[Cites 9, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Dhyan Foundation Through Vedprakash ... vs Google Llc And Anr on 9 December, 2025
Author: N. J. Jamadar
Bench: N. J. Jamadar
2025:BHC-AS:53891
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
SAINATH
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 760 OF 2025
Dhyan Foundation
A registered Charitable Non-Profit
Organization, through its representative,
Mr. Vedprakash Mishra, Age - 54 years,
Occ: Service, having office at
22, Raja Bahadur Mansion,
2nd Floor, Mumbai Samachar Marg,
Fort, Mumbai - 400 023. ..Petitioner
Versus
1. Google LLC
Incorporated under the laws of Delware,
Located at 1600, Amphitheatre Parkway,
Mountain View, CA 94043.
2. State of Maharashtra ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 794 OF 2025
Dhyan Foundation
A registered Charitable Non-Profit
Organization, through its representative,
Mr. Vedprakash Mishra, Age - 54 years,
Occ: Service, having office at
22, Raja Bahadur Mansion,
2nd Floor, Mumbai Samachar Marg,
Fort, Mumbai - 400 023. ..Petitioner
Versus
1. Google LLC
Incorporated under the laws of Delware,
Located at 1600, Amphitheatre Parkway,
Mountain View, CA 94043.
1/21
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
2. State of Maharashtra ...Respondents
Mr. Harish Pandya a/w Adv. Raju Gupta a/w Ms. Mavali
Jadhav i/b Mr. Raju Gupta, for Petitioner.
Mr. Aabad Ponda a/w Mr. C. Keswani, Mr. Tanmay Bhave, a/w
Ms. Chandrama Raje, i/b Economic Laws Practice, for
Respondent No. 1.
Mr. A. D. Kamkhedkar, APP for State.
CORAM : N. J. JAMADAR, J.
RESERVED ON : 21st NOVEMBER 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 09th DECEMBER 2025
JUDGMENT:
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and with the
consent of the parties, heard finally.
2. As these petitions have their genesis in the orders passed
by the learned Magistrate, in one and the same proceeding, the
petitions were heard together and are being decided by this
common judgment.
3. The petitioner is a registered charitable non-profit
organization. It is promoting the cause of animal welfare. The
petitioner works for the rescue, care, treatment and
rehabilitation of animals, with the assistance of law enforcement
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
agencies. YouTube, a social media intermediary, is operated by
Google LLC - Respondent No. 1.
4. The petitioner alleges the Respondent No. 1 has allowed to
broadcast and publish five per se defamatory videos, on
YouTube platform. Those videos containing baseless, false and
the defamatory imputations against the petitioner were widely
circulated. They have the propensity to tarnish the image and
reputation of the petitioner.
5. The petitioner thus filed a miscellaneous application,
being MA No.4907/2021, before the Metropolitan Magistrate,
Ballard Pier, Mumbai. By an order dated 31 st March, 2023, the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate allowed the said application
and directed Respondent No. 1 to stop and remove the
circulation of the defamatory videos and the State Government -
Respondent No. 2 was directed to enter into correspondence
with Respondent No. 1 to comply with the rules framed under
Information Technology Act, 2000.
6. Since the Respondent No. 1 failed to delete the offending
videos, the petitioner filed another Miscellaneous Application i.e.
CC No. Misc/3800448/2023, for initiation of action for
disobedience of the order of the Court.
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
7. The petitioner claims the Respondent No. 1 thereupon
approached the Court of Session and filed Criminal Revision
Application along with an application for condonation of delay of
116 days. By an order dated 31st December, 2024, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge allowed the application for
condonation of delay.
8. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred WP No.
760/2025 asserting, inter alia, that the said application was
allowed in a mechanical manner, without any sufficient cause
having been made out by the Respondent No.1.
9. By a further order dated 02nd January, 2025 in the
Revision Application No. 04/2025, the learned Additional
Sessions Judge stayed the proceedings in CC No.
Misc/3800448/2023, initiated by the petitioner for the
disobedience of the order passed by the learned Magistrate
dated 31st March, 2023. The petitioner has, thus, preferred Writ
Petition No. 794/2025 to assail the legality, propriety and
correctness of the said interim order.
10. I have heard Mr. Harish Pandya, the learned Counsel for
the petitioner, Mr. Aabad Ponda the learned Senior Advocate for
the Respondent No. 1, and Mr. A. D. Kamkhedkar learned APP
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
for the State at some length. With the assistance of learned
Counsel for the parties, I have perused the material on record
including the pleadings before the Courts below and the
impugned orders.
WRIT PETITION NO.760 OF 2025
11. Mr. Pandya, the learned Counsel for petitioner, submitted
that, the learned Additional Sessions Judge committed a grave
error in law in condoning the delay of 116 days in filing the
revision application, though the Respondent No. 1 had not
ascribed any reason which could amount to a sufficient cause.
Taking the Court through the averments in the application for
condonation of delay, Mr. Pandya would urge the only reason
that can be discerned from the application is that, the
Respondent No. 1 being a large organization was required to
have draft of the revision application approved at multiple levels
before the same could be finalized and filed before the Court.
Such a cause can, under no circumstances, be said to be
sufficient to condone the delay of 116 days, submitted Mr.
Pandya.
12. As against this, Mr. Ponda, the learned Senior Advocate for
Respondent, would urge that, the application for condonation of
delay contains adequate grounds which make out a sufficient
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
cause. In any event, according to Mr. Ponda, the application for
condonation of delay deserves to be construed liberally and once
the Court of first instance exercises the discretion to condone
the delay, the superior Court ought not to likely interfere with
such exercise of discretion.
13. Mr. Ponda would further submit that, the developments in
the intervening period bear upon the challenge to the impugned
order. The revision application was extensively heard by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge and the matter was posted
for pronouncement of judgment on 08 th May, 2025. On that day,
when the learned Additional Sessions Judge declined to permit
the petitioner to file the written notes of arguments, the learned
Judge was informed that, that letters have been addressed to
the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court for transfer
of the said revision application to another Court, as the
petitioner had lost faith in the said Court. Thus, the matter
came to be adjourned to 09th June, 2025. In the backdrop of
these developments, according to Mr. Ponda, the challenge does
not deserves to be entertained.
14. The roznama of the proceedings in the revision application
dated 03rd May, 2025 does indicate that, the arguments were
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the matter
was posted for judgment to 08th May, 2025. On account of the
events that unfolded before the learned Additional Sessions
Judge on 08th May, 2025, it appears, the learned Additional
Sessions Judge was constrained to adjourn the proceedings to
09th June, 2025. There are allegations and counter-allegations in
regard to the manner in which the proceedings were conducted
before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. This Court does
not consider it necessary to delve into those submissions.
Suffice to note, the fact remains, the revision application was
heard finally and was posted for passing judgment on 08 th May,
2025. Nonetheless, this Court considers it appropriate to test
the legality, propriety and correctness of order of condonation of
delay without being swayed by the aforesaid factor.
15. The principles which govern the exercise of discretion in
the matter of condonation of delay are well settled. It is not the
length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause that deserves
consideration. Undoubtedly, where the delay is inordinate and
unexplained, the length of delay assumes significance.
Ordinarily, the Courts adopt a liberal approach in the matter of
condonation of delay and lean in favour of condonation of delay
so as to advance the cause of substantive justice. This approach
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
stems from the overarching principle that, the majesty of the
Courts lies in deciding the matters on merits rather than on
technicalities. Procedure which is a handmaid of justice ought
not be allowed to score a march over substantive justice. In the
absence of willful negligence or want of bonafide, the Courts are
persuaded to construe the sufficiency of the cause liberally.
16. The court is expected to be alive to the remit of jurisdiction
where the challenge is to an order condoning the delay. There is
a subtle yet significant difference in the approach of the court
when the court at the first instance has exercised its discretion
to condone the delay and in cases where the application for
condonation of delay is rejected by such court. In the former
case, since the court below has exercised its discretion in a
positive manner to condone the delay, ordinarily the superior
court should not interfere with such a finding, as it has the
potentiality to promote the cause of substantive justice.
However, where the court at the first instance refuses to
condone the delay, the superior court is at liberty to reassess
the entire matter of condonation of delay and arrive at its own
conclusion, de hors the conclusion arrived at by the court
below.
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
17. A profitable reference in this context can be made to the
oft-quoted decision of the Supreme Court in the case of N.
Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy1, wherein the difference n
the approach was illuminatingly delineated. The observations in
paragraphs 9 to 13 are instructive and, thus, extracted below:
"9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter
of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act
does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if
the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no
matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only
criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be
uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation
whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can
be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.
Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is
the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally
the superior court should not disturb such finding, much
less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of
discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or
perverse. But it is a different matter when the first cut
refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior
cut would be free to consider the cause shown for the
delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come
to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of
the lower court.
10. The reason for such a different stance is thus:
The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the
dispute between the parties and to advance substantial
justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in
different situations in not because on the expiry of such
time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.
11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly.
1 (1998) 7 SCC 123
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the
damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of
limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the
redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious
and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of
time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer
persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts.
So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending
period for launching the remedy may lead to unending
uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation
is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the
maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules
of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the
parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort
to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The
idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a
legislatively fixed period of time.
12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would
result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause.
There is no presumption that delay in approaching the
court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the
words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain V/s. Kuntal
Kumari (AIR 1969 SC 575) and State of W.B. V/s.
Administrator, Howrah Municipality ((1972) 1 SC 366).
13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay
there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant
concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his
plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation
does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part
of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost
consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable
ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the
party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean
against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning
delay the Could should not forget the opposite party
altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser
and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation
expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the
applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party
for his loss."
(emphasis supplied)
18. In the case of Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through Legal
Representatives & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. 2, on which
reliance was placed by Mr. Ponda, the Supreme Court
underscored the difference in the approach, in the following
words :-
"33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in
mind that we are not hearing an application for
condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a
discretionary order of the High Court granting the
prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the
former, whether to condone or not would be the only
question whereas in the latter, whether there has
been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of
the prayer for condonation would be the question.
Law is fairly well-settled that 'a court of appeal should
not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised
by the courts below'. If any authority is required, we
can profitably refer to the decision in Manjunath
Anandappa v. Tammanasa, which in turn relied on
the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat
Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha where it has been held
that: 'an appellate power interferes not when the
order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly
wrong'."
19. Reverting to the facts of the case, in the light of the
aforesaid enunciation of law and applying the principles
expounded therein, it becomes evident that, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge was also influenced by the fact that,
2 (2023) 10 SCC 531
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
the principal grievance of the Respondent No. 1 was that the
order impugned in the revision was passed without jurisdiction.
In this context as well, the legal position is absolutely clear. The
Court ought not start with the merits of the matter, while
determining an application for condonation of delay. It is only
after appreciation of the sufficiency of the cause ascribed for the
condonation of delay and weight of the resistance thereto, the
Court may look into the merits of the matter to tilt the scale in
favour of condonation of delay.
20. A useful reference in this context can be made to a recent
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of H. Guruswamy
and others vs. A. Krishnaiah since deceased by LR(s)3, wherein
the Supreme Court expounded as to how and when the merits
of the matter may come into play while deciding an application
for condonation of delay, as under:
"16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration while
considering whether the delay should be condoned or not.
From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it
appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation
for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a
party has lost his right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that
the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against
3 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54.
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
the technical considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the
party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side
is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the
merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay."
(emphasis supplied)
21. In the application for condonation of delay, the
Respondent has contended that, the time was consumed in
taking the decision with regard to filing of revision and in
finalizing the draft as the Respondent No. 1 is a large and multi-
layered organization. In addition, reference to the merits of the
order impugned in the revision and the consequences that may
ensue if delay is not condoned, is made.
22. If the cause ascribed by the Respondent No. 1 is
considered in the light of the period of delay, it cannot be said
that, the Respondent No.1 had not ascribed any cause. The
cause ascribed by the Respondent No.1 cannot be said to be
wholly unsustainable. It does not appear that, there was
negligence or lack of bonafide on the part of the Respondent No.
1. The exercise of discretion by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, therefore, cannot be termed as arbitrary or perverse.
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
23. As the learned Additional Sessions Judge has exercised
positive discretion to condone the delay, in exercise of the
supervisory jurisdiction, this Court does not find it expedient to
interfere with the impugned order which promotes cause of
determination of the lis on merits rather than on technicalities.
24. Resultantly, the challenge to the order condoning the delay
fails.
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 794/2025
25. Assailing the order dated 02nd January, 2025 whereby the
learned Additional Sessions Judge stayed the further
proceedings in CC No. Misc/3800448/2023 Mr. Pandya would
urge, with a decree of vehemence that, the said order was
passed when there was no challenge to the said order in the
revision application. It was further submitted that, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge passed the impugned order dated
02nd January, 2025 without providing an effective opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner. The contention on behalf of respondent
that there was jurisdictional error in passing the order dated
31st March, 2023 in CC No. 4907/SS/2021 was stated to be
wholly incorrect. The Court is competent to pass such order
directing the intermediary to remove the offending content.
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
Therefore, the impugned order dated 02nd January, 2025 which
stayed the proceedings initiated by the petitioner for
disobedience of the order dated 31st March, 2023 was wholly
illegal and unsustainable.
26. Per contra, Mr. Ponda would urge that, there is indeed a
prayer in the revision application to stay the effect and operation
of order dated 31st March, 2023. Since the learned Magistrate by
order dated 31st March, 2023 had disposed of CC No.
4907/SS/2021, the Respondent No. 1 could only pray for
staying the effect and operation of said order and the
application bearing CC No. Misc/3800448/2023 preferred by
the petitioner was, in essence, for the enforcement of the said
order dated 31st March, 2023. As the learned Additional
Sessions Judge has found that, a prima facie arguable case was
made out, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was well
within his rights in staying the further proceeding in CC No.
Misc/3800448/2023.
27. To buttress the submission that, the Magistrate has no
jurisdictional competence to pass an order to block the website
and direct removal of the alleged offending content under
Section 69-A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking
for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, Mr. Ponda
placed a very strong reliance on the judgment of Tripura High
Court in the case of State of Tripura Vs. Sri. Soumen Sarkar 4,
decided on 22nd January, 2021.
28. Mr. Pandya joined the issue by canvassing a submission
that, the aforesaid decision rendered by the High Court of
Tripura did not consider the Division Bench judgment of the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 5, decided on 12th
October, 2020, wherein the Division bench of the High Court
had directed the Central Bureau of Investigation to take steps to
block the users who post the offending content. Therefore, Mr.
Pandya would urge, it cannot be said that, when per se
defamatory and offending content is circulated, the Court is
denuded of the power to order its removal.
29. At this stage, it is necessary for this Court to observe
caution, as the criminal revision application wherein the
challenge to the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate to pass an
order directing Respondent No.1 to stop and remove the
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
offending content is yet to be adjudicated. There is a clear and
present danger of the observations made by this court
influencing the adjudication by the Court of Session. Therefore,
this court does not consider it appropriate to delve into the
question of jurisdictional competence of the learned Magistrate
to pass the order dated 31 March 2023, in detail. The existence
of prima facie case would be required to be evaluated only from
the standpoint of the justifiability of the order of stay to the
proceedings before the learned Magistrate in CC Misc
No.3800448 of 2023.
30. Section 69-A of the Information Technology Act, 2000
empowers the Central Government or any of its officers specially
authorized to direct any agency of the Government or
intermediary to block for access by the public or cause to be
blocked for access by the public any information generated,
transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer
resource. The Central Government or the specially authorized
officer may exercise the said power, if it or he is satisfied that
it is necessary or expedient to do so for specified reasons,
namely, in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India,
defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with
foreign State or public order or for preventing incitement to the
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
commission of any cognizable offence relating to the aforesaid
grounds. The Central Government or the specially authorized
officer is enjoined to record reasons in writing for issuing such
directions.
31. Sub-section (2) of section 69-A provides that the procedure
and safeguards, subject to which such blocking for access by
the public may be carried out, shall be such as may be
prescribed. In exercise of the rule making power, the Central
Government has framed the Information Technology (Procedure
and Safeguards for Blocking for access of Information by Public)
Rules, 2009.
32. Interpreting the provisions of the Rules, 2009, especially
Rule 10, which deals with process of order of the Court for
blocking of information, the Chief Justice of the High Court of
Tripura in the case of the State of Tripura V/s. Sri Soumen
Sarkar6 enunciated that, the source of power for blocking any
access to the members of the public, therefore, flows from sub-
section (1) of section 69-A of the Act, and, none of the rules
particularly Rule 5 or Rule 10 of the said Rules can be seen as
vesting a particular Court with such powers if it otherwise does
not possess. Rule 10 is not a source of power of a Magistrate to
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
pass such an order. Unless and until it is established that,
outside the said Rules, the Magistrate has the power to order
blocking of the information, recourse to Rule 10 of the said
Rules cannot be had. Blocking circulation of any information
sought to be put in public domain by someone would be
curtailing his right to freedom of speech and expression and
corresponding limitation on the right of the public to access
information. Power to curtail free speech cannot be recognized
without specific statutory provision with proper safeguards.
33. In the case of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Amaravati (supra), on which reliance was placed by Mr. Pandya,
the fact situation was completely different. In the peculiar and
rather grave facts, where the authority and dignity of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh was sought to be undermined by
posting abusive and defamatory content in relation to the High
Court and its Judges on different sites on social media and even
in the interviews given to the electronic media, the High Court,
on its administrative side, had filed a Petition. In those peculiar
facts, the Division Bench of the High Court had entrusted the
investigation to CBI and observed that the CBI may take steps
so that all defamatory posts available on social media be struck
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
down and to block the users who were posting such defamatory
posts, in accordance with law.
34. I am afraid, the aforesaid decision would govern the facts
of the case at hand. From the perusal of the provisions
contained in Section 69-A and the Rules, 2009, prima facie, the
view formed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge about the
jurisdictional competence of the learned Magistrate to pass the
order dated 31 March 2023, cannot be faulted at.
35. The submission of Mr. Pandya that no order passed in CC
No. Misc/3800448/2023 was under challenge before the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, and, therefore, no interim
order could have been passed in the revision application, is
required to be stated to be repelled. In the revision application,
as noted above, by way of interim relief, respondent No.1 had
prayed to stay the effect and operation of the order dated 31
March 2023. What the Petitioner was seeking in CC No.
Misc/3800448/2023 was action for disobedience of the said
order dated 31st March 2023. Thus, it cannot be said that there
was no nexus between the challenge in the revision application
and the impugned order dated 2nd January 2025, staying
further proceedings in CC No. Misc/3800448/2023.
27 CRI WP 760.25.DOC
36. For the foregoing reasons, this Court does not find any
justifiable reason to interfere with the order granting stay to the
further proceedings in CC No. Misc/3800448/2023, till the final
decision of the revision application.
37. Resultantly, both the Writ Petitions deserve to be
dismissed.
38. Hence, the following order:-
::ORDER::
(i) Writ Petition No. 760/2025 and Writ Petition No.
794/2025 stand dismissed.
(ii) Rule discharged.
(iii) No costs.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 09/12/2025 21:20:34
