on regular medication, was
better and going to work. The doctor admitted that on all the
aforesaid dates, his behaviour was normal, he was giving good
responses and had good mental health. He further admitted
that after April - 2014, the appellant was never an indoor
patient. On the point of mental condition of the appellant on
21/4/2015, i.e., the date of incident, he said that he cannot tell
about his mental condition.
24] We find above evidence to be proving two things;
one is that the appellant was a patient of Schizophrenia, and
the other is that his mental condition was reasonably well. His
mental state was such where he could understand what is right
and what is wrong. He was also in a position to know
consequences of the act. He was never found dangerous to his
own life or that of others. Rest of the evidence is in the nature
of general information about behaviour of patients suffering
from Schizophrenia.
25] Thus, the question is, whether benefit of Section 84
of the IPC could be extended to him. We will comment upon it
once we deal with other two defence witnesses.
26] DW3 - Sanghmitra is a jail authority. He admitted
that on 14/5/2015, i.e., subsequent to incident, the appellant
was sent to Civil Hospital, Wardha, for medical treatment of
mental illness. He also admitted that a request was made to the
learned Magistrate to transfer the appellant to Nagpur Central
Jail for medical treatment.
27] In cross-examination, he admitted that if prisoner's
behaviour is abnormal, the prison authority used to inform
about it to the concerned Court. He then deposed that there is
no document to show that during the period from 23/4/2015
to 19/5/2015, the mental and physical behaviour of the
appellant was abnormal, and that it was intimated to the
concerned Court.
28] Thus, the evidence of DW3 indicates that post
incident, when the appellant was in jail, he was referred to
medical treatment, however, incident of abnormal behaviour
was not reported at that time.
29] DW4 - Dr. Amit is the doctor, who was attached to
Regional Mental Hospital. He examined the appellant. He has
stated that after treatment and regular medication, his health
was stable. He admitted that such kind of disease is a severe
mental illness, and long term management is required for
treatment of such patient.
30] In cross-examination, he admitted that due to
regular medicines, the patient was having no active symptoms
of mental illness. He further admitted that patient was well
oriented to time, place and person. He admitted that he would
not have issued report (Exh. 12) if the patient was not stable.
He admitted that the patient was stable when he examined,
and hence, issued report that he was stable.
31] Thus, the evidence of DW4 will further substantiate
that the appellant though was suffering from Schizophrenia
had no serious impairment of understanding the consequences
of the act and/or to distinguish between right or wrong acts.
32] In light of above, the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Bapu Alias Gujraj Singh Vs. State
of Rajasthan [(2007) 8 SCC 66] will be relevant. The Supreme
Court, while examining scope of Section 84 of the IPC, held
thus :
"1 to 7 ....
8. Under Section 84 IPC, a person is exonerated from
liability for doing an act on the ground of unsoundness
of mind if he, at the time of doing the act, is either
incapable of knowing (a) the nature of the act, or (b)
that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.
The accused is protected not only when, on account of
insanity, he was incapable of knowing the nature of the
act, but also when he did not know either that the act
was wrong or that it was contrary to law, although he
might know the nature of the act itself. He is, however,
not protected if he knew that what he was doing was
wrong, even if he did not know that it was contrary to
law, and also if he knew that what he was doing was
contrary to law even though he did not know that it
was wrong. The onus of proving unsoundness of mind
is on the accused. But where during the investigation
previous history of insanity is revealed, it is the duty of
an honest investigator to subject the accused to a medi-
cal examination and place that evidence before the
court and if this is not done, it creates a serious
infirmity in the prosecution case and the benefit of
doubt has to be given to the accused. The onus,
however, has to be discharged by producing evidence
as to the conduct of the accused shortly prior to the
offence and his conduct at the time or immediately
afterwards, also by evidence of his mental condition
and other relevant factors. Every person is presumed to
know the natural consequences of his act. Similarly
every person is also presumed to know the law. The
prosecution has not to establish these facts.
9 and 10 ....
11. The section itself provides that the benefit is
available only after it is proved that at the time of
committing the act, the accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing, or that even if he did not know it, it was either
wrong or contrary to law then this section must be
applied. The crucial point of time for deciding whether
the benefit of this section should be given or not, is the
material time when the offence takes place. In coming
to that conclusion, the relevant circumstances are to be
taken into consideration, it would be dangerous to
admit the defence of insanity upon arguments derived
merely from the character of the crime. It is only
unsoundness of mind which naturally impairs the
cognitive faculties of the mind that can form a ground
of exemption from criminal responsibility. Stephen in
History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. II, p. 166
has observed that if a person cuts off the head of a
sleeping man because it would be great fun to see him
looking for it when he woke up, would obviously be a
case where the perpetrator of the act would be
incapable of knowing the physical effects of his act. The
law recognises nothing but incapacity to realise the
nature of the act and presumes that where a man's
mind or his faculties of ratiocination are sufficiently
dim to apprehend what he is doing, he must always be
presumed to intend the consequence of the action he
takes. Mere absence of motive for a crime, howsoever
atrocious it may be, cannot in the absence of plea and
proof of legal insanity, bring the case within this
section. This Court in Sheralli Wali Mohd. v. State Of
Maharashtra [(1973) 4 SCC 79] held that:
"The mere fact that no motive has been proved
why the accused murdered his wife and children
or the fact that he made no attempt to run away
when the door was broken open, would not
indicate that he was insane or that he did not
have the necessary mens rea for the commission
of the offence."
12. Mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion,
irresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of a psy-
chopath affords no protection under Section 84 as the
law contained in that section is still squarely based on
the outdated M'Naughton rules of 19th century
England. The provisions of Section 84 are in substance
the same as those laid down in the answers of the
Judges to the questions put to them by the House of
Lords, in M'Naughton's case [(1843) 4 St Tr NS 847
(HL)]. Behaviour, antecedent, attendant and
subsequent to the event, may be relevant in finding the
mental condition of the accused at the time of the
event, but not that remote in time. It is difficult to
prove the precise state of the offender's mind at the
time of the commission of the offence, but some
indication thereof is often furnished by the conduct of
the offender while committing it or immediately after
the commission of the offence. A lucid interval of an
insane person is not merely a cessation of the violent
symptoms of the disorder, but a restoration of the
faculties of the mind sufficiently to enable the person
soundly to judge the act; but the expression does not
necessarily mean complete or perfect restoration of the
mental faculties to their original condition. So, if there
is such a restoration, the person concerned can do the
act with such reason, memory and judgment as to
make it a legal act; but merely a cessation of the violent
symptoms of the disorder is not sufficient."
33] Thus, to extend benefit under Section 84 of the IPC,
the person/accused must be, at the time of doing an act, either
incapable of knowing (a) the nature of the act, or (b) that he is
doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The protection is
available only on account of insanity, where it is proved that he
was incapable of knowing the nature of act, and also, that he
was unaware that the act was wrong or that it was contrary to
law, although he might know the nature of act itself. The Court
further held that protection under Section 84 of the IPC is not
available if the accused knew that what he was doing is wrong,
even if he did not know that it was contrary to law, and also, if
he knew that what he was doing is contrary to law, even
through he did not know that it was wrong. The benefit is
available only if it is proved that at the time of committing the
act, he was suffering from such inability. Most importantly, the
Supreme Court held that onus of proving unsoundness of mind
is on the accused. The Court clarified that mere abnormality of
mind or partial delusion, irresistible impulse or compulsive
behaviour of a psychopath affords no protection under Section
84 of the IPC as the law contained in that Section is still
squarely based on the outdated M'Naughton rules of 19th
century England. The Court held that behaviour, antecedent,
attendant and subsequent to the event, may be relevant in
finding the mental condition of the accused at the time of the
event, but not that remote in time.
34] Thus, the conduct of the appellant is extremely
crucial. The evidence on this point is that the appellant came
out with axe in his hand after seeing Aryan on road again
playing with tyre. He continued assault despite attempt of his
mother to prevent it. Immediately after assault, he ran away.
The conduct of the appellant to run away from the spot after
assault is indicative of the fact that he was aware of the
consequences of the assault. The said conduct also indicates
that he was aware of the nature of act, which he was
committing. The said conduct coupled with doctors' evidence
that he was well oriented and showed stable behaviour will
disentitle him of any benefit. He cannot be, thus, exonerated in
terms of Section 84 of the IPC.
35] Thus, having noted all the attending circumstances,
it appears to us that the appellant has committed homicidal
death of an innocent child. The trial Court has given well
reasoned finding on this point. It has considered the defence as
well. The finding is in tune with the provisions of law. No
interference, therefore, is called for in the impugned judgment.
The appeal is dismissed.
36] Fees of the learned Counsel appointed to represent
the appellant be quantified and paid as per Rules.
JUDGE JUDGE
Sumit
Signed by: Mr. Sumit Agrawal
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 17/12/2025 10:45:09
