Bombay High Court
Fulan Bablu Mandal vs The State Of Maharashtra on 14 August, 2025
2025:BHC-AS:35247-DB
MANOJ 903-APEAL-50-2019.DOC
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.50 OF 2019
WITH
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.1647 OF 2018
IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.50 OF 2019
Fulan Bablu Mandal
Age- 30, Adult Indian Inhabitant
Occu- At present Nil,
Resident of Kamble Farm House, Karjat,
Tal- Karjat, Dist- Raigad,
Original Address State Assam ...Appellant
Presently at Nagpur Jail.
Versus
The State of Maharashtra,
Through Sr. Inspector of Police, Neral Police
Station, Taluka- Karjat, District- Raigad. ...Respondent
Ms. Pratiksha A. Thube i/by Mr. Shashikant Chaudhary,
for the Appellant.
Ms. Geeta P. Mulekar, APP for the Respondent-State.
CORAM : SUMAN SHYAM &
SHYAM C. CHANDAK, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 07th AUGUST, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 14th AUGUST, 2025
JUDGMENT :
(PER : SHYAM C. CHANDAK, J.)
1 Present Appeal has been directed against the Judgment and
Order dated 16/05/2018, in Sessions Case No.50 of 2016, passed
by the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Raigad-
Aligab. Thereby, the Appellant was convicted for the commission
of an offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and was sentenced as under :-
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U/Sec. To suffer imprisonment of life and to pay a fine of
302 Rs.500/- in default to suffer S.I. for six months.
U/Sec. To suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for six years and to
201 pay a fine of Rs.500/- in default to suffer R.I. for three
months.
2 Heard Ms. Thube, the learned Counsel appearing for the
Appellant, and Ms. Mulekar, the learned APP appearing for the
Respondent-State. Perused the entire record.
3 The prosecution case was that, the informant Mr. Pramod
Shankar Kamble (PW-1) was the owner of a farm house, situated
in village Salokh Tarfe Varedi, Tal. Karjat. Since last 8 years of the
incident, Bablu Mandal ("Bablu") was working as a watchman in
the said farm house. Bablu alongwith his wife ("Accused") and
their 2 children were residing in a labour room, in the farm house.
The Accused used to complain to the wife of PW-1 that Bablu was
consuming liquor and harassing her.
3.1 On 17/01/2016, the Accused phoned Mrs. Sumitra, the wife
of PW1, and told her that, Bablu went away somewhere from the
night of 16/01/2016. The wife of PW-1 phoned him and told the
said fact. PW-1 inquired about Bablu, but he was not found. On
18/01/2016, PW-1 came to his farm house and inquired with the
Accused. The Accused told PW-1 that her mother would come to
fetch her back. But, considering the Accused was alone with her
two children, PW-1 appointed two labours at the farm house for
her safety. On 19/01/2016, when PW-1 was going to Kalamb Police
Chowki to file missing complaint of Bablu, one Bali Ainkar met
him and told that he saw Bablu on the last day or a day before.
Therefore, PW-1 returned home without filing the complaint.
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3.2 On 24/01/2016, at about 2:00 pm, PW-1 along with the
mother and brother of the Accused went to Kalamb Police Chowki
and filed a missing complaint of Bablu. Then, they came to the
farm house. At that time, the Accused told him that they would go
to their native and requested PW-1 to arrange tickets for them. At
about 6:30 pm, Rahul Garud, driver of PW-1 went to relieve
himself behind the farm house. Then, Rahul came back and told
PW-1 that the slab lid on the tank was moved a little and an
obnoxious smell was coming out of the tank. Therefore, PW-1 went
there alongwith Rahul and pushed the slab lid aside. A human
body kept in a plastic bag was lying in a septic tank.
3.3 The matter was reported to police. The police visited the
spot and took out that plastic bag. Body of Bablu was lying in the
bag in a decomposed state. PW-1 and the Accused identified the
body of Bablu. Then PW-1 filed a Report (Exh.19) therein he had
narrated the aforestated and alleged that, some unknown person
killed Bablu and disposed of his body in the septic tank. Police
registered the said Report at CR.No.21/2016, under Sections 302
and 201 of the I.P.C. P.W.5 Ravindra Patil, API conducted
investigation. He recorded an Inquest Panchnama (Exh.35) and
the Spot Panchnama (Exh.34) near the septic tank. PW-3 Deepak
Sangale conducted the post-mortem and recorded that, the cause
of death was head injury with fracture of mandible.
3.4 On 26/01/2016, police arrested the Accused. On
27/01/2016, the Accused gave a Voluntary Statement leading to
recovery of an iron rod used to assault Bablu. On the same day,
police recorded the Spot Panchnama (Exh.24) in the room of the
occurrence. Thereafter, police recorded the statement of the
witnesses from time to time.
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3.5 Investigation revealed that, PW-4 Ashtami is sister of the
Accused. PW-4 was residing at Anjam Phata. Bablu was addicted
to liquor. On 15/01/2016, at about 1:00 pm, Bablu took PW-4 to
his house and then went out to consume liquor. In the night, Bablu
returned to the room inebriated. The Accused and others were
eating dinner. The Accused wanted to go to her parental house.
But, Bablu asked her not to go as he had no money. Therefore,
quarrel ensued between them and the Accused threw chilly
powder in the eyes of Bablu. The Accused then assaulted Bablu
with an iron rod on the head, mouth and chest. Bablu sustained
fatal injuries and died. Thereafter, the Accused put his dead body
in the plastic bag and concealed it in the septic tank. After
completion of investigation, PW-5 Ravindra Patil filed charge-
sheet.
4 During the trial, the prosecution examined 5 witnesses :-
PW-1 Pramod Shankar Kamble, is the first informant. PW-2
Vasant Ganpat Khaire, panch to voluntary statement leading to
recovery etc. PW-3 Dr.Deepak Janardan Sangale, Medical Officer.
PW-4 Ashtami Shibas Biswas, eye witness to the incident. PW-5
Ravindra Dattatray Patil, Investigation Officer.
5 On closure of the prosecution evidence, the trial Court
questioned the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein she
denied the incriminating evidence and circumstances. The defence
of the accused was of total denial and false implication.
6 On evaluating the prosecution evidence, the learned Judge
of the trial Court held the Accused guilty of the murder and
therefore, convicted and sentenced her as noted above. Hence, this
Appeal.
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7 We have gone through the evidence on record with the help
of the learned Counsel for the Accused and the learned APP.
8 Ms. Thube, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant
has submitted that, the children of the Accused were the eye
witnesses, but they were not examined. PW-4, the alleged eye-
witness, had promptly disclosed about the murder to her relatives.
PW-4 was available for recording her statement. Yet, there is a
huge and unexplained delay in recording her statement by the
police as PW-4 was not a reliable witness. Ms. Thube, further
submitted that, no other person had seen the Accused committing
the murder and disposing of the body in the septic tank. There is
no evidence that Bablu and Accused were seen last together, just
before the murder. The body was recovered after 8 days of the
murder. Ms. Thube, has submitted that the recovery of the iron
bar is not reliable. There is no other circumstantial evidence
against the accused to show that she has committed the murder.
Therefore, according to Ms. Thube the charge was not proved and
the Accused is entitled for acquittal. In the alternative, Ms. Thube
urged that, looking at the nature of the evidence of PW-4, and the
reason of the murder, this is a clear case of an offence of Section
304 of the I.P.C. Accordingly, the Appeal may be dealt with.
9 In contrast, Ms. Mulekar, the learned APP appearing for the
Respondent-State has submitted that the evidence of PW-4 did
not shatter in the cross-examination. There was no enmity
between PW-4 and the Appellant. The Accused has failed to
explain as to why her own sister had deposed against her. As such,
it is baseless to think that PW-4 has deposed falsely and she was
not a reliable witness. She submitted that, only the Accused knew
that Bablu was missing from 16/01/2016, yet, she did not
promptly file the missing complaint and rather avoided it, giving
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false excuse. Ms. Mulekar submitted that, looking at the injuries
caused to Bablu, it is clear that the Accused had intentionally
inflicted those injuries with an intent to cause the death. As such,
this is a clear case of culpable homicide amounting to murder.
Therefore, Ms. Mulekar has urged to dismiss the Appeal.
10 PW-3 Dr. Sangale and Dr. Khandare, Asstt. Professor jointly
conducted the post-mortem. On external and internal examination
they found the following injuries on the body of Bablu:-
External Injuries:-
1. Depressed area of size 11 x 5 c.m. noted over right
frontoparietal region. On palpation fracture noted.
2. Laceration of size 5 x 3 c.m. x bone deep over left temple
region just in front of a left ear with crawling of maggots,
margin irregular, infiltrated with blood, dark red in colour.
3. Abrasion of size 5 x 3 c.m. over left cheek region, reddish
brown in colour.
4. Laceration of size 7 x 2 c.m. x scalp deep noted over right
parital region, margin irregular, blood infiltration noted at
margin.
5. Contusion of size 13 x 6 c.m. x 1 c.m. over middle part of
forehead, Dark brown in colour.
6. Abrasion of size 3 x 1 c.m. and 2 x 1 c.m. over posterior
aspect of left mid thigh region, reddish brown in colour.
On palpation, following fractures were noted:-
1. Fracture of right fronto parietal region.
2. Fracture of nasal bone.
3. Fracture of mandible.
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Internal Injuries:-
1. Under scalp contusion of size 8 x 4 c.m. X scalp deep
noted over left parieto-occipital region, dark-reddish in
colour.
2. Coronal suture diastasis noted on left side of skull
(postmortem decomposition change)
3. Communitted fracture of right fronto-partital region of
skull of size 15 x 11 c.m. into brain deep noted. Pieces of
bone separated, fracture margin of bone infiltrated with
blood. Brain - is semiliquified pulpy, Brain matter greyish
black in colour.
11 Evidence of PW-3 Dr. Sangale indicates that, the external
injuries were ante mortem in nature. The injuries were possible by
hard and blunt object like iron rod. The internal injuries were fatal
and sufficient to cause death. The cause of death was head injury
with fracture of mandible. Considering the decomposition changes
noted during the postmortem examination, PW-3 had opined that
the time since death was more than 6 to 7 days. Accordingly, he
issued the postmortem report (Exh.29).
12 PW-3 was cross-examined. But nothing material has come
therein to disbelieve his aforesaid evidence and the post-mortem
report. Thus, his evidence has proved that the said injuries were
intentionally caused and it led to the death of Bablu.
13 Now turning to the evidence of PW-1 Pramod Kamble, in his
examination-in-chief, PW-1 has deposed very same to his Report
(Exh.19). PW-5 has proved the Inquest Panchnama and the Spot
Panchnama. Both these documents were also admitted by the
Accused. It supported the evidence of PW-1. Thus, from the
testimonies of PW-1 and PW-5 it is proved that, at the relevant
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time, Bablu, his wife-Accused and their 2 children were residing in
the farm house of PW-1, which fact the Accused never disputed.
Further, it proved that, on 17/01/2016, the Accused had
telephonically told PW-1's wife that from the night of 16/01/2016,
Bablu was missing. Therefore, PW-1 wanted to file his missing
report. However, on 24/01/2016, the dead body of Bablu was
found in the septic tank of the said farm house.
14 P.W.4 Ashtami has categorically deposed that, on the
relevant day, at about 4:00 pm, Bablu took her to his house. In the
night, Bablu returned to the room inebriated and asked the
Accused to give Rs.100/-. But the Accused did not give him the
money. Therefore, Bablu beat the Accused. The Accused got angry
and she threw chilly powder in the eyes of Bablu. Then, the
Accused assaulted Bablu with an iron pipe on the head, mouth and
chest. Bablu sustained injuries and he died. Thereafter, the
Accused had put the dead body of Bablu in the plastic bag and hid
it in the septic tank.
15 The aforesaid evidence of PW-4 remained unshaken in the
cross-examination. Her evidence is supported by the expert
evidence of PW-3 and the post-mortem report which show that the
injuries on the body of Bablu were possible by the iron rod. PW-4
had no enmity with the Accused and any reason to depose falsely
against her. In other words, PW-4 had no Axe to grind against the
Accused. Hence, we have no hesitation to accept and rely upon the
evidence of PW-4.
16 The testimony of PW-2 Vasant Khaire, panch and PW-5
established that, while the Accused was in the police custody, on
27/01/2016, the Accused had made a voluntary statement in the
presence of the panchas that, she was ready to produce the iron
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rod which she had concealed. PW-5 recorded the Memorandum
(Exh.22) thereof. Further, their testimony proved that the Accused
had led them to the farm house. There, the Accused took them to a
store room and produced the iron rod. PW-5 seized the same
under the Recovery Panchnama (Exh.23). This circumstance
corroborated the version of PW-4.
17 With the help of the evidence of PW-2 and PW-5, the
prosecution has proved that, the Accused showed the room, where
Bablu was assaulted. There, PW-5 recorded the Spot Panchnama
(Exh.24). During that action, PW-5 took the swab samples of the
blood seen at the spot. Thereafter, Accused produced her Saree
which was on her person and stained with blood during the
incident. PW-5 seized that Saree under Panchnama (Exh.25).
Nevertheless, the CA Report does not show that blood was found
on the swab samples collected during the Spot Panchnama and the
seized Saree. Yet, it will not nullify the other evidence of the
prosecution witnesses.
18 In view of the above discussion, we hold that, the Accused
had assaulted Bablu with the iron rod and intentionally caused
him the aforesaid injuries which led to his death. Thus, the death
was culpable homicide. According to Ms. Mulekar, the said act is
covered by Section '300 3rdly' of the I.P.C. which provides that
culpable homicide is murder, "If it is done with the intention of
causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended
to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death" However, Ms. Thube, the learned Counsel contended that
the said act of causing the death of Bablu is falling under
Exception 1 to Section 300 of I.P.C., which is punishable only
under Section 304 of I.P.C.
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19 Looking at this controversy, it would be apposite to refer the
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anbazhagan
vs. The State, reported in (2023) SCC OnLine SC 857 wherein in
para 66(4) and 66(5) it has been enunciated as under :-
" 66 (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular
injury was intended, and objectively that injury was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300
of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
66 (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following
classes of cases: (i) when the case falls under one or the
other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by
one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury
caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is
covered by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death' but is of a lower degree
of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury
'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall under
Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is
done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but
without intention to cause death or an injury likely to
cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two
parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first
part, the crime of murder is first established and the
accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions
to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part,
the crime of murder is never established at all.
Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty
of the offence punishable under the second part of
Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his
case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the
IPC."
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20 Exception 1 of Section 3oo of I.P.C. provides that, "Culpable
homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the
power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the
death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death
of any other person by mistake or accident." While dealing with
this exception, in a recent decision in Vijay @ Vijaykumar vs. State
Represented by Inspector of Police , reported in (2025) 3 SCC 671,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 observed
as under :-
"18. It is not each and every provocation that will reduce
the crime from murder to culpable homicide not amounting
to murder. The provocation must be both grave and sudden.
In order to invoke the benefit of the exception, it must be
established that the act committed by the accused was a
simultaneous reaction of grave as well as sudden
provocation which deprived him of the power of self-
control. If the provocation is grave but not sudden, the
accused cannot get the benefit of this exception. Likewise,
he cannot invoke the exception where the provocation
though sudden is not grave."
19. In Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions reported
in 1942 A.C. 1, Viscount Simon observed:
"It is not all provocation that will reduce the
crime of murder to manslaughter. Provocation,
to have that result, must be such as temporarily
deprives the person provoked of the power of self
control, as the result of which he commits the
unlawful act which causes death. "In deciding the
question whether this was or was not the case,
regard must be had to the nature of the act by
which the offender causes death, to the time
which elapsed between the provocation and the
act which caused death, to the offender's conduct
during that interval, and to all other
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circumstances tending to show the state of his
mind": Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law, art.
317. The test to be applied is that of the effect of
the provocation on a reasonable man, as was laid
down by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex v.
Lesbini 7, so that an unusually excitable or
pugnacious individual is not entitled to rely on
provocation which would not have led an
ordinary person to act as he did. In applying the
test, it is of particular importance (a) to consider
whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since
the provocation to allow a reasonable man time
to cool, and (b) to take into account the
instrument with which the homicide was
effected, for to retort, in the heat of passion
induced by provocation, by a simple blow, is a
very different thing from making use of a deadly
instrument like a concealed dagger. In short, the
mode of resentment must bear a reasonable
relationship to the provocation if the offence is to
be reduced to manslaughter".
20. In order to bring the case within said Exception 1, the
following conditions must be complied with:
(i) The deceased must have given provocation to the
accused
(ii) The provocation must be grave;
(iii) The provocation must be sudden;
(iv) The offender, by reason of the side provocation, shall
have been deprived of his power of self-control;
(v) He should have killed the deceased during the
continuance of the deprivation of the power of
selfcontrol; and
(vi) The offender must have caused the death of the
person who gave the provocation or that of any other
person by mistake or accident."
21 Then, in paragraph 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
considered the three ingredients namely (i) the provocation was
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sudden; (ii) the provocation was grave; and (iii) loss of self-
control, one by one, as under:
"22.1 Whether the provocation was sudden or not does not
present much difficulty. The word 'sudden' involves two
elements. First, the provocation must be unexpected. If an
accused plans in advance to receive a provocation in order to
justify the subsequent homicide, the provocation cannot be
said to be sudden. Secondly, the interval between the
provocation and the homicide should be brief. If the man
giving the provocation is killed within a minute after the
provocation, it is a case of sudden provocation. If the man is
killed six hours after the provocation, it is not a case of
sudden provocation.
22.2 the main difficulty lies in deciding whether a certain
provocation was grave or not. A bare statement by the
accused that he regarded the provocation as grave will not be
accepted by the court. The court has to apply an objective test
for deciding whether the provocation was grave or not. A
good test for deciding whether a certain provocation was
grave or not is this: "Is a reasonable man likely to lose self-
control as a result of such provocation?" If the answer is in
the affirmative, the provocation will be classed as grave. If the
answer is in the negative, the provocation is not grave. In this
context, the expression 'reasonable man' means a normal or
an average person. A reasonable man is not the ideal man or
the perfect being. A normal man sometimes loses temper.
There is, therefore no inconsistency in saying that, a
reasonable man may lose self-control as a result of grave
provocation. A reasonable or normal or average man is a legal
fiction. The reasonable man will vary from society to society.
A Judge should not impose his personal standards in this
matter. By training, a Judge is a patient man. But the
reasonable man or the normal man need not have the same
standard of behaviour as the judge himself. The reasonable
man under consideration is a member of the society, in which
the accused was living. So, education and social conditions of
the accused are relevant factors. An ordinary exchange of
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abuse is a matter of common occurrence. A reasonable man
does not lose self-control merely on account of an ordinary
exchange of abuses. So, courts do not treat an ordinary
exchange of abuses as a basis for grave provocation. On the
other hand, in most societies, adultery is looked upon as a
very serious matter. So, quotes are prepared to treat adultery
as a basis for grave provocation.
22.3 the question of loss of self-control comes up indirectly
in deciding whether a particular provocation was grave or
not. So, if it is proved that the accused did receive grave and
sudden provocation, the court is generally prepared to
assume that homicide was committed while the accused was
deprived of the power of self-control. In some cases, it may be
possible for the prosecution to prove that the accused
committed the murder with a cool head in spite of grave
provocation. But such cases will be rare. So, when the
accused has established grave and sudden provocation, the
court will generally hold that he has discharged the burden
that lay upon him under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC."
22 In view thereof, in paragraph 23 the Apex Court posed a
question to itself, i.e, What should be the approach of the court?
This question, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has answered thus:
"The provocation must be such as will upset not merely a
hasty and hot-tempered or hypersensitive person, but one of
ordinary sense and calmness. The Court has to consider
whether a reasonable person placed in the same position as
accused would have behaved in the manner in which the
accused behaved on receiving the same provocation. If it
appears that the action of the accused was out of all
proportion to the gravity or magnitude of the provocation
offered, the case will not fall under the exception. The case
can only fall under the exception when the court is able to
hold that provided the alleged provocation is given, every
normal person would behave or act in the same way as the
accused in the circumstances in which the accused was
placed, acted."
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23 In paragraph 24, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed
that, "In the words of Viscount Simon: "The whole doctrine
relating to provocation depends on the fact that it causes, or may
cause, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, whereby
malice, which is the formation of an intention to kill or to inflict
grievous bodily harm, is negatived. Consequently, where the
provocation inspires and actual intention to kill, or to inflict
grievous bodily harm the doctrine that provocation may reduce
murder to manslaughter seldom applies".
24 In paragraph 25 and 26 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
observed that, Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 casts
onus of proof on the accused. The burden of proving the
circumstances covered by said Exception 1 is on the Accused. It is,
therefore, for the Accused to prove that the provocation received
by him was such as might reasonably be deemed sufficient to
deprive him of self-control, and that the act of killing took place
whilst that absence of control was in existence and may fairly be
attributed to it.
25 In the case in hand, the evidence of PW-1 and PW-4 clearly
indicates that, Bablu had a habit of taking alcohol and he used to
harass the Accused. As such, it is apparent that, the life of the
Accused was very miserable in the company of Bablu, despite the
fact that they were married for about 10 years. Even at the time of
the incident, Bablu was under the influence of alcohol. And in that
state, he quarrelled with the Accused over very trifle money and
also beat her, that too when the Accused and others were quietly
eating, as deposed by PW-4. Therefore, it appears that the incident
had occurred during the course of a sudden quarrel, in the heat of
passion. There was no premeditation on the part of the Accused.
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26 Record indicates that, at the time of the incident, the
daughter and Son of the Accused were aged 8 and 6 years,
respectively. It is not the case of the prosecution that, at any point
of time, the Accused behaved with Bablu in a rough or improper
manner. It is also not the case that the Accused used to disrespect
or abuse Bablu due to her constant harassment by him and his
habit of consuming alcohol. Therefore, in the facts, it can be said
that, always, the Accused maintained calm and tolerated, whatever
way she was treated by Bablu. This tolerance, according to us,
must be for only one reason, that the Accused and her two small
children were dependent upon Bablu. However, Bablu never tried
to understand that painful plight of the Accused. Instead, he
continued treating her in that manner. It appears that, the said
constant harassment of the Accused in general and the act of
beating her at the time of the incident in particular, provoked her
to respond the reckless behaviour of Bablu by taking the law in
hand and unmindful of the serious consequences thereof on her
life and her children. As a result, the Accused had hit Bablu and
caused his death. Therefore, and considering the nature of the
injuries, we are of the opinion that said Exception 1 to Section 300
of I.P.C. is applicable to the facts of the present case.
27 In view thereof, in our opinion, the appropriate conviction
would be under Section 304 Part I of I.P.C. Consequently, the
impugned conviction and sentence under Section 302 of I.P.C. is
liable to be quashed and set-aside. Instead, the Appellant is liable
to be convicted and sentenced under Section 304 Part I of I.P.C.
However, the conviction and sentence for the offence of Section
201 of I.P.C. is justifiable in the facts of the case. Accordingly, the
Appeal succeeds partly. Hence, the following Order is passed:-
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1) Criminal Appeal No.50 of 2019 is partly allowed.
2) The impugned Judgment and Order of conviction and
sentence dated 16/05/2018, in Sessions Case No.50 of
2016, passed by the Court of the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Raigad-Alibag, against the Appellant for
the offence punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C. is
quashed and set-aside.
3) Instead, the Appellant Fulan Bablu Mandal is convicted
for the offence punishable under Section 304 (Part I) of
I.P.C. and is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment
for a period of 10 years and to pay fine of Rs.500/- in
default of payment of fine to undergo simple
imprisonment for six months.
4) The conviction and sentence imposed on the Appellant
for the offence punishable under Section 201 of I.P.C. is
upheld.
5) Both the substantive sentences shall run concurrently.
6) The Appellant has already undergone her sentence of
imprisonment under Section 304 (Part I) and Section
201 of I.P.C. The Appellant is detained at Yerwada
Central Prison, Pune. Hence, she be released forthwith
on payment of the fine amount, if not required to be
detained in any other case/s.
7) Consequently, the Criminal Application No.1647 of 2018
is disposed of.
8) Legal Aid fees be paid to the Appointed Advocate.
Digitally
signed by
(SHYAM C. CHANDAK, J.) (SUMAN SHYAM, J.)
WAKLE
WAKLE MANOJ
MANOJ JANARDHAN
JANARDHAN Date:
2025.08.14
17:15:01
+0530
14th August 2025
