Bombay High Court
Jambu Kumar Seth vs The State Of Maharashtra And Ors on 14 August, 2025
Author: N. J. Jamadar
Bench: N. J. Jamadar
2025:BHC-AS:35255
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Arun Sankpal
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 19491 OF 2024
Jambu Kumar Seth
Age: 56 years, Occupation: Business,
Indian Inhabitant, residing at
Flat No. 1701, 17th Floor, Nutan Annex Building,
Road No.3, Goregaon (West),
Mumbai 400 104. ..Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra,
Through Secretary of Government of
Maharashtra Mantralaya,
Mumbai 400 032.
2. Competent Authority Rent Control Act,
Konkan Division At Mumbai,
Having office at 5th Floor,
MHADA Building, Gruhnirman Bhavan,
Digitally signed
Gandhi Nagar, Bandra East,
by ARUN
ARUN
RAMCHANDRA
SANKPAL
RAMCHANDRA
SANKPAL
Date:
2025.08.14
Mumbai, Maharashtra 400 051.
17:40:02
+0530
3. The Additional Divisional Commissioner
Konkan Division at Mumbai,
Office of the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan
Division, 1st Floor, Old Secretariat (Annex),
Karmaveer Bhaurao Patil Marg,
Fort, Mumbai 400 032.
4. Mehul Mehta
Age: 39 years, Occupation: Services
5. Ruchi Mehul Mehta
Age: 40 years, Occupation: Service
Both of Mumbai, Indian Inhabitants,
1/16
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Having address at Flat No. 1701,
17th Floor, Nutan Annex Building,
Road No. 3, Goregaon (West),
Mumbai 400 104, and
presently residing at Mehta's CE-157,
Sector 1, Saltlake (Near Arunachal Bhawan), ...Respondents
Kolkata - 700 064.
Mr. Aadil Parsurampuria, with Viraj Bansod, i/b Tushar Goradia, for
the Petitioner.
Mr. Hamid Mulla, AGP, for Respondent Nos. 1 to 3.
Mr. Anil R. Mishra, for the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5.
CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
RESERVED ON : 30th JULY 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 14th AUGUST 2025
JUDGMENT:
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the consent of
the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.
2. This Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India calls in
question the legality and correctness of a judgment and order passed by
the Additional Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, Mumbai, in
Revision Application No. 832 of 2024, whereby the Revision preferred by
the Petitioner against an order passed by the Competent Authority under
Section 24 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act 1999 ("the Rent Act
999") came to be dismissed by affirming the order of eviction passed by
the Competent Authority.
3. Background facts can be stated in brief as under:
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3.1 The Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are the owners of Flat No. 1701,
Nutan Annex Building, Goregaon (West), Mumbai ("the subject flat").
The Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 entered into a Leave and License
Agreement dated 11th January 2023 with the Petitioner and thereby
allowed the Petitioner-licensee to use and occupy the subject flat on
Leave and License basis for a period of four months commencing from
10th January 2023. The Petitioner paid a security deposit of
Rs.1,50,000/-. The parties agreed that the Petitioners shall pay
Rs.53,000/- per month towards the compensation for the use and
occupation of the subject flat on or before fifth day of the respective
month.
3.2 The Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 alleged that, the Petitioner
committed default in payment of the agreed monthly compensation.
Therefore, the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 addressed a notice on 10 th
April 2023 alleging that the Petitioner committed breach of the terms of
the license and, thus, terminated the license.
3.3 The Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 filed an Application being No. 135
of 2023 before the Competent Authority seeking the eviction of the
Petitioner from the subject flat and a direction to pay compensation at
double the agreed rate of compensation, i.e., 1,06,000/- till the delivery
of the clear and vacant possession of the subject flat.
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3.4 The Petitioner appeared before the Competent Authority. At this
juncture it is necessary to note that there is a serious controversy as to
whether the Petitioner had sought leave to defend the Application as
envisaged by the provisions contained in Section 43(4) of the Rent Act
1999. However, the Petitioner did file an Affidavit in Reply on 31 st July
2023.
3.5 The Petitioner, inter alia, contended that the Application for
eviction on the strength of the alleged termination of licence was not
maintainable, before the expiry of the term of the license. The
jurisdiction of the Competent Authority was also questioned on the
count that the subject flat was used for commercial purpose and,
therefore, the Competent Authority lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
3.6 By an order dated 30th August 2024, the Competent Authority
allowed the Application observing, inter alia, that the Petitioner did not
seek leave to defend the Application as envisaged by Section 43(4) of
the Rent Act 1999, and the term of license had expired by the efflux of
time, and, yet, the Petitioner had not delivered vacant possession of the
subject flat to the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5. The Petitioner was thus
directed to hand over clear, vacant and peaceful possession of the
subject flat and also pay damages to the Respondent Nos.4 and 5 at the
rate of Rs.1,06,000/- per month from 10th May 2023 till the delivery of
the possession of the subject flat.
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3.7 Being aggrieved, the Petitioner invoked the revisional jurisdiction
of the Divisional Commissioner, Mumbai.
3.8 The Revisional Authority found no ground to interfere with the
order passed by the Competent Authority as it was neither perverse nor
illegal.
3.9 Being further aggrieved, the Petitioner has invoked the writ
jurisdiction of this Court.
4. I have heard Mr. Aadil Parsurampuria, the learned Counsel for
the Petitioner, Mr. Anil Mishra, the learned Counsel for the Respondent
Nos. 4 and 5, and Mr. Hamid Mull, the learned AGP, for the Respondent-
State.
5. As a controversy arose as regards the filing of the Application
seeking leave to defend, the original record was called from the
Competent Authority. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the
parties, I have perused the material on record in this Petition as well as
the original record.
6. Mr. Aadil Parsurampuria, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner,
initially premised his submissions on an alleged patent illegality in the
impugned orders to the extent it has been recorded that, the Petitioner-
licensee had not sought leave to defend the Application. Attention of the
Court was invited to the copy of the Application (Exhibit "F", page 49 of
the Petition) which was allegedly filed by the Petitioner on 24 th June
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2023 seeking leave to defend the Application. Yet, Mr. Parsurampuria
would urge, both the Competent Authority as well as the Revisional
Authority have proceeded on an incorrect premise that the Petitioner
had not sought leave to defend the Suit. Mr. Parsurampuria would urge
that, such erroneous impression of the Authorities under the Rent Act
1999 caused grave prejudice to the Petitioner as the Authorities have not
at all delved into the substantive defence raised by the Petitioner in the
Affidavit in Reply, on the premise that the Petitioner had not sought
leave to defend. The vitiation thus began, urged Mr. Parsurampuria.
7. Mr. Parsurampuria would urge even in the absence of a formal
application for leave to defend, under Section 43(4) of the Rent Act,
1999, the Authorities could not have declined to consider the Affidavit in
reply filed on behalf of the Petitioner as in the Affidavit in Reply the
Petitioner had categorically sought leave to defend. What Section 43(4)
of the Rent Act 1999 requires is filing of an Affidavit stating grounds on
which licensee seeks to contest the Application for eviction. Sub-Section
(4) of Section 43 does not necessarily mandate filing of a separate
Application for leave to defend, was the thrust of the submission of Mr
Parsurampuria.
8. On the merits of the matter, Mr. Parsurampuria would urge, the
Competent Authority as well as the Revisional Authority have not at all
delved into the ground raised by the Petitioner that the subject flat was
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used for commercial purpose. In that view of the matter, according to
Mr. Parsurampuria, both the orders deserve to be quashed and set aside
and the Application is required to be remitted for afresh determination
taking into account the fact that the Petitioner had in fact filed an
Application for leave to defend.
9. Mr. Mishra, the learned Counsel for the Defendant Nos. 4 and 5,
stoutly countered the submissions on behalf of the Petitioner. Mr. Mishra
urged with a degree of vehemence that, the Petitioner has approached
the Revisional Authority as well as this Court with a patently false case
that the Petitioner had filed an Application for leave to defend.
According to Mr. Mishra, the Application for leave to defend; a
purported copy of which has been annexed to the Petition at Exhibit "F"
(page 49 of the Petition), was not at all filed before, and formed part of
the record of, the Competent Authority. Yet submissions were brazenly
advanced before this Court that, despite filing of the Application for
leave to defend, the Authorities proceeded on an incorrect footing that
the Petitioner had not sought such leave.
10. Mr. Mishra would further submit that, since the period of license
has expired on 10th May 2023, the continued occupation of the subject
flat by the Petitioner, despite having filed an undertaking to vacate the
subject flat on or before 10th May 2024, is wholly unsustainable.
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11. Even otherwise, there is no defence to the Application for
eviction as the period of license has long expired. Therefore, the Petition
deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs, submitted Mr. Mishra.
12. I have given anxious consideration to the submissions canvassed
across the bar and also carefully perused the material on record.
13. To start with, it is incontrovertible that the Leave and License
Agreement was executed by and between Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and
the Petitioner, on 11th January 2023. There is not much controversy over
the essential terms of the said Agreement. The term of license was four
months. The agreed compensation was Rs.53,000/- per month. The
compensation was to be paid on or before 5 th day of the respective
month. The controversy between the parties revolves around the
transactions which form the prelude to the said Agreement dated 11 th
January 2023 and the purpose for which the subject flat was given on
license.
14. Before adverting to the aforesaid contentious issues, the aspect as
to whether the Petitioner had indeed filed an Application seeking leave
to defend deserves to be determined as in view of the special procedure
envisaged by Section 43 of the Rent Act 1999, a licensee is not entitled
to contest the prayer for eviction unless he obtains the leave to defend.
The provisions contained in Section 43 of the Rent Act 1999 envisage a
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summary procedure for determination of the Application under Section
24 of the Rent Act 1999.
15. It is imperative to note that before the Revisional Authority as
well as this Court, the order of the Competent Authority was assailed by
taking specific grounds in the Revision Application and the instant
Petition that, the Competent Authority recorded an incorrect finding that
the Petitioner had not filed an Application for leave to defend and, thus,
the order passed by the Competent Authority suffered from the vice of
perversity.
16. As noted above, in the wake of the dispute between the parties
over the very filing of the Application for leave to defend, the record and
proceedings before the Authorities were called. The roznama of the
proceedings before the Competent Authority makes it abundantly clear
that the Application for leave to defend was not at all filed. On 25 th July
2023, the Petitioner appeared through an Advocate and sought time to
file leave to defend., and on the scheduled date, i.e., 31 st July 2023, the
Petitioner filed Affidavit in Reply. No Application for leave to defend was
filed on that day or thereafter.
17. Mr. Parsurampuria submitted that the filing of an Affidavit in
Reply, which also contained a prayer that the Petitioner be granted leave
to defend the Application, was a substantial compliance of the mandate
contained in Section 43(4) of the Rent Act 1999, and, therefore, the
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Authorities could not have proceeded on the premise that the Petitioner
had not sought leave to defend.
18. The aforesaid submission oversimplifies the situation, which
seriously reflects upon the conduct of the Petitioner. Had the Petitioner
approached the Court with a case that, instead of filing a formal
Application for leave to defend, the Petitioner had filed an Affidavit in
Reply which in itself contained a prayer to grant leave to defend and,
thus, the Authorities ought to have considered the said Affidavit for the
purpose of grant of leave to defend, different considerations would have
come into play.
19. However, the Petitioner not only approached the Revisional Court
as well as this Court with a positive case that he had field an application
for leave to defend but also placed on record a copy of the said
Application (Exhibit "F"); putting oath behind the assertion that the said
document (Exhibit "F") was a copy of the Application for leave to defend
filed before the Competent Authority. Such Application for leave to
defend neither finds mention in the roznama of the proceedings nor
forms part of the record of the proceedings before the Competent
Authority.
20. It is also necessary to note that in this Petition, the Petitioner
raised specific grounds of having filed the Application for leave to
defend and that the Competent Authority erred in holding that such
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Application was not filed (Paragraphs 5 and 7 and Grounds C (c), C(d)
and C(e)).
21. Evidently, the Petitioner approached the Court with a false case to
his knowledge. It was not a case of mere suppression of the fact. On the
contrary, it was a case of positive misstatement. What exacerbates the
situation is the fact that, despite Mr Mishra repetitively asserting that no
such Application was filed, Mr. Parsurampuria persisted with the
submission that such Application, a copy of which is placed on record at
Exhibit "F", was indeed filed by the Petitioner. Even after the record and
proceedings of the Authorities were called and it turned out that no such
Application was filed, it is disconcerting to record that there was no hint
of remorse on the part the applicant for having been made a deliberate
false statement.
22. The legal position is well neigh settled. A party who approaches
the Court with unclean hands and indulges in fraudulent acts and sharp
practices to score a march over the adversary, does not deserve any
relief. Over a period of time, the principle has ingrained in the justice
dispensation system that such a litigant deserves to be thrown out of the
Court, summarily.
23. A useful reference in this context can be made to the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) Vs
Jagannath (Dead) by L.Rs. And Ors.1, wherein the approach to deal with
1 AIR 1994 SC 853.
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the parties who come to the Court with a falsehood was delineated as
under :
"7.......The courts of law are meant for imparting justice
between the parties. One who comes to the court, must
come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that
more often than not, process of the court is being
abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-
dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks
of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain
the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to
say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has
no right to approach the court. He can be summarily
thrown out at any stage of the litigation."
24. In the case of Dalip Singh V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. 2
the Supreme Court expressed its anguish, in the following words :
"1. For many centuries, Indian society cherished
two basic values of life i.e., `Satya' (truth) and `Ahimsa'
(non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma
Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their
daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of justice
delivery system which was in vogue in pre-independence
era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the
courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-
independence period has seen drastic changes in our value
system. The materialism has over-shadowed the old ethos
and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that
those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of
falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in
the court proceedings.
2 (2010) 2 SCC 114
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2. In last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up.
Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for
truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical
means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge
posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time
to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a
litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who
touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not
entitled to any relief, interim or final."
25. On this count alone, the Petition deserves to be dismissed.
26. Nonetheless, this Court considers it appropriate to briefly delve
into the sustainability of the impugned order. It was brought on record
that prior to the Agreement in question, there were two Leave and
License Agreements between the parties in respect of the very subject
flat. The first Agreement was executed on 5 th May 2021 for a term of 11
months, commencing from 10th May 2021. The second was executed on
15th June 2022 for a term of 9 months commencing from 10 th April 2022
to 9th January 2023. The second Agreement was followed by Agreement
in question commencing from 10th January 2023 to 9th May 2023.
27. The fact that in the Application before the Competent Authority
there was no reference to the prior Agreements does not detract
materially from the case of the Respondent Nos 4 and 5 as the principal
defence of the Petitioner was that the subject flat was used for
commercial purpose. The character of agreement or the jural
relationship between the parties was not contested. The prior two
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Agreements as also the Agreement in question categorically record that
the subject flat was used for residential purpose and it was given to the
Petitioner for residential use only. There was a covenant not to use the
subject flat for any other purpose.
28. The endeavour of the Petitioner to take the matter out of the
jurisdiction of the Competent Authority by contending that, to the
knowledge of the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5, the subject flat was used for
commercial purpose has to surmount an insuperable impediment of the
express terms of the grant under the Leave and License Agreement,
namely, the subject flat was to be used for residential purpose only.
Moreover, in view of the provisions contained in Explanation (b) to
Section 24, an Agreement for License in writing is conclusive evidence of
the facts stated thereunder. The conclusive presumption thus operates
qua the user of the premises as well.
29. Though an endeavour was made to contend that the licensor had
no authority to terminate the license, in the context of the subsequent
developments, the said issue pales in significance. The Revisional
Authority was justified in recording a finding that the Competent
Authority was in error in holding that the Leave and License Agreement
did not contain a termination clause. In fact, under Clause 11 of the
Leave and License Agreement, the licensor was entitled to seek
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possession of the licensed premises in the event of breach on the part of
the licensee of any of the terms and conditions of the license Agreement.
30. In any event, on the day the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 filed the
Application before the Competent Authority, the term of license had
already expired. The Petitioner has no right to hold on to the subject flat
after the expiry of the term of license.
31. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the order of eviction as well
as the direction to pay the compensation at double the agreed rate, are
wholly justified. Thus, no interference is warranted with the impugned
order in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.
32. Since the Petitioner made an attempt to mislead the Revisional
Authority and this Court by making a deliberate false statement that he
had filed Application seeking leave to defend and also placed on record
a copy thereof (Exhibit "F"), which does not form part of the record of
the Competent Authority, while refraining from taking any action for
such deliberate false statement, this Court considers it appropriate to
impose costs on the Petitioner.
33. Hence, the following order:
:ORDER:
(i) The Petition stands dismissed with costs of
Rs.50,000/- to be paid by the Petitioner to the Maharashtra
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State Legal Services Authority within a period of four weeks
from today.
(ii) Rule discharged.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
