Bombay High Court
Mukesh Eknath Naik vs Mubina Bi Faniband on 7 August, 2025
2025:BHC-GOA:1456 WP 321.2025
Sonam
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO.321 OF 2025
Mr Mukesh Eknath Naik
Son of Mr Eknath Naik
Aged 43 years, service,
R/o H. No 2045,
Mharvapaz Moli,
Khandepar, Usgao,
Ponda Goa. .... Petitioner
Versus
1. Mrs Mubina Bi Faniband
Wife of Mr Mahammed Samulla
Daughter in law of
Mr Azad Faniband,
Aged above 35 years,
Indian National,
Ward Member Ward No IX Of
VP of Rumdamol, Davorlim,
R/o H. No 487, Rumdamol,
Davorlim Salcete Goa.
2. Mr Mohammed Samiulla Faniband
Son of Mr Azad Faniband Aged
Above 35 years, Indian National,
Ward Member Ward No VII Of
VP of Rumdamol, Davorlim, R/o
H. No. 487, Rumdamol,
Davorlim Salcete Goa
3. Mr Mohammed Mustafa Dodmani
Son of Mr Mehboob Dodmani
Aged above 35 years,
Indian National,
Ward Member Ward No IV Of
Page 1 of 25
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
VP of Rumdamol, Davorlim,
R/o H. No 561, Rumdamol,
Davorlim Salcete Goa.
4. Mrs Zubeda Bi Abubakar Agasar
Wife of Abubakar Shaikh Daughter
of Mr Mohammed Ali Agasar
Aged above 35 years,
Indian National,
Ward Member Ward No V Of
VP of Rumdamol, Davorlim,
R/o LIG-412, Rumdamol,
Davorlim Salcete Goa.
5. Mr Mohammed Ali Agasar,
Son of Mr. Chaman Sab Agasar
Aged above 35 years,
Indian National,
R/o EWS-558, Rumdamol,
Davorlim Salcete Goa
6. The Village Panchayat of
Rumdamol Davorlim Through its
Secretary Rumdamol Davorlim,
Salcete Goa.
7. The BDO South Goa Margao Goa
8. State of Goa,
Thr. Chief Secretary
Porvorim-Goa .... Respondents
Mr. Gaurish Agni with Mr. Kishan Kavlekar, Advocates for the
Petitioner.
Mr. Parag Rao with Mr. Jay Mathew, Advocates for Respondent
Nos. 1 to 4.
Page 2 of 25
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
Mr. Devidas Pangam, Advocate General with Mr. Tukaram
Gawas, Additional Government Advocate for Respondent Nos. 7
and 8.
CORAM:- VALMIKI MENEZES, J.
RESERVED ON : 6TH AUGUST, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON :- 7TH AUGUST, 2025
JUDGMENT:
1. Registry to waive objections and register the matter.
2. Heard learned Advocates for the parties.
3. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith; at the request of
and with the consent of learned Advocates for the parties, the
matter is finally heard and disposed of. Learned Advocate Mr.
Kishan Kavlekar waives service on behalf of the Petitioners,
learned Advocate Mr. Jay Mathew waives service for Respondent
Nos. 1 to 4 and Mr. Tukaram Gawas Additional Government
Advocate waives service for Respondent Nos. 7 and 8.
4. This petition takes exception to an order dated 02.08.2025,
whereby the District Court, in its revisional jurisdiction under
Section 201B of the Panchayat Raj Act (the Act) has granted the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, a stay for 20 days, of an order dated
28.07.2025 of the Block Development Officer (BDO) holding the
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 stood disqualified in terms of the
provision under Sub Section 4 of Section 55 read with clause (d)
of Sub Section 1 of Section 12 of the Act.
5. The Petitioner is the original complainant before the Village
Panchayat of Rumdamol, Davorlim. The Respondent Nos. 1 to 5,
who are elected members of the Panchayat from different Wards
within the jurisdiction of this Panchayat. The Petitioner has
initially filed several complaints before the Panchayat claiming
that certain persons named in the complaint, who were directly
related to the Respondent Nos. 1 to 5, had undertaken illegal
constructions in lands within the jurisdiction of the Panchayat,
contrary to planning regulations and without a construction
licence under the Act. It is the Petitioner's case that when these
complaints were taken up at the monthly meeting of the
Panchayat on 18.01.2024, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, attended
this meeting and passed certain resolutions with regard to these
structures, despite, these members being related to the persons
who had allegedly constructed the structures illegally.
6. It is the Petitioner's case that since the Respondent Nos. 1 to
4, had a pecuniary interest in the lands/structures constructed, as
aforesaid, the persons who had constructed the same being their
close relations, they stood disqualified in terms of the provisions
of Sub Section 4 of Section 55 read with clause (d) of Sub Section
1 of Section 12 of the Act. An application to that effect was filed
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
by the Petitioner before the BDO on 04.10.2024. After receiving
notice of this application, Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed their
common reply to the application, admitting that although they
were related to the parties mentioned in the complaint, they did
not take part in the decision making process at the meeting of the
Panchayat. The reply also states that no action was taken by the
Panchayat, at the meeting, attended by Respondent Nos. 1 to 4
and no adverse impact or conflict of interest arose. The
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 stated that the allegations in the
application regarding pecuniary interest of the Panchayat
members was baseless and unfounded. This reply is signed by the
Advocate for the Respondents and has no supporting affidavit.
7. Thereafter, written arguments came to be filed by the parties
before the BDO, who passed an order dated 28.07.2025, holding
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to have been disqualified.
The order dated 28.07.2025 of the BDO was assailed in a
Revision filed by the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 before the District
Court, who after issuing notice to the Petitioner, and hearing the
parties passed the impugned order, granting a stay to the operation
of the order of the BDO for 20 days.
8. The main ground raised in the petition is that the District
Court ought not to have granted a stay of a disqualification order,
and if it was of the opinion that the order was required to be
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
stayed, it ought to have made the order conditional upon
restraining the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 from participating in any
meetings of the Panchayat or taking any decisions or voting in
such meetings.
9. Following are the submissions advanced by learned
Advocate for the Petitioner, Advocate Mr. Gaurish Agni :
(a) It was submitted that the BDO having held that the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 had incurred disqualification
owing to the fact that these Respondents had taken part
in discussions on the complaint of the Petitioner,
subject matter of which were illegal constructions of
their relatives, the effect of such disqualification
renders the seat of the member of the Panchayat to be
vacant; the seat earlier occupied by Respondent Nos. 1
to 4 for their respective Wards having fallen vacant,
elections to these seats are required to be immediately
conducted. It was submitted that the effect of granting
stay of a disqualification of a member, would directly
be an interference in the process of fresh elections, in
addition to which, it would confer all rights vested in
an elected member, including the right to vote and take
decisions for the Panchayat, despite their
disqualification.
(b) Alternately it was argued that even if the
disqualification stood stayed, and the order operated as
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
an embargo to conducting fresh election to the four
vacant posts occupied by Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, the
District Court ought to have imposed conditions on the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, restraining them from
participating in any meetings of the Panchayat, in its
discussions or casting their votes at meetings convened
for any specific purpose.
(c) To buttress these submissions, reliance was placed on
the following Judgments:
1. Smt.Indira Nehru Gandhi v/s Shri Raj Narain and
another (1975) 2 SCC 159
2. Pandurang Dagadu Parte v/s Ramchandra
Baburao Hirve and Others 1997 SCC OnLine
Bom 130
3. Rupesh Ravindra Sakharkar v/s Narendra
Madhukar Kambekar and Anr 2016 SCC OnLine
Bom 8471
4. Ulhas Morajkar v/s Anand Tulaskar and Anr
(High Court of Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition
No.1328 of 2024)
10. Per Contra, Mr. Parag Rao, Advocate appearing for
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 has supported the impugned order and
advanced the following submissions:
(a) It was submitted that the District Court has not passed
its order mechanically, but has considered the records
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
before the BDO, and after arriving at a prima facie
conclusion that the order of the BDO does not record
specific findings on the question that the Respondent
Nos. 1 to 4 were related to the persons who had
allegedly constructed illegal structures, nor had it
given any finding as to in what manner these
Respondents had pecuniary interest in the subject
matter of the constructions; it was based on this prima
facie conclusion that the order granting a blanket stay
of the disqualification was passed. It was further
submitted that a perusal of the order of the BDO would
reveal that there is no finding on the issue of the
pecuniary interest of the Respondents in the subject
matter of the complaints which would justify a blanket
stay being granted.
(b) It was further submitted that the Respondent Nos. 1 to
4 being democratically elected members of the
Panchayat, they should not be easily dislodged from
their post, unless they have been conclusively held to
be in violation of the provisions of Section 12 (1); it
was submitted that the violations in clause (a) to (d) of
that provision are required to be conclusively proved
against the Respondents, before any disqualification is
incurred by them. The learned Advocate referred to
various paragraphs of the impugned order to contend
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
that there was no specific finding that the grounds
under clause (d) of Sub Section 1 of Section 12 of the
Act, had been made out.
(c) It was further contended that in matters of election
disputes, a higher forum dealing with a challenge to a
disqualification, held to have been incurred by an
elected representative, would always have the power to
grant a stay of the operation of such disqualification; it
was contended that the power to grant a stay would
obviously be exercised after the higher forum
considers, prima facie, whether the impugned order
could be sustained. It was then submitted that the
District Court has considered the impugned order and
has formulated the issues for determination in the
revision application which are recorded in paragrapg
No. 11 of the order. At the relevant time, the District
Court also considered, the fact that a meeting had been
called for by the Director of Panchayats to elect a new
Sarpanch as the post of the Sarpanch had fallen vacant,
and the operation of the disqualification order would
casting their votes to elect a new Sarpanch, or for any
of them to contest these elections. It is on that
consideration, that it is submitted, the District Court's
order does not call for interference.
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
(d) Reliance has been placed on the following Judgments:
1. Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v/s
State of Bihan and Others (1999) 8 SCC 16
2. The Akhada St. Estevam Village and 2 Others v/s
Smt. Seema Rohidas Narvekar and 5 ors ( High
Court of Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition
no.497/2009)
3. Shri Jagdish bhobe v/s State of Goa and 3 Ors (
High Court of Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition
no.295/2010)
4. Kranti Associates private Limited and Another v/s
Masood Ahmed Khan and Others (2010) 9 SCC
5. Mohan Vithal Dabhale v/s Santosh vasant
Morajkar and 6 Ors ( High Court of Bombay at
Goa in Writ Petition no.323/2010)
6. Raviyashwant Bhoir v/s District Collector Raigad
and Others (2012) 4 SCC 407
7. Dayal Shanakardas Harchandani and others v/s
Municipal corporation for the City of Ulhasnagar
and Others 2017 (6) Mh.L.J.
8. High Court on its own Motion (In the matter of
Illegal construction) v/s State of Goa Thre Chief
Secretary and 3 Ors ( High Court of Bombay at
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
Goa in Public Interest Litigation (Suo Motu)
no.2/2022)
9. Laxmidas Ashok Chimulkar and Anr v/s State of
Goa and Ors ( Supreme Court of India in SLP(c)
No.19887 of 2023)
11. Before I proceed to decide whether the impugned order
granting a blanket stay of the disqualification requires
interference, certain facts which are not in dispute and are now
made part of the record are required to be noted.
It is not in dispute that the Respondent No. 1 was elected as
a Sarpanch and Respondent No. 2 was elected as a Deputy
Sarpanch of the Panchayat. The resolutions in questions were
passed in a meeting dated 18.01.2024, and the Respondent Nos. 1
and 2 resigned from the post of Sarpanch and Deputy Sarpanch
respectively on 29.05.2025 and 04.06.2025, after this meeting.
They continued in the post of member for their respective Wards,
whilst Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were throughout members of the
Panchayat. The post of Sarpanch and Deputy Sarpanch had
therefore remained vacant since the resignations of Respondent
Nos. 1 and 2 from these posts and obviously, elections had to be
conducted to fill up these posts, so that the Panchayat continues to
function.
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
12. It is also matter of record that after the order of the BDO
was passed on 28.07.2025, whereby Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 stood
disqualified, the Director of Panchayats, by an order of
29.07.2025, called for elections to the post of Sarpanch and
Deputy Sarpanch, which were to be conducted on 04.08.2025.
The Revision Application was filed on 30.07.2025, before the
District Court at Margao. After the order of stay was granted on
02.08.2025, the BDO who was to conduct the election to the post
of Sarpanch wrote a letter dated 04.08.2025 to the Director of
Panchayats, stating due to his own sickness, was unable to
conduct the election on 04.08.2025. During the hearing of the
matter on 06.08.2025, the learned Advocate General appearing for
Respondent Nos. 7 and 8 made a statement that the elections have
been deferred without fixing any specific date.
13. In cases where an elected representative has incurred
disqualification on account of the happening of an event or on
account of his conduct, the law has been well settled over the last
five decades. Under most enactments, dealing with this subject,
there are Appeals or revisions provided against a decision by
which an elected representative is declared disqualified, and the
scope of the Appellate or Revisional Court to grant a stay of such
a declaration with or without condition attached to such an order,
is no more res-integra. One of the earliest Judgments on the
subject is Indira Gandhi (supra), in which the Supreme Court has
considered the effect of the declaration of a representative being
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
disqualified, and the effect of granting stay of such
disqualification; that was a case, where the Petitioner was
declared by the High Court to have been disqualified as a Member
of Parliament for indulging in corrupt electoral practices, but was
also holding the position of Prime Minister. Relevant passages
from the Judgment are quoted below:
"24. It is evident on its face that the orders are
dichotomous in character. The two limbs stand out
clearly and they are: (a) that 'the operation of the
judgment and order of the High Court be and is
hereby stayed and (b) the petitioner shall abide by
certain enumerated terms viz., (i) he will be entitled to
attend the sessions of the Legislature and sign the
Register; (ii) he shall not take part in the proceedings
of the House or vote or draw any remuneration as
such Member. In the instances I have examined, the
appeals are against orders 'unseating' the returned
candidate on the ground of corrupt practice and
disqualifying him for the statutory six-year period
prescribed in Section 8A. If corrupt practice is found
disqualification follows, although sometimes the trial
Court expressly writes it into the order itself, as in the
present case. If the finding of corrupt practice does
not come into effect, the sequel of disqualification also
does not come into effect. If the biopsy of the stay
order inevitably shows that the finding of corrupt
practice is suspended and is not operative, the
electoral disqualification automatically stands
eclipsed. Section 8A being the necessary follow-up of
the judgment under Section 100, what is the legal
effect of an order by this Court suspending the
operation of the judgment and order of the High
Court? By sheer force of the first limb of this Court's
stay order the judgment and order of the High Court
is nullified for the nonce i.e., till the appeal is
disposed of. Consequentially, the disqualification also
ipso jure remains in abeyance.
25. What then is the import of the conditions imposed
in the stay order? They inhibit the elected member,
who otherwise by virtue of the stay of the judgment,
will be entitled to exercise all his rights and privileges
as member from doing certain things expressly
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
tabooed viz., (a) participating in the proceedings; (b)
voting or drawing remuneration. For all other
purposes, the voiding judgment being suspended, he
continues as member. Indeed, the very direction that
he attend the House and sign in the Register as
member to avoid disqualification under Article 101 of
the Constitution postulates that he is a member and is
not disqualified under Section 8A of the Act. For, if the
disqualification under Section 8A operates and he
ceases to be a member, there is no need to veto his
drawing remuneration, voting or participating in the
proceedings. It would be a curious contradiction to
say that a person is disqualified to be chosen as or
being a member and yet be allowed to sign the
Register as Member. Can the Court, without
stultifying itself and usurping power, permit a non-
member to sit in the House instead of or even in the
visitor's gallery, unless it necessarily reads into the
order of stay of judgment a suspension of the
disqualification also? There are a number of other
privileges for a Member of Parliament which are left
untouched by this Court's prior stay orders. Moreover,
the specific direction suspending the judgment and
order under appeal, read in its plenitude, also
suspends the finding of corrupt practice. So much so,
the disqualification also shares the fate. I have no
doubt that the reasonable effect of a stay order is that
there is a plenary eclipse of the High Court's
judgment and order during the pendency of the
appeal, subject to the few restraints clamped down on
an appellant. Those restraints are the second limb of
the stay order and are explicit enough.
26. The essential point to note is that by necessary
implication the disqualification imposed on every
appellant also stands suspended in all cases of
conditional stay. The stay is complete, but carved out
of it are but three limitations. For all other purposes,
the appellant, in all such cases, continues a member.
For instance, if he is prevented from entering the
Legislature, a breach of privilege arises. I have gone
at length into these ramifications to remove recondite
doubts. The typical stay restores to the appellant,
during its operation, the full status of a member of a
Legislature minus the right to participate in debates,
including voting and drawing of remuneration as a
legislator.
27. For these reasons I propose to direct a stay,
substantially on the same lines as have been made in
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
earlier similar cases, modified by the compulsive
necessities of this case.
28. What would be the legal impact of an order of this
type on the Prime Ministership of the petitioner? The
question canvassed about the office of the Prime
Minister and its involvement in the present case has
exercised Counsel on both sides and it is but proper to
dissolve the mists of possible misunderstanding by an
explicit statement. This appeal, it is plain, relates
solely to the Lok Sabha membership of the appellant
and the subject-matter of her office qua Prime
Minister is not directly before this Court in this
litigation. Indeed, that office and its functions are
regulated carefully by a separate fasciculus of Articles
in the Constitution. There is some link between
membership of one of the two Houses of Parliament
and ministership (Article 75) but once the stay order
is made, as has been indicated above, the
disqualification regarding membership is in
suspended animation and does not operate. Likewise,
the appellant's membership of the Lok Sabha remains
in force so long as the stay lasts. However, there will
be a limitation regarding the appellant's participation
in the proceedings of the Lok Sabha in her capacity as
member thereof, but, independently of the
membership, a Minister and a fortiori, the Prime
Minister, has the right to address both Houses of
Parliament (without right to vote, though) and has
other functions to fulfil (Articles 74, 75, 78 and 88 are
illustrative). In short, the restrictions set out in the
usual stay order cannot and will not detract from the
appellant being entitled to exercise such rights as she
has, including addressing Parliament and drawing
salary, in her capacity as Prime Minister. There will
thus be no legal embargo on her holding the office of
Prime Minister. However, this legal sequitur of the
situation arising from the stay of the judgment and
order of the High Court, including the suspension of
the disqualification under Section 8A, has nothing to
do with extra-legal considerations. Legality is within
the Court's province to pronounce upon, but canons of
political propriety and democratic dharma are
polemical issues on which judicial silence is the
golden rule.
31. Let me sum up the terms of the operative order I
hereby pass:
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
I. Subject to para III below, there will be a stay of the
operation of the judgment and order of the High
Court under appeal.
II. Consequentially, the disqualification imposed upon
the appellant as a statutory sequel under Section 8A
of the Act and as forming part of the judgment and
order impugned will also stand suspended. That is to
say, the petitioner will remain a member of the Lok
Sabha for all purposes except to the extent restricted
by para III so long as the stay order lasts.
III. The appellant-petitioner, qua Lok Sabha member,
will be entitled to sign the Register kept in the House
for that purpose and attend the sessions of the Lok
Sabha, but she will neither participate in the
proceedings in the Lok Sabha nor vote nor draw
remuneration in her capacity as Member of the Lok
Sabha.
IV. Independently of the restrictions under para III on
her membership of the Lok Sabha, her rights as Prime
Minister or Minister, so long as she fills that office, to
speak in and otherwise to take part in the proceedings
of either House of Parliament or a joint sitting of the
Houses (without right to vote) and to discharge other
functions such as are laid down in Articles 74, 75, 78,
88, etc., or under any other law, and to draw her
salary as Prime Minister, shall not be affected or
detracted from on account of the conditions contained
in this stay order."
14. Culling out the principles laid down in this Judgment, every
Appellate or Revisional Court considering a challenge to the
decision of declaration of disqualification would always have the
power to grant an order staying the operation of the decision or
disqualification, and while doing so, would give due prima facie
consideration to the facts of the case and the manner in which the
Court that has rendered the decision considered the case. Amongst
these various considerations would be the findings arrived at in
the decision, and broadly the material which was before that
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
forum to arrive at the decision. The higher forum would also have
to consider the effect and consequence of grant of stay of a
decision of disqualification, in the present case, considering the
effect of the decision, which may cause vacancy of the member's
seat and may cause a paralysis in the functioning of the
Panchayat. It is in this light, that on the basis of the principles
laid down in Indira Nehru Gandhi (supra), that the District Court
would have to decide whether an order of stay was necessary or
justified, and if necessary, whether restrictions should be imposed
on the disqualified member in his functioning, during the
pendency of the proceeding in the higher forum.
15. Several Judgments have been cited before me on the
aforementioned question. Be that as it may, in almost all the case
law dealing with these circumstances, Courts have almost
consistently, when granting a stay of the disqualification, have
also imposed restrictions on the functioning of the disqualified
member. Reference is made to few of these decisions.
The court has imposed restrictions on the disqualified
member while granting stay in Pandurang Dagadu Parte (supra)
in the following paragraph:
33. At this stage, counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 to 9
prays for stay of our order to enable his clients to
approach the Apex Court. Our order is stayed up to 15th
of May, 1997 on condition that the Respondent Nos. 1 to
9, during the pendency of stay, will be entitled to attend
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
the meetings but will not be entitled to of deliberate,
deliberate vote and draw their remunerations.
In Rupesh Ravindra Sarkhar( supra) an interim order was
passed which holds as follows:
18.At this stage, Mr. Joshi orally applies for
continuation of the interim order dated 29.04.2014. On
29.04.2014, this Court passed the following interim
order:
"i) The petitioners shall be entitled to attend the
Municipal Council meetings and sign the register
ⅱ) However, the petitioners shall not take part in the
proceedings of the said meetings or vote or draw any
remuneration.
19. Mr. Joshi assures that petitioner will not apply for
further extension of the interim order
20. Mr. Pilankar opposes the oral application on the
ground that Interim order was passed in favour of the
petitioner pending the Petition. As the Petition is finally
allowed and the Election Petition is dismissed, the
interim order should not be continued.
21. Having regard to the fact that the interim order is
operating since 29.04.2014 as also S.LP. preferred by
the petitioner against this order was dismissed and
having due regard to the fact that respondent No. 1
intends to challenge this order in the higher Court, I
find that the request made by Mr. Joshi is reasonable.
Hence, for the period of 8 weeks from today, the interim
order dated 29.04.2014 shall remain in force, with
clear understanding that no application for further
extension of interim order shall be entertained.
This court in its order dated 12.06.2024 in Ulhas Morajkar
(supra) has also taken the same view in its paragraph no.7 which
is quoted below:
"7. Since the Petitioner is an elected Member and
acting as a Deputy Sarpanch, who has now been
disqualified without conducting any inquiry, the
order passed by the Director of Panchayats
disqualifying the Petitioner from the membership,
is stayed till the disposal of the Petition. However,
it is made clear that since the allegations against
the Petitioner are serious in nature and in
connection with misappropriation of funds, the
Petitioner is restrained from taking part in any
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
proceedings of the Village Panchayat of Sangolda,
till the disposal of the present Petition. However,
he continues to remain as a Member/Deputy
Sarpanch of the said Panchayat as the order of the
Director of Panchayats is stayed as above."
16. In the present case, one of the complaints with regard to
alleged illegal constructions have been made by the Petitioner
against one Azad Faniband, who is the father of Respondent No.
2, who at the relevant time when the resolution was passed, was
the Deputy Sarpanch; Respondent No. 1 is the wife of Respondent
No. 2 and daughter-in-law of the said Azad. Respondent No. 1
was the Sarpanch of the Village Panchayat at the time when the
resolution/meeting regarding the complaint pertaining to the
illegal structure was held. The other complaint of illegal
construction is made against one Mehboob Dodmani, who is the
father of Respondent No. 3, who was at the relevant time a
member of the Panchayat who attended the meeting in question.
Yet another complaint was filed before the Panchayat alleging
illegal construction by Respondent No. 5 himself. Respondent No.
4 is the daughter of Respondent No. 5 and is a member of the
Panchayat. Respondent No. 4 was present at that meeting,
however, the minutes of the meeting record that Respondent No. 5
did not attend or participate in the meeting of 18.01.2024.
17. In the reply to the application under Section 12(1) of the
Act, none of the Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 have denied the
relationship alleged by the Petitioner, which is found in para 2 of
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
the application. Respondent No. 5 did not file any reply, but as the
record suggests, he did not attend the meeting in question.
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 have also not denied that their presence at
the meeting of the Panchayat held on 18.01.2024 where the
complaints with regard to illegal constructions done by the above
persons were first considered. In para 6 and 7 of the reply, these
Respondents state that they were parties to the resolution which
merely recorded that the parties involved in such constructions
should be called and heard, and the complaint should be kept
pending till the next meeting. The averment in para 7 of the reply
accepts that the parties are related, but states that the Respondent
Nos. 1 to 4 did not take part in the decision making process to
attract Section 55(4) of the Act. This reply is not supported by an
affidavit of any of the Respondent No. 1 to 4.
18. Prima facie, therefore, on the uncontroverted material before
the BDO, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who were Sarpanch and
Deputy Sarpanch at the relevant time were present for the meeting
dealing with the complaint of illegal construction by their own
father/father-in-law. Similarly, Respondent No. 3 who was present
for the meeting was dealing with the complaint of illegal
construction made against his own father. These prima facie
findings are derived from the records and in my considered
opinion, ought to have been considered by the District Court
whilst, taking a call on whether to grant a stay of the operation of
the order of the BDO resulting in the disqualification of
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and to consider whether any restrictions
be imposed on the participation of these Respondents in affairs of
the Panchayat, during the pendency of the Revision Application.
19. A perusal of the impugned order would reveal that after
formulating the two issues to be considered for deciding the
Revision Application, which are recorded in para 11 of the
impugned order, the only consideration that weighed in the mind
was that the elections of Sarpanch was fixed on 04.08.2025 and if
the impugned order was not stayed, irreparable loss would be
caused to the Respondents and their Revision would be rendered
infructuous.
This consideration would be irrelevant, and in any event,
was based on incorrect facts.
20. The post of Sarpanch and Deputy Sarpanch did not fall
vacant on account of passing of the impugned order dated
28.07.2025, but fell vacant when Respondent Nos. 1 and 2
resigned from these two posts, respectively on 29.05.2025 and
04.06.2025, much before the order was passed. The election to
these two posts were therefore required to be held within 6
months of the post falling vacant. If the disqualification incurred,
by the order of the BDO went unchallenged, the post of member
of Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 would also fall vacant immediately on
passing of the order of the BDO on 04.06.2025. It is the effect of
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
the disqualification that was stayed, for if it were not stayed, the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 ran the risk of their seats being filled in by
fresh elections. The order of stay therefore, takes care of this
situation and operates in a manner that could preserve its status
quo insofar as the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 continue to be members
of the Panchayat, as a result of which no fresh elections can be
called for to fill in their posts of members.
21. However, the Revisional Court could not be unmindful of
the facts of the case, which have been referred to by me above,
and it was necessary to put curbs on the participation of the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in further meetings of the Panchayat, as
there was already a disqualification incurred by them. On the facts
of this case, and the prima facie conclusions which are evident
from the pleadings before the BDO, this is a case that required
restrictions to be imposed on the participation of the Respondent
Nos. 1 to 4 in line with the Judgment of the Supreme Court in
Indira Gandhi (supra) and other Judgments referred to by me
above. The pleadings before the BDO, prima facie suggests the
participation of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in the meeting of
18.01.2024; a resolution was passed on that day on the subject
matter of the complaints alleging illegal constructions erected by
persons who were directly related to Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 i.e.
their father/father-in-law. There are references made by the BDO
in order dated 28.07.2025 to the meeting held on 18.01.2024, the
participation of Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and the fact that they
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
discussed the complaint dated 15.01.2024, and then failed to take
action. There is therefore, some consideration of the record to
conclude the participation of Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 at the
meeting.
22. Learned Advocate Shri. Parag Rao had submitted that
though the election for the post of Sarpanch and Deputy Sarpanch
for the moment has been kept in abeyance, there is every
likelihood that the election for these two posts may be notified
and if restrictions are put on the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 from
participating in these elections, they would be prevented from
submitting their nominations to the post of Sarpanch and Deputy
Sarpanch or from casting their vote in such an election.
This may be the apprehension of the Respondent Nos. 1 to
4, but the fact remains that as of date, there is an order of
disqualification operating against them, which in normal course
would disqualify these Respondents from the post of member of
the Panchayat. To eclipse this position, by granting a blanket stay
of the disqualification after the prima facie conclusions referred to
by me would amount to granting the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 the
full right to act in every manner that a sitting member of the
Panchayat is conferred with. Considering the vast number of
Judgments, both of the Supreme Court and this Court, which have
dealt with similar situations, there is no case made out for
continuation of a blanket order of stay; this situation calls for
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
striking a balance, in maintaining the status quo, insofar as the
membership of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 is concerned, and
restricting their participation in meetings of the Panchayat, whilst
continuing to represent their respective Wards. Even otherwise,
considering the statement made by the learned Advocate General,
that at present the elections to the post of Sarpanch and Deputy
Sarpanch have been kept in abeyance, and considering the
directions which are proposed to give in the matter, it may be
desirable that the Director of Panchayats may keep these elections
in abeyance till orders are passed by the District Court on the
Revision Application.
23. For all the reasons referred to above, I pass the following
order:
The impugned order dated 02.08.2025, shall stand modified
and operate in the following terms:
(a) In addition to the operative part of the impugned order
dated 02.08.2025 granting stay of the operation of the order
dated 28.07.2025 of the BDO, which is confirmed, the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, during the pendency of the
Revision Application No.27/2025, may attend the meetings
of the Panchayat and sign the register at such meeting, but
shall not take part in any proceedings of such meetings or
be entitled to delibrate or vote at such meetings of the
Village Panchayat of Rumdamol, Davorlim.
7th August, 2025
WP 321.2025
(b) since the next date of hearing of the Revision Petition
before the District Court is on 16.08.2025, the District Court
is requested to ante-date the hearing and to commence the
hearing of the petition before it, preferably from 12.08.2025
onwards; since the functioning of the Panchayat may be
impaired, due to the operation of the stay order dated
02.08.2025, as modified by this order, the District Court
may endeavour to dispose of the petition preferably by
22.08.2025, being uninfluenced by the prima facie findings
given above, which are solely for the consideration of grant
of stay of the order of the BDO.
24. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to
costs.
25. Parties to act on an authenticated copy of this order, which
shall be communicated by them to the District Court.
VALMIKI MENEZES, J.
VALMIKI MENEZES, J.
7th August, 2025
