Bombay High Court
Sahayog Nagrik Sewa Sahakari Sanstha, ... vs State Of Maharashtra, Department Of ... on 25 August, 2025
2025:BHC-AS:36635-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.9837 OF 2022
Shikar Swayamrozgar Seva
Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit
Nashik through Chairperson & Ors. ....Petitioners
versus
Commissionerate of Social Welfare
Education Sec. & Ors. ....Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.11844 OF 2023
Pankaj Liladhar Meshram ....Petitioner
versus
State of Maharashtra
through Department of Social
Justice & Special Assistantance ....Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.16111 OF 2022
Santosh Traders & Suppliers
through its Proprietor
Santosh Raghu Suryawanshi ....Petitioner
versus
The State of Maharashtra
through its Secretary
Social Welfare Department. ....Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.16112 OF 2022
Anil Pyarelal Agrwal & Ors. ....Petitioners
versus
Commissioner, Social Welfare & Anr. ....Respondents
WITH
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WRIT PETITION NO.16113 OF 2022
Mrunali Multiserviace Sales and
Bhojanalay ....Petitioner
versus
State of Maharashtra ....Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.16114 OF 2022
Suabhagya Bahuddeshiya Sushishikshit
Berojgar Seva Sahakari Sanstha Ltd. ....Petitioner
versus
State of Maharashtra
through its Principal Secretary & Ors. ....Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.16115 OF 2022
Sahayog Nagrik Sewa Sahakari
Sanstha Ltd.
(Deleted as per order of Court
dated 16.09.2022) ....Petitioner
versus
State of Maharashtra
Department of Social
Justice & Special Assistance ....Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.437 OF 2023
Ramchandra Dundapa Kamble & Ors. ....Petitioners
versus
Principal Secretary
Social Justice and Special Assistance
Department & Anr. ....Respondents
_________
Mr. Sangram Chinappa (through video conferencing), for
Petitioner in WP/9837/2022.
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Ms. Ruta Koli with Ms. Deepika Mule i/b Mr. M.M. Kondekar, for
Petitioner in WP/16111/2022.
Dr. Suresh T. Mane with Mr. Ramesh Golait, for Petitioner in
WP/437/2023.
Dr. Birendra Saraf, Advocate General with Ms. Neha Bhide, Govt.
Pleader, Mr. O.A. Chandurkar, Addl. GP, Mr. Kushal Amin. 'B' Panel
Counsel & Mr. M.M. Pabale, AGP for State, Respondent in
WP/9837/2022,WP/16111/2022,WP/11844/2023, WP/16112/2022,
WP/16113/2022 & WP/437/2023.
Ms. G.R. Raghuwanshi, AGP for State, Respondent in
WP/116114/2022 & WP/16115/2022.
Mr. Ashutosh M. Kulkarni with Mr. Sarthak Diwan i/b
Mr. Vaibhav Gaikwad for Respondent No. 4, 5, 8 in WP/9837/2022
& for Applicant in IA/2100/2023.
__________
CORAM: ALOK ARADHE, CJ. &
SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
DATE : 25 AUGUST 2025.
JUDGMENT :
(Per Sandeep V. Marne, J.)
1. Writ Petition No.437 of 2023 is not on Board. With consent of
parties the same is taken on Board for hearing.
2. E-tender notice dated 7 July 2022 issued by the State
Government is the subject matter of challenge in the present
Petitions. Some of the Petitions also challenged Government
Resolution (GR) dated 24 June 2022 issued by Social Justice
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Department formulating the procedure for providing catering
services and milk supply in tetra pack in Government Hostels and
Government Residential Schools.
3. By GR dated 24 June 2022 suitable changes were made in the
prevailing policy in respect of invitation of tenders for providing
tetra pack of flavored milk (200 ml) to all Hostels and Residential
Schools across the State and for catering services. The earlier GRs
issued on 26 July 2011, 30 January 2016, 1 December 2016, 29
November 2021 and 21 June 2022 are superseded. The modified
policy envisaged supply of the said items through centralized
mode. The earlier process of zonal or district-wise tender was
departed. In pursuance of GR dated 24 June 2022, e-tenders dated 7
July 2022 were issued on a division-wise centralized mode for
supply of meals to the admitted students of Government Hostels
and Residential Schools and for supply of milk. Eligibility criteria
has been prescribed in the tender notices. The present Petitions are
filed challenging the e-tender notices on the ground that
centralization of the tender process deprives rights of the Petitioners
to participate in the tender process on account of prescription of
stringent financial criteria which cannot be met with by Co-
operative Societies, Women Self-Help Groups etc.
4. We have heard Mr. Chinappa, Dr. Mane and Ms. Koli, the
learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. Their broad
submissions revolve around the tendering authority making a
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departure from earlier policy of issuing zone-wise/district-wise
tenders. That the impugned tender notice seeks to oust the smaller
players from competition with a view to award the work only to
chosen large bidders. That the impugned tender process permits
sub-tendering thereby enabling the large contractors to secure
contracts and then engage sub-contractors. GR dated 24 June 2022 is
also questioned on the ground that the same is contrary to the spirit
of Article 46 of the Constitution of India. That the impugned action
is contrary to GR dated 1 December 2016 as well as order dated 20
January 2017 passed in PIL No.16 of 2016. That there is apparent
contradiction in clauses of GR dated 24 June 2022. That the private
Respondents are erroneously held eligible though they do not fulfill
the prescribed eligibility criteria.
5. Dr. Saraf, the learned Advocate General opposes the Petitions
submitting that the tendering authority is empowered to formulate
the tender conditions as per its own requirements. That Petitioners
cannot dictate terms to the tendering authority. That State
Government had faced numerous issues while implementing
district-wise tenders in the past. He would explain the rationale
behind the changing policy. That the allegation of sub-tendering is
misleading as sub-tendering is permitted only in rare circumstances
that too with prior approval of the Commissioner. That MSMEs are
not prevented from participating in the tender process and since
Petitioners are not MSMEs, they cannot raise the said issue. That the
issue stands concluded by judgment of Division Bench of this Court
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in Renuka Mata Mahila Bachat Gat vs. State of Maharashtra 1.
That Petitioners are total strangers to the tender process and cannot
be permitted to question the same. He would pray for dismissal of
the Petitions.
6. We have also heard Mr. Kulkarni, the learned counsel
appearing for successful bidders, who would submit that his clients
have been executing work in response to contracts awarded to them
for considerable period of time and there is no reason to interfere in
contracts awarded to them at such belated stage. He would rely on
judgment of this Court in Hemant Ashar vs. Nashik Municipal
Smart City Development Corporation Limited & Ors.2.
7. We have considered the submissions and have perused the
records.
8. Though Petitioners have challenged the e-tender notice dated
7 June 2022, particularly the eligibility criteria prescribed therein,
none of them have participated in the tender process. Since
Petitioners have failed to submit their bids in pursuance of the
impugned tender process, can they be permitted to question the
same is the issue that arises for consideration. The issue is no longer
res integra and is covered by judgment delivered by us in Hemant
Ashar (supra) in which it is held in paragraphs 12 to 18 as under:
1 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2615
2 Writ Petition No.867 of 2024, decided on 13 June 2025
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"12) The next issue for consideration is whether Petitioner would
have locus to maintain the present Petition questioning correctness
of the tender process and seeking cancellation of work order issued
in favour of Respondent No.3. For the purpose of seeking direction
for termination of work order dated 29 December 2022 issued in
favour of Respondent No.3, Petitioner has essentially invoked
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. In order to invoke certiorari
jurisdiction of this Court, Petitioner needs to satisfy that he is an
'aggrieved person'. The Apex Court, in its Four Judge Bench
decision, in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai V/s. Roshan Kumar Haji
Bashir Ahmed and Others, (1976) 1 SCC 671 has dealt with the
issue as to who can be considered as an 'aggrieved person' and
what qualification such person must meet to secure such status.
The Apex Court held in paragraphs 10 to 14 as under:
10. Article 226 of the Constitution empowers the High
Court to issue to any person or authority, including the
Government, within its territorial jurisdiction, directions,
orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari
for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other
purpose.
11. As explained by this Court in Dwarkanath v. I. T. O.,
Kanpur, the founding fathers of the Constitution have
designedly couched the article in comprehensive
phraseology to enable the High Court to reach injustice
wherever it is found. In a sense, the scope and nature of the
power conferred by the article is wider than that exercised
by the writ courts in England. However, the adoption of the
nomenclature of English writs, with the prefix "nature of"
superadded, indicates that the general principles grown over
the years in the English courts, can, shorn of technical
procedural restrictions, and adapted to the special
conditions of this vast country, in so far as they do not
conflict with any provision of the Constitution, or the law
declared by this Court, be usefully considered in directing
the exercise of this discretionary jurisdiction in accordance
with well recognised rules of practice.
12. According to most English decisions, in order to have
the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction. the
petitioner should be an "aggrieved person" and, in a case of
defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a
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writ of certiorari as a matter of course, but if he does not
fulfil that character, and is a "stranger", the Court will, in its
discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in very
special circumstances.
13. This takes us to the further question: Who is an
"aggrieved person and what are the qualifications requisite
for such a status? The expression "aggrieved person" denotes
an elastic, and to an extent, an clusive concept. It cannot be
confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and
comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be
described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and
meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the
content and intent of the statute of which contravention is
alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and
extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent
of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English courts
have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide
construction on the expression "aggrieved person". However,
some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether
an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the
necessary locus standi for 'standing to invoke certiorari
jurisdiction.
14. We will first take up that line of cases in which an
"aggrieved person has been held to be one who has a more
particular or peculiar interest of his own beyond that of the
general public, in seeing that the law is properly
administered. The leading case in this line is Queen v.
Justices of Surrey decided as far back as 1870. There, on the
application by the highway board the justices made
certificates that certain portions of three roads were
unnecessary. As a result, it was ordered that the roads
should cease to be repaired by the parishes.
13) After examining the judgments of Courts in UK and USA,
the Apex Court concluded in paragraphs 37 to 39 as under :
37. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to
apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily
fall in any of these categories (i) person aggrieved; (ii)
'stranger'; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper.
Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from
those coming under the first two categories. Such persons
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inter-fere in things which do not concern them. They
masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in
the name of pro bono publico, though they have no
interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They
indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial
process either by force of habit or from improper motives.
Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or
cheap popularity while the ulterior intent of some
applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking
the wheels of administration. The High Court should do
well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the
threshold.
38. The distinction between the first and second categories
of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated.
The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a
solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of
lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an
outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling
within the central zone are those whose legal rights have
been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the
category of 'persons aggrieved. In the grey outer circle the
bounds which separate the first category from the second,
intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal
direction. All persons in this outer zone may not be "persons
aggrieved".
39. To distinguish such applicants from 'strangers', among
them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus
made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their
efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case,
including the statutory context in which the matter falls to
be considered. These are Whether the applicant is a person
whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a
legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest,
recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly
affected by the act or omission of the authority,
complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal
grievance, a person against whom a decision has been
pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of
something or wrongfully refused him something, or
wrongfully affected his title to something? Has he a
special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some
grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common
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with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and
be heard by the authority before it took the impugned
action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise
of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the
part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which
the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is being
considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down
ethical or professional standards of conduct for the
community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of
particular individuals ?
(emphasis added)
14) Applying the tests discussed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Jasbhai Motibhai Desai (supra) it is difficult to hold that
Petitioner's legal right has been infringed or that he has suffered a
legal wrong or injury in his personal capacity on account of
implementation of the impugned tender process or on account of
issuance of work order in favour of Respondent No.3. Similarly, he
has not suffered a legal grievance since no decision has been
pronounced, which has wrongly deprived him of something. In
our view, therefore, Petitioner would not fit into the expression
'aggrieved person' for the purpose of conferment on him locus to
maintain the present Petition questioning the implementation of
the tender process or for challenging the work order issued in
favour of Respondent No.3.
15) Even if the Petitioner succeeds in the present Petition, the
subject work will not be issued to him. It is not the case of the
Petitioner that he fulfills the eligibility criteria to participate in the
fresh tender process and can participate in the fresh tender process
initiated after cancellation of the impugned tender process. Thus,
Petitioner would gain nothing even if the present Petition is
allowed. In our view, therefore Petitioner cannot be treated as a
'person aggrieved' and would lack locus to maintain the present
Petition. The petition at the instance of the Petitioner is thus non-
maintainable.
16) It is also well settled law that a non-participant in the tender
process cannot challenge the same. Reference in this regard can be
made to the Apex Court judgment in NHAI V/s. Gwalior-Jhansi
Expressway Ltd. (2018) 8 SCC 243, in which it is held as under :
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20. ..... Having failed to participate in the tender process
and, more so, despite the express terms in the tender
documents, validity whereof has not been challenged, the
respondent cannot be heard to contend that it had acquired
any right whatsoever. Only the entities who participate in
the tender process pursuant to a tender notice can be
allowed to make grievances about the non-fulfilment or
breach of any of the terms and conditions of the tender
documents concerned. The respondent who chose to stay
away from the tender process, cannot be heard to whittle
down, in any manner, the rights of the eligible bidders who
had participated in the tender process on the basis of the
written and express terms and conditions. At the
culmination of the tender process, if the respondent had not
participated, in law, the offer submitted by the eligible
bidders is required to be considered on the basis of the
stated terms and conditions. Thus, if the claim of the
respondent was to be strictly adjudged on the basis of the
terms and conditions specified in the subject tender
document, the respondent has no case whatsoever.
17) More recently, the Apex Court has held in Airport Authority
of India V/s. Centre for Aviation Policy, Safety and Research,
2022 SCC Online 1334 as under:
26. At the outset, it is required to be noted that respondent
No. 1 claiming to be a non-profit organisation carrying out
research, advisory and advocacy in the field of civil aviation
had filed a writ petition challenging the tender conditions in
the respective RFPs. It is required to be noted that none of
the GHAs who participated in the tender process and/or
could have participated in the tender process have
challenged the tender conditions. It is required to be noted
that the writ petition before the High Court was not in the
nature of Public Interest Litigation. In that view of the
matter, it is not appreciable how respondent No. 1 - original
writ petitioner being an NGO would have any locus standi to
maintain the writ petition challenging the tender conditions
in the respective RFPs. Respondent No. 1 cannot be said to
be an" aggrieved party". Therefore, in the present case, the
High Court has erred in entertaining the writ petition at the
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instance of respondent No. 1, challenging the eligibility
criteria/tender conditions mentioned in the respective RFPs.
The High Court ought to have dismissed the writ petition on
the ground of locus standi of respondent No. 1 - original writ
petitioner to maintain the writ petition.
18) In our view therefore, Petitioner, who has not participated in
the tender process, lacks the locus standi to maintain the Petition."
9. In our view, failure on the part of Petitioners to participate in
the tender process would clearly debar them from challenging the
same. It is seen that most of the Petitions are filed well after the last
day for bidding got over. In Writ Petition Nos.9873 of 2022 and 437
of 2023 which are the lead Petitions argued by Mr. Chinappa and
Dr. Mane, no challenge was raised to the tender notice during the
window period when bids could be submitted. Writ Petition
No.9837 of 2022 is filed on 12 August 2022 i.e. after last date for
submission of bids of 28 July 2022 got over. Writ Petition No.437 of
2023 is filed in November 2022 i.e. long after the period for
submissions of bids was over. The fact that Petitions are not filed
immediately after noticing the tender eligibility criteria shows that
the Petitioners were not interested in participating in the tender
process and have filed the present Petitions only by way of an
afterthought. The pretext of discussions with Government cited by
the Petitioners for not filing the Petitions within the window period
for submission of bids does not appeal to us. If Petitioners were
really interested in securing contracts, they ought to have filed the
Petitions immediately after issuance of tender notices. Most of the
Petitions are filed well after expiry of the period for submissions of
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bids. Though some of the Petitions are filed before expiry of period
for submission of bids, none has appeared on behalf of those
Petitioners indicating lack of interest on their part in prosecuting
the Petitions.
10. Even if the aspect of impermissibility to challenge tender
process by a stranger is momentarily ignored, we are unable to
notice any element of arbitrariness or irrationality in implementing
centralized tender process by the State Government. In the past,
implementation of district-wise tender processes apparently gave
rise to various difficulties where the process was taking long time.
There were complaints against suppliers and the Government found
it difficult to monitor performance of contract by large number of
suppliers. Government was also required to take action against
large number of suppliers, some of whom were required to be
replaced. There was also variance in base prices leading to
grievances by the suppliers. The quality of food was also not found
to be satisfactory. These issues in the past tender process prompted
the State Government to opt for centralized tender process to be
implemented at divisional levels. Instead of processing multiple
tenders for numerous zones and monitoring the activities of
numerous suppliers, the Government has thought it appropriate to
supply catering services through centralized mechanism by
engaging limited number of suppliers.
11. It is well settled law that no person has a fundamental right to
do business with the Government. The tendering authority, being
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the principal, enjoys the necessary latitude in formulating eligibility
criteria which best suits its requirement. Petitioners cannot insist
that the supply of catering services must be done in such a manner
which ensures business opportunities to them. Supply of food items
to the students is of paramount importance and the public interest
of providing quality food items to students will prevail over the
private interest of Petitioners in doing business. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that the tendering authority is the best judge to
assess its requirements and formulate tender conditions accordingly
and that interference by Courts needs to minimal (see Michigan
Rubber (India) Limited vs. State of Karnataka and Others 3, Afcons
Infrastructure Limited vs. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation
Limited4 .
12. The issue of implementation of centralized tender process
was involved in Renuka Mata Mahila Bachat Gat (supra) in which
centralized tenders were floated for supply of Micronutrient
Fortified Energy Dense Food as Supplementary Nutrition Food, the
Take Home Ration through Anganwadi Centres. This Court has
held in paragraphs 51, 80, 81 and 82 as under:
"51. Therefore, it is clear that there is no such
overarching principle of decentralization and involvement of
Self-Help Groups laid down in the decisions relied on by the
Petitioners or the NFS Act to deviate from the statutory Rules
and the policy of the State existing as of today, which reflect a
different policy.
3 (2012) 8 SCC 216
4 (2016) 16 SCC 818
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80. The Petitioners have challenged the Tender conditions
on the following grounds. The primary argument, already
addressed, revolves around decentralization. Clauses 4.1.3
and 4.1.7 of the RFP are specifically challenged as arbitrary,
unreasonable, and irrational. The other contentions are as
follows: These clauses impede the participation of Self-Help
Groups and mahila mandals in the tender process, despite the
inclusive definition of 'Bidders' that encompasses them and
does not expressly exclude their involvement. The current
tender, issued at the division level in Maharashtra, deviates
from previous tenders conducted at the gram-panchayat,
project, or district levels. Additionally, after the Vaishnorani
case decision in the financial year 2021-2022, no tender for
supplying Micronutrient Fortified Energy Dense Food and
Micronutrient Fortified Meal had been issued by the State of
Maharashtra. The definition of "Turnover" in Clause (m) of the
RFP considers turnover from manufacturing and supplying
Micronutrient Fortified Energy Dense Food and
Micronutrient Fortified Meal over the last five financial years.
It will cause prejudice to the Petitioners because the turnover
for the last financial year 2021-2022 is mandatory for
calculation. That year, the ICDS Scheme of Take Home Ration
(Dry Ration) was implemented at the Anganwadi level (gram-
panchayat), leading to significantly lower turnover and net
worth. Clause 4.1.7 stipulates that the net worth of the bidder
must not be less than 5% of the yearly expenditure of the
applied revenue division, consolidated from each district
within that division. These requirements, if upheld, could
effectively exclude Self-Help Groups, providing an undue
advantage to large private contractors, and contradicting
principles of fair competition. Consequently, Clauses 4.1.3 and
4.1.7 are deemed arbitrary, discriminatory, unrealistic, unfair,
and unreasonable, violating Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. The procedure of floating the tenders at the division
level is viewed as unfair and unjust, and the Respondents
have not sufficiently addressed this core issue in their
affidavit-in-reply dated 8 June 2023. Clause 2.5 of the tender,
which promotes competitive pricing and financial bidding, is
arbitrary, irrational, unfair, and unreasonable. The
Government of Maharashtra resolution dated 29 February
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2016 expressly discourages competitive bidding, citing
potential impacts on food quality. The State's argument that
this approach would save State funds lacks a logical basis. If
upheld, the impugned clauses and conditions could hinder
the participation of Self-Help Groups and mahila mandals,
contradicting the principles of decentralization endorsed by
various authoritative bodies and policies. The conditions
related to "Turnover"and the net worth requirement in clause
4.1.7 are also challenged as unrealistic and potentially
exclusionary, with the retention of these clauses likely
eliminating Self-Help Groups from competition.
81. The State has argued that the conditions it has outlined
in its tender are carefully designed to effectively address the
problem of malnutrition by providing nutritious
supplements. According to the State, while Self-Help Groups
are included as bidders, the conditions in the tender primarily
focus on how to achieve the goal of combating malnutrition.
Since no current statutory provision that confers preferential
rights to Self-Help Groups, the tender conditions cannot be
amended to accommodate such non-existent rights. Based on
its wisdom and experience, the State has observed that the
response involving Self-Help Groups was extensive, even at
the lowest decentralized level. As a result, it decided to issue a
tender with conditions that, in its judgment, are the most
appropriate. As long as these conditions do not violate any
pre-existing statutory rights, they cannot be deemed arbitrary.
Ultimately, the State's role is to fulfill its obligations under the
NFS Act. There may be room for flexibility, and alternative
approaches might achieve the same goal; while the State may
not be entirely successful in its efforts, it is entitled to innovate
as long as it does not infringe on fundamental principles or
existing statutory rights.
82. Before we analyze the rival contentions, it is
necessary to keep in mind the extent and limitations of
judicial review concerning the tender conditions. The court's
role is not to substitute its judgment for that of the authority
but to ensure that the tender conditions meet the criteria of
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reasonableness, non-arbitrariness, and adherence to the rule
of law."
13. In the present case also, Petitioners have not been able to
demonstrate an element of arbitrariness in implementing
centralized tender process. Therefore, this Court cannot interfere in
the manner in which the tender process is implemented. Petitioners
cannot insist that the smaller contracts must be awarded so as to
ensure business opportunities for them.
14. Even otherwise the contracts in pursuance of the impugned
tender process have already been awarded on 6 November 2023.
Though the work orders are made subject to the outcome of
Petitions, this Court cannot loose sight of the fact that most period
of contracts is already over. The successful contractors have been
supplying the catering services for almost two years. This is yet
another factor why this Court is not inclined to interfere in the
impugned tender process, particularly at the instance of Petitioners
who have failed to participate in the tender process.
15. The objection of denial of opportunities to MSMEs or SC/ST
bidders are without any basis. Petitioners are not MSMEs and there
is no prohibition on MSMEs participating in the tender process. The
tender notice envisages award of 4% work to SC/ST bidders who
were willing to avail the reservation after meeting eligibility criteria
and offering services at the lowest bid rates. No SC/ST bidder has
participated or qualified in technical eligibility criteria. Therefore,
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the contention of denial of reservation to SC/ST bidders is clearly
misplaced as Clauses 4, 10, 13, 14, 22, 23 and 24 of the tender notice
do envisage due reservations and concessions to the reserved
category bidders.
16. The objection of sub-tendering also does not appeal to us as
the relevant clause in the tender notice permits sub-letting of work
partially or fully in case of exigency or excessive work load or any
compelling circumstances with due approval of Commissioner,
Social Welfare with further umbrella condition of not compromising
the quality of food and services. Though sub-letting is allowed in
exceptional circumstances (since food services cannot be suspended
in emergency circumstances), the contractor is held responsible of
quality of food and services. The provision for sub-letting appears
to have been done to take care of rare circumstances where the
contractor is prevented from supplying catering services to the
students who cannot be left hungry and without food. The objection
of sub-tendering is thus totally baseless.
17. Considering the overall conspectus of the case, we do not find
any valid ground to interfere in the impugned tender process. The
impugned GR dated 24 June 2022 is a policy decision taken by the
State Government in which this Court would loath to interfere in
absence of an element of arbitrariness or irrationality.
k 19/19 6 wp 9837.22 group db as.doc
18. The Petitions are thus devoid of merits. They are accordingly
dismissed.
(SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.) (CHIEF JUSTICE)
SUDARSHAN RAJALINGAM
RAJALINGAM KATKAM
KATKAM Date:
2025.08.26
18:19:12 +0530
