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Bombay High Court
Santosh Sudam Bhalerao vs The State Of Maharashtra Through Its ... on 8 December, 2025
Author: Vibha Kankanwadi
Bench: Vibha Kankanwadi
2025:BHC-AUG:34556-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 13929 OF 2023
WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5708 OF 2025
Santosh s/o Sudam Bhalerao,
Age 39 years, Occu: Business,
R/o H. No.5-3-10, Lane No.3,
Beside Maruti Mandir, MIDC,
Area Chikalthana, Brijwadi,
Aurangabad, Tq. & District:
Aurangabad -----PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. The State of Maharashtra,
Through its Principal Secretary,
Departmental Industries Mining
And Marathi Language 114 Annex
Building, Mantralaya, Mumbai-32.
2. The Chief Executive Officer,
The Maharashtra Industrial
Development Corporation,
Head Office, 8, Udyog Sarthi,
Mahakali Cave Road, Andheri
East, Mumbai-400093.
3. The Joint Chief Executive Officer,
(Jr. C.E.O.), Maharashtra Industrial
Development Corporation (MIDC),
Head Office, 9, Udyog Sarthi,
Mahakali Cave Road, Andheri
East, Mumbai-400093.
4. The Regional Officer, Aurangabad,
Maharashtra Industrial Development
Corporation, Railway Station
Road, Aurangabad.
5. The Chief Planer,
MIDC Udyog Sarthi,
Mahakali Cave Road, Andheri
WP-13929-2023.odt 1 of 41
East, Mumbai-400093.
6. Technical Advisor,
Udyog Sarthi,
Mahakali Cave Road, Andheri
East, Mumbai-400093.
7. Vinayak V. Andhale,
Age Major, Occu: Business,
R/o C/o CA office of Zawar,
Joyti Nagar, Shanoor Miya
Dargha Road, Aurangabad.
8. Vidhya Prafulla Bafna,
Age Major, Occu: Business,
R/o C/o Plot No.C-30, MIDC,
Chikalthana, Aurangabad.
9. Gauri w/o Ashish Zawar,
Age Major, Occu: Business,
R/o C/o CA office of Zawar,
Joyti Nagar, Shanoor Miya
Dargha Road, Aurangabad. ----RESPONDENTS
Mr. B. L. Sagar Killarikar h/f Mr. M. B. Sandanshiv, Advocate for
petitioner
Mr. A. R. Kale, Addl. GP for respondent No. 1
Mr. Shrihari Aney, Senior Advocate i/b Mr. S S. Dande, Advocate for
respondent Nos. 2 to 6
Mr. A. M. Karad, Advocate for respondent No. 7
Mr. A. S. Golegaonkar, Amicus Curiae
Mr. Swapnil Patil a/w Mr. N. S. Shah and Mr. S. S. Sarde, Advocate for
respondent No. 9
CORAM : Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi &
Hiten S. Venegavkar, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 09th October, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 08th December, 2025
JUDGMENT (PER : Hiten S. Venegavkar, J) :
-
WP-13929-2023.odt 2 of 41
1. The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the
decisions taken in the meetings of the Minor Modification Committee
(MMC) on 21.09.2023 and the Land Allotment Committee (LAC) of MIDC
on 25.09.2023, whereby open spaces bearing Nos. 8 and 15 in the
Chikalthana MIDC Industrial Area, Aurangabad, came to be allotted to
respondent Nos. 7 to 9. The petitioner seeks quashing of these decisions
and also direction to the Maharashtra Industrial Development
Corporation ("MIDC") to allot the very same open spaces to him.
It must be stated at the outset that the applications for allotment
of the subject lands were submitted not by the present petitioner in his
individual capacity, but by a partnership firm operating under the name
and style of M/s. Shri Pratiksha Industries. The present writ petition,
however, has not been instituted by the said firm; instead, it has been
filed by the petitioner in his personal capacity. The petition is
conspicuously silent on whether the partnership firm is duly registered
under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and whether the firm or its
partners have authorized the petitioner to institute these proceedings on
its behalf. In the absence of any challenge by the firm itself an
independent legal entity to the rejection of its applications, a serious and
fundamental issue arises with respect to the petitioner's locus standi and
WP-13929-2023.odt 3 of 41
the very maintainability of a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India at his behest. In our considered view, such a
petition, filed by an individual without demonstrating due authorization
from the partnership firm, would ordinarily not be maintainable and
could be rejected on this ground alone. Nevertheless, since the matter
also raises a broader challenge to the policies adopted by the MIDC in
making allotments of its plots without recourse to public advertisement
or auction, we have deemed it appropriate to entertain the petition to
that limited extent. While addressing this larger issue, we shall also
examine the applicability of the MIDC's policies to the case of the
petitioner, who asserts that he is a partner of the original applicant, M/s.
Shri Pratiksha Industries.
Petitioners Case :-
2. MIDC is a statutory corporation constituted under the Maharashtra
Industrial Development Act, 1961 ("MIDC Act"), for the planned and
accelerated development of industries within the State. It acquires,
develops and disposes its land in notified industrial areas in terms of the
MIDC Act and the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation
Disposal of Land Regulations, 1975 ("Land Disposal Regulations" or "DLR
1975"). Petitioner submits that Chikalthana Industrial Area, Aurangabad,
WP-13929-2023.odt 4 of 41
is one such industrial estate and open spaces Nos. 8 and 15 form part of
the layout of said area and were originally shown as open spaces, which
were subsequently considered for conversion and allotment.
3. The petitioner claims to be a partner in a firm known as M/s Shree
Pratiksha Industries. He states that he submitted an application dated
24.05.2023 in the name of the said firm for allotment of open spaces
Nos. 8 and 15 for setting up a manufacturing unit for agro equipment
along with warehousing. He asserts that he submitted another
application dated 25.08.2023, and that he was ready and willing to
invest more than ₹20 crores in the proposed unit. According to him,
under Government notifications dated 31.12.2018 and 04.09.2023, agro
equipment and food processing industries are recognized as "thrust
sectors" entitled to priority allotment and, therefore, his proposal fell
within the preferred category.
4. The grievance of the petitioner is that, although his applications
were prior in point of time, the respondent MIDC authorities ignored his
claim and instead considered the online applications of respondent Nos.
7 to 9, whose proposals were admittedly later in time. The petitioner
contends that the policy of priority allotment, requires that among
applicants, seniority in submitting applications ought to be preferred. He
alleges that the failure to consider his application in the meeting of the
WP-13929-2023.odt 5 of 41
decisions of the MMC and LAC amounts to illegal discrimination,
arbitrariness and favoritism in favour of respondent Nos. 7 to 9. He
further alleges that he issued a legal notice dated 27.09.2023 to MIDC
asserting his grievance and insisted for his claim of allotment.
5. The petitioner states that he attempted to submit his proposal
online, but that the MIDC online portal for the Aurangabad Division was
allegedly not functioning, as reflected in certain screenshots annexed to
the petition. On this basis he contends that there was a genuine
impediment in following the online procedure and that his offline
applications, accompanied by a detailed project report and processing
fee, ought to have been treated as valid and considered by the LAC. He
relies on a seniority list of proposals in which, according to him, the
name of partnership firm M/s. Pratiksha Industries appears at serial No.
31 whereas respondent No. 9 appears at serial No. 34.
6. The petitioner also asserts that MIDC, while filing its reply, has
admitted that certain other entities have been allotted plots on the basis
of offline applications. On the strength of these instances, he contends
that the plea now taken by MIDC that only online applications are
entertained is a mere pretext and that MIDC follows a pick-and-choose
policy in entertaining offline applications of favored parties while
rejecting similarly placed applicants such as the petitioner. He further
WP-13929-2023.odt 6 of 41
alleges that the allotment in favour of respondent No. 9 was made
during the pendency of the petition and that the said plot has been
transferred to a third party.
7. On the above basis, the case of the petitioner, as pleaded and as
argued, is that: (i) Partnership firm's application was prior in time; (ii)
belongs to a thrust sector with the requisite investment; (iii) offline
applications ought to have been accepted in view of the alleged non-
functioning of the portal; (iv) MIDC has entertained offline applications of
others; and (v) the allotment of the subject open spaces in favour of
respondent Nos. 7 to 9 is arbitrary, discriminatory, violative of Article 14
of Constitution of India and contrary to MIDC's own circulars mandating
allotment by e-tender.
8. The learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the circular
dated 26.09.2016, which revises the land allotment process in light of
the "Ease of Doing Business" policy, contemplates allotment of plots by
the e-tender process and requires public advertisement of available plots
in newspapers and on the official website. He contends that, in the
absence of any such advertisement or e-tender for open spaces Nos. 8
and 15, the very entertainment of the online application of respondent
Nos. 7 to 9 is illegal. Relying upon the rejection communication dated
07.07.2023, he submits that MIDC itself stated that the plots at
WP-13929-2023.odt 7 of 41
Chikalthana Industrial Area were to be allotted only by tender. He
therefore, questions how, despite such communication, respondent Nos.
7 to 9 could have allowed to access and apply online for the very same
plot.
9. The petitioner's counsel further contends that the minutes of the
LAC meeting dated 25.09.2023 reveal that representatives of respondent
Nos. 7, 8 and 9 were present before the Committee, whereas no such
opportunity was accorded to the petitioner. According to him, this
differential treatment in hearing and processing applications is indicative
of bias and favoritism. He places heavy reliance on the decision of this
Court in Real Team Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, Writ
Petition No. 9279 of 2012, decided on 20 February 2014, where this
Court, while interpreting Regulation 4 of the Land Disposal Regulations,
emphasized the need for transparency and fairness, and observed that
allotment of public property by entertaining individual applications is an
exception and not the rule, and that ordinarily disposal should be
through public auction or open tender.
10. The learned advocate also relies upon the decision of the Supreme
Court in Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2011) 5 SCC 29 : AIR 2011 SC 1834, where allotment of land
to a memorial trust at a throwaway price was struck down on the ground
of lack of transparency and denial of equal opportunity. He submits that
WP-13929-2023.odt 8 of 41
the principle that emerges from that decision is that public land can be
allotted only after issuing an advertisement and inviting competitive
offers, so as to ensure a level playing field for all similarly situated
persons.
11. On these premises, the petitioner's counsel argues that the
prevailing policy of MIDC, to allot plots on a priority basis and in online
mode without advertisement of specific plots, violates the constitutional
requirement of fairness and equal opportunity and the settled principle
that disposal of public property should be ordinarily through
advertisement and tender. He accordingly prays that the allotment in
favour of respondent No. 9 be set aside and that MIDC be directed to
allot the subject plots to the petitioner.
Case of Respondent Authorites of MIDC -
12. Respondent No. 4, the Area Manager of MIDC, has filed a detailed
reply affidavit as well as an additional affidavit, setting out the statutory
framework and policy evolution, and firmly opposing the petition. MIDC
points out that it is a statutory corporation constituted under the MIDC
Act, with its functions, powers and duties specified in Sections 14, 15
and 16. Section 39 in particular deals with the power to dispose of land
acquired by the State Government and transferred to the Corporation.
Sub-section (1) of Section 39 permits disposal of such land, with or
WP-13929-2023.odt 9 of 41
without development, "to such person, in such manner, and subject to
such terms and conditions as it considers expedient for securing the
purposes of this Act", subject to any directions issued by the State
Government. Sub-section (3) of Section 39 clarifies that, save as to
disposal by way of gift, mortgage or charge, disposal may be "in any
manner, whether by way of sale, exchange or lease or by the creation of
any easement, right or privilege or otherwise".
13. MIDC further relies on the Land Disposal Regulations, 1975 and, in
particular, Regulation 4, which expressly provides that out of the land
covered by the layout, the Corporation may dispose of plots of land
"either by public auction or by entertaining individual applications".
Regulation 6 prescribes the form and manner of applications and the role
of the Chief Executive Officer and the Land Committee in scrutinizing the
applications and making recommendations. MIDC submits that these
regulations clearly recognize two distinct and equally valid manners of
disposal and that there is no statutory mandate that disposal must in all
cases be by auction or tender.
14. As regards the facts of the present case, MIDC submits that the
petitioner's applications were submitted offline, were not in the
prescribed form, and were wholly incomplete. He did not furnish the
partnership registration certificate, net-worth certificate of partners, nor
a detailed project report in the format prescribed by the circular dated
WP-13929-2023.odt 10 of 41
13.10.2022. He also did not submit any valid application through the
online portal. After scrutiny, his applications were rejected on
07.07.2023 and 29.08.2023. MIDC states that the rejection
communications were dispatched and that the petitioner has not
challenged them till date. Thus, at the time when the LAC considered the
proposals for the subject plots, the petitioner had no valid application
pending at all.
15. Furthermore, MIDC asserts that five valid online applications were
received for the subject lands, including that of respondent No. 9. After
technical scrutiny, these applications were placed before the LAC in its
meeting dated 25.09.2023. In that meeting, one application was
rejected, three were deferred and respondent No. 9's application was
recommended for allotment, having been found fully compliant with the
policy for priority allotment under the State's Industrial Policy and MIDC
circulars. Allotment order was issued on 30.01.2024; possession was
handed over on 24.01.2025; and a registered agreement to lease has
been executed on 07.03.2025. MIDC submits that substantial rights have
thus been created in favour of respondent No. 9 and that this Court
ought not to unsettle a completed allotment in the absence of clear
illegality or mala fides.
16. Respondent No. 4 explains in detail the evolution of MIDC's land
allotment policy. Initially, allotments were made predominantly on a
WP-13929-2023.odt 11 of 41
first-come-first-served basis. With rapid industrialization, growing
demand from multinational corporations and large domestic enterprises,
and the State's objective of attracting substantial investments, the
earlier policy was found inadequate. Therefore, the Board of Directors of
MIDC, by resolutions dated 19.12.2007 and 04.01.2008, introduced a
system of "priority allotment" for certain categories of investors meeting
specified investment thresholds and conditions. This policy has since
been refined by circulars issued from time to time, including the circular
dated 26.09.2016, which seeks to align MIDC's land allotment process
with the Ease of Doing Business policy, and the circulars dated
31.12.2018 and 04.09.2023, which identify thrust sectors and reduce
investment thresholds for certain backward regions.
17. In order to enhance transparency and consistency, MIDC decided
that applications for allotment, particularly under the priority category,
would be accepted only in online mode. By office order dated
29.11.2017, detailed guidelines were issued stipulating that applications
must be filed online, that they would be technically scrutinized, and that
only eligible applications would be placed before the LAC. Ineligible
applications would be summarily rejected, with reasons communicated to
the applicants. It is in this backdrop that the petitioner's offline and
incomplete applications were rejected, while respondent No. 9's online
and complete application was accepted for consideration.
WP-13929-2023.odt 12 of 41
18. MIDC specifically refutes the allegation that the online portal for
Aurangabad was non-functional. It points out that, during the relevant
period, several online applications, including that of respondent No. 9,
were successfully submitted and processed for Chikalthana Industrial
Area. The screenshots produced by the petitioner, according to MIDC,
pertain to other industrial areas and do not establish any systemic failure
in the Aurangabad Division.
19. As to the instances cited by the petitioner of other offline
allotments, MIDC explains that in cases like M/s Shivamtika Agro
Industries Pvt. Ltd., an initial offline request was followed by a valid
online application dated 29.09.2022, and only the online application was
processed. In other instances, such as allotments to MSEDCL, the Police
Department, educational trusts and Bar Council, the allotments were for
public amenities and institutional uses, processed either through the
Minor Modification Committee or upon specific Board resolutions. Those
cases stand on a different footing and cannot be equated with industrial
allotments under the priority category to private entrepreneurs.
20. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Shrihari Aney, appearing for MIDC,
supports the stand taken in the affidavits. He submits that the powers of
MIDC under Sections 15(j) and 15(k) of the MIDC Act are wide enough
to permit the Corporation to devise modes of allotment best suited to
WP-13929-2023.odt 13 of 41
fulfil its statutory functions, subject to constitutional limitations. Section
15(j) empowers the Corporation "to enter into and perform all such
contracts as it may consider necessary or expedient for carrying out any
of its functions", while Section 15(k) authorises it "to do such other
things and perform such acts as it may think necessary or expedient for
the proper conduct of its functions and the carrying into effect the
purposes of this Act". Sections 18 and 39 of MIDC Act, and the
provisions of Land Disposal Regulations, the statutory framework clearly
permits MIDC to make allotments either by auction or by entertaining
individual applications, including under special schemes such as priority
allotment.
21. The learned senior counsel relies upon the Division Bench
judgments of this Court in Somnath Gangadhar Karale v. State of
Maharashtra, 2016 (5) Bom CR 185 and Parshwanath Infra Tech
Pvt. Ltd., Dhule v. Maharashtra Industrial Development
Corporation, Mumbai & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 16008, wherein
Regulation 4 of the Land Disposal Regulations has been expressly
interpreted to recognize that MIDC may dispose of land either by public
auction or by entertaining individual applications, and that allotments
based on individual applications can be lawful provided the process is
transparent and supported by policy.
22. The learned senior counsel further draws attention to the recent
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Division Bench decision of this Court in Bhrastachar Nirmoolan
Sangathana v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine Bom
2963, wherein challenges to several land allotments made by MIDC at
concessional rates and without tender to educational institutions were
repelled. This Court held that, so long as the Land Disposal Regulations,
which empower MIDC to make allotments by entertaining direct
applications, were not challenged, and so long as the allotments were
not shown to be arbitrary or mala fide, no interference was warranted
merely on the ground that there was no public advertisement.
23. The learned senior counsel also relies on Real Team Systems
Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra , 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 2916, where
this Court, while insisting on transparency and fairness in the processing
of individual applications, recognized that there may be exceptional
situations where allotment by individual application is permissible and
that the Land Disposal Regulations contemplate such exigencies. He then
referred to order dated 31.07.2025 passed by this Court in present
petition stating that MIDC's allotment policies will be tested which reads
as under :-
1. Considering the orders passed in this petition on
19.06.2025, 23.06.2025 and 27.06.2025 and the fact
that this Court intends to test the Priority Online
Allotment Scheme of plots of the Respondent - MIDC,
it would be appropriate that the said respondent is
granted an opportunity to place on record the factual
backdrop in which such policy will have to be tested.
WP-13929-2023.odt 15 of 41
2. The Respondent - MIDC is granted time till
08.08.2025 to place on record a short affidavit giving
the factual matrix. The Petitioner is permitted to file a
rejoinder affidavit on or before 14.08.2025. The
learned amicus curiae is requested to place his note
along with compilation of judgments on record on or
before 14.08.2025.
3. List the petition for further consideration on
20.08.2025 at 2:30 p.m.
24. In light of above stated orders and in support of the constitutional
validity of the MIDC policy, the learned senior counsel relies on several
decisions of the Supreme Court. i) Ramana Dayaram Shetty v.
International Airport Authority of India , (1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR
1979 SC 1628.
ii)In Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu & Kashmir ,
(1980) 4 SCC 1 : AIR 1980 SC 1992.
iii) Aggarwal & Modi Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. New Delhi Municipal
Council, (2007) 8 SCC 75,
iv)Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress (supra)
v)Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of
2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1,
Thus, placing reliance on the aforesaid judgments, he
submitted that Government and its instrumentalities are bound by Article
14 of Constitution of India to act fairly in the matters of awarding public
contract. Distribution of State largessee must be informed by the results
WP-13929-2023.odt 16 of 41
and guided by public interest. However, he submitted that the State can
recognize and consider choosing the method of distribution of its own
choice with care and caution that such method is not arbitrary or
discriminatory. He further submitted that it will not be appropriate to
hold that public auction is only transparent and fair method for allotment
of public property. The State and its instrumentalities should be kept free
to adopt any other modes keeping the public interest in the forefront. All
the aforesaid judgments supports the different policies which has been
adopted by MIDC from time to time, and therefore, the same will have to
be upheld in Court of law as constitutional.
Submissions of Amicus Curiae :-
25. An Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court has submitted written
notes of his submissioln on record. Perusal of the submission, the Amicus
has analyzed the MIDC Act, Land Disposal Regulations, the various
circulars and Board resolutions and the factual matrix of the present
case. The Amicus notes that Regulation 4 of the Land Disposal
Regulations expressly permits disposal either by auction or by
entertaining individual applications and that the priority allotment policy
is a species of the latter method, resting on objective criteria such as
investment thresholds, thrust sector classification, location in backward
regions and the like. The Amicus also notes that the petitioner has not
challenged the validity of the MIDC Act, the Land Disposal Regulations,
WP-13929-2023.odt 17 of 41
or the circulars introducing and regulating priority allotment, nor has he
challenged the rejection orders dated 07.07.2023 and 29.08.2023 by
which his own applications were declined. The only relief sought is to set
aside the allotments in favour of respondent Nos. 7 to 9 and to direct
MIDC to allot the plots to the petitioner.
26. According to the Amicus, in light of the statutory framework and
the Supreme Court decisions noticed above, it cannot be contended that
MIDC's priority allotment policy or its insistence on online mode is per se
unconstitutional or contrary to the principle of equal opportunity. The
true question is whether, in the facts of this case, MIDC has acted
arbitrarily or discriminatory in applying its policy. Upon examining the
record, including the LAC minutes, the communications issued to the
petitioner and the scrutiny of respondent No. 9's application, the Amicus
concludes that there is nothing to suggest mala fides, collateral
considerations or discrimination. On the contrary, the petitioner did not
even cross the threshold of eligibility under the prevailing policy,
whereas respondent No. 9 did so.
27. Having considered the pleadings and submissions, it is appropriate
to first deal with the constitutional objection raised by the petitioner,
namely that the prevailing policies of MIDC to make allotments on a
priority basis and in online mode, without advertisement of specific plots,
violates the constitutional principle that public largesse should be
WP-13929-2023.odt 18 of 41
ordinarily distributed by inviting tenders after public advertisement.
28. It is well-settled in Ramana Dayaram Shetty (supra)
12. We agree with the observations of Mathew, J., in V.
Punnan Thomas v. State of Kerala that:
The Government, is not and should not be as free
as an individual in selecting the recipients for its
largesse. Whatever its activity, the Government is
still the Government and will be subject to
restraints, inherent in its position in a democratic
society. A democratic Government cannot lay
down arbitrary and capricious standards for the
choice of persons with whom alone it will deal.
The same point was made by this Court in Erusian
Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal
where the question was whether black-listing of a
person without giving him an opportunity to be heard
was bad? Ray, C.J., speaking on behalf of himself and
his colleagues on the Bench pointed out that black-
listing of a person not only affects his reputation which
is, in Poundian terms, an interest both of personality
and substance, but also denies him equality in the
matter of entering into contract with the Government
and it cannot, therefore, be supported without fair
hearing. It was argued for the Government that no
person has a right to enter into contractual relationship
with the Government and the Government, like any
other private individual, has the absolute right to enter
into contract with any one it pleases. But the Court,
speaking through the learned Chief Justice, responded
that the Government is not like a private individual who
can pick and choose the person with whom it will deal,
but the Government is still a Government when it
enters into contract or when it is administering largesse
and it cannot, without adequate reason, exclude any
person from dealing with it or take away largesse
arbitrarily. The learned Chief Justice said that when the
Government is trading with the public, "the democratic
form of Government demands equality and absence of
arbitrariness and discrimination in such transactions...
WP-13929-2023.odt 19 of 41
The activities of the Government have a public element
and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality.
The State need not enter into any contract with
anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly without
discrimination and without unfair procedure". This
proposition would hold good in all cases of dealing by
the Government with the public, where the interest
sought to be protected is a privilege. It must,
therefore, be taken to be the law that where the
Government is dealing with the public, whether by way
of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing
quotas or licences or granting other forms of largesse,
the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will
and, like a private individual, deal with any person it
pleases, but its action must be in conformity with
standard or norms which is not arbitrary, irrational or
irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government
in the matter of grant of largesse including award of
jobs, contracts, quotas, licences, etc. must be confined
and structured by rational, relevant and non-
discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government
departs from such standard or norm in any particular
case or cases, the action of the Government would be
liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the
Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but
was based on some valid principle which in itself was
not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory.
Thus, the Government and its instrumentalities, in entering into
contracts or distributing benefits or largesse, must act fairly, without
arbitrariness, and must afford equal opportunity to all persons similarly
circumstanced. The Supreme Court in that case held that the
"Government cannot act arbitrarily and cannot give or withhold largesse
in its arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will. It must, therefore, be
guided by relevant considerations and not by any extraneous or
irrelevant considerations, and if it does so, its action would be liable to
be struck down as arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the
WP-13929-2023.odt 20 of 41
Constitution".
29. In Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy (supra)
15. The second limitation on the discretion of the
government in grant of largess is in regard to the
persons to whom such largess may be granted. It is
now well settled as a result of the decision of this Court
in Ramana D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority
of India, that the government is not free, like an
ordinary individual, in selecting the recipients for its
largess and it cannot choose to deal with any person it
pleases in its absolute and unfettered discretion. The
law is now well established that the government need
not deal with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so
fairly without discrimination and without unfair
procedure. Where the government is dealing with the
public whether by way of giving jobs or entering into
contracts or granting other forms of largess, the
government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and,
like a private individual, deal with any person it
pleases, but its action must be in conformity with some
standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or
irrelevant. The governmental action must not be
arbitrary or capricious, but must be based on some
principle which meets the test of reason and relevance.
This rule was enunciated by the court as a rule of
administrative law and it was also validated by the
court as an emanation flowing directly from the
doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14. The court
referred to the activist magnitude of Article 14 as
evolved in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and
Maneka Gandhi case and observed that it must follow
as a necessary corollary from the principle of
equality enshrined in Article 14 that though the
State is entitled to refuse to enter into relation-
ship with anyone, yet if it does so, it cannot
arbitrarily choose any person it likes for entering
into such relationship and discriminate between
persons similarly circumstanced, but it must act in
conformity with some standard or principle which
meets that test of reasonableness and non-
WP-13929-2023.odt 21 of 41
discrimination and any departure from such
standard or principle would be invalid unless it can
be supported or justified on some rational and
non-discriminatory ground. (SCC p. 512, para 21)
This decision has reaffirmed the principle of
reasonableness and non-arbitrariness in governmental
action which lies at the core of our entire constitutional
scheme and structure.
Thus, the Court reiterated that the State's actions in
distributing benefits or entering into contracts must be "informed with
reason" and guided by public interest; any action that is "arbitrary,
irrational or irrelevant" would attract the vice of Article 14. At the same
time, the Court recognized that there may be situations where, for public
interest reasons, the State may depart from a purely revenue-
maximizing approach and adopt a method such as negotiation, provided
that the departure is justified and non-arbitrary.
30. In Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress (supra), on which the
petitioner relies, the Supreme Court was confronted with an allotment of
valuable land to a memorial trust associated with a political leader at a
nominal premium and on highly concessional terms, without any
transparent process or rational criteria. In that context, the Court
stressed that "when State largesse is to be conferred on any person or
entity, the Government must adopt a method which is fair, just and
transparent and also conforms to the doctrine of equality" and held that
making a largesse available to a chosen body without any public notice
WP-13929-2023.odt 22 of 41
or rational classification was impermissible. That decision turned on its
own facts, where the Court found a complete absence of rational policy
and transparency.
31. The apparent tension in some of these earlier decisions was
comprehensively addressed by the Constitution Bench in Natural
Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 , (2012) 10
SCC 1. After examining Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress, Centre
for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1, and
other decisions, the Constitution Bench held that auction is not a
constitutional requirement or a mandatory method for all allocations. The
Court observed that "there is no constitutional principle that only one
method, namely auction, must be followed in all cases of disposal of
public property or natural resources" and that "the choice of method is to
be made by the State, keeping in view the nature of the resource, the
object of allocation and the larger public interest". What Article 14
requires is that the chosen method must be fair, transparent, non-
arbitrary and in consonance with the purpose of the statute or policy.
32. In considering the constitutional validity of the MIDC's policy, it is
necessary to bear in mind the settled doctrine that laws and policies
relating to economic and fiscal regulation stand on a distinct footing and
are entitled to a greater degree of judicial deference. In R.K. Garg v.
WP-13929-2023.odt 23 of 41
Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675,
8. Another rule of equal importance is that laws
relating to economic activities should be viewed with
greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as
freedom of speech, religion etc. It has been said by no
less a person than Holmes, J. that the legislature
should be allowed some play in the joints, because it
has to deal with complex problems which do not admit
of solution through any doctrinaire or strait-jacket
formula and this is particularly true in case of
legislation dealing with economic matters, where,
having regard to the nature of the problems required to
be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be
allowed to the legislature. The court should feel more
inclined to give judicial deference to legislative
judgment in the field of economic regulation than in
other areas where fundamental human rights are
involved. Nowhere has this admonition been more
felicitious expressed than in Morey v. Doud where
Frankfurter, J. said in his inimitable style:
In the utilities, tax and economic regulation
cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-
restraint if not judicial deference to legislative
judgment. The legislature after all has the
affirmative responsibility. The courts have only
the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When
these are added to the complexity of economic
regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error,
the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the
number of times the judges have been overruled
by events - self-limitation can be seen to be the
path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige
and stability.
The Court must always remember that "legislation is
directed to practical problems, that the economic
mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many
problems are singular and contingent, that laws are not
WP-13929-2023.odt 24 of 41
abstract pro-positions and do not relate to abstract
units and are not to be measured by abstract
symmetry"; "that exact wisdom and nice adaption of
remedy are not always possible" and that "judgment is
largely a prophecy based on meagre and uninterpreted
experience". Every legislation particularly in economic
matters is essentially empiric and it is based on
experimentation or what one may call trial and error
method and therefore it cannot provide for all possible
situations or anticipate all possible abuses. There may
be crudities and inequities in complicated experimental
economic legislation but on that account alone it cannot
be struck down as invalid. The courts cannot, as
pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in
Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining
Company, be converted into tribunals for relief from
such crudities and inequities. There may even be
possibilities of abuse, but that too cannot of itself be a
ground for invalidating the legislation, because it is not
possible for any legislature to anticipate as if by some
divine prescience, distortions and abuses of its
legislation which may be made by those subject to its
provisions and to provide against such distortions and
abuses. Indeed, howsoever great may be the care
bestowed on its framing, it is difficult to conceive of a
legislation which is not capable of being abused by
perverted human ingenuity. The Court must therefore
adjudge the constitutionality of such legislation by the
generality of its provisions and not by its crudities or
inequities or by the possibilities of abuse of any of its
provisions. If any crudities, inequities or possibilities of
abuse come to light, the legislature can always step in
and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the
essence of pragmatic approach which must guide and
inspire the legislature in dealing with complex economic
issues.
Thus, a Constitution Bench emphasized that laws dealing with economic
activities "are viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil
rights", because such measures involve "evaluation of diverse economic
WP-13929-2023.odt 25 of 41
criteria" and "balancing of conflicting social and economic values and
interests". The Court cautioned that, when the State is experimenting in
the economic field to address complex problems, courts should not strike
down such measures "unless they are clearly violative of the
constitutional provisions or are manifestly arbitrary or irrational". That
principle applies with equal force to an industrial development
corporation which frames and refines policies for land allotment to
secure industrial growth.
33. The policy of priority allotment and online applications is, in
essence, an incident of the State's economic and industrial policy. In
State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566,
34. But, while considering the applicability of Article
14 in such a case, we must bear in mind that, having
regard to the nature of the trade or business, the Court
would be slow to interfere with the policy laid down by
the State Government for grant of licences for
manufacture and sale of liquor. The Court would, in
view of the inherently pernicious nature of the
commodity allow a large measure of latitude to the
State Government in determining its policy of
regulating, manufacture and trade in liquor. Moreover,
the grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor
would essentially be a matter of economic policy where
the Court would hesitate to intervene and strike down
what the State Government has done, unless it appears
to be plainly arbitrary, irrational or mala fide. We had
occasion to consider the scope of interference by the
Court under Article 14 while dealing with laws relating
to economic activities in R. K. Garg v. Union of India".
WP-13929-2023.odt 26 of 41
We pointed out in that case that laws relating to
economic activities should be viewed with greater
latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom
of speech, religion, etc. We observed that the
legislature should be allowed some play in the joints
because it has to deal with complex problems which do
not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait-
jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of
legislation dealing with economic matters, where,
having regard to the nature of the problems required to
be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be
allowed to the legislature. We quoted with approval the
following admonition given by Frankfurter, J. in Morey
v. Dond:
In the utilities, tax and economic regulation
cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-
restraint if not judicial deference to legislative
judgment. The legislature after all has the
affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the
power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these
are added to the complexity of economic regulation,
the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering
conflict of the experts, and the number of times the
judges have been overruled by events self-limitation
can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and
institutional prestige and stability.
What we said in that case in regard to legislation
relating to economic matters must apply equally in
regard to executive action in the field of economic acti-
vities, though the executive decision may not be placed
on as high a pedestal as legislative judgment insofar as
judicial deference is concerned. We must not forget
that in complex economic matters every decision is
necessarily empiric and it is based on experimentation
or what one may call 'trial and error method and,
therefore, its validity cannot be tested on any rigid "a
priori considerations or on the application of any strait-
jacket formula. The Court must while adjudging the
constitutional validity of an executive decision relating
to economic matters grant a certain measure of
WP-13929-2023.odt 27 of 41
freedom or play in the joints' to the executive. "The
problem of government" as pointed out by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Metropolis
Theatre Co. v. State of Chicago
are practical ones and may justify, if they do not
require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be,
and unscientific. But even such criticism should not
be hastily expressed. What is best is not discernible,
the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or
condemned. Mere errors of government are not
subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably
arbitrary exercises which can be declared void.
The Government, as was said in Permian Basin Area
Rate cases, is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments
which may be called for by particular circumstances.
The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by
the State Government merely because it feels that
another policy decision would have been fairer or wiser
or more scientific or logical. The Court can interfere
only if the policy decision is patently arbitrary,
discriminatory or mala fide. It is against the
background of these observations and keeping them in
mind that we must now proceed to deal with the
contention of the petitioners based on Article 14 of the
Constitution.
Thus, another Constitution Bench dealt with a challenge to a liquor
licensing policy on the ground of alleged discrimination and lack of
auction. The Court held that policies in the realm of economic regulation
are not to be tested by the same standard of strict scrutiny as penal or
civil rights legislation, and that "the court would be slow to interfere with
the policy decision of the State Government" so long as it is not
"patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide". That reasoning
WP-13929-2023.odt 28 of 41
reinforces the conclusion that a court exercising writ jurisdiction must
accord latitude to MIDC's policy choices in structuring its allotment
mechanisms.
34. The Supreme Court has also repeatedly underlined that decisions
involving disinvestment, commercial structuring or strategic economic
choices are primarily for the executive, subject only to a limited scrutiny
on the touchstone of arbitrariness, illegality or mala fides. In BALCO
Employees Union (Regd.) v. Union of India , (2002) 2 SCC 333,
92. In a democracy, it is the prerogative of each
elected Government to follow its own policy. Often a
change in Government may result in the shift in focus
or change in economic policies. Any such change may
result in adversely affecting some vested interests.
Unless any illegality is committed in the execution of
the policy or the same is contrary to law or mala fide, a
decision bringing about change cannot per se be
interfered with by the court.
93. Wisdom and advisability of economic policies are
ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless it can
be demonstrated that the policy is contrary to any
statutory provision or the Constitution. In other words,
it is not for the courts to consider relative merits of
different economic policies and consider whether a
wiser or better one can be evolved. For testing the
correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is
Parliament and not the courts. Here the policy was
tested and the motion defeated in the Lok Sabha on 1-
3-2001.
WP-13929-2023.odt 29 of 41
Thus, the Court observed that economic policies are based on "expertise
and experimentation" and that "wisdom and advisability of economic
policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review" unless they
infringe constitutional or statutory provisions. The MIDC scheme
impugned before this Court is a manifestation of such policy choices in
the field of industrial development and deserves similar deference.
35. Viewed through the lens of Article 14 as it now stands after the
development of the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness, the test is
whether the policy or its implementation is capricious, irrational or
lacking in any determining principle. In Shayara Bano v. Union of India,
(2017) 9 SCC 1,
95. On a reading of this judgment in Natural Resources
Allocation case it is clear that this Court did not read
McDowell as being an authority for the proposition that
legislation can never be struck down as being arbitrary.
Indeed the Court, after referring to all the earlier
judgments, and Ajay Hasia in particular, which stated
that legislation can be struck down on the ground that
it is "arbitrary" under Article 14, went on to conclude
that "arbitrariness" when applied to legislation cannot
be used loosely. Instead, it broad based the test,
stating that if a constitutional infirmity is found, Article
14 will interdict such infirmity. And a constitutional
infirmity is found in Article 14 itself whenever
legislation is "manifestly arbitrary" i.e. when it is not
fair, not reasonable, discriminatory, not transparent,
capricious, biased, with favouritism or nepotism and
not in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and
equitable treatment. Positively speaking, it should
WP-13929-2023.odt 30 of 41
conform to norms which are rational, informed with
reason and guided by public interest etc.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that a law or rule would be "manifestly
arbitrary" if it is "not fair, not reasonable" and "disproportionate,
excessive or otherwise manifestly unreasonable". The MIDC policy is the
very antithesis of such arbitrariness: it is founded on an intelligible
differentia (thrust sector investors meeting specified criteria), is
anchored in the economic and industrial policy of the State, and
prescribes a clear procedural framework of online application, scrutiny,
and consideration by the Land Allotment Committee.
36. From a constitutional perspective, the shift to an online system is
best understood as part of the State's attempt to fulfill its obligation of
ensuring transparent and accountable governance. The architecture of e-
governance, when properly designed, can be an instrument to actualize
the mandate of Article 14 by reducing the zone of unguided discretion,
minimizing human interface and standardizing the application of norms.
The online-only requirement in the present case does not operate as an
arbitrary barrier but it applies uniformly to all prospective applicants in
the priority category it is preceded and accompanied by public circulars;
and it is addressed to a class of industrial entrepreneurs who are fully
capable of accessing and using digital platforms. Concerns about
WP-13929-2023.odt 31 of 41
exclusion due to digital divide, which may arise in the context of welfare
benefits or basic entitlements, do not present themselves with the same
intensity when the affected class comprises sophisticated commercial
entities seeking industrial plots.
37. It is also of significance that the MIDC policy is not a bare
conferment of largesse, but an instrumentality for securing the Directive
Principles. Article 38 enjoins the State to strive to promote the welfare of
the people by securing a social order informed by social, economic and
political justice, while Article 39(b) directs that the ownership and control
of the material resources of the community be so distributed as best to
subserve the common good. Priority allotment to units in thrust sectors
and backward regions, governed by objective criteria and channelled
through a transparent digital process, is plainly aligned with these
constitutional commitments. The policy, far from being suspect, is a
vehicle through which the State deploys its resources to catalyse
industrial growth, employment and regional balance.
38. In Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India , (2009) 7
SCC 561,
168. In a democracy, it is the prerogative of each
elected Government to follow its own policy. Often a
WP-13929-2023.odt 32 of 41
change in Government may result in the shift in focus
or change in economic policies. Any such change may
result in adversely affecting some vested interests.
Unless any illegality is committed in the execution of
the policy or the same is contrary to law or mala fide, a
decision bringing about change cannot per se be
interfered with by the court.
169. It is neither within the domain of the courts nor
the scope of judicial review to embark upon an enquiry
as to whether a particular public policy is wise or
whether better public policy can be evolved. Nor are
the courts inclined to strike down a policy at the behest
of a petitioner merely because it has been urged that a
different policy would have been fairer or wiser of more
scientific or more logical. Wisdom and advisability of
economic policy are ordinarily not amenable to judicial
review. In matters relating to economic issues the
Government has, while taking a decision, right to "trial
and error" as long as both trial and error are bona fide
and within the limits of the authority. For testing the
correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is
Parliament and not the courts.
170. Normally, there is always a presumption that the
governmental action is reasonable and in public
interest and it is for the party challenging its validity to
show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is not
informed with public interest. This burden is a heavy
one and it has to be discharged to the satisfaction of
the court by proper and adequate material. The court
cannot lightly assume that the action taken by the
Government is unreasonable or against public interest
because there are large number of considerations,
which necessarily which necessarily weigh with the
Government in taking an action.
The Supreme Court reiterated that policy decisions of the executive
are not to be interfered with lightly and that it is "the prerogative of each
WP-13929-2023.odt 33 of 41
elected Government to follow its own policy", subject of course to the
policy not being contrary to law or the Constitution. That principle
squarely applies where the State and its instrumentalities have
consciously adopted a model of digital, criterion-based allotment for
industrial lands to advance clearly articulated development objectives.
39. Seen in this constitutional light to accept petitioners plea would, in
effect, be to unravel a rational and constitutionally permissible
framework of economic and digital governance in order to accommodate
an individual who chose not to submit to its discipline. Article 14 does
not compel such an outcome. On the contrary, it requires this Court to
ensure that those who comply with a transparent, uniformly applicable
regime are not prejudiced by an ad hoc relaxation in favour of those who
did not.
40. These principles, in our view, directly answer the petitioner's
constitutional objection. There is no absolute rule that all lands held by
public bodies must in every case be allotted only by advertisement and
tender. What is required is that the policy adopted must be rational,
must serve a legitimate public purpose, must not be arbitrary or
discriminatory, and must provide equal opportunity to all persons who
are similarly situated within the framework of that policy.
WP-13929-2023.odt 34 of 41
41. The MIDC policy of priority allotment, as seen from the circulars of
2007, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2018 and 2023, is founded on the objective of
promoting industrial development in designated areas by attracting
investments in identified thrust sectors creates a distinct class of
beneficiaries namely, entrepreneurs who satisfy specified criteria of
investment, sector, employment generation and location. That
classification is clearly rational and bears a direct nexus with the object
of the MIDC Act and the State's Industrial Policy. The policy does not
exclude the general public from consideration as a matter of arbitrary
favour; rather, it creates a legitimate and reasonable sub-class for
preferential treatment, which is permissible under Article 14.
42. Within this policy framework, MIDC has adopted the online mode
of application. Far from being a device to exclude persons, the online
system, accompanied by publicized circulars specifying eligibility criteria
and procedure, fosters transparency, eliminates scope for manipulation
at the application stage, and simplifies scrutiny. Any person who satisfies
the prescribed criteria may access the online portal and submit an
application. The requirement of online submission is procedural and
uniformly applicable to all prospective applicants in the priority category.
There is nothing inherently arbitrary or exclusionary about it.
43. In that sense, the MIDC policy does not resemble the situation in
WP-13929-2023.odt 35 of 41
Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress , where a single entity was picked out
for favoured treatment without any rational policy or process. Rather, it
is closer to the category of cases recognized by the Supreme Court
where the State, consistent with its policy, may allocate land or contracts
to a defined class of beneficiaries such as institutions, cooperatives, or
units in backward areas without auction, provided that the criteria are
transparent and applied uniformly.
44. The Division Bench decision in Bhrastachar Nirmoolan
Sangathana v. State of Maharashtra (Supra) reinforces this position
in the context of MIDC land allotments. The Court there held that, once
the Land Disposal Regulations which empower MIDC to make allotments
by entertaining direct applications are not challenged, and where the
allotments are made in accordance with those regulations and are not
shown to be arbitrary or mala fide, the mere absence of public
advertisement does not vitiate the allotments. That principle squarely
applies here.
45. Thus, the petitioner's broad proposition that MIDC's priority
allotment policy and online system are per se unconstitutional because
they do not involve advertisement and tender of each plot to the public
at large cannot be accepted. The constitutional requirement is equality
WP-13929-2023.odt 36 of 41
among equals, not an abstract insistence on auction in every
circumstance. These MIDC policies, being founded on reasonable
classification and a transparent, uniform procedure, is constitutionally
valid.
46. Turning now to the application of the policy in the facts of this
case, the question is whether the petitioner has shown any arbitrary or
discriminatory treatment against him. It is undisputed that his
applications were submitted offline. It is also undisputed that they were
incomplete, lacking essential documents such as mandatory documents
of partnership registration, net-worth certificate and a detailed project
report in the prescribed format. They were, therefore, ineligible under
the prevailing policy, which required complete online applications for
consideration under the priority allotment category. MIDC rejected the
petitioner's applications on 07.07.2023 and 29.08.2023, with reasons
recorded and communicated. Admittedly, the petitioner has not
challenged those rejection orders nor demonstrated that those
documents are available with him even now.
47. In contrast, respondent No. 9 submitted a complete online
application on 04.09.2023, for a project falling within an approved thrust
sector, supported by a detailed project report, net-worth certificate and
other requisite documents. The application was scrutinized, placed
WP-13929-2023.odt 37 of 41
before the LAC along with other online applications, and considered on
its merits. The LAC, in its meeting of 25.09.2023, decided to allot the
plot to respondent No. 9, rejecting one application and deferring three
others. There is nothing in the record to suggest that respondent No. 9
was preferred on any extraneous ground or that the petitioner was
similarly situated in terms of compliance with the policy.
48. The petitioner's reliance on alleged seniority in a list of applications
is misplaced. Under the present policy, mere chronological priority of
incomplete or ineligible offline applications confers no right. Seniority, if
at all, can be relevant only among eligible applicants who have complied
with the prescribed mode of application. To hold otherwise would be to
subvert the policy itself and compel MIDC to consider applications that
do not even cross the threshold of eligibility.
49. The contention that the online portal for Aurangabad was non-
functional is not borne out by the record. Several online applications,
including that of respondent No. 9, were successfully submitted and
processed for Chikalthana Industrial Area during the relevant period. The
screenshots furnished by the petitioner do not convincingly establish a
systemic failure. Even assuming that the petitioner faced some technical
difficulty on a particular occasion, nothing prevented him from seeking
assistance, trying again, or at least complying with the documentary
WP-13929-2023.odt 38 of 41
requirements so that his offline application could be regularised when the
portal was functional. Instead, he persisted with incomplete offline
filings.
50. As regards the instances cited by the petitioner of other offline
allotments, MIDC has adequately explained that those cases either
involved subsequent online applications (as in the case of M/s
Shivamtika Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd.) or related to public amenities and
institutional uses, decided at a different level. The petitioner, a private
entrepreneur seeking an industrial plot under the priority allotment
category, is not similarly situated with such entities. Article 14 does not
mandate indiscriminate parity between unequal classes.
51. No material has been placed before the Court to suggest mala
fides, collateral considerations or any ulterior motive in the allotment
made to respondent No. 9. The petitioner's allegations of collusion and
transfer to third parties are vague and unsupported by credible evidence.
Respondent No. 4 has clarified that the change from an individual
promoter to an LLP was carried out in accordance with a specific MIDC
circular and does not amount to an unlawful transfer.
52. It is also relevant that the allotment in favour of respondent No. 9
has been fully acted upon. Allotment has been made, possession
delivered and an agreement to lease has been registered. The law is
WP-13929-2023.odt 39 of 41
well-settled that courts should be slow to interfere with completed
transactions in the absence of clear illegality, particularly where third-
party rights have intervened and where the allotment advances the
statutory objective of industrial development. The petitioner has not
demonstrated any such illegality here.
53. In the circumstances, we are of the considered view that: (i) the
MIDC policy of allotment of its plots on priority allotment and by online
application is constitutionally valid and consistent with Sections 14, 15,
18 and 39 of the MIDC Act and provisions of MIDC Disposal of Land
Regulations, 1975. (ii) the said policy does not violate the principle of
equal opportunity as elucidated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its
pronouncements such as Ramana Dayaram Shetty, Kasturi Lal Lakshmi
Reddy, Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress , Natural Resources Allocation,
In re; etc and all the other pronouncements which are discussed herein
above (iii) the petitioner has failed to establish any arbitrariness,
discrimination or mala fides in the allotment of the subject plots to
respondent No. 9.
54. The petitioner's grievance essentially arises from his own failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure and to challenge, in time, the
rejection of his applications. Judicial review under Article 226 cannot be
used to confer on him, through a writ of mandamus, a right to allotment
which he never acquired in terms of the prevailing policy. The Court
WP-13929-2023.odt 40 of 41
cannot rewrite the policy or compel MIDC to abandon a transparent
online system in favour of an ad hoc, offline seniority list which has no
legal sanction.
55. Before parting we express gratitude towards learned Amicus Curie
for his valuable assistance. For all the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition
is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order
as to costs.
56. Pending civil application, if any, stands disposed of.
(Hiten S. Venegavkar, J.) (Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi, J.)
B. S. Joshi
WP-13929-2023.odt 41 of 41
