Bombay High Court
Maa Roshani Trading Company Pro. ... vs Shri Ajay S/O Lakshmanrao Dhanve Prop. ... on 1 April, 2025
2025:BHC-NAG:3410
1 apl540.24.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO.540 OF 2024
1. Maa Roshani Trading Company,
Prop. Kailash S/o Ajabrao Kakde,
Aged about 45 years, Occ: Business,
R/o Yashwant Colony, Opposite New
Arts College, Bachelor Road, Wardha
Tah. And Dist. Wardha.
2. Kailash s/o Ajabrao Kakde
Aged about 45 years, Occ: Business,
R/o Yashwant Colony, Opposite New
Arts College, Bachelor Road, Wardha
Tah. And Dist. Wardha.
...Applicants
(Orig. Accused)
...V E R S U S...
Shri Ajay S/o Lakshmanrao Dhanve,
Aged about 46 years, Occ. Business,
Prop. M/s Dhanve Sons and Traders,
R/o Pande Layout, in front of Bhoyar
CoIlege, Amravati Road, Nachangaon,
Tah. Deoli, Dist. Wardha.
...Non-applicant
(Orig. Complainant)
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Ms A.R. Sharma, Advocate for Applicants.
Shri G.B. Sawal, Advocate for Non-applicant.
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CORAM :- M.W. CHANDWANI, J.
DATE :- 01/04/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT:
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent
of parties the matter is taken up for final hearing.
2 apl540.24.odt
2. The case in hand is squarely covered by the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava Vs.
The State of Jharkhand and another1, wherein the Supreme Court
in para 19 has held as under:
"19. Subject to what is held earlier, the main conclusions
can be summarised as follows:
a. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section
143A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not
mandatory. The word "may" used in the provision cannot
be construed as "shall."
b. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A,
the Court must record brief reasons indicating
consideration of all relevant factors.
c. The broad parameters for exercising the discretion
under Section 143A are as follows:
i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits
of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of
the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the
application. The financial distress of the accused can also
be a consideration.
ii. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued,
only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case.
iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie
plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to
grant interim compensation.
iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made out to grant
interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind
to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted.
While doing so, the Court will have to consider several
factors such as the nature of the transaction, the
relationship, if any, between the accused and the
complainant, etc.
v. There could be several other relevant factors in the
1 2024 INSC 205
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peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be
exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not
exhaustive."
3. In the present case, the learned JMFC, Pulgaon has
opined in the impugned order that reason is not a sine qua non
while deciding the application for direction to pay interim
compensation under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881. It has also been observed by the trial Court that making
any observations as to the defence of the accused may cause
prejudice the accused as well as may not be acceptable to be
considered at this stage. These observations are clearly against the
observations made by the Supreme Court in para 19(c)(i) of
Rakesh's case (supra), wherein it has been held that the power
under Section 143A for direction to pay interim compensation is
discretionary. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the
merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of
the defence pleaded by the accused in reply to the application.
Therefore, the Court has to apply its mind and evaluate the merits
of the case and the plausible defence of the accused and give a
prima facie opinion which has not been done in this case. The
order passed by the learned JMFC is erroneous and is required to
be set aside. Hence, the application is partly allowed.
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4. The impugned order below Exh.26 in S.C.C.
No.68/2021 dated 12.12.2023 passed by the learned JMFC,
Pulgaon is hereby set aside.
5. The learned JMFC, Pulgaon is directed to reconsider
the application filed by the non-applicant in light of the
observations made in the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Rakesh (supra).
6. In the above terms, the application stands disposed of.
JUDGE
Wagh
