Bombay High Court
Shivkumar Khandu Udtewar U/G Of His ... vs Sanjay Baburao Waghmare (Deleted) And ... on 7 August, 2025
2025:BHC-AUG:21275
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 106 OF 2025
Shivshankar s/o Khandu Udtewar
Age 16 Years, Minor U/G of his father,
Khandu s/o Madhavrao Udtewar, Age : 50
years, Occupation : Labour,
R/o Shirur (T), Tal. Ahmedpur,
District Latur.
...Applicant
Versus
1 Sanjay s/o Baburao Waghmare
(Deleted)
2 Managing Director, D.C.C.
Bank,
Tilak Nagar, Latur,
Tal, & District Latur.
3 Reliance General Insurance
Company Ltd.
MurarijiPeth, CTS No.8516/11,
Subhash Chowk, Murarji Chowk,
Murarji Peti Solapur,
Tal & Dist. Solapur 413001.
4 The Deputy Registrar/Taxing
Officer
The High Court of Judicature
Of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad. ...Respondents
Shri Manoj D. Shinde, Advocate a/w Shri P. C. Mayure,
Advocate h/f Shri Shrikant B. Madde, Advocate for the
Applicant.
Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 4.
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 128 OF 2025
Page 1 of 22
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
1 Vilas Bayaji Thorve,
Age 69 Years, Occupation : Agri,
R/o. Nageshwadi, Tq. Patoda, ...Applicant
District Beed.
Versus
1 The State of Maharashtra
Through Government Pleader,
High Court of Bombay,
Bench at Aurangabad.
2 Taxing Officer
The High Court of Judicature
Of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad. ...Respondents
Shri Akshay S. Jagtap, Advocate for the Applicant.
Shri B. A. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 127 OF 2025
1. Vilas Bayaji Thorve,
Age 69 Years, Occupation : Agri,
R/o. Nageshwadi, Tq. Patoda,
District Beed. .. Applicant
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra
Through Government Pleader,
High Court of Bombay,
Bench at Aurangabad.
2. Taxing Officer
The High Court of Judicature
Of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad. .. Respondents
Shri Akshay S. Jagtap, Advocate for the Applicant.
Shri B. A. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
Page 2 of 22
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 95 OF 2025
1. Vilas Bayaji Thorve,
Age 69 Years, Occupation : Agri,
R/o. Nageshwadi, Tq. Patoda,
District Beed. .. Applicant
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra
Through Government Pleader,
High Court of Bombay,
Bench at Aurangabad.
2. Taxing Officer
The High Court of Judicature
Of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad. .. Respondents
Shri Akshay S. Jagtap, Advocate for the Applicant.
Shri B. A. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 137 OF 2025
1. Vilas Bayaji Thorve,
Age 69 Years, Occupation : Agri,
R/o. Nageshwadi, Tq. Patoda,
District Beed. .. Applicant
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra
Through Government Pleader,
High Court of Bombay,
Bench at Aurangabad.
2. Taxing Officer
The High Court of Judicature
Of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad. .. Respondents
Page 3 of 22
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
Shri Akshay S. Jagtap, Advocate for the Applicant.
Shri B. A. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
Shri S. V. Natu, Shri P. F. Patni, Shri Avinash Khande,
Shri Mohit R. Deshmukh, Shri P. C. Mayure and Shri
Mahesh Swami, Advocates addressed the issue on
behalf of petitioners.
CORAM : SHAILESH P. BRAHME J.
Date on which matters closed for : 25th JULY 2025
judgment
Date on which judgment Is : 07th August 2025
pronounced
JUDGMENT:
1. Heard both sides finally.
2. The issue involved in these revisions is as to whether
appellants, who are neither insurer, nor owner in appeal for
enhancement preferred against judgment and award of the
claims tribunal passed U/Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act
(hereafter referred as to the 'M. V. Act' for the sake of brevity
and convenience) can restrict the value or claim for payment
of lessor court fees at the time of filing of appeal.
3. Revisional Petitioners suffered adjudication by Claims
Tribunal and they have approached High Court, challenging the
award. The appeals preferred by them are registered, but
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
office raised objection of deficit Court fees. The demand is
questioned by them and the matter is referred to learned
Taxing Officer. The Taxing Officer rendered decision upholding
the office objection of deficit court fees by passing separate
orders which are under challenge, under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
4. It is informed by petitioners that the claim of the office for
deficit court fee is debatable and the litigants are required to
face such objection frequently. In order to settle the
controversy by my previous order, I called upon the members
of the Bar to address the issue. Accordingly with the
assistance of learned Counsels who eagerly responded, I
propose to decide these matters of general importance.
5. In Civil Revision Application No.106/2025, Appellant is
the original Claimant who had met with accident and sustained
injuries affecting his earning capacity. He had claimed Rs.
40,00,000/- as compensation before the Tribunal and paid
Court fees which was maximum before the Tribunal. His claim
was partially allowed awarding compensation of Rs. 5,50,000/-
with interest. Being aggrieved by the award and for
enhancement of compensation, appeal is preferred valuing the
claim at Rs. 1,00,000/- for purpose of Court fees. An amount of
Rs.3205/- is paid towards Court fees. The office raised
objection that Appellant is liable to pay Court fees for
difference of amount. The claim restricted to Rs. 1,00,000/- is
not accepted by the office and he is called upon to pay Rs.
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
24,410/- towards deficit Court fees.
6. In Civil Revision Application Nos.128/2025; 137/2025;
95/2025 and 127/2025, Appellant before Court was neither
owner, nor insurer. The vehicle involved in the accident was
purchased by him, but it was not registered with the
competent authority. The Tribunal saddled the liability by the
impugned award treating him to be the owner of the vehicle.
Hence he preferred appeals. In the foot note of the
memorandum of the appeal, it is stated that he is paying half
of the ad valorem fees as he is neither insurer, nor owner. His
claim for Court fees is objected by the office. Ultimately the
learned Taxing Officer upheld the objection and called upon
Appellant to pay full ad valorem fees.
7. Learned Counsels Mr. Manoj Shinde, Mr. Mohit Deshmukh,
Mr. S. V. Natu, Mr. Avinash Khande, Mr. P. C. Mayure canvassed
their submissions objecting the decision of the Taxing Officer in
following manner :
(i) The Appellant - Original Claimant when prefers appeal
against judgment and award passed by the Tribunal either
wholly or partially dismissing the claim would be liable to pay
Court fees as per Section 7(2)(ii) of the Maharashtra Court Fees
Act (Hereinafter referred to 'Act'). It is permissible for such
Appellant to restrict the claim for payment of one half of ad
valorem fees.
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
(ii) Section 7(2) of the Act permits the Appellant to restrict
the claim to a particular amount and if he succeeds in appeal
then he/she has to make good the deficit court fees.
(iii) Once the value in the memorandum of appeal is
restricted to a particular figure, Office or Registry cannot insist
to pay Court fees either on the whole claim, if it is wholly
rejected by the Tribunal or on difference of the claim, if claim is
partially rejected. There is no prohibition in the Act to restrict
the claim.
(iv) M. V. Act is a benevolent legislation and Section 7(2) of
the Act cannot be interpreted in the manner to defeat object
sought to be achieved.
(v) The apprehension that Appellant is likely to extract the
services of the Court by valuing appeal at a meager amount
and by dodging to pay Court fees is misplaced.
(vi) So far as payment of Court fees is concerned, there is no
difference between the appeal preferred against rejection of
entire claim by the Tribunal and appeal preferred against
partial rejection.
(vii) The hardship, precarious condition and distress suffered
by the Appellant in most of the cases are overlooked and the
approach of the Taxing Officer is against the spirit of
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
enactment.
(viii) There is no ceiling on the Court fees so far as appeals
filed in High Court are concerned, which secures the interest of
the State.
8. Learned advocate Mr. C. K. Shinde for the Taxing Officer
and learned A.G.P. Mr. B. A. Shinde oppose the above referred
submissions while supporting orders passed by the Taxing
Officer. They would submit that it is not permissible in law for
the Appellant to restrict the claim to a particular value when
the appeal is against difference of amount of compensation. It
is submitted that appeal is continuation of the proceedings and
whatever Court fees is paid in the Tribunal has to be paid again
in appeal. The Court fees are designed keeping in view
expenditure on administration of justice. The human efforts,
time and energy are equally exerted for deciding restricted or
unrestricted or deprived claim. It is further submitted that
Appellate Court has to undertake the exercise in its entirety to
find out entitlement and liability. Hence entire Court fees is
payable. The demand of Court fees is justifiable. It is further
submitted that no concession can be granted in payment of
Court fees, though Motor Vehicle Act, is a beneficial legislation.
9. Having heard both sides, the issue needs to be addressed
is as to whether it is permissible for the Appellant to restrict
the relief at a particular value of the claim in the appeal for
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
payment of Court fees or the Appellant is obliged to pay Court
fees on the difference of amount?
10. The objection raised by the office and the decision
rendered by learned Taxing Officer is in respect of Section 7(2)
of the Act. Section 7(1) of the Act pertains to fee payable on
memorandum of appeal in case of award of compensation
under various acts for acquisition of land for public purpose.
The controversy involved in the present Revision is not in
respect of matters involving acquisition of land, but matters
involving accident under Motor Vehicle Act. For the purpose of
computation and determination of Court fees on the
memorandum of appeal against award of the Claims Tribunal is
regulated by sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Maharashtra
Court Fees Act, which is as follows :
The Maharashtra Court Fees Act,
1 ...
2 ...
7. (1) ........
(2) The amount of fee payable under this Act
on a memorandum of appeal against an award of a
Claims Tribunal preferred under section 110-D VI of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, shall be computed as
follows:-
(i) If such appeal is preferred by the insurer
or owner of the motor vehicle- the full ad-
valorem fee leviable on the amount at which the
relief is valued in the memorandum of appeal
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
according to the scale prescribed under Article 1
of Schedule I;
(ii) If such appeal is preferred by any other
person one half of ad-valorem fee leviable on the
amount at which the relief is valued in the
memorandum of appeal according to the said
scale.
Provided that, if such person succeeds in the
appeal, he shall be liable to make good the deficit, if
any, between the full ad-valorem fee payable on the
relief awarded in the appeal according to the said scale
and the fee already paid by him; and the amount of
such deficit shall, without prejudice to any other mode
of recovery, be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue.
11. Though the title of Section 7 is common for both sub-
sections, there is material difference in the manner of payment
of the Court fees. The legislative intent for the difference can
be traced to object and the purpose for which Motor Vehicle
Act is enacted. I propose to deliberate this aspect in further
part of my judgment while dealing with the object and purport
of the Act.
12. There are two categories of Appellant stipulated in Clause
Nos. (i) and (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act.
Depending upon the category, the Court fees is payable either
as full ad valorem and one half of ad valorem. Injured persons
or dependents of deceased who are aggrieved by inadequate
or no compensation are covered by Sub-section (2)(ii) because
they are other persons than insurer or owner. Sub-section 2(ii)
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
and the proviso thereafter would indicate a concession given to
those persons/Appellants. They are permitted to pay one half
of the ad valorem fees on the amount on which the relief is
valued in the memorandum of the appeal.
13. The persons/appellants falling in category of sub-Sec. 2(ii)
are the victims of the accident. They are sufferers of physical,
mental and financial trauma due to the bodily injuries resulting
into partial or full disablement. In case of death, the sufferings
and trauma would be of such magnitude which cannot be
quantified. Many a times when the bread-earner in the family
dies, the members and the dependents of the family would
require to face emotional and social trauma as well. Bodily
injury due to accident would leave deep impact on earning
capacity or wellness. The hardship and trauma get aggravated
due to the decision rendered by the Tribunal. These distressed
persons come to the Court with bleeding heart. The
legislature has shown them a compassion to facilitate them to
prosecute the remedy effectively. A special care is being taken
by the Legislature by stipulating concession of payment of one
half of the ad valorem Court fees.
14. In both Clauses of sub-section (2), the wordings are, fee
leviable on the amount at which the relief is valued. These
words permit the Appellant to quote a value for restricting the
relief. Otherwise the wordings would have been mandatory
appellant to pay court fees on difference between the amount
awarded and the amount claimed. But this is not the text of
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
Clause (i) and (ii). Unlike that of sub-section (1) of Section 7, in
case of appeal arising out of acquisition of land, choice is
available to restrict claim at a particular value. In case of
appeals arising out of the accident, wordings are used with
specific purport. Once this difference between sub-section (1)
and sub-section (2) is understood, there is no difficulty to
comprehend that Appellants who are preferring appeal in
Motor Vehicle Act have the choice to restrict their relief to a
particular claim quoted in the memorandum of the appeal. In
the teeth of express provision, it is not possible to accept any
other interpretation.
15. When words are clear and unambiguous, it is not
permissible to derive any other interpretation which would
defeat the purpose of the enactment. Clause Nos. (i) and (ii) of
sub-section (2) of Section 7 give choice to the Appellant to
restrict relief to particular amount. Therefore the interpretation
of learned Taxing Officer to call upon the Appellant to pay
deficit Court fees according to difference between the amount
awarded and the amount claimed cannot be countenanced.
This approach is against the legislative intent and the express
provision of the Statute.
16. Learned Taxing Officer referred to judgment of the
coordinate bench in the matter of Govind Vs. State of
Maharashtra. In that case appeal was under Land Acquisition
Act for which Section 7(1) of Court Fees Act would apply.
Present matters are within purview of Sec. 7(2) of the Act and
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
therefore reliance on the said judgment is totally misplaced.
The purport and the scheme of payment of Court fees under
Section 7(2) of the Act is altogether different. The reliance
placed by the Taxing Officer on paragraph no.10 of the
judgment, is thoroughly misconceived. The explanation
appended to sub-clause (i) and (ii) of Section 7(2) is totally loss
sight of.
17. In appropriate case, this Court will delve upon the scope
of Sec. 7(1) of the Act and examine as to whether it is
permissible in appeal arising out of land acquisition to restrict
the claim to a particular value for the payment of Court fees.
18. While interpreting the provision of enactment, the
objection sought to be achieved needs to be looked into. Motor
Vehicle Act is a benevolent legislation for the persons who
meet with accident. There are provisions in the Statute
designed to assist the victims, sufferers and the stake holders
of the accident. It is not out of the context to refer to the
judgment of the Supreme Court by which the Claimants are
held entitled to receive more compensation than claimed in
the petition. The very genesis of payment of compensation is it
would be just and reasonable to mitigate sufferings and
distress'. The rules of procedure are designed to achieve the
said object. The humanistic approach of the Supreme Court is
evident from the following judgments :
A Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and others reported in
(2003) 2 SCC 274.
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
B. Syed Basheer Ahameed and others Vs. Mohammad
Jameel and another reported in (2009) 2 SCC 225.
19. The purposive interpretation besides literal interpretation
needs to be adopted. The paramount consideration is the
object or the purport of the Act which is sought to be achieved.
I lend support for literal and purposive interpretation of
provision of Sec. 7(2) of the Act from the following judgments :
a. Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. and another Vs. Cherian
Varkey Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others (2010) 8
SCC 24 for the purpose of statutory interpretation, principles
are laid down in para Nos. 20 to 21.6 by the Supreme Court,
which are as follows :
20. The principles of statutory interpretation are well
settled. Where the words of the statute are clear and
unambiguous, the provision should be given its plain and normal
meaning, without adding or rejecting any words. Departure from
the literal rule, by making structural changes or substituting
words in a clear statutory provision, under the guise of
interpretation will pose a great risk as the changes may not be
what the Legislature intended or desired. Legislative wisdom
cannot be replaced by the Judge's views. As observed by this
Court in somewhat different context :
"When a procedure is prescribed by the Legislature, it is
not for the court to substitute a different one according
to its notion of justice. When the Legislature has spoken,
the Judges cannot afford to be wiser." (See : Shri Mandir
Sita Ramji vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi - (1975) 4 SCC 298).
21. There is however an exception to this general rule. Where
the words used in the statutory provision are vague and
ambiguous or where the plain and normal meaning of its words or
grammatical construction thereof would lead to confusion,
absurdity, repugnancy with other provisions, the courts may,
instead of adopting the plain and grammatical construction, use
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
the interpretative tools to set right the situation, by adding
or omitting or substituting the words in the Statute. When
faced with an apparently defective provision in a statute,
courts prefer to assume that the draftsman had committed a
mistake rather than concluding that the Legislature has
deliberately introduced an absurd or irrational statutory
provision. Departure from the literal rule of plain and
straight reading can however be only in exceptional cases,
where the anomalies make the literal compliance of a provision
impossible, or absurd or so impractical as to defeat the very
object of the provision. We may also mention purposive
interpretation to avoid absurdity and irrationality is more
readily and easily employed in relation to procedural
provisions than with reference to substantive provisions.
b. Shailesh Dhariyawan Vs. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla reported
in (2016) 3 SCC 619 : principles of purposive interpretation are
laid down in following paragraphs :
31. The aforesaid two reasons given by me, in addition to the
reasons already indicated in the judgment of my learned Brother,
would clearly demonstrate that provisions of Section 15(2) of the
Act require purposive interpretation so that the aforesaid objective/
purpose of such a provision is achieved thereby. The principle of
'purposive interpretation' or 'purposive construction' is based on
the understanding that the Court is supposed to attach that
meaning to the provisions which serve the 'purpose' behind such a
provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it designed to
accomplish? To put it otherwise, by interpretative process the
Court is supposed to realise the goal that the legal text is designed
to realise. As Aharan Barak puts it:
"Purposive interpretation is based on three components:
language, purpose, and discretion. Language shapes the
range of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter
acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he
or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from among the
(express or implied) semantic possibilities. The semantic
component thus sets the limits of interpretation by
restricting the interpreter to a legal meaning that the text
can bear in its (public or private) language."3
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely, language, purpose
and discretion 'of the Court', insofar as purposive component is
concerned, this is the ratio juris, the purpose at the core of the text.
This purpose is the values, goals, interests, policies and aims that
the text is designed to actualize. It is the function that the text is
designed to fulfil.
33. We may also emphasize that the statutory interpretation of a
provision is never static but is always dynamic. Though literal rule
of interpretation, till some time ago, was treated as the 'golden
rule', it is now the doctrine of purposive interpretation which is
predominant, particularly in those cases where literal
interpretation may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity.
If it brings about an end which is at variance with the purpose of
statute, that cannot be countenanced. Not only legal process
thinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a
grand strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place they
offered purposivism, this principle is now widely applied by the
Courts not only in this country but in many other legal systems as
well.
c. The Full Bench in the matter of Kanhaiyyalal Sonbaji
Gajbhiye Vs. Bhartiya Jgruti Shikshan Sanstha Sawari (Javahar
Nagar and others reported in 2020(6) MH.L.J. 595 highlights
that interpretation process is amalgamation of literal and
purposive objects in following manner :
14. The arguments so put-forward present different view
points and would require for their appreciation detailed
examination of relevant provisions of the The Maharashtra
Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service)
Regulation Act, 1977 (for short "Act, 1977") and the Rules,
1981, in the light of well established principles of
interpretation of statutes. After all, any interpretative process
is governed by the set principles, precepts and doctrines. In
law, it begins with an effort to ascertain true intention of the
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
legislature or the rule making authority through the words
used in the statute or rule and if necessary, by making a
resort to other aids, which may be internal or external to the
statute. When only plain meaning is considered, the approach
is literal and when the meaning is found out with reference to
object and purpose of an enactment, the method is purposive.
However, now it is well established that the intention of the
legislature assimilates two aspects: in one aspect it carries the
concept of "meaning" or what the words mean and in another,
it takes along the idea of "purpose and object". Any
interpretative process thus is an amalgamation of literal and
purposive approaches. This formulation has received the
approval of the Supreme Court and is called "cardinal
principle of construction" (see Union of India V/s. Elphinstone
Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. [AIR 2001 SC 724]).
15. It may be added here that even for knowing of the
meaning the words convey, apart from litera legis, the context
of the letters assumes importance. In the case of Reserve
Bank of India V/s. Peerless Finance and Investment Co.,
(1987) 1 SCC 424 it was held that the interpretation must
depend on the text and the context, they being the bases of
interpretation. It was observed that if the text was the
texture, context was what lent it colour. It was also held that,
such interpretation as would make textual interpretation
match the contextual, would be the best kind of interpretation.
As regards the search for discovery of purpose of the statute, it
has been held, one need not be restricted to the internal aid
furnished by the statute itself, that is, the text and the context
of the provision under construction, and one may look beyond
them. Other provisions contained in the same enactment,
statement of objects and reasons or the preamble to the
enactment, existing state of the law, other statutes in pari
materia, if any, and the mischief which the statute intends to
remedy, would all be useful tools in the construction of a
statute. These aids widen the concept of "context", in which
the text is to be read and understood. A useful reference in
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
this regard may be made to the principles laid down in the
cases of Premchand Jain V/s. R.K. Chhabra, (1984) 2 SCC 302,
Bhagwan Baksh Singh (Raja) Vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1940
PC,1982, Utkal Contractors and Joinery Pvt. Ltd. V/s. State of
Orissa, (1987) 3 SCC 279 and District Mining Officer V/s. Tata
Iron and Steel Company, AIR 2001 SC 3134.
20. I am of the considered view that purposive or literal
interpretation of sub-section (2) leaves no iota of doubt to
conclude that it is permissible for the Appellant to restrict his
relief to a particular value and to pay Court fees accordingly. I
therefore do not concur with the observations of learned Single
Judge in paragraph no. 5 of Vivek Badgire Vs. Saheblal
Moinuddin. There is no provision either in the Motor Vehicle
Act or in the Maharashtra Court Fees Act to indicate that it is
not permissible to restrict the claim for the purpose of Court
fees.
21. The proviso to sub-section (2) indicates that the Appellant
is under obligation to pay full ad-valorem fees on the relief
awarded in the appeal. The appellants falling in Clause No. (ii)
is given concession of payment of one half of ad valorem Court
fees for time being and if they succeed in appeal, they would
have to make good the deficit Court fees. Therefore it is not
that the concession of payment of one half of ad valorem Court
fees is in its perpetuity. The specific intent for incorporating
the concession of one half of ad valorem Court fees at the
beginning and that too for time being is in view of peculiar
circumstances in which appeal would be preferred.
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
22. It's a common knowledge that even if some amount is
awarded by the Tribunal, the amount would not get disbursed
unless a recourse to execution is taken for realizing the
amount awarded by the Tribunal. In case a total rejection of the
claim hardship is of greater magnitude. It cannot be lost sight
of that the Claimant has to pay entire Court fees in the
Tribunal, notwithstanding decision of the claim. Considering
these situations concession to restrict the relief to a particular
value is provided. This aspect is totally ignored by the Taxing
Officer while compelling the Appellant to pay Court fees
according to difference between the amount awarded and the
amount claimed.
23. It needs to be mentioned that there can be no difference
in the appeal preferred by Claimant against complete rejection
of his claim and partial rejection of his claim. In both
circumstances, the Appellant is entitled to restrict the relief to
a particular value for payment of Court fees. Therefore the
decision of learned Single Judge in the matter of Vivek
Ravikumar Badgire (supra) on which the reliance is placed by
learned Taxing Officer cannot be made applicable. In that case
entire claim was rejected by the Tribunal and while preferring
appeal, relief was restricted to a particular amount. The above
aspect is not brought to the notice and it is recorded that such
a restriction is not permissible in the eyes of law.
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
24. The apprehension is expressed during the course of
submission by learned Counsel Mr. C. K. Shinde that Court fees
are designed to meet expenditure on the administration of the
justice and equal amount of energy, time and human efforts
are exerted notwithstanding quantum of court fees. This
submission cannot be accepted for the reason that the human
efforts, energy and time would not go waste because
ultimately before receiving the payment Appellant is required
to pay deficit Court fees. The Appellant who is receiving benefit
of appellate jurisdiction cannot escape from the liability of the
payment of deficit Court fees. The defaulted court fees is
recoverable as land revenue as per rule.
25. It is relevant to notice that sub-section (2) of Section 173
stipulates that no appeal should lie against award of a claim
Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal, is less than
Rs.1,00,000/-. This provision suppresses mischief and prohibits
persons who are likely to take disadvantage of valuing the
relief at extremely meager sum and availing adjudication.
Therefore I do not find that there is any possibility of taking
disadvantage of the concession engrafted in the Section 7(2).
26. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that Court fees are
not in the nature of taxes or the commission. There is no
profiteering purpose in charging the Court fees. Court fees is
for the purpose of meeting the expenditure for administration
of justice. There is ceiling on the payment of Court fees even if
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
the money claim exceeds a particular limit. The Legislature has
struck a balance of not imposing the ceiling on the payment of
Court fees on memorandum of appeal preferred in the High
Court.
27. My attention is adverted to the different decision of the
learned Single Judge referred in the impugned order. With
respect, I am of the considered view that the above aspect of
the matter has not been dealt with. Those cannot be made
applicable to the cases. Impugned judgment and order in Civil
Revision Application No.106/2025 is perverse and liable to be
quashed. It is noticed that learned Taxing Officer is frequently
relying upon the decision referred in the impugned judgment in
deciding Court fees claims. He is expected to undertake
rectified approach.
28. Civil Revision Application No.106/2025 is allowed and
impugned order is quashed.
29. In the remaining matters, the Appellant claims to be the
purchaser of the vehicle which is yet to be registered with the
Department. In that context, he is claiming himself to be
covered by clause (ii) of Section 7(2). I have already recorded
that Appellant has to pay full ad valorem fees. Only question is
as to when to pay the same. Even if Appellant is treated to be
the owner and held liable by the Tribunal, a concession of
payment of one half of ad valorem fees, would not absolve him
from payment of deficit Court fees in the future. In that view of
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt
the matter, I find that there is no impediment in treating the
Appellant to be any other person and permitting him to pay
one half of ad valorem fees.
30. Impugned order in that cases are quashed and set aside.
Civil Revision Application Nos.128/2025; C. R. A. No. 137/2025;
C. R. A. No. 95/2025 and C. R. A. No. 127/2025 are allowed,
thereby quashing impugned judgment and orders.
[ SHAILESH P. BRAHME ]
JUDGE
bsb/Aug. 25
