Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 1505 Bom
Judgement Date : 6 August, 2025
2025:BHC-AUG:20830
1 SA.172-99.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
SECOND APPEAL NO.172 OF 1999
The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.
Through Divisional Manager,
Divisional Office,
Adalat Road, Aurangabad. ... Appellant.
(Ori. Defendant)
Versus
Dr. Suresh S/o Sadanand Borkar,
Age 44 years, Occu. Medical Practitioner,
R/o. Avanti, 74, Dashmeshnagar,
New Osmanpura, Aurangabad. ... Respondent.
(Ori. Plaintiff)
...
Advocate for Appellant : Mr. R. F. Totla.
Advocate for Respondent : Mr. Adwait M. Joshi h/f Mr. Milind
Madhu Joshi.
...
CORAM : SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J.
RESERVED ON : 31.07.2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 06.08.2025.
JUDGMENT :
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1. Heard both the sides finally.
2. Appellant/insurance company is aggrieved by judgment
and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court in Regular Civil
Appeal No.103 of 1998 confirming the judgment and decree
passed by Trial Court in Special Civil Suit No.679 of 1996
awarding damages of Rs.37,923/- to the respondent/original
plaintiff payable by the appellant/original defendant.
2 SA.172-99.odt
3. Respondent had filed suit for damages of Rs.37,923/-.
He is owner and driver of the four wheeler which was insured
with the appellant company. It met with an accident on
14.04.1996 and sustained damages. The respondent claimed
damages from the appellant company, but no heed was paid.
Therefore, suit was filed by the respondent contending that
there was a valid insurance and valid licence with the
respondent at the time of accident.
4. Appellant contested the suit on the ground that there
was no valid licence at the relevant time. The licence of the
respondent was expired. Under the contract, appellant was not
liable to pay anything to the respondent.
5. Respondent examined himself and produced his licence
at Exh.31 and insurance policy at Exh.32. Appellant examined
one witness. Trial Court decreed the suit and awarded damages
of Rs.37,923/- along with interest @ 18% p.a. vide judgment
dated 16.02.1998. Being aggrieved, Regular Civil Appeal
No.103 of 1998 was filed and it was dismissed on 09.11.1998.
6. While admitting Second Appeal, following substantial
question of law was framed :
3 SA.172-99.odt
"Whether on the date of the accident, the driver of the vehicle was having effective licence meaning thereby, whether he was holding a licence on the date of the accident ?"
7. At the time of final hearing with the consent of the
parties, additional substantial questions of law are framed.
Both the parties showed readiness to work out the matter on
the same date. They did not ask for time. Hence, with their
consent, the matter was heard by framing following additional
substantial questions of law :
"A) Whether the Hon'ble Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the claim arising out of an accident in view of sections 166 and 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act ?
B) Whether the Hon'ble Lower Appellate Court is justified in deciding an appeal without passing any order on the production of additional evidence by way of document ?
C) Whether the Hon'ble Lower Court is justified in awarding an interest @ 18% p.a without framing any issue, as well without any discussion in the impugned judgment ?"
8. Learned counsel Mr. Totala appearing for the appellant
submits that suit filed by the respondent is barred under
Section 175 of Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 4 SA.172-99.odt
"Act" for sake of brevity and convenience). He would further
submit that application Exh.3 which was submitted before
Lower Appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 27 was not
decided by the Appellate Court causing great prejudice to the
appellant because vital documents were placed on record
towards additional evidence. He would further submit that no
reasons are assigned by both the Courts below for awarding
interest @ 18% nor any issue to that effect was framed in the
Trial Court. It is further submitted that it was mandatory for
the respondent to have valid and effective licence which is
under Section 3(1) as well as there is a term of the contract
between appellant and the respondent which is misinterpreted
by the Courts below.
9. Per contra, learned counsel Mr. Joshi would submit that
the Civil Court has jurisdiction because this type of plea was
not raised by the appellant in the Trial Court and conjoint
reading of Section 166 read with 165(1) of the Act invests
jurisdiction with the Civil Court. The additional evidence which
was sought to be produced before the Lower Appellate Court
could have been produced by the appellant in the Trial Court
itself. There was no pleading to that effect. The additional
evidence was not the fresh discovery. It is further submitted 5 SA.172-99.odt
that the respondent had applied for renewal of licence which
was renewed from 25.07.1996. A renewal is mere a regularity.
It is further contended that as per Section 15(1), the renewal
has to be treated with effect from date of its expiry.
10. Appellant did not raise defence of want of jurisdiction in
the written statement. Neither any issue was framed in the
Trial Court nor point of determination is framed in the Lower
Appellate Court. However, the objection is regarding the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court which goes to the root of the
matter, I permitted the appellant to address on the point. My
attention is adverted to Section 175 which bars the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent has adverted my
attention to Sections 165 and 166 of the Act. According to him,
as per Section 165(1), the Claim Tribunal is established to
decide claims of damages to any property of the third person
arising out of the accident. In the present case, owner is the
insured person who was driving the car and in accident the
same was damaged. Therefore, it is not a case of damage to
any property of a third person. I am unable to accept the
submission of the respondent. The following provision is
relevant :
6 SA.172-99.odt
"166. Application for compensation - (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made
--
(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or
(b) by the owner of the property; or
(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or
(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be ?"
12. A specific provision is made in the Act referred above for
filing application for compensation by the owner of the
property. Section 166(1)(b) covers the present case and the
claim could have been filed before the Tribunal instead of
approaching the Civil Court. As the claim was entertainable,
bar under Section 175 is attracted. I am of the considered view
that Civil Court had no jurisdiction.
13. Learned counsel for the appellant had rightly referred to
the judgment of Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs. DLF Universal
Ltd. and another ; (2005) 7 Supreme Court Cases 791 .
Following is the relevant paragraph :
"We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) Territorial or local 7 SA.172-99.odt
jurisdiction; (ii) Pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) Jurisdiction over the subject matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity."
For want of jurisdiction appellant is bound to succeed in
the present second appeal.
14. It has come on record by the oral evidence of both the
witnesses that the licence of the respondent had expired on
11.11.1995. The accident occurred on 14.04.1996. Within one
month, no steps were taken by the respondent to renew the
licence. He resorted to renewal after the accident which is
candidly admitted by him in his cross-examination. The
renewal was sought for on 25.07.1996 and it was renewed
from 25.07.1996 upto 28.02.2000. When the accident took
place, respondent was not holding valid licence. In this regard,
it is relevant to notice following provision :
8 SA.172-99.odt
"15. Renewal of driving licences - (1) Any licensing authority may, on application made to it, renew a driving licence issued under the provisions of this Act with effect from the date of its expiry."
15. The respondent did not apply for the renewal within 30
days from the date of expiry of the licence i.e. 11.11.1995. The
first proviso comes into effect which renders the renewal of the
licence from the date of renewal, not from the date of its
expiry. The wordings of Section 15(1) are very specific. Both
the Courts below failed to comprehend the literal meaning of
the provision and arrived at patent illegality. Both the Courts
below have given undue weightage to the fact that he was not
disqualified from holding or obtaining the licence. This
interpretation is erroneous one. Both the Courts below have
not taken into account Section 15(1) of the Act.
16. The contract between the parties i.e. insurance policy is
placed on record which is at Exh.32. It provides for effective
driving licence at the time of accident. The word "and" is used
in between two sentences. First part is about the obligation for
a person driving vehicle to hold an effective licence at the time
of accident and the next sentence is he should not be
disqualified from holding or obtaining such licence. Both the
Courts below interpreted "and" as "or" which is not the purport 9 SA.172-99.odt
of the term. The interpretation of the clause of the policy is
patently illegal and perverse.
17. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance
on the judgment of Pernod Ricard India (P) Ltd. Vs. The State
of Madhya Pradesh and others. The facts and circumstances of
that judgment are distinguishable. It was a case of penalty
under Foreign Liquor Rules. The Rule 19 of 1996 Rules
provided rigorous penalty of four times for the deficiencies in
excess of the limit prescribed under the rules. On 29.03.2011,
Rule 19 was substituted and comparatively venial penalty was
brought into force. The question before the Court was that the
demand notice was given to a person after the amendment was
brought into force. The rule is held to be retroactive. This
judgment will not help the respondent.
18. Appellant filed application Exh.3 under Order 41 Rule 27
seeking to produce additional evidence. The application was
not considered either way by the Lower Appellate Court. The
Lower Appellate Court should have dealt with the application
at the time of final hearing, but I hold it to be irregularity. I
have considered the contents of the application and the
documents which were sought to be produced. There is no
valid explanation with the appellant as to why those were not 10 SA.172-99.odt
produced before the Trial Court. Those are not the new
discovery of the evidence. Therefore, even if the application
Exh.3 has not been dealt with, I do not think that any prejudice
can be said to have been caused to the appellant.
19. Both the Courts below did not assign any reason for
awarding 18% interest. They should have assigned some
reasons for imposing the extreme interest on the appellant.
However, payment of interest is consequential one. Unless the
respondent proves his entitlement to receive the amount, the
payment of interest would not come into picture.
20. For the reasons stated above, we find force in the
submissions of learned counsel for the appellant. The
substantial question of law in respect of the licence and bar of
jurisdiction of the Civil Court will have to be answered in
favour of the appellant and the question in respect of
additional evidence will have to be answered against the
appellant. As I have concluded that respondent is not entitled
to compensation, the last substantial question becomes
redundant.
21. For the reasons stated above, second appeal is allowed.
11 SA.172-99.odt
22. Impugned judgment and decree passed by Lower
Appellate Court and Trial Court are quashed and set aside.
23. Special Civil Suit No.679 of 1996 stands dismissed.
(SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J.)
...
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